Ceo Locus of Control and Small Firm Performance: an Integrative Framework and Empirical Test*

Previous research on the impact of chief executive officer (CEO) locus of control is mainly based on simple and partial mappings of bivariate associations between CEO locus of control and organizational outcomes. In addition, distinct substreams have emerged in which intricately related phenomena are studied separately. to overcome this fragmentation and polarization, we provide and empirically test an integrative framework based on previously tested hypotheses on the impact of CEO locus of control. Our approach differs from prior research in two ways. First, it simultaneously takes account of strategic choice and firm performance in order to assess the extent to which strategy mediates the relationship between CEO locus of control and organizational performance. Second, we consider the CEO to be both a formulator and implementor of organizational strategies. Besides the observation that CEO locus of control seems to matter a lot in terms of explaining organizational performance in the present sample, our results demonstrate that an integrative approach increases our insight into the impact of CEO locus of control by revealing why some CEOs achieve higher organizational performance than others.     

CEO compensation: does it pay to be green?

The relationship between chief executive officer (CEO) compensation and various organizational variables (i.e., size, length of tenure of the CEO, board composition and firm performance) has been explored in academic research. However, the relationship between CEO compensation and the firm's reputation based on the firm's commitment to the community and the environment has been relatively unexamined in the academic research. This study's purpose is to empirically examine this relationship using the Fortune Reputation Index as revised by Brown and Perry (1995) . Using a sample of 186 firms in 1990 and 188 firms in 1991, the relationships between CEO compensation and organization size, financial performance and environmental reputation are examined. The results of the study demonstrate that there is a strong relationship between CEO compensation and firm environmental reputation, firm size and firm financial performance. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. and ERP Environment     

Riding off into the Sunset: Organizational Sensegiving,Shareholder Sensemaking,and Reactions to CEO Retirement

We test hypotheses derived from resource dependence and sensemaking/sensegiving theoretical lenses in the context of CEO succession, focusing on an under‐researched yet prevalent type of executive turnover – CEO retirement. Using event study methodology and a sample of CEO retirements from S&P 1500 firms during the 2003–12 period, we find that, all else equal, shareholders’ perceptions of organizations’ capacity to serve their interests are adversely affected when a retirement related change occurs in the leadership structure. Specifically, in line with resource dependence theory, we find that CEO retirement disclosures typically generate negative abnormal returns. Furthermore, in line with the sensemaking perspective, we find that the magnitude of shareholders’ reactions is contingent on the lexical sensegiving cues contained in the organizational narratives that are released to capital markets via executive retirement announcements. Overall, our theory and results point to CEO retirement events as consequential in the eyes of shareholders, challenging an important assumption of extant succession research. Moreover, they suggest that shareholders’ interpretation of these events is influenced by organizational sensegiving, highlighting the important role of organizational communication around succession events.     

Does CEO compensation matter in boosting firm performance? Evidence from listed French firms

The paper investigates the impact of chief executive officer (CEO) compensation on firm performance from a sample of 155 listed French companies on SBF 120, over 2009–2018. Findings suggest that an increase in CEO compensation seems to improve the accounting‐based firm performance, nevertheless it hurts the firm stock market value. More pronounced results are reported when we control for sector compensation interactions. We argue that attractive compensation may improve the executive services in achieving shareholders' objectives, but investors seem to not appreciate a CEO compensation increase. Based on the agency theory, it might be argued that investors fear possible executive opportunistic behavior encouraging them to enjoy overcompensation .     

