A model of cost-based transfer pricing

In most decentralized organizations, goods and services are transferred between divisions. These transfers are frequently recorded in the accounting books of the divisions; the term transfer price refers to the dollar amount of the interdivisional exchange. This study considers two main issues: (i) the costs and the benefits of delegating decisions through a system of transfer pricing and divisional performance evaluation, and (ii) the performance of one common method of pricing intrafirm transactions: cost-based transfer pricing.The study analyzes a firm in which each divisional manager has better information about the divisional environment than what is known by the firm's top management. The first half of the paper demonstrates that the firm can attain the optimal level of profits with a compensation system utilizing (i) reports by divisional managers describing in complete detail each manager's private information, and (ii) divisional performance evaluation with cost-based transfer pricing. Next, a situation is considered in which divisional managers are not able to communicate their private information to the firm's top management because of complexity of divisional environments or managers' specialized expertise. In this bounded-rationality setting, a managerial-compensation system employing cost-based transfer pricing allows the firm to earn strictly higher expected profits than if all decisions are made by the firm's top management relying on divisional managers' reports.Financial support from the Unisys Corporation is gratefully acknowledged.     

Reducing conflict in balanced scorecard evaluations

Recent studies [Ittner, C., & Larcker, D. (2003). Coming up short on nonfinancial performance measurement. Harvard Business Review(November) 88–95; Ittner, C., Larcker, D., & Randall, T. (2003b). Performance implications of strategic performance measurement in financial services firms. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 28, 715–741] provide evidence of companies’ tendency to overlook the validity of the causal links between driver and outcome measures of the balanced scorecard (BSC), and to ignore the underlying strategically-linked causal business models. It is posited that this propensity leads to conflict between top management and divisional managers because of the failure of the former to evaluate and consider strategy effectiveness in performance evaluation. The present study hypothesizes that individuals in the top-manager role do not take into account strategy effectiveness unless they are explicitly required to do so. In contrast, individuals in the store-manager role automatically consider the quality of strategy without being prompted to do so. A study using 63 evening MBA students provides support for the hypotheses. The results have implications for the study of evaluation biases in BSC as well as in other performance measurement systems, and for devising means to mitigate them.     

Performance Incentives within Firms: The Effect of Managerial Responsibility

We show that top management incentives vary by responsibility. For oversight executives, pay‐performance incentives are $1.22 per thousand dollar increase in shareholder wealth higher than for divisional executives. For CEOs, incentives are $5.65 higher than for divisional executives. Incentives for the median top management team are substantial at $32.32. CEOs account for 42 to 58 percent of aggregate team incentives. For divisional executives, the pay–divisional performance sensitivity is positive and increasing in the precision of divisional performance and the pay–firm performance sensitivity is decreasing in the precision of divisional performance. These results support principal–agent models with multiple signals of managerial effort.     

The effect of framing and negotiation partner’s objective on judgments about negotiated transfer prices

A common approach to set transfer prices is via intra-firm negotiation. However, Luft and Libby [Luft, J. L., & Libby, R. (1997). Profit comparisons, market prices and managers’ judgments about negotiated transfer prices. The Accounting Review, 72(2), 217–229] found that because of the existence of self-serving biases, negotiating managers have different expectations regarding what constitutes a ‘fair’ transfer price, leading to a less efficient negotiation process. In this study, we examine two factors that are expected to affect managers’ transfer price negotiation judgments, namely, framing as a gain or as a loss and the negotiation partner’s objective (whether the partner’s objective involves high or low concern-for-others). We propose that these two factors affect managers’ perceptions of the negotiation context, and thus the way they interpret the economic and social consequences of accounting information. Our results show that a loss frame (compared to a gain frame) exacerbates managers’ self-serving biases and increases the ‘transfer price expectation gap’ between buyers and sellers. Further, in our experiment where market price is higher than equal-profit price, we find that managers’ transfer price expectations are lower (and deviate more from the prevailing market price) when they are negotiating with a partner with high concern-for-others than with a partner with low concern-for-others. We discuss the broader implications of these results for the design of management accounting systems.     

