Federal Reserve Independence in the Aftermath of the Financial Crisis: Should We Be Worried?

The extraordinary circumstances of the past few years have led to extraordinary responses by the Federal Reserve and other central banks. These ventures into uncharted waters have heightened political scrutiny to the point of raising concern about future independence. In discussing independence of the Federal Reserve, it is important to separate its regulatory and supervisory functions from its monetary policy function. It is the latter in which the question of independence is most important. History indicates that independent monetary policy has been a powerful deterrent to inflation. This paper outlines the threats to Federal Reserve independence, particularly as it exists from the unconventional policies that it pursued to mitigate the financial crisis. Economists have an important role in making the case that monetary policy remains independent.     

Preparing for a Smooth (Eventual) Exit

One aspect of the U.S. Federal Reserve's efforts to mitigate the financial crisis was the accumulation of unprecedented levels of assets. As financial and economic conditions become healthy and sustainable, the U.S. Federal Reserve will wind down these positions. Doing so without disruption poses serious challenges, but they are challenges that the U.S. Federal Reserve has considered carefully and that can be managed successfully. The approach features caution and transparency and must be coordinated with traditional monetary policy. This paper describes the potential effects of the U.S. Federal Reserve's exit activities and how it will control them.     

浅析美联储“量化宽松”的货币政策

从2008年3月27日至2010年3月18日,美联储面对汹涌而来的金融危机打开印钞机,资产总额大幅上升,基于美联储所采取的种种举动,总结出美联储量化宽松的货币政策的特点,并且分析它所产生的影响。     

The Depoliticization of Monetary Policy

In the past thirty years, it has been claimed that Republicans tend to favor relatively restrictive monetary policy while Democrats favor relatively accommodative monetary policy. Another claim is that, regardless of which political party is in power, monetary policy tends to be relatively restrictive during the first two years of an administration and relatively accommodative during its final two years. The present paper finds an absence of empirical evidence supporting either claim by restricting the sample period to the past quarter century (1982–2006). The depoliticization of monetary policy decisions probably reflects, among other factors, both the post-1970s new-Keynesian consensus in macroeconomic theory and the realization of political independence of the Federal Reserve System during the Volcker-Greenspan years. Editor’s note: After this article was submitted and accepted for publication by Business Economics, Mr. Tempelman took a position with the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. The views expressed are strictly those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York or the Federal Reserve System.     

What's Wrong With the Federal Reserve: What Would Restore Independence?

The actual degree of independence of the Federal Reserve has varied over the years. This paper traces its history and finds that the Federal Reserve has been most successful in its dual full-employment, low inflation mandate when it follows fixed rules, and focuses on the intermediate term rather than trying to react to short-term developments under political pressure. Going forward, monetary policy should emphasize on annual monetary growth more and short-term interest rates less. A number of policies are recommended to support this overall emphasis on intermediate-term stability.     

Threats to monetary policy independence: reasons to be concerned

Several legislative efforts are under way that aim to impose greater congressional oversight of and influence on the monetary policy decision making of the Federal Reserve System. Some of these initiatives might do little harm or even make marginal improvements. But others pose more serious threats to the operational independence of monetary policy. Proposals to require the Federal Reserve to frame monetary policy decisions according to a mathematical formula imply a concrete simplicity of policy that is inaccurate and misleading. And the reporting requirements associated with these proposals threaten to negate the major advantage of monetary policy as a countercyclical weapon—speed. Proposals to subject the non-monetary policy functions of the Fed to the appropriations process provide Congress with additional leverage that could be used to apply pressure to monetary policy decisions. For its part, the Fed should continue to increase transparency through more timely and complete release of relevant information and analysis. To best promote the objectives of stable prices and maximum employment, the operational independence of the Federal Reserve’s monetary policy decision making needs to be preserved and protected.     

The Effectiveness of Central Bank Independence vs. Policy Rules

This paper assesses the relative effectiveness of central bank independence vs. policy rules for the policy instruments in bringing about good economic performance. It examines historical changes in (1) macroeconomic performance, (2) the adherence to rules-based monetary policy, and (3) the degree of central bank independence. Macroeconomic performance is defined in terms of both price stability and output stability. Both de jure and de facto central bank independence at the Federal Reserve are considered. The main finding is that changes in macroeconomic performance during the past half century were closely associated with changes in the adherence to rules-based monetary policy and in the degree of de facto monetary independence at the Federal Reserve. But changes in economic performance were not associated with changes in de jure central bank independence. Formal central bank independence alone has not generated good monetary policy outcomes. A rules-based framework is essential.     

