The Impact of Private Label Introduction on Assortment,Prices, and Profits of Retailers*

We study how introducing private-label brands (PLs) affects retail prices and profits, accounting for assortment adjustments of national brands (NBs). We employ an event-study framework and scanner data on the US beef market. When a PL is added to the low-priced market segment, we find that retail stores further differentiate NBs from the PL and remove same-segment NBs. When a PL is added to the high-priced segment, however, NB assortment changes are limited. PL introduction and PL-driven NB assortment changes impose small price effects on NB, but strongly cannibalize NB demand and steer consumers toward PLs, likely increasing store profits.     

Can Firms Benefit From Competition?

We typically assume that exit of competitors from an industry benefits those that remain. We show here that, when one accounts for the supply chain effects of exit, this need not be the case. Specifically, when exit downstream induces exit of upstream producers, input prices rise to the detriment of downstream firms. If mark-ups on inputs are large while downstream mark-ups are small, then exit of downstream competitors reduces the profits of non-exiting firms. We show that this result is quite general and argue that it has application beyond competition policy, being especially apt in the area of industry dynamics.     

Collusion Under Imperfect Monitoring with Asymmetric Firms

We explore the effects of asymmetries in capacity constraints on collusion where market demand is uncertain and where firms’ sales and prices are private information. We show that all firms can infer when at least one firm's sales are below some firm‐specific ‘trigger level.’ When firms use this public information to monitor the collusive agreement, price wars may occur on the equilibrium path. Symmetry facilitates collusion but, if price wars are sufficiently long, then the optimal collusive prices of symmetric capacity distributions are lower on average than the competitive prices of asymmetric capacity distributions. We draw conclusions for merger policy.     

Upstream Competition between Vertically Integrated Firms

We propose a model of two‐tier competition between vertically integrated firms and unintegrated downstream firms. We show that, even when integrated firms compete in prices to offer a homogeneous input, the Bertrand logic may collapse, and the input may be priced above marginal cost in equilibrium. These partial foreclosure equilibria are more likely to exist when downstream competition is fierce or when unintegrated downstream competitors are relatively inefficient. We discuss the impact of several regulatory tools on the competitiveness of the wholesale market.     

Innovations,Prices and Employment: A Theoretical Model and an Empirical Application for West German Manufacturing Firms

In this paper a theoretical model of the impact of product and process innovations on output, capacity utilization, employment and prices is developed. The model is estimated with a unique set of micro-data from West German manufacturing firms. The empirical results reveal that innovative firms are more successful. They show a higher utilization and more output and employment growth than non-innovative firms. Innovations also change market behaviour. In sectors with a large share of product innovators, firms more often change employment and less often change prices, i.e. product innovations reduce price competition.     

A Comparison of Prices Brought by English Auctions and Private Negotiations

A comparison of house prices brought by English auctions and private negotiations produced evidence that the pricing mechanism matters. In an active market for middle- to high-priced houses, auctions extracted higher prices than private negotiations.     

Asymmetric price adjustments: A supply side approach

Using a model of dynamic price competition, we provide an explanation from the supply side for the well-established observation that output prices react faster in response to input cost increases than to decreases. When costs decline, the opportunity of profitable storing in anticipation of higher future costs allows competitive firms to coordinate on prices above current marginal costs. The initial price response is only partial and profitable storing relaxes competition. Conversely, when costs rise, storing is not beneficial in anticipation of lower future costs and firms immediately adjust their prices to current marginal costs, which entails the standard Bertrand outcome. Our results shed new light on the empirical evidence about asymmetric pricing and can stimulate further empirical investigation on this puzzle.     

Government-Assisted Oligopoly Coordination? A Concrete Case

In 1993 the Danish antitrust authority decided to gather and publish firm-specific transactions prices for two grades of ready-mixed concrete in three regions of Denmark. Following initial publication, average prices of reported grades increased by 15–20 percent within one year. We investigate whether this was due to a business upturn and/or capacity constraints, but argue that these seem to have little explanatory power. We conclude that a better explanation is that publication of prices allowed firms to reduce the intensity of oligopoly price competition and, hence, led to increased prices contrary to the aim of the authority.     

Bricolage as a Path to Innovativeness for Resource‐Constrained New Firms

Evidence suggests that both nascent and young firms (henceforth: “new firms”)—despite typically being small and resource‐constrained—are sometimes able to innovate effectively. Such firms are seldom able to invest in lengthy and expensive development processes, which suggests that they may frequently rely instead on other pathways to generate innovativeness within the firm. In this paper, we develop and test arguments that “bricolage,” defined as making do by applying combinations of the resources at hand to new problems and opportunities, provides an important pathway to achieve innovation for new resource‐constrained firms. Through bricolage, resource‐constrained firms engage in the processes of “recombination” that are core to creating innovative outcomes. Based on a large longitudinal dataset, our results suggest that variations in the degree to which firms engage in bricolage behaviors can provide a broadly applicable explanation of innovativeness under resource constraints by new firms. We find no general support for our competing hypothesis that the positive effects may level off or even turn negative at high levels of bricolage.     

