Tariff‐jumping FDI and domestic firms' profits

Abstract.  Studies of trade policy welfare effects often ignore the potential for tariff‐jumping foreign direct investment (FDI) to mitigate positive gains to domestic producers. Using event study methodology we find that affirmative U.S. antidumping decisions are associated with average abnormal gains of over 3% to a firm in the petitioning industry in the absence of tariff‐jumping FDI, but much smaller and statistically insignificant abnormal gains if there is tariff‐jumping FDI. We also find evidence that tariff jumping in the form of new plants or plant expansion has significantly larger negative effects on U.S. domestic firms' profits than other types of tariff‐jumping FDI. JEL Classification: F13, F23, L11     

International capital flows under asymmetric information and costly monitoring: implications of debt and equity financing

Abstract.  The impact of increased equity trade on a small open economy is examined. Stochastic second‐period output depends on first‐period investment. Owing to information asymmetries, domestic agents cannot reveal credibly the level of first‐period investment to international financiers. Consistent with recent proposals to strengthen the international financial system, domestic firms choose to incur self‐monitoring costs to increase capital inflows. As an alternative to borrowing, domestic agents may sell ownership claims to second‐period output. When equity claims convey information, equity trade is preferred to international borrowing, consistent with developing economies' observed reliance on international equity relative to debt in recent years. JEL Classification: F41, G15     

Partial Small Country Import Pass-through,Currency Composition,and Imported Inputs

Long run import pass-through is investigated in a partial equilibrium model in the context of a small domestic economy. Contrary to the standard view, it is shown that long run small country pass-through may be incomplete provided three sufficient conditions are met: (i) the foreign producer uses imported inputs, (ii) those inputs are paid for in a neutral currency, and (iii) three-way arbitrage is in operation. The theoretical predictions of.the partial equilibrium model are tested against the results of recent small country empirical studies. The sensitivity of pass through to productivity changes, monopsonistic behaviour, imperfect competition, the timeframe of the firm. and tariff protection are also examined. [F13]     

Export orientation and domestic merger policy: theory and some empirical evidence

Abstract.  Recent 'open‐economy industrial organization' literature finds export orientation enhances the weight of post‐merger international competitive gains, favouring lenient domestic merger policy. However, mergers seldom generate the 'significant synergies' supportive of international competitive gains. Since a joint‐economies‐of‐production effect suggests domestic mergers tend to generate international competitive losses (not gains), export orientation favours strict (not lenient) domestic merger policy. We show how non‐synergistic domestic mergers in the presence of international sales might reduce national welfare and incur stringent merger reviews. A panel data set of U.S. merger policy by manufacturing sector, 1990–2001, empirically supports export orientation, leading to strict merger policy. JEL classification: L40, F10     

Border effects and the availability of domestic products abroad

Abstract.  Trade between countries could fall short of trade within a country because (1) the volume of international trade is less than the volume of domestic trade for a given product (the intensive margin); or (2) some goods that are sold domestically are simply not exported (the extensive margin). My theoretical model illustrates that either of these two factors could explain a given aggregate 'border effect.' I examine the empirical relevance of this distinction by isolating the fraction of total domestic production attributable only to exporters, finding that around one‐half of the border effect may be attributed to each explanation. JEL classification: F1     

生产性服务业对经济增长的集聚效应研究——基于中国地级城市面板VAR分析

笔者从马歇尔、雅各布斯外部性及新经济地理的综合视角,通过建立面板VAR模型研究了我国生产性服务业集聚对城市经济增长的影响。结果表明:生产性服务业专业化、多样化和集聚规模与城市经济增长之间具有长期的均衡关系;生产性服务业专业化与多样化对经济增长具有单向因果关系;生产性服务业多样化无论在长期还是短期均促进了城市经济增长,而专业化却对经济增长产生负向效应。由于城市生产性服务业整体规模偏小,其对经济增长的规模效应尚不显著。鼓励生产性服务业多样性发展,避免同一部门的过度集聚,扩大重点生产性服务部门的运营规模可能是较为理想的政策安排。     

Tariffs versus quotas in the presence of imperfect competition and cross‐border externalities

Abstract.  We consider trade policies intended to affect the production of a foreign monopolist that generates negative externalities. We derive the optimal tariff and optimal import quota and examine which policy measure should be used to maximize domestic welfare. We find that if the domestic government does not have full information on the foreign firm's production method and if cross‐border externalities exist, import quotas are in some cases preferable to tariffs. Otherwise, however, tariffs are preferable to quotas. JEL Classification: F13, F18     