美国经济的信贷紧缩和美联储货币政策工具创新

2007年美国爆发次贷危机,次贷危机引发信贷紧缩,信贷紧缩对美国实体经济的消极影响具体表现为:住宅投资急剧下降、企业投资急剧下降和个人消费支出的减少。信贷紧缩影响了实体经济,使美国陷入了经济衰退。美联储在这次金融危机中为稳定金融体系积极充当金融体系"最终贷款人"角色,美联储在使用传统金融工具的同时,积极创新,开发了多种新的工具。定期拍卖工具、定期证券出借工具、一级交易商信贷工具、与外国中央银行的货币互换和干预商业票据市场。当然,美联储一系列的政策创新举措也引发了许多担忧。     

The Federal Reserve's Mandate: Long Run

Given the slow recovery of the U.S. economy, quantitative easing of monetary policy in the form of U.S. Federal Reserve asset purchases has been attractive. However, it is not clear that the current and likely future economic environment warrants this policy, given its long-term risks. This paper outlines these risks and makes the case for a return to conventional policy by allowing currently held assets to roll off the Federal Reserve's balance sheet as they reach maturity and by resuming more conventional monetary policy. This is not a quick fix, but it is less risky than current policy in achieving the Federal Reserve's long-run dual mandate of price stability and maximum employment.     

The Need to Return to a Monetary Framework

This paper examines the 100-fold increase in reserve balances at the Federal Reserve during 2008. By looking at the balance sheet of the Federal Reserve and factors influencing the supply and demand for reserves, the paper shows that the increase was due to large purchases of securities and loans to certain sectors and institutions. Such actions constitute a combination of monetary policy and industrial policy, or a mondustrial policy. This characterization raises questions about the future of the Federal Reserve and suggests the need to return to a monetary framework that controls the money supply while the interest rate is zero and establishes rules for setting the interest rate.     

The Response of Small Business Owners to Changes in Monetary Policy

The small business sector of the economy accounts for half of private gross domestic product and well over half of private sector employment. Little is known about how these firms and the banks that serve them are affected by changes in monetary policy. Using data from the monthly surveys of the members of the National Federation of Independent Business, the impact of unexpected (between meeting) Federal Reserve announcements on owner expectations and hiring and spending plans are examined. Using interviews filled out during the month, “before” and “after” groups are analyzed to assess the impact of Federal Reserve announcements on firm behavior. Narrowing the analysis period to just days before and after Federal Reserve announcements permits the assessment of owner responses uncontaminated by other events. Changes in owner expectations and spending and hiring plans are shown to be translated into subsequent changes in actual spending and hiring that are often the opposite of what is suggested by conventional economic theory. Firms that do not use debt respond in the same way as those regularly active in credit markets. The results provide additional insight and richness to our understanding of the transmission channels through which monetary policy impacts the real economy.     

Three Challenges to Central Bank Orthodoxy

Since 2007–09, the Federal Reserve has pursued a very aggressive monetary policy strategy. This strategy has been associated with healthy labor market conditions, moderate economic growth, and inflation—netting out the effects of a major oil price shock—that is close to the Federal Open Market Committee’s (FOMC’s) 2 percent target. Thus, with the economy returning to normal, it is natural for the FOMC to begin the process of exiting its highly accommodative policy. The FOMC has laid out several well-defined steps for this process. This strategy may be called central bank orthodoxy, since it is a natural extension of the classical view. However, three challenges to this orthodoxy have developed. Although each challenge is interesting and potentially helpful, the orthodox view provides a better basis for devising near- and medium-term monetary policy decisions.     

100 Jahre Federal Reserve System

The Federal Reserve System (Fed) was created in December 1913 when the Federal Reserve Act was signed. Since then, the Fed has become the most influential central bank in the world. This article gives an overview of the Fed’s history and its structure before evaluating the Fed’s monetary policy over the last 100 years. The main findings are that the last 100 years have shown that a central bank is useful for solving economic problems but that sometimes the central bank has created its own problems.     