Sunk Costs,Market Contestability,and the Size Distribution of Firms

In this paper we offer a new economic explanation for the observed inter-industry differences in the size distribution of firms. Our empirical estimates based on three temporal (1982, 1987, and 1992) cross-sections of the four-digit US manufacturing industries indicate that increased market contestability, as signified by low sunk costs, tends to reduce the dispersion of firm sizes. These findings provide support for one of the key predictions of the theory of contestable markets: that market forces under contestability would tend to render any inefficient organization of the industry unsustainable and, consequently, tighten the distribution of firms around the optimum.     

Innovation Management Practices Compared: The Example of Project‐Based Firms*

The importance of project‐based firms is increasing, as they fulfill the growing demands for complex integrated systems and knowledge‐intensive services. While project‐based firms are generally strong in innovating their clients' systems and processes, they seem to be less successful in innovating their own products or services. The reasons behind this are the focus of this paper. The characteristics of project‐based firms are investigated, how these affect management practices for innovation projects, and the influence of these practices on project performance. Using survey data of 203 Dutch firms in the construction, engineering, information technology, and related industries, differences in characteristics between project‐based and nonproject‐based firms are identified. Project‐based firms are distinguished from nonproject‐based firms on the basis of organizational configuration, the complexity of the operational process, and the project management capabilities of the firm. Project‐based firms also differ with regard to their level of collaboration and their innovation strategy, but not in the level of autonomy. A comparison of 135 innovation projects in 96 of the firms shows that project‐based firms do not manage their innovation projects different from other firms. However, the effects of specific management practices on project performance are different, particularly the effects of planning, multidisciplinary teams and heavyweight project leaders. Differences in firm characteristics provide an explanation for the findings. The implication for the innovation management literature is that “best” practices for innovation management are firm dependent.     

Why Do Suppliers Charge Larger Buyers Lower Prices?

The phenomenon of input suppliers charging larger buyer firms, relative to smaller buyer firms, lower prices is commonly explained in terms of supplier economies of scale, supplier competition for larger buyers, and the larger bargaining power of larger buyers. This paper provides an alternative explanation, and shows that the observed direction of differential pricing can benefit the supplier by lowering the level of tacit collusion its buyers can sustain in their output market. This result also provides a new mechanism through which a ban on price discrimination by input suppliers may lower consumer welfare.     

Service Regulations,Input Prices and Export Volumes: Evidence from a Panel of Manufacturing Firms

Using a panel of firm‐level data from Spanish manufacturers, this study shows that better service regulation reduces the price of intermediate inputs paid by downstream firms. The beneficial cost effects of services reforms extend to both large and small‐to‐medium sized corporations (SME’s), but the former tend to enjoy greater gains. This feature also manifests itself in international markets. We find evidence of an input cost channel through which service regulations affect the volume of exports of large manufacturers, while the evidence of such a channel is weaker for SME’s. Our estimates indicate that, from 1991 to 2007, large firms increased their volume of exports by an average of 20 per cent as a result of the direct input cost effect of services reforms, such that the firms that benefited the most typically belonged to industries more dependent on service inputs. Furthermore, convergence to the ‘best practice’ regulatory framework in services would have raised exports at least by an additional nine per cent. We conclude that firm size is relevant for the connection between services reforms, intermediate input prices and export volumes.     

Entry deterrence and dynamic competition : The role of capacity reconsidered

We study a model with sequential capacity choice and entry by firms into an industry. Post-entry competition is long term and firms compete by choosing prices. The complex role played by the capacity choice of the first mover is highlighted. In contrast to the conclusions derived from static or reduced form specifications, entry may be deterred only by choosing a low capacity level and charging a very high price. The arguments are used to provide an explanation of events in the U.S. phosphorus industry.     

Upstream merger in a successive oligopoly: Who pays the price?

This study applies a successive oligopoly model, with an unobservable non-linear tariff between upstream and downstream firms, to analyze the possible anti-competitive effects of an upstream merger in the Norwegian food sector (specifically, the market for eggs). The theoretical predictions are that an upstream merger may lead to higher average prices paid by downstream firms and at the same time no changes in the prices paid by consumers. Consistent with the theoretical predictions it is found that the merger had no effect on consumer prices, but led to higher average prices paid by the downstream firms to the merged firm.     

PERSPECTIVE: Cross‐Functional Integration in Spanish Firms

Published studies of new product development in Spain provide conflicting evidence regarding the role of cross‐functional integration in new product success. One possible explanation for these results is the use of idiosyncratic scales for measuring the level of cross‐functional integration. This study adopts the scale items used in a previous study and replicates that research process using data collected from managers of 134 Spanish companies involved in new product development. Findings confirm the appropriateness of these scales in a Spanish context and the importance of cross‐functional integration to new product success in Spanish firms. No support is found for the hypothesis that participative management is positively correlated with the level of cross‐functional integration. Cross‐functional integration is found to be negatively related to goal incongruity and positively related to top‐management support for integration.     

