Alignment or entrenchment? Corporate governance and cash holdings in growing firms

This study contends that the association between corporate cash holdings and corporate governance is subject to the investment environments that firms face. For example, firms with an abundance of investment opportunities have a strong incentive to hold cash in order to maintain their competitive positions. Shareholders accept high levels of cash holdings in such growing firms if corporate governance can protect their interests. This study examines the effects of corporate governance on cash holdings for a sample of high-tech firms. The results show that CEO ownership, the directorship of venture capitalists (VCs), and independent directors play critical roles in corporate cash policy. In addition, the boards are more effective when the firms' CEOs are also their founders or when VCs hold a large stake of company shares. The effects of corporate governance are more significant in younger firms while the effects of firm-specific economic variables are more significant in older firms in the sample.     

Cash holdings in SMEs: speed of adjustment,growth and financing

This paper studies the effect of growth opportunities, financial constraints and financial distress on the speed of adjustment of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) to their target cash holdings. We use a sample of Spanish SMEs from the period of 1998 to 2012. The results support the existence of a target cash holding level to which small firms attempt to converge. Additionally, consistent with the precautionary motive for cash holdings, the results show that SMEs with greater growth opportunities adjust more quickly to their target cash holding level to preserve their financial flexibility and to be able to take advantage of profitable investment opportunities when they arise. Moreover, for SMEs in financial difficulties, the adjustment speed of cash is higher to avoid financial distress costs. Finally, we observe a faster speed of adjustment for cash holding in the crisis period for all firms, as a possible response to the credit restrictions faced by SMEs.     

The Effect of Governance Mechanisms on Small and Medium‐Sized Enterprise Cash Holdings: Evidence from the United Kingdom

This paper investigates the impact of governance mechanisms on small and medium‐sized enterprise (SME) cash holdings from 2000 to 2009, employing static and dynamic panel data analyses. We find no evidence that firm governance index and insider ownership affect cash holdings. This might indicate that governance mechanisms in SMEs are relatively weak. We also report that chief executive officer compensation has a positive effect on cash holdings. Firm‐specific factors such as firm size, leverage, and liquidity negatively affect cash holdings, whereas the research and development ratio and operating risk are positively associated with them. Finally, SMEs have target cash holdings and adjust to these.     

The financial determinants of corporate cash holdings: Evidence from some emerging markets

This paper investigates corporate cash holdings in developing countries. In particular, we look into the effect of capital structure and dividend policy on cash holdings in Brazil, Russia, India, and China and compare our results with a control sample from the US and the UK. Our sample contains 1992 firms across these countries for the period 2002–2008. We employ Instrumental Variables analysis to control for the endogeneity of the financial policies (cash holdings, capital structure, and dividend policy). Our results show some evidence that capital structure and dividend policy affect cash holdings. There are similarities between developed and developing countries on the factors determining corporate cash holdings. The results of our cross-country model provide evidence that capital structure, dividend policy, and firm size are important factors in determining cash holdings. Finally, we show that firms operating in countries with low shareholder protection hold more cash.     

Anticorruption,political connections,and corporate cash policy: Evidence from politician downfalls in China

We examine how firms change their cash policies in response to the downfall of corrupt politicians in China. We find that firms connected to their local government increase cash holdings when high-profile politician downfalls occur in the government. Consistent with the precautionary saving argument, the effect is stronger for firms that have greater investment opportunities or face greater financial constraints. Compared to unaffected firms, affected firms save more cash out of cash flows and have a higher marginal value of cash holdings. Overall, we show that the collapse of firms' political connections has significant impacts on those firms' financial policies.     

Foreign Ownership and Corporate Cash Holdings in Emerging Markets

This article examines the link between foreign ownership and corporate cash holdings. We utilize a data sample of firms listed on the Ho Chi Minh City stock exchange covering the period 2007–2015. Employing different econometric techniques for panel data, we find that higher foreign ownership is associated with more corporate cash holdings. This finding suggests that foreign investors in the Vietnam stock market are subject to precautionary motive and agency motive forcing firms to hold more cash. However, the outcome suggests potential agency problems because managers might subsequently use this cash reserve for their own advantages. These problems are even more pronounced in emerging markets where investor protection mechanism is weak. Accordingly, this highlights the importance of a monitoring mechanism to refrain corporate managers from investing in value‐destroying projects.     