European monetary policy: Institutional design and policy experience

The following article examines design issues relevant to European monetary policy: central bank independence, and the accountability and transparency of monetary policy strategy. An empirical approach is then applied which allows a comparison between the ECB and other central banks. It also enables an investigation of whether the ECB simply follows the US Federal Reserve Bank, as is sometimes claimed.     

Central Banking in the Crisis: Conceptual Convergence and Open Questions on Unconventional Monetary Policy

The advanced economies — financial crisis that began in 2007 was triggered by factors that could not have been easily foreseen but also by factors that had been familiar since the Great Depression but were ignored or forgotten. However, once the crisis was apparent, central banks of the major advanced economies — the European Central Bank, the U.S. Federal Reserve System, the Bank of England, and the Bank of Japan reacted quickly and with a remarkable convergence of policy with respect to defining price stability, communication, enhanced banking surveillance, the role of money and monetary aggregates, unconventional liquidity supply, and forward guidance. These elements of convergence are discussed with respect to their strength and possible dangers in stabilizing the global financial system.     

Can Monetary Policy Meet the Needs of Financial Stability? Remembering the Frb Alongside the Fomc

The monetary policy remedy for demand weakness flowing from one set of macroeconomic imbalances could lead to another set of imbalances in the financial and economic system. The only prudent way to insure against collapse is to have a resilient financial system. The instruments to require that lie with regulators, not with monetary policymakers. Within the Federal Reserve System, they lie with the Board, not with the Open Market Committee. In mapping and articulating its approach to macroprudential policy, the Board needs to determine its decision-making norms having regard to their implications for communication strategy, and how it sees its own role in dynamic regulatory policy fitting with the FOMC’s approach to conjunctural policy     

Financial Stability and the Hemianopsia of Monetary Policy

Financial stability concerns cannot be separated from macroeconomic objectives of monetary policy. Stimulative monetary policy works by creating financial conditions that could lead to instability in markets that could, in turn, engender deflationary pressures. Although the Federal Reserve Act does not explicitly mention financial stability as an FOMC objective, it is fundamentally bound together with the achievement of the explicit goals of maximum employment and price stability.     

An Interview With Ben S. Bernanke

In this interview, Dr. Bernanke recounts the concerns of his early days as chairman of the Federal Reserve in 2006 and the onset of the 2007–09 financial crisis. He then turns to the collapse of Lehman Brothers and AIG and its fallout. He emphasizes how important it is for the public to understand the Federal Reserve and what it does and the consequent importance of clear communication. Turning to postcrisis policies, he discusses unwinding quantitative easing, the global low-interest rate environment, and the importance of the Federal Reserve in maintaining financial stability. He expresses his confidence that recent measures make the U.S. economy less vulnerable to financial shocks than before the crisis. He also makes comments on income inequality and the housing market and discusses the statistics that he monitors regularly on the U.S. and global economies.     

中国货币政策对银行风险承担行为的影响研究——基于异质性视角

国际金融危机的爆发引发了理论界对货币政策是否影响银行体系稳定更为广泛的关注。文章基于异质性视角构建动态面板数据模型对货币政策与银行风险承担行为之间的关系进行估计,研究结果表明：2003-2011年,货币政策变量对银行风险偏好的影响具有时滞性,贷款利率提高有助于抑制银行风险,货币供应量增加会刺激银行更加冒险;不同银行对货币政策冲击会做出异质反应,随着资本充足率的提高,货币政策对银行风险承担行为的影响效果减弱。因此,加强中国人民银行在宏观审慎监管中的主导作用、建立逆周期的货币政策和资本监管协调机制是后金融危机时代我国监管当局的重要议题。     

Monetary Policy Independence under Flexible Exchange Rates: An Illusion?

I analyse whether countries with flexible exchange rates are able to pursue an independent monetary policy, as suggested by traditional theory. I use data for three Latin American countries with flexible exchange rates, inflation targeting and capital mobility – Chile, Colombia and Mexico – to investigate the extent to which Federal Reserve actions are translated into local central banks' policy rates. The results indicate that there is significant ‘policy contagion’ and that these countries tend to ‘import’ Fed policies. The degree of monetary policy independence is lower than what traditional models suggest.