A market game approach to differential information economies

In this paper we recast a differential information economy as a strategic game in which players propose net trades and prices. Pure strategy Nash equilibria are strong and determine both consumption plans and commodity prices that coincide with the Walrasian Expectations equilibria of the underlying economy. The authors acknowledge support by research grants BEC2003-09067-C04-01 (Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia and FEDER), PGIDT04XIC30001PN (Xunta de Galicia) and SA070A05 (Junta de Castilla y León). JP Torres-Martínez is also grateful to CNPq-Brazil and University of Vigo for financial support. We are indebted to N.C. Yannelis for helpful comments and insights.     

Existence of Sparsely Supported Correlated Equilibria

We show that every N-player K ₁ × ... × K _N game possesses a correlated equilibrium with at least zero entries. In particular, the largest N-player K × ... × K games with unique fully supported correlated equilibrium are two-player games. We thank an anonymous referee for most useful comments. The first author acknowledges financial support from Spanish Ministry of Science and Technology, grant SEJ2004-03619, and in form of a Ramón y Cajal fellowship. The second author acknowledges support by the PASCAL Network of Excellence under EC grant no.506778, as well as from Spanish Ministry of Science and Technology and FEDER, grant BMF2003-03324. Both authors also acknowledge financial support from BBVA grant “Aprender a jugar.”     

Recursive utility with unbounded aggregators

A new framework is presented for the study of the existence and uniqueness of solutions to the Koopmans’ equation in the unbounded case, that is based on the contraction mapping approach. In the bounded below case with bounded consumption streams, uniqueness of the solution in the whole class of weak-star continuous utility functions is obtained. When the aggregator is unbounded below and/or consumption streams are unbounded, existence of a weak-star continuous solution is shown, and a simple criterium to check the sufficient conditions for existence is provided. Juan Pablo Rincón-Zapatero and Carlos Rodríguez-Palmero gratefully acknowledge financial support by the Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia and FEDER funds under Research Projects MTM2005-06534 and SEJ2005-08709/ECON, respectively, and by Consejería de Educación de la Junta de Castilla y León under Research Projects VA99/04 and VA017B05, respectively. This paper has substantially benefited from the comments of an anonymous referee. Particular and special thanks are due to Robert Becker for his very helpful comments and valuable suggestions.     

An empirical investigation of the effect of borrowing constraints on Spanish consumption

Abstract. This work analyses the relevance of borrowing constraints on the intertemporal behaviour of Spanish non-durable consumption. We estimate Euler equations with cohort data extracted from the “Encuesta Continua de Presupuestos Familiares” (ECPF) for the period 1985–1993. The results are robust to the use of different estimators to eliminate fixed individual effects, to different specifications of the model, to the effect of uncertainty and to the presence of habits in consumption. Our results allow us to conclude that non-durable consumption of a considerable fraction of the Spanish population is affected by borrowing constraints. At the same time, and in accordance with similar results for other countries, we confirm that borrowing constraints are especially important for the young. The author acknowledges the grant received from the Conselleria de Cultura, Educación y Ciencia de la Generalitat Valènciana, as part of its grant's programme for stays in foreign universities and the financial support by DGICYT grants SEC99-0820 and SEC 2002-00667. The author also acknowledges the hospitality of the Department of Economics at University College London (UCL) and of the Departamento de Análisis Económico de la Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia. This work has been presented in the XXV Simposio de Análisis Económico, held in Bellaterra (Spain) in December 2000. Finally, the author acknowledges comments by J. E. Boscá and two anonymous referees that have contributed to improving the final version of the paper.     