CEO compensation and the seasoned equity offering decision

Empirical research on seasoned equity offerings indicates that the decision to make an SEO typically engenders a decline in firm value, as investors interpret this decision as a signal of poor financial health or that the stock is overpriced. Here, we add to the literature by analyzing the short‐term market reaction to SEO announcements and the chief executive officer's link to firm performance (i.e. the proportion of CEO equity‐based compensation). Results support the hypothesis that investors are more likely to view the announcement of an SEO as a last resort source of capital when the proportion of CEO equity‐based compensation is high. In such cases of high equity‐based compensation, our findings indicate that the SEO announcement provides an incremental signal of financial distress above that provided by financial statements. We also find this relationship (last resort signal) to be stronger when large information asymmetries exist between management and investors. Thus, managers should consider the ramifications of executive compensation structure when considering whether to make an SEO. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Executive compensation in North American high-technology firms: a contextual approach

After reviewing the literature surrounding the link between executive compensation and innovation activities of North American firms, we examine two gaps in the area. First, we analyze how contextual factors can affect CEO pay in high-technology companies. In particular, we study three contextual dimensions: political, economic, and social. Second, we consider the specific case of executive compensation in high-technology firms when family ties are present at the helm. Drawing on agency rationale and previous research, we develop a series of instrumental propositions intended to provide the theoretical basis for a future research agenda in the area.     

CEO hometown identity and firm green innovation

Drawn on the upper echelons theory, this study investigates how chief executive officer (CEO) hometown identity drives firm green innovation. We propose that CEO hometown identity has a positive impact on a firm's green innovation performance. Furthermore, we explore the moderating role of managerial discretion determined by organizational and environmental factors (i.e., institutional ownership and market complexity). We propose that institutional ownership negatively moderates the positive relationship between CEO hometown identity and green innovation, but market complexity plays a positive moderating role. Using Chinese publicly listed firms from 2002 to 2016 in heavily polluting industries, our findings support these hypotheses. Our research contributes to the upper echelons theory and corporate social responsibility literature and has substantial practical implications.     

Not all Risk Taking is Born Equal: The Behavioral Agency Model and CEO's Perception of Firm Efficacy

We examine the relationship between agent (CEO) risk bearing and the quality of executive risk‐taking outcomes, by examining the contingency effect of CEO perceived firm efficacy. In doing so, we extend the behavioral agency model (BAM) beyond predictions of risk magnitude to examining how CEO risk‐taking outcomes differ qualitatively in response to risk bearing. We argue that CEO risk bearing (due to stock options or cash compensation) will positively influence performance outcomes in the presence of higher perceived firm efficacy. However, this positive influence reverses when efficacy is lower. We demonstrate the utility of firm efficacy in exploring the effect of agent risk bearing on performance outcomes and provide the insight that the CEO pay‐performance relationship is influenced by the CEO’s perception of firm efficacy. © 2014 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

Contextual Influences on Executive Selection: Firm Characteristics and CEO Experience

This study examines the relationship between antecedent organizational characteristics and the pre-succession experience of individuals chosen as chief executive officer (CEO) – relationships that have received limited attention in past research. A sample of 214 CEO selection decisions was used to test hypothesized relationships between the firm characteristics of size, performance, growth, advertising intensity, risk and individual attributes pertaining to the experience of selected CEOs. Results indicate the following relationships: pre-succession profitability, size and advertising intensity are associated with the chosen executives' organizational tenure levels; pre-succession firm size and risk are associated with the age of selected CEOs; and, pre-succession profitability and advertising intensity are associated with type of functional background experience. Findings provide new insights into the relative importance of pre-succession experience associated with different organizational contexts in CEO selection decisions.     

CEO and Outside Director Equity Compensation: Substitutes or Complements for Management Earnings Forecasts?

Abstract

This study examines how the equity compensation of chief executive officers (CEO) and that of outside directors affect management earnings forecasts (MFs) and the relationship between these two positions in terms of compensation. Our evidence reveals that CEO (director) equity compensation is positively associated with MF likelihood, frequency, and accuracy when director (CEO) equity compensation is not high. However, an increase in director (CEO) equity compensation is not effective in improving disclosure quality when the level of CEO (director) equity compensation is already high. These results suggest that the two incentive mechanisms act as substitutes when both are intensively used in the context of MF disclosure.     