Management accounting systems, top management team heterogeneity and strategic change

Institutional and market changes force many organizations across economic sectors to reconsider their strategic position and engage in strategic change. Organizations differ in their ability to realize strategic change, however, which appears to depend on several factors in their strategic management process. In this paper we explore two such factors simultaneously, which are the composition of the top management team and the characteristics of the management accounting system. In particular, the paper investigates how top management team heterogeneity affects strategic change both directly, and indirectly, through the design and use of the management accounting system. Hypotheses are developed and tested through a survey study among 103 Spanish public hospitals. We find significant effects of top management team heterogeneity on the extent and direction of strategic change, and find that the use of the management accounting system partially mediates the relationship between top management team heterogeneity and strategic change. The paper contributes to the extant literature on the complex relationships between strategic change and MAS [Gerdin, J., & Greve, J. (2004). Forms of contingency fit in management accounting research – a critical review. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 29, 303–326], by analysing both extent and direction of strategic change, and by recognizing the importance of top management teams’ use of the management accounting system for strategic change.     

Information and the transnational SME controller

One of the issues that face the small- and medium-sized enterprise (SME) when expanding is the ‘control’ issue and this paper investigates and presents preliminary evidence of ‘controlling’ or ‘management accounting’ practice in a transnational SME. Wibsey, the site of the case, is now a small group of companies that have expanded from a U.K. base into 10 European countries. This expansion has posed complex problems, which have increased the information requirements of the SME. The contextual issues of complexity and resulting challenges for the transnational organization in its management accounting, information and control systems are considered. Wibsey uses traditional management accounting as the basis of supporting decision-making in the group and a lower level of information need is reported, in contrast to Dent (1996) (Dent, J. F., 1996. Global competition: challenges for management accounting and control,Management Accounting Research , 7(2), 247–269), because the group chooses to maintain a traditional ‘accounting-led’ evaluation system in controlling and evaluating its transnational operations.     

Transfer Pricing and the Control of Internal Corporate Transactions

One potential weakness of all divisional profitability schemes is their inability to capture synergies among business units. One way of managing this problem is to design a transfer pricing scheme that attempts to assign common costs and benefits to different business units. What makes transfer pricing both so interesting, and such a challenge, is that the solution involves finding a way to encourage divisional managers whose pay is likely to depend on such transfer prices to reveal their private or unbiased information about the firm's costs in a way that serves the interest of the rest of the firm. With that end in view, the authors provide a general analytical framework for setting transfer prices and go on to discuss the costs and benefits of each of the most common transfer‐pricing methods: (1) market pricing; (2) marginal cost pricing; (3) full‐cost pricing; and (4) negotiated prices.     

India’s strategic future: 2025

Based on the geopolitical developments in India’s neighbouring countries and India’s response to them, this paper depicts four scenarios—Storms and Fires, Rainbow in the Sky, Light and Shadows and Across Space. Each scenario explores a set of possible events and the consequences triggered by it. While Storms and Fires is based on the rise of a sharp nationalist Indian sentiment in the face of heightened security tensions in the region, Across Space outlines the future of India’s worldview shaped by the present government’s policy of US primacy. Light and Shadows is based on differential policy towards neighbours—conflict with Pakistan and cooperation with other neighbours. This scenario is predicated on the supremacy of economic objectives whereas Rainbow in the Sky is based on the regional cooperation as the primary guiding force of the Indian foreign policy. Though major geopolitical events in its neighbourhood will impact the immediate future of India, India’s response and internal strengths and weaknesses will determine its long-term future. It is therefore essential for the country to develop a well considered trajectory of its strategic options for the next 25 years.     

Negotiated versus Cost-Based Transfer Pricing

This paper studies an incomplete contracting model to compare the effectiveness of alternative transfer pricing mechanisms. Transfer pricing serves the dual purpose of guiding intracompany transfers and providing incentives for upfront investments at the divisional level. When transfer prices are determined through negotiation, divisional managers will have insufficient investment incentives due to hold-up problems. While cost-based transfer pricing can avoid such hold-ups, it does suffer from distortions in intracompany transfers. Our analysis shows that negotiation frequently performs better than a cost-based pricing system, though we identify circumstances under which cost-based transfer pricing emerges as the superior alternative.     

Monetary policy, ‘dollarization,’ and parallel market exchange rates: The case of the Dominican Republic

Excessive money creation may give rise to inflation tax revenues and to a depreciation of the domestic currency. this in turn leads to a shift away from the domestic currency into a foreign currency (e.g., the US dollar, hence the term ‘dollarization’). From the domestic monetary authority's point of view, ‘dollarization’ is an unwelcomed phenomenomn, thus the monetary authorities will attempt to arrest the ‘dollarization’ phenomenon while maintaining the excessive money growth. This paper develops and tests a model which analyzes the effects of monetary policy on dollarization and the ‘parallel’ market exchange rates.     