Participation and Consumption of Illegal Drugs among Adolescents

This paper identifies the determinants affecting the adolescent populations' decision regarding whether or not to consume illegal drugs. The authors estimate a simultaneous Type II Tobit model for each sample substance, including marijuana, LSD, amphetamines, cocaine, volatile substances, and heroine. The data are drawn from three Spanish Surveys on Drug Use in the School Population conducted in 1994, 1996, and 1998. The results indicate that illegal drug use among Spanish adolescents is clearly determined by economic variables. It is similarly determined by other sociodemographic variables, such as personal habits, family environment, and the receipt of information regarding the negative consequences of drug use. This paper was partially written while José Alberto Molina was Visiting Researcher at the Fundación de Estudios de Economía Aplicada-FEDEA (Madrid, Spain), to which he would like to express his thanks for the hospitality and facilities provided. The authors are grateful to two anonymous referees for their helpful observations on an earlier version of this paper. Similarly, Namkee Ahn, as well as various participants at the XIX Spanish Health Economics Meeting (Zaragoza, Spain) and at the 2001 Annual Meeting of the Population Association of America (Washington DC), have all offered valuable comments and suggestions. Finally, the authors would like to express their gratitude for the financial support provided by the Spanish Ministry of Education-CICYT and the European Commission (Project FEDER 2FD97-2057). The usual disclaimer applies.     

Term structure and the estimated monetary policy rule in the Eurozone

In this paper we estimate a standard version of the New Keynesian Monetary (NKM) model augmented with term structure in order to analyze two issues. First, we analyze the effect of introducing an explicit term structure channel in the NKM model on the estimated parameter values of the model, with special emphasis on the interest rate smoothing parameter using data for the Eurozone. Second, we study the ability of the model to reproduce some stylized facts such as highly persistent dynamics, the weak comovement between economic activity and inflation, and the positive, strong comovement between interest rates observed in actual Eurozone data. The Sect. 3 implemented is a classical structural method based on the indirect inference principle. We are grateful to Eduardo Ley, two anonymous referees and seminar participants at the XXXI Simposio de Análisis Económico (Oviedo, Spain) and Bank of Spain for their useful comments. Financial support from Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología and Universidad del País Vasco (Spain) and Fundación Séneca through projects SEJ2004-04811/ECON, 9/UPV00035.321-13511/2001 and I02937/PHCS/05, respectively, is gratefully acknowledged. The first author also thanks Fundación Ramón Areces for financial support.     

A contribution to duality theory,applied to the measurement of risk aversion

This paper determines the precise connection between the curvature properties of an objective function and the ray-curvature properties of its dual. When the objective function is interpreted as a Bernoulli or cardinal utility function, our results characterize the relationship between an agent’s attitude towards income risks and her attitude towards risks in the underlying consumption space. We obtain these results by developing and applying a number of representation theorems for concave functions.The work of Juan E. Martínez-Legaz has been supported by the Spanish Ministry of Science and Technology and the FEDER, project BEC2002-00642, and by the Departament d’Universitats, Recerca i Societat de la Informació, Direcció General de Recerca de la Generalitat de Catalunya, project 2001SGR-00162. He also thanks the Barcelona Economics Program of CREA for its support. John Quah would like to acknowledge with gratitude the financial support of the ESRC (grant number R000271171). He would also like to thank the Department of Economics at UC Berkeley, whose hospitality he enjoyed while completing this project. Both authors would like to thank Simon Cowan for pointing the way to some important references. They are also very grateful to the referee whose insightful suggestions led to a much improved paper     

Labour segregation and immigrant and native-born wage distributions in Spain: an analysis using matched employer–employee data

This article carries out an empirical examination of the origin of the differences between immigrant and native-born wage structures in the Spanish labour market. Special attention is given in the analysis to the role played by occupational and workplace segregation of immigrants. Legal immigrants from developing countries exhibit lower mean wages and a more compressed wage structure than native-born workers. By contrast, immigrants from developed countries display higher mean wages and a more dispersed wage structure. The main empirical finding is that the disparities in the wage distributions for the native-born and both groups of immigrants are largely explained by their different observed characteristics, with a particularly important influence in this context of workplace and, specially, occupational segregation. Hipólito Simón, Esteban Sanromá and Raúl Ramos wish to thank the support received from the Ministerio de Fomento and the Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia through the projects T 75/2006 (Plan Nacional de Investigación, Desarrollo e Innovación Científica), SEJ2004-05860/ECON and SEJ2005-04348/ECON, respectively. A previous version of this paper was published as an IVIE Working Paper (WP-EC 2007-03).     