The effect of CEO compensation structure on the early internationalization of newly public firms

This study suggests the incentive perspective as an antecedent of early internationalization. We argue that early internationalization is a risky strategy for a CEO in a relatively young firm and that a potential agency problem arises between a CEO and shareholders in such a context. By drawing on agency theory, we theorize that the CEO compensation structure plays a critical role in the early internationalization decision. In a sample of 145 newly public U.S. firms, we find that the likelihood of early internationalization is negatively associated with the CEO’s secured cash pay and positively associated with the CEO’s equity-based compensation. In addition, we find that the positive association between equity-based compensation and the likelihood of early internationalization becomes stronger as the CEO’s tenure increases. These findings show that the interest alignment between a CEO and shareholders affects the strategic decision of early internationalization. Our study contributes to the literature on corporate governance and international business by underscoring the importance of the compensation structure as a significant driver of value-creating strategic initiatives and by identifying incentive factors that spur firms to internationalize early.     

Chief executive officer compensation,firm performance,and strategic coopetition: A seemingly unrelated regression approach

Coopetition denotes the simultaneous cooperation and competition in a business relationship and is broader in depth and width than competition. This pioneering comparative study employs a seemingly unrelated regression system to investigate the impact of peer-pay bias and pay-for-relative performance upon the highly controversial chief executive officer (CEO) pay. The analysis of the 21 Dow–Jones firms from 1992 to 2013 shows that the pay-for-performance relationship is contingent on the fit between CEO's strategic decisions and firm's core competency. The CEO pay is driven by the intensification of firm coopetition. We contribute to executive compensation, corporate strategy, and econometric methods.     

Executive Pay Matters: Looking Beyond the CEO to Explore Implications of Pay Disparity on Non‐CEO Executive Turnover and Firm Performance

Using a longitudinal data set covering a span of 10 years, we investigate the impact of vertical and horizontal pay disparity on non‐CEO executive turnover and subsequent firm performance. Hypothesizing differential responses to pay disparity depending on a non‐CEO executive's responsibilities, we first categorize non‐CEO executives based on their job demands and their role in the organization (e.g., oversight, divisional). We then explore how pay disparity influences the relationship between executive category and turnover, and how the level of pay disparity impacts the relationship between turnover and firm performance. We find that executive category significantly impacts the likelihood of turnover, and also influences firm performance. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed. © 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

The Value of CEO Mobility: Contextual Factors That Shape the Impact of Prior CEO Experience on Market Performance and CEO Compensation

This study examines the value that prior CEO experience has for the companies that hire such CEOs—as reflected in the firms’ subsequent market‐based performance—as well as its value for the CEO that possesses this experience—as reflected in his or her initial compensation. While we suggest that shareholders tend not to benefit from firms hiring experienced CEOs, we also argue that particular firm and industry contextual factors that shaped the prior CEO experience help ameliorate this detrimental effect. Regardless, we also suggest that prior CEO experience generally stands to benefit the CEOs, in that it brings them a compensation premium over those CEOs without such prior experience. We tested our hypotheses on a sample of 654 US CEO succession events that occurred between 2001 and 2004 and found broad support for our hypotheses. We close with a discussion of the implications of our findings for future research as well as what they mean for firms hiring experienced CEOs and for CEO careers more generally. © 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

权益性超额薪酬、CEO权力强度与真实盈余管理

基于公司治理角度,以2011—2016年沪深A股上市公司非平衡面板数据为样本,分析了A股上市公司真实盈余管理水平是否受到高管团队权益性超额薪酬的影响以及CEO权力强度和内部控制质量对两者关系的调节作用。研究发现,高管权益性超额薪酬与真实盈余管理呈显著正相关关系,CEO权力强度能够显著加强权益性超额薪酬对于真实盈余管理的正向影响,而高质量的内部控制整体上能够抑制权益性超额薪酬对于真实盈余管理的促进作用。     