Intrafirm Trade,Bargaining Power,and Specific Investments

This paper compares the performance of standard-cost with negotiated transfer pricing under asymmetric information. Negotiated transfer pricing generally achieves higher expected contribution margins, as this method tends to be more efficient in aggregating private information into a single transfer price. Standard-cost transfer pricing confers more bargaining power to the supplier and therefore generates better incentives for this division to undertake specific investments. The opposite holds for buyer investments. If a corporate controller has disaggregated information about divisional costs and revenues, then the firm can improve upon the performance of standard-cost transfer pricing by setting a centralized transfer price equal to expected cost plus a suitably chosen mark-up.     

The evolution of management accounting routines in small businesses: a social construction perspective

This paper explores the development of management accounting in small firms through a social construction perspective. Taking Dirsmith’s (1998) (Dirsmith, M. W. 1998. Accounting and control as a solution to technical problems, political exchanges and forms of social discourse: the importance of substantive domain, Behavioural Research in Accounting, 10 (Supplement), 65–77) lead we examine the evolution of control and decision-making processes within four growth-orientated service sector businesses. Key to the perspective is the notion of the owner–manager and his/her employees as creators of management accounting routines that form through a cycle of action, externalization and habitualization. These routines still remain in the control of the originator and are flexible in nature. As the business grows these routines may become objectified into localized management accounting ‘facts’ and they may also be challenged by externally imported accounting conventions. This paper explores the creation of idiosyncratic accounting knowledge and the effects of its transmission over the history of the businesses.     

A coevolutionary analysis of organisational systems and processes: Quantitative applications to information system dynamics in small entrepreneurial firms

We present a quantitative, dynamic analysis of coevolution in the new firm. Organisation is treated as a process, rather than a state, involving the simultaneous evolution of interacting systems within, and between, small firms and their environment. Our quantitative analysis uses primary source, time-elapsed data, obtained by face-to-face interviews with entrepreneurs. We found a link between performance and microevolutionary experience. High performers were more innovative, more radical ‘change makers’, more willing to ‘wait and see’, and more willing to use ‘soft’ technologies than low performers.     

Transfer Pricing for Corporate Treasury in the Multinational Enterprise

Intercompany financing transactions are becoming increasingly important to multinational enterprises (MNEs) as they expand internationally. Corporate treasurers of MNEs have many responsibilities, including the management of international capital structure and cost of capital, the financing of cross‐border acquisitions, foreign direct investment, international capital budgeting and cash management, management of foreign exchange and transactional risk, and port‐folio and investment management. This article focuses on a corporate function, transfer pricing, that is potentially relevant to each of these activities. Whenever a payment crosses borders in a treasury context—whether to provide a loan, purchase a receivable, provide a guarantee, sweep cash, factor a receivable, provide a hedge or insurance product—a transfer pricing issue is present. Transfer pricing is often viewed as a taxation issue and thus the responsibility of the corporate tax department. This article challenges that view, and makes the case that an integrated, multi‐functional approach to MNE treasury planning in the context of transfer pricing can be an important component in improving the efficiency of cross‐border financial management. The paper uses conceptual and empirical information as well as numerical examples to illustrate relevant tax and transfer pricing concepts for policy planners and others responsible for MNE treasury and tax planning.     

Time-varying long-run mean of commodity prices and the modeling of futures term structures

The exploration of the mean-reversion of commodity prices is important for inventory management, inflation forecasting and contingent claim pricing. Bessembinder et al. [J. Finance, 1995, 50, 361–375] document the mean-reversion of commodity spot prices using futures term structure data; however, mean-reversion to a constant level is rejected in nearly all studies using historical spot price time series. This indicates that the spot prices revert to a stochastic long-run mean. Recognizing this, I propose a reduced-form model with the stochastic long-run mean as a separate factor. This model fits the futures dynamics better than do classical models such as the Gibson–Schwartz [J. Finance, 1990, 45, 959–976] model and the Casassus–Collin-Dufresne [J. Finance, 2005, 60, 2283–2331] model with a constant interest rate. An application for option pricing is also presented in this paper.     