Ex post bidding and efficient coordination unemployment

Abstract.  We study the implementation of constrained‐efficient allocations in labour markets where a basic coordination problem leads to an equilibrium matching friction. We argue that these allocations can be achieved in a non‐cooperative equilibrium if wages are determined by ex post bidding. This holds true even in finite‐sized markets where the equilibrium‐matching process has decreasing returns to scale – where the 'Hosios rule' does not apply – both with and without heterogeneity. JEL classification: D83, J64     

Product standards, trade disputes, and protectionism

Abstract.  Disputes over national product standards are a major source of tension in international trade negotiations. The usual pattern is that exporters challenge new product standards as a 'disguised barrier to trade.' The paper develops a two‐country political agency model of standard setting. It is shown that there exists a political equilibrium in which the importing country on average applies a more stringent standard than the exporting country. This difference can be due either to a too lax standard in the exporting country or a too stringent standard in the importing country. JEL classification: F18, F13, D72     

Strategic policy for product R&D with symmetric costs

Abstract.  In this paper I examine strategic policy for product R&D in an international duopoly where domestic and foreign firms are identical. It is shown that strategic R&D policy is described by a subsidy schedule contingent on firms' quality choices. Unilateral policy enables its domestic firm to produce a high‐quality product, making equilibrium outcome unique. With two active governments, in equilibrium they implement different subsidy schedules. Two equilibrium outcomes exist, which are identical except for the identity of the countries. Thus, both countries have an equal chance to become the high‐quality exporter. Both Bertrand and Cournot cases are examined. JEL classification: F12, F13
Politique stratégique pour le R&D dans le développement de nouveaux produits quand les coûts sont symétriques.  Ce mémoire examine la politique stratégique pour le R&D dans le développement de produits nouveaux dans un duopole international où les entreprises domestique et étrangère sont identiques. On montre que cette politique est décrite par cédules de subventions qui dépendent des choix du niveau de qualité des entreprises. Une politique unilatérale permet à l'entreprise domestique de manufacturer un produit de haute qualité– ce qui engendre des résultats d'équilibre uniques. Si deux gouvernements sont actifs, en équilibre, ils mettent en place des cédules de subventions différentes. Deux résultats d'équilibre existent qui sont identiques sauf pour l'identité des pays. Donc les deux pays ont une chance égale de devenir l'exportateur du produit de haute qualité. On examine les cas de figure à la Bertrand et à la Cournot.     

Trade, market size, and industrial structure: revisiting the home‐market effect

Abstract.  This paper shows that the issues in the recent discussion over the 'home‐market effects' are more complicated than previously thought. It is shown that, in general, market size matters for industrial structure even when both the homogeneous and the differentiated goods face transport costs. The home‐market effect for production structure can arise, disappear, or even reverse in sign. The analysis shall change a common perception about de‐industrialization of (small) economies and may also have important implications for the empirical research strategies in this area. JEL classification: F12, L1     

生产者服务对制造业出口的影响——基于行业面板数据的实证分析

本文分析作为制造业中间投入的生产者服务对我国制造业出口的影响.首先,基于2000-2007年投入产出数据,我们计算了我国制造业出口的国内生产者服务增值份额,结果表明我国制造业单位产品出口中直接和间接的生产者服务投入处于波动中上升的趋势.其次,利用2004-2007年25个行业的数据,我们建立面板数据模型分析生产服务对制造业出口的影响,结果显示:生产者服务对我国制造业出口的增长起促进作用;与金融、保险等高端生产者服务相比较,制造业出口对批发零售、运输仓储等低端生产者服务依赖度较大.最后,论文基于上述研究结论给出了相应的政策建议.     