A model of endogenous political party platforms

Summary. We develop a model of endogenous party platform formation in a multidimensional policy space. Party platforms depend on the composition of the parties primary electorate. The overall social outcome is taken to be a weighted average of party platforms and individuals vote strategically. Equilibrium is defined to obtain when no group of voters can shift the social outcome in its favor by deviating and the party platforms are consistent with their electorate. We provide sufficient conditions for existence of equilibria.Received: 20 November 2002, Revised: 21 August 2003JEL Classification Numbers: D72, C62.Correspondence to: Ignacio Ortuño-OrtínWe thank A. Caplin, S. Chattopadhyay, C. Martinelli and J. D. Moreno-Ternero and two anonymous referees for helpful comments. This research started while Ortuño-Ortín was a visitor in the Department of Economics at NYU; he thanks for the kind hospitality of this institution. F. Marhuenda and I. Ortuño-Ortín gratefully acknowledge financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Technology Project BEC2001-1653 and Project BEC2001-0980, respectively; A. Gomberg gratefully acknowledges the financial support from the Asociación Mexicana de Cultura.     

Collective bargaining under perfect information. The negotiation of national agreements

We structurally estimate a perfect information bargaining model of collective negotiations using data on national agreements for Spain. The model is a stochastic model of sequential bargaining in which we allow for the possibility of negotiations ending without agreement, a common feature in the data. Delays in equilibrium are the result of uncertainty about the surplus to be divided among the players and not of information asymmetries. The model fits the data well regardless of the limitations imposed by the parametric specification adopted. Our results show that agents are patient and that the advantage from proposing is large.JEL Classification: J50, C73, C78We thank Fabian Marquez, Sergio Santillan and Jose Maria Zufiaur for helping us to create the data base on Spanish National Agreements. We also thank Cesar Alonso, Juanjo Dolado, Gautam Gowrisankaran, Maia Guell, Antonio Merlo and participants at the 1999 European Meeting of the Econometric Society for very helpful comments. Jose E. Galdon thanks financial support from the following institutions: European Commission for a TMR Marie Curie Fellowship, Spanish Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnologia for project BEC2002-00954 and Spanish Ministerio de Educacion, Cultura y Deporte for project PR2004-0057. He also thanks the hospitality of STICERD (LSE) and the IR Section (Princeton University) where part of this work was completed. The usual disclaimers apply.     

Union games: technological unemployment

Summary. Given a production economy, we define union games by considering strategic behavior of the suppliers of factors. We refer to the Nash equilibria of this game as union equilibria. We analyze situations where the unemployment of factors is supported as a union equilibrium. The degree of unemployment depends on technological conditions. This allows us to model a source of unemployment which differs from the usual sources provided in the literature. We state a limit result that demonstrates that, as the market power of unions decreases, the corresponding sequence of union equilibria converges to the Walrasian equilibrium, that is, to full employment of factors. We also provide some examples that illustrate the main results.Received: 21 October 2004, Revised: 14 December 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: D51, C72. Correspondence to: Emma Moreno-GarcíaE. Moreno acknowledges financial support from the Research Grant BEC2000-1388-C04-01 (Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología and FEDER). G. Fernández de Córdoba and E. Moreno acknowledge financial support from the Research Grant SA091/02 from Junta de Castilla y León. We are indebted to C. Alós-Ferrer, C. Pita, D. Anisi, J. A. Ortega, F. Jimeno, J. P. Torres-Martínez, M. Steinert and C. Hervés for helpful comments and insights. We are particularly grateful to T. Kehoe and an anonymous referee for suggestions that improved this paper.     

Legal form and risk exposure in Spanish firms

Abstract. It is well-known that the legal form adopted by a firm determines the type of legal responsibility borne by its owners in case of bankruptcy. In this paper we argue that a firm under a limited liability status should be characterized by a higher than average bankruptcy probability, which ultimately captures their risk exposure when output is affected by exogenous shocks. To test this prediction we extend Lee's (1976) switching regressions model to a panel dataset of 1313 Spanish firms from 1990–1994, separating them into corporate and entrepreneurial forms (with/without limited liability, respectively). We consider both random effects and fixed effects panel data models, taking into account the potential endogeneity between risk exposure and the legal form choice. Our results confirm the hypothesis that firms under limited liability have significant higher risk exposure than firms under unlimited liability. The authors gratefully acknowledge valuable suggestions from Maite Martínez-Granado, A. Jorge Padilla, Javier Suárez and two anonymous referees. Data and financial support provided by the Fundación Empresa Pública (Madrid) and comments from participants at seminars held at CEMFI, Simposio de Análisis Económico and Universidad de Vigo are also sincerely appreciated. Mr. Campos particularly acknowledges research funding by the University of Las Palmas.     