PRICE DISPERSION IN THE SMALL AND IN THE LARGE: EVIDENCE FROM AN INTERNET PRICE COMPARISON SITE

This paper examines four million daily price observations for more than 1,000 consumer electronics products on the price comparison site http://Shopper.com . We find little support for the notion that prices on the Internet are converging to the 'law of one price.' In addition, observed levels of price dispersion vary systematically with the number of firms listing prices. The difference between the two lowest prices (the 'gap') averages 23 per cent when two firms list prices, and falls to 3.5 per cent in markets where 17 firms list prices. These empirical results are an implication of a general 'clearinghouse' model of equilibrium price dispersion.     

When the Former CEO Stays on Board: The Role of the Predecessor’s Board Retention for Product Innovation in Family Firms

Understanding product innovation in family firms is an important research endeavor given the economic predominance of those firms, their idiosyncrasies, and the importance of constant renewal for those firms to achieve transgenerational survival. Recently, family firm research has highlighted the role of next-generation chief executive officers (CEOs; i.e., successors) who are often seen as drivers for innovating a family firm’s products. However, prior research has typically neglected that predecessors, who are often portrayed as less willing to introduce product innovation, frequently remain involved postsuccession through occupying board positions and thus still substantially influence the decision-making processes and outcomes of family firms, such as product innovation. As a result, our understanding of the role of predecessors and their postsuccession involvement in family firms’ product innovation remains unclear. Building on stakeholder salience theory and on insights from the literature on innovation and succession in family firms, we develop hypotheses about how and under which conditions the predecessor’s board retention affects product innovation in family firms after succession. Building on more than 200 family firm CEO succession cases in small- and medium-sized, privately owned family firms, our results reveal that the predecessor’s board retention negatively affects product innovation. This negative effect is strengthened with increasing involvement of the predecessor in the successor selection process, and it is offset in the case of family succession. Our findings contribute to the emerging stream of research on family firm succession and product innovation and provide important implications for practice.     

Technology Acquisition in Family and Nonfamily Firms: A Longitudinal Analysis of Spanish Manufacturing Firms

Technology acquisition from external sources has been identified as a critical competence for sustained success in innovation, and research has paid a good deal of attention to studying its advantages, drawbacks, determinants, and outcomes. Traditionally, research has modeled the choice to acquire technology from outside a firm's boundaries as the result of a trade‐off between the benefits of external acquisition (e.g., higher return on investment, lower costs, increased flexibility, access to specialized skill sets, and creativity) and its drawbacks (e.g., opening the market to new entrants, risk of imitation of core competencies, and reduced value appropriability). Yet, this view does not capture the behavioral considerations that may potentially encourage or discourage managers from sourcing technology outside the firm's boundaries. This behavioral aspect is especially important if one wants to understand the conduct in external technology acquisition of family firms, which are found to favor strategic actions that preserve the controlling families' control and authority over business, even at the cost of giving up potential economic benefits. Thus, external technology acquisition is likely to be interpreted differently in family and nonfamily firms. Despite its importance, how the involvement of a controlling family affects decisions in technology and innovation management and specifically external technology acquisition is an overlooked topic in extant research and requires further theoretical and empirical examination. This study attempts to fill these gaps by extending the tenets of the behavioral agency model and prior research pointing to particularistic decision‐making in family firms to uncover the behavioral drivers of external technology acquisition in family and nonfamily firms. Theory is developed that relates performance risk, family management, and the contingent effect of the degree of technology protection on external technology acquisition, and the hypotheses are tested with longitudinal data on 1540 private Spanish manufacturing firms. The analyses show that managers are more likely to acquire technology from external sources through research and development contracting when firm performance falls below managers' aspirations. Family firms are generally more reluctant to acquire external technology, and the effect of negative aspiration performance gaps becomes less relevant as family management is higher, which is attributed to family managers' attempts to avoid losing control over the trajectory that technology follows over time. However, family firms become more favorable to considering the adoption of an open approach to technology development when some protection mechanisms (specifically, the filing of patents on the firm proprietary technologies) increase the managers' perceptions of control over the technology trajectory. As such, this study makes a contribution to the understanding of the behavioral factors driving external technology acquisition, and it offers important insights regarding technology strategy in family firms.     

Union Decertifications's Impact on Shareholder Wealth

Recent research correlated share price declines in financial markets with union organizing. Investors seemingly anticipate a redistribution of earnings away from shareholder returns toward employee compensation. The markets discount security prices accordingly. But were that the case, union decertification activity should correlate with persistent, abnormally high returns on equity investments. Failure to find returns that are both abnormally high and persistent invites an alternative explanation that is consistent with the data from both studies. This study finds that firms that retained union representation in decertification cases actually outperformed those that ousted the bargaining agent in a partitioned sample comparison.