Corporate cash holdings,uncertainty avoidance,and the multinationality of firms

We examine the relationship between uncertainty avoidance, multinationality and firm cash holdings. We develop several hypotheses from corporate finance and multinational firm theory, positing that cultural factors as well firm multinationality influence corporate cash holdings. In particular, firms in countries with high uncertainty avoidance hold more cash as a way to hedge against undesired states of nature. At the same time, firm multinationality moderates the effects culture has on the firm's holdings of liquid assets. Based on a large panel of firms in fifty countries, we present evidence consistent with these hypotheses. Firms in countries with high levels of uncertainty avoidance tend to hold more cash. Against commonly held views in cash management, the degree of multinationality of the firm is positively correlated with holdings of cash. At the same time, the effect of national culture on firm's cash holdings is lower for multinationals. These results are economically significant.     

Corporate cash holdings and promoter ownership

We examine the relationship between corporate cash holdings and promoter ownership for a sample of Indian non-financial firms. Consistent with the arguments of the ‘efficient monitoring hypothesis’, our results broadly suggest that promoter ownership is negatively associated with cash holdings, thereby highlighting the role of large owners in preventing cash accretion in an emerging market context. Indicating prominent influence of corporate ownership on cash management, we find that corporate non-promoter ownership is also negatively related with cash holdings. With regard to promoter ownership of foreign entities, our results suggest that cash holdings share a U-shaped relationship with ownership of foreign promoter corporations. In addition, our findings provide weak evidence to support a more pronounced negative association between cash holdings and promoter ownership for group-affiliated firms as compared to non-affiliated firms since the former faces lower financial constraints on account of access to internal capital markets. Finally, we perform long-term effect analysis in order to reinforce robustness of our results.     

非国有股东超额委派董事与企业现金持有

基于持股权与控制权非对等配置逻辑，文章以2009—2019年A股国有上市企业为研究主体，实证检验非国有股东超额委派董事对企业现金持有水平的影响。研究发现，非国有股东超额委派董事显著提高参股国企的现金持有水平，且随着超额委派比例增加更加显著；进一步地，该正向作用在中央层级企业及市场化进程较高地区表现更为显著；明晰其作用机理，发现其通过抑制超额持现所致的过度投资行为、迫使无效耗散的现金尽快回流进而提高持现水平；此外，非国有股东超额委派董事和超额委派比例均有助于优化现金二次配置，促使企业将超额现金用于发放现金股利及进行创新投入，并最终提升现金持有价值和企业价值。文章结论不仅印证和延伸混改推进过程中非国有资本在高层治理维度所发挥的积极作用，更为进一步深化混合所有制改革及完善中小股东保护体系提供借鉴。     

Cash holdings and corporate governance in family-controlled firms

This study examines the association between corporate governance and cash policy within family-controlled firms. Family businesses are complex, because, in addition to dealing with common business requirements and opportunities, they must consider the needs and desires of the family owners. The results of this study show that the impact of corporate governance, with its separation of control rights and cash flow rights, director-ownership-in-pledge ratio and proportion of independent directors on cash policy, differs between family-controlled and nonfamily-controlled firms. Separation of seat control rights and cash flow rights, as well as chair duality, significantly affects the cash policy within different levels of cash holdings in firms.     

Corporate Governance and Strategic Change in SMEs: The Effects of Ownership,Board Composition and Top Management Teams

This paper investigates how governance mechanisms affect the ability of small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) to introduce strategic change. Previous research typically assumes that governance mechanisms operate independently of each other. Building on agency theory and insights from the literature on small firm governance, we hypothesize that governance variables related to ownership, the board of directors and the top management team all affect strategic change and that it is important to examine the interaction effects of these governance mechanisms. Using a longitudinal sample of over 800 SMEs, our general logic and hypotheses are supported by the analyses. We find that closely held firms exhibit less strategic change than do SMEs relying on more widespread ownership structures. However, to some extent, closely held firms can overcome these weaknesses and achieve strategic change by utilizing outside directors on the board and/or extending the size of the top management teams. Implications for theory and management practice in SMEs are discussed. All three authors have contributed equally to the paper. Their names are listed alphabetically.     

高管的银行背景、所有权性质与企业现金持有决策

本文分析高管的银行背景是否影响企业现金持有决策,以及这种影响在国有企业和民营企业之间是否存在显著差异。基于中国非金融类上市公司2003－2013年的数据,检验发现,那些聘请具有银行背景的人士担任高管的企业具有显著更低的现金持有水平和更快的现金持有调整速度。相对于国有企业,高管银行背景对企业现金持有决策的影响在民营企业显著更强。上述研究结论有助于揭示社会资本在促进企业发展中的具体运行机制,为上市公司做出更优的现金持有决策具有重要的启示意义。     

External managers,family ownership and the scope of SME internationalization

SMEs are important to world business and the majority of SMEs are family firms. Yet some family SMEs are inert, local firms while others are dynamic and international. Do certain governance structures encourage the scale and scope of their internationalization? We jointly apply social capital and corporate governance theories to explain the scope of family SMEs internationalization, and find that professional managers externally recruited from outside the family are important, but only for lower levels of family ownership, suggesting synergistic combinations of ownership and management. It is the combination of external capital with external managers that really works.     