Mathematical utility theory and the representability of demand by continuous homogeneous functions

The resort to utility-theoretical issues will permit us to propose a constructive procedure for deriving a homogeneous of degree one continuous function that gives raise to a primitive demand function under suitably mild conditions. This constitutes the first self-contained and elementary proof of a necessary and sufficient condition for an integrability problem to have a solution by continuous (subjective utility) functions.The work of José C. R. Alcantud has been supported by FEDER and Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia under the Research Project SEJ2005-0304/ECON, and by Consejería de Educación (Junta de Castilla y León) under the Research Project SA098A05. Carlos R. Palmero acknowledges financial support by FEDER and Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia under the Research Project SEJ2005-08709/ECON, and by Consejería de Educación (Junta de Castilla y León) under the Research Project VA017B05.     

Treasury auctions in Spain: a linear approach

Abstract. The majority of Treasuries use discriminatory auctions to sell government debt. A few Treasuries use uniform auctions. The Spanish Treasury is the only one that uses a hybrid format of discriminatory and uniform auctions. All Treasury auctions are multiple-unit multiple-bid auctions, usually assumed to be common and unknown value auctions. Taking in account these features, we analyze the Spanish auction format, taking a linear approximation to bidders' multiple bids, and characterize a parameter set in which the Spanish format gives higher expected seller's revenue than discriminatory and uniform auctions. Policy implications are obtained by calibrating theoretical results with data. We thank S. Nu?ez, and seminar participants at GREQAM, CEFI, the 1999 CEF meeting in Boston and the 57th European Meeting of the Econcometric Society for suggestions. We are especially grateful to two anonymous referees for detailed comments that greatly improved the paper. Any error is our responsability. The authors express their thanks for financial support to Ministerio de Ciencia y Teconologia from Proyecto SEC2000-0723, n_o 9114.     

Fiscal policy and private consumption behaviour: The Spanish case

In this article we analyse whether the Ricardian equivalence hypothesis is a valid approximation for Spains economic reality or whether there exist deviations from that situation which would be more in line with the conventional Keynesian perspective of the effects of debt on private consumption-savings decisions.Our aim is to contribute to the rather sparse empirical literature on the subject for the Spanish case. The analysis is based on annual aggregate data for Spain covering the years 1955 to 2000, and uses both the structural and the Euler equation approaches to test the neutrality proposition, and is thus to be considered as a generalization of foregoing work on the Spanish economy.The findings indicate that support for Ricardian equivalence is mixed, while we also find very little support for the Keynesian specification of consumption and fiscal policy.First revision received: March 2003 / Final version received: October 2003The authors wish to thank M. Ferré, J.M. González-Páramo, A. Marchante, P. Meguire, F. Pedraja, J.L. Raymond, J. Salinas and two anonymous referees for their helpful comments and suggestions on this paper. We also thank the participants in the V Encuentro de Economía Aplicada (Oviedo, Spain, June 2002) and the XVII Simposio de Análisis Económico (Salamanca, Spain, December 2002) for their comments. Any remaining defects are our responsibility. We also are grateful to the Institute for Fiscal Studies of Spain (Ministerio de Hacienda, Secretaría de Estado de Hacienda) for its financial support.     

The optimality of the Common Fisheries Policy: the Northern Stock of Hake

We evaluate the management of the Northern Stock of Hake during 1986-2001. A stochastic bioeconomic model is calibrated to match the main features of this fishing ground. We show how catches, biomass stock and profits would have been if the optimal Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) consistent with the target biomass implied by the Fischler's Recovery Plan had been implemented. The main findings are: i) an optimal CFP would have generated profits of more than 667 millions euros, ii) if side-payments are allowed (implemented by ITQ's, for example) these profits increase 26%. JEL Classification: Q22, Q28 We thank two anonymous referees whose comments and suggestions have substantially improved the paper, and to Javier Pereiro from Instituto Oceanográfico de Vigo for making available part of data available to us. Financial support from the Instituto de Estudios Económicos de Galicia, Pedro Barrie de la Maza, FEDER, Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología, SEC2002-4318-C02-01 (José María Da-Rocha), CICYT 1393-12254/2000 and SEC2003-02510/ECO (María José Gutiérrez), Fundación BBVA 1/BBVA 00044.321-15466/2002 (María José Gutiérrez) and from Universidad del País Vasco, 9/UPV00035.321-13511/2001 (María José Gutiérrez) is gratefully acknowledged.     