THE VIABLE EVA CENTER (OR, HOW TO SLICE A COMPANY SO IT DOESN'T BLEED)

How a company is sliced, or broken up into divisions of various sorts, has a huge effect on the accountability and hence the behavior of its managers. Senior management faces a tradeoff between delegating authority to subordinates who have the best information for specific decisions, and maintaining authority to avoid parochial behavior that might hurt the organization as a whole. Divisions exist within companies to provide a framework for such delegation. A divisional structure allows decision-making authority to be pushed down along with accountability for results. Thus, how divisions are established is critical to decision-making, motivation, and accountability.
The ultimate test of a well-formed division is a high degree of correspondence between division financial results and financial results for the company as a whole. When an increase in divisional EVA can contribute to a decline in company-wide EVA, this is evidence of a poorly formed division, or what the author calls a "non-viable" EVA center. This article provides a framework for defining a "viable EVA center" as well as three ways of making existing divisions more viable: (1) use of transfer pricing and intrafirm charges; (2) reorganization; and (3) aggregation of divisional results.     

Assessing business risk: The case of Premier Punch, Inc

The recently issued Statement on Auditing Standards No. 109, Understanding the Entity and Its Environment and Assessing the Risks of Material Misstatement, emphasizes the need for auditors to understand the client’s business and environment, particularly the client’s business risk [American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) (2006a), understanding the entity and its environment and assessing the risks of material misstatement, Statement on Auditing Standards No. 109. New York, NY: AICPA]. However, the manner in which auditors obtain such an understanding, especially an auditor’s assessment of a client’s business risk, is often challenging for students because they lack the business experience necessary to perform such an assessment. This case provides students with an opportunity to assess business risk in a realistic context that includes evidence beyond the content of the financial statements. Company information is provided via a webpage (www.premierpunch.com) with content similar to that of an actual investor relations site. Students must evaluate the information presented in the company’s annual report, press releases and other sources, and consider the impact of that information on several facets of business risk. Students also perform an analytical review of the company’s financial statements and synthesize the case information into a professional memo containing their assessment of business risk.     

Collusion Proof Transfer Payment Schemes with Multiple Agents

Most of the current studies on transfer pricing under asymmetric information focus on a single principal and a single agent. Under a separating management and ownership assumption, transfer pricing is at minimum a three-person problem involving one principal and two agents. This paper considers a transfer pricing problem with two agents who possess private information and seek to maximize their net cash flows, instead of divisional accounting profits. The objectives of this paper are: (1) to derive a direct-revelation mechanism that induces truth telling and efficient allocation; (2) to study the agents' collusion behaviors under the direct-revelation mechanism. The findings indicate that when agents have the option to quit after contracting, it is optimal for the center to produce less than the first-best output level unless the costs for both divisions are at their lowest levels. The optimal amount of underproduction varies according to the demand condition. In addition, two sets of transfer functions, named as identical and nonidentical functions, are derived to induce truth-telling and yield optimal equilibrium output. The two sets of transfer functions are subject to collusion. However, the functions induce different collusion behaviors among agents, that is, the collusion sets for both functions are not common sets. This property enables us to eliminate any collusion between agents, particularly prior to their observation of private information.     

A theory of systemic risk and design of prudential bank regulation

Systemic risk is modeled as the endogenously chosen correlation of returns on assets held by banks. The limited liability of banks and the presence of a negative externality of one bank’s failure on the health of other banks give rise to a systemic risk-shifting incentive where all banks undertake correlated investments, thereby increasing economy-wide aggregate risk. Regulatory mechanisms such as bank closure policy and capital adequacy requirements that are commonly based only on a bank’s own risk fail to mitigate aggregate risk-shifting incentives, and can, in fact, accentuate systemic risk. Prudential regulation is shown to operate at a collective level, regulating each bank as a function of both its joint (correlated) risk with other banks as well as its individual (bank-specific) risk.     

The most influential journals in academic accounting

In this article we summarize the findings of articles that have ranked academic accounting journals, as well as articles that provide other bases for considering journal quality. Results indicate that five journals—Accounting, Organizations and Society, Contemporary Accounting Research, Journal of Accounting and Economics, Journal of Accounting Research, and The Accounting Review—rank consistently as the top journals in the field. However, these five journals differ substantially as to the numbers of articles they publish overall as well as the proportions of articles that are related to the various specialty areas of accounting. Further, the relative proportions of articles by area do not correspond to the numbers of individuals working in the specialty areas. Financial accounting articles appear in disproportionately high numbers for all journals except Accounting, Organizations and Society, whereas management accounting articles appear in disproportionately low numbers for all journals except Accounting, Organizations and Society. In all journals, systems and tax articles also appear to be disproportionately low vis-à-vis the numbers of individuals working in these areas. Auditing receives fairly even exposure across journals and vis-à-vis individuals in the area, except in the Journal of Accounting and Economics.