Human Capital and CEO Compensation during Institutional Transitions

Firms appoint CEOs with different types of human capital in order to manage resource dependencies. How CEOs are compensated thus can be conceptualized as a valuation process of how boards view the value of CEOs' human capital. Two types of human capital – international experience and political ties – have emerged as potential drivers of CEO compensation during institutional transitions. But how they impact CEO compensation has remained unclear. We develop a resource dependence‐based, contingency framework to focus on the external and internal factors that enable or constrain human capital to impact CEO compensation. Because of the tremendous regional diversity within China, externally, we focus on the level of marketization of the region in which firms are headquartered. Internally, we pay attention to two corporate governance mechanisms: politically connected outside directors and compensation committee. Data from 10,329 firm‐year observations at 94 per cent of listed firms in China largely support our framework. Overall, our study contributes to resource dependence research by extending this research to the context of institutional transitions with a focus on how human capital impacts CEO compensation.     

The Acquisition of Restructured Firms: An Illustration of Market Discipline?

We examine the relationship between chief executive officer (CEO) compensation and acquisition activity subsequent to corporate restructurings in a sample of 152 firms created by a voluntary corporate spin-off. We also investigate the linkage between these relationships and the stock market reaction to the initial restructuring announcements. Surprisingly, CEO wealth in the form of stock and options is strongly related to friendly and hostile acquisition activity, respectively. Moreover, the stock market appears to anticipate this subsequent acquisition activity. These results ask us to rethink our understanding of the motivational properties of equity ownership and the stock market's reaction to voluntary corporate spin-off announcements.     

Leadership instability in hospitals: the influence of Board-CEO relations and organizational growth and decline

This study tested whether leadership instability--a systemic pattern of frequent succession in the top management position of an organization--was associated with sociopolitical structures that define the relationship between the board and chief executive officer (CEO), controlling for temporal patterns of the organizational life-cycle stage. In organizations that are not profit maximizing and subject to considerable uncertainty, such governance properties were hypothesized to affect leadership instability independent of organizational growth or decline. Results of regression analyses demonstrate strong main effects of board-CEO relations, net of the impact of organizational life cycle, on leadership instability.     

Executive pay and performance: the moderating effect of CEO power and governance structure

This paper examines the crucial question of whether chief executive officer (CEO) power and corporate governance (CG) structure can moderate the pay-for-performance sensitivity (PPS) using a large up-to-date South African data-set. Our findings are threefold. First, when direct links between executive pay and performance are examined, we find a positive, but relatively small PPS. Second, our results show that in a context of concentrated ownership and weak board structures; the second-tier agency conflict (director monitoring power and opportunism) is stronger than the first-tier agency problem (CEO power and self-interest). Third, additional analysis suggests that CEO power and CG structure have a moderating effect on the PPS. Specifically, we find that the PPS is higher in firms with more reputable, founding and shareholding CEOs, higher ownership by directors and institutions, and independent nomination and remuneration committees, but lower in firms with larger boards, more powerful and long-tenured CEOs. Overall, our evidence sheds new important theoretical and empirical insights on explaining the PPS with specific focus on the predictions of the optimal contracting and managerial power hypotheses. The findings are generally robust across a raft of econometric models that control for different types of endogeneities, pay, and performance proxies.     

CEO compensation, shareholder rights, and corporate governance: An empirical investigation

We investigate whether CEO compensation is influenced by the strength of shareholder rights. Our evidence reveals that CEOs of firms where shareholder rights are weak obtain more favorable compensation. It is also found that higher CEO pay is associated with a higher degree of potential managerial entrenchment. Additionally, CEOs of firms with governance provisions that offer them protection from takeovers enjoy more generous pay. We also examine the change in CEO compensation relative to the change in shareholders' wealth. The evidence shows that when there is an increase in shareholders' wealth, the CEO is able to obtain higher incremental compensation when shareholder rights are weak. On the contrary, when shareholders' wealth falls, there is no corresponding decline in CEO compensation when shareholder rights are weak. Given the empirical evidence, we argue that CEO compensation practices reflect rent expropriation rather than optimal contracting.