Catalog competition and Nash equilibrium in nonlinear pricing games

We model strategic competition in a market with asymmetric information as a noncooperative game in which each seller competes for a buyer of unknown type by offering the buyer a catalog of products and prices. We call this game a catalog game. Our main objective is to show that catalog games have Nash equilibria. The Nash existence problem for catalog games is particularly contentious due to payoff discontinuities caused by tie-breaking. We make three contributions. First, we establish under very mild conditions on primitives that no matter what the tie-breaking rule, catalog games are uniformly payoff secure, and therefore have mixed extensions which are payoff secure. Second, we show that if the tie-breaking rule awards the sale to firms which value it most (i.e., breaks ties in favor of firms which stand to make the highest profit), then firm profits are reciprocally upper semicontinuous (i.e., the mixed catalog game is reciprocally upper semincontinuous). This in turn implies that the mixed catalog game satisfies Reny’s condition of better-reply security—a condition sufficient for existence (Reny in Econometrica 67:1029–1056, 1999). Third, we show by example that if the tie-breaking rule does not award the sale to firms which value it most (for example, if ties are broken randomly with equal probability), then the catalog game has no Nash equilibrium. This paper was written while the second author was Visiting Professor, Centre d’Economie de la Sorbonne, Universite Paris 1, Pantheon-Sorbonne. The second author thanks CES and Paris 1, and in particular, Bernard Cornet and Cuong Le Van for their support and hospitality. The second author also thanks the C&BA and EFLS at the University of Alabama for financial support. Both authors are grateful to Monique Florenzano and to participants in the April 2006 Paris 1 NSF/NBER Decentralization Conference for many helpful comments on an earlier version of the paper. Finally, both authors are especially grateful to an anonymous referee whose thoughtful comments led to substantial improvements in the paper. Monteiro acknowleges the financial support of Capes-Cofecub 468/04.     

Price and tick size preferences in trading activity changes around stock split executions

We investigate the low prices preferences and the optimal relative tick size hypotheses, as possible explanations of the stock split execution effects in a pure order-driven and multi-tick market. Using intraday data for the Spanish Stock Exchange during 1997-2001, we find that stock splits do not improve liquidity but do change trading composition. Following splits, small trades from retail investors increase significantly, especially in the larger stock splits. However, we find that this effect seems to disappear with the new tick-size rules adopted by Spanish market in 1999. We extend the optimal relative tick size hypothesis for a multi-tick market by considering the effects of stock splits on the absolute tick size. We observe that the increase in small trades occurs only in those splits that increase the relative tick and decrease the tick-size simultaneously. Our findings suggest that small investors are attracted by stock splits that cause an absolute tick-size reduction, which are those with relatively lower transaction costs.JEL Classification: G19, G32, G35We thank two anonymous referees and the editor, J.M. Campa, for their comments and for providing us very helpful guidance on how to improve the paper. The authors gratefully acknowledge financial support from the Dirección General de Investigación del Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología, grant BEC2002-03797. A first version of this study has been published in the working paper series of the Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, IVIE. Any remaining errors are the authors responsibility.     

Computationally restricted unmediated talk under incomplete information

Summary. We show the role of unmediated talk with computational complexity bounds as both an information transmission and a coordination device for the class of two-player games with incomplete information and rational parameters. We prove that any communication equilibrium payoff of such games can be reached as a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium payoff of the game extended by a two phase universal mechanism of interim computationally restricted pre-play communication. The communication protocols are designed with the help of modern cryptographic tools. A familiar context in which our results could be applied is bilateral trading with incomplete information.Received: 9 September 2002, Revised: 14 March 2003, JEL Classification Numbers: C72. Correspondence to: Amparo UrbanoWe wish to thank financial aid from the Valencian Institute of Economic Research (IVIE) and partial support by DIGCYT under project PB95 - 1074. A previous version of this work appears as IVIE Working Paper WP-AD 99-07, under the title: "Unmediated talk under incomplete information".