The Impact of Human Resource Practices and Compensation Design on Performance: An Analysis of Family-Owned SMEs

A sample of 168 family-owned fast growth small and medium enterprises (SMEs) was used to empirically examine the consequences of five human resource practices on sales growth performance. The results suggest that training and development, recruitment package, maintaining morale, use of performance appraisals, and competitive compensation were more important for high sales-growth performing firms than for low sales-growth performing firms. In addition, we examined the use of incentive compensation in the form of cash, noncash, and benefits and perks for four different levels of employees in family-owned SMEs. The findings suggest that high sales-growth performing firms used more cash incentive compensation at every level in the organization.     

Why do firms hold so much cash? An innovation explanation

Theory holds that knowledge has positive economic consequences. While US corporations defend record high level cash holdings citing the precautionary motive in response to changing firm characteristics, I find that knowledge‐based innovation can partially explain these changes. Using distance to the nearest research university as a measure of knowledge intensity, I show that knowledge‐intensive firms hold more cash, even after controlling for firm R&D. Moreover, knowledge‐intensive firms exhibit higher marginal value of cash and save more cash from cash flows than their less knowledge‐intensive counterparts. Overall, the precautionary motive appears to dominate the agency motive, with the effect of knowledge on cash holdings strengthening over time. Copyright © 2014 ASAC. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The impact of internationalization degree on cash levels: Evidence from Latin America

Although cash management has been extensively studied, the cash policies of multinational corporations (MNCs) outside of the U.S. market have been underexplored. We fill this gap in the literature by comparing the cash policies of MNCs to those of non-MNCs in a Latin American setting (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru). Using different proxies for multinationality, we find evidence that the cash holdings of multilatinas are significantly higher than those of their domestic counterparts. Overall, given that foreign markets may offer the best investment opportunities for many MNCs, our results are consistent with the argument that multilatinas maintain higher cash levels to take advantage of the greater growth opportunities abroad. We contribute to the literature on cash management and international business by expanding knowledge regarding the efforts of MNCs in emerging markets. Our results hold following a series of robustness checks and endogeneity concerns.     

股权结构、股东保护与上市公司现金持有量

我国上市公司的治理结构一直是各方关注的焦点，尤其是股权结构、中小股东保护等问题。本文选取了2000年上市公司样本991个，定义了基于股权结构的股东保护变量，并在此基础上研究了股东保护与现金持有量之间的关系。研究结果表明，上市公司现金持有量差异较大，并且在股东保护较好的情况下，现金持有量相对较小，二者之间呈现负相走的关系。由于影响现金持有量的因素较多，我们选取了相当数量的影响因素作为控制变量，检验在其进入模型的情况下，对股东保护与现金持有量之间关系的影响；结果表明，股权结构影响下的股东保护与现金持有量具有负的线性相关性。     

公司治理结构与现金持有量

经理人‘自利动机’可能会影响到公司现金持有量以及现金使用。不同治理结构又会对‘自利动机’构成不同的约束,从股权集中度、经理人所有权以及董事会构成、外部投资者受保护的程度等角度分析公司现金持有量与公司治理结构的关系,进一步研究公司治理结构与现金持有量,对我国上市公司实现现代化管理有重要意义。     

Corruption and cash holdings: Evidence from emerging market economies

We examine the effect of corruption on cash holdings and cash value using a panel data set of 4236 firms from 16 emerging market economies. We find that the cash holdings are positively related to the corruption and by managing their cash holdings upwards, the firms can benefit in the corrupt environment by trading cash. Furthermore, cash holding adds value to the firms. However, it is insignificant when the firms are operating in high corruption environment with low investor protection. Overall, the evidence suggests that corruption play an important role in shaping the cash policies of firms in emerging markets.     

Investment Committee,Corporate Cash Holdings and Corporate Life Cycle

We investigate the association between voluntary formation of board investment committee (IC) and corporate cash holdings of nonfinancial firms over the corporate life cycle stages for a large sample of Gulf Cooperation Council firms during 2005–2016. We find that IC increases corporate cash holdings in growth and maturity stages of firm, compared to introduction, shake‐out, and decline stages. These results have important implications for investors, policy makers, and regulators. Our findings are robust to various econometrics specifications.