Sorting by foot: 'travel‐for' local public goods and equilibrium stratification

Abstract.  We re‐examine Tiebout's hypothesis of endogenous sorting in a competitive spatial equilibrium framework, by considering both income and preference heterogeneity and by allowing agents to decide endogenously the number of visits to a 'travel‐for' local public good. The equilibrium configuration may be completely segregated, incompletely segregated, or completely integrated, depending on relative market rents and income/preference/local tax parameters. A segregated equilibrium may feature endogenous sorting purely by income or by both income and preferences. While the rich need not be closer to the local public facility site, multiple equilibria may arise when the equilibrium configuration is incompletely segregated. JEL classification: D50, H41     

Preferential trade areas, multinational enterprises, and welfare

Abstract.  The effects of preferential trade areas (PTAs) on the investments by multinational enterprises and their implications for the welfare of members and non‐members are studied in a model with two types of firms: national firms and multinational firms. In the presence of multinational activity PTAs can create new investment as well as divert investment from non‐members to members. Both affect the welfare of members positively. More interestingly, if the investment creation effect of a PTA is sufficiently strong, then the PTA could be welfare enhancing for non‐members as well. JEL classification: F2, L1     

生产性服务业数字化水平与制造业全球价值链地位的协同推进实践

数字化是新发展格局全国统一大市场下国内产业结构转型升级的重要表征。从产出、成本双视角建构理论解析我国生产性服务业数字化水平对其制造业全球价值链（GVC）地位的影响与调节机制,以2014—2019年我国省级制造业行业层面的面板数据为研究对象进行实证分析,结果表明：第一,“十三五”时期我国生产性服务业数字化水平对制造业总体GVC地位的积极影响尚未充分发挥,而在东部地区与中部地区则表现出较强的正向影响,行业竞争在东部地区与中部地区生产性服务业数字化水平与制造业GVC地位的影响中发挥着正向调节效应,而科技创新能力在西部地区与东北部地区发挥正向调节效应;第二,我国生产性服务业数字化水平同期积极推动资本密集型制造业GVC地位攀升,行业竞争在技术密集型制造业GVC地位影响中发挥正向调节作用,而科技创新能力、制度环境在劳动密集型和资本密集型制造业GVC地位影响的调节效应较弱。这一结论为新发展格局阶段利用国内超大规模市场优势、双循环驱动下国内产业数字化高质量发展和实施区域异质化调节措施提供了可行的政策着力点和优化的路径选择。     

Lobbying, multisector trade, and sustainability of free‐trade agreements

Abstract.  This paper is concerned with the sustainability of free‐trade agreements (FTA). FTA sustainability is influenced by governments' valuations of political contributions, discount factors, the lobbying position of the specific‐interest groups in the intra‐industry trade sectors, and the sectoral coverage of the FTA. I find that (i) under certain conditions, the FTA under protectionist lobbying could be more sustainable than the FTA under no political pressure; (ii) the lobby‐supported FTA is more sustainable than the lobby‐opposed FTA and the FTA under no political pressure; and (iii) multisector trade enhances FTA sustainability. JEL Classification: F12, F13, F15.     

Interconnected communications networks and home market effects

Abstract.  This study develops a model of trade that highlights the effects of the interconnection of country‐specific communications networks as a driving force behind trade in high‐tech products with positive transport costs. By constructing a two‐country model of monopolistic competition with two production factors, it is shown that the locational decisions of firms may magnify the influence of interconnected networks. In a reversal of the standard home market effects, the abundance of unskilled labour in the developing countries can attract high‐tech firms from the developed countries. JEL classification: D43, F12, L13     

Minorities and majorities: a dynamic model of assimilation

Abstract.  The paper analyses the population dynamics of a country that has two ethnic groups, a minority and a majority, and minority members can choose to assimilate into the majority. Depending on the minority's size, the long‐run outcome can be full or no assimilation. Under certain parameter values multiple equilibria exist, including the two extreme cases. The paper demonstrates that both the long‐run outcome and the equilibrium path may be inefficient. Two extensions to the basic model are considered. The first one allows for a comparison between a multicultural and a 'melting pot' society. The second one introduces population growth and studies the interplay between exogenous and endogenous changes in the minority's size. JEL classification: J110, J150, J180     

Enforcing Domestic Quality Dominance through Quotas*

We study duopoly competition between a domestic and a foreign firm who first choose their quality and then compete in prices in the domestic market. As is well known, the free‐trade equilibrium exhibits quality differentiation and indeterminacy of the quality leader. We show that an import quota can enforce, as the unique subgame‐perfect equilibrium outcome, the quality ranking that favors the domestic producer and thereby can increase domestic welfare.     

A factor endowment theory of international trade under imperfect competition and increasing returns

Abstract.  Constructing a two‐good (competitive and imperfectly‐competitive goods), two‐primary factor (capital and labor) and two‐country model of international trade where the imperfectly‐competitive sector is subject to increasing returns to scale, we establish an oligopolistic version of the Heckscher‐Ohlin theorem. JEL classification: F10, F12