Trade liberalization through asset markets

Political-economy expositions of trade policy have traditionally described asset or factor ownership as not subject to change. Asset markets, however, allow individuals to change the composition of income sources. We consider an economy with stochastic productivity to show how the equilibrium composition of asset portfolios influences individual attitudes toward free trade. The model links financial market completeness and trade liberalization in the second half of the 20th century and provides a contributing answer to why governments in poorer countries without well-developed financial markets have failed to liberalize trade.     

后危机时代中国外贸宏观管理的战略调整:金融经济语境的实证描述

金融经济的全球渗透业已构成后危机时代中国外贸宏观管理的内在要素。通过构造影响实体经济的新机制和增加货币市场需求管理的复杂性重塑全球市场的需求面,辅之以全球化新趋势的供给面变化,金融经济正在构建新的国际贸易政策的全球环境。有鉴于此,中国外贸宏观管理调整应关注金融经济对国际贸易发展的内生性影响,相机实施新的外贸宏观调控以适应金融经济日益深化条件下经济周期的特征变化,同时基于中国开放型经济发展阶段特征的识别,建立国内外需求的统筹调节机制以满足宏观战略和企业组织结构调整目标。近期应当注意统筹运用金融、货币和主权信用手段改进中国的出口贸易环境,整合全球分销网络以建立动态培植和调节需求的新机制,并加强新型贸易品部门监控。     

Reciprocated unilateralism in trade policy

Using the menu-auction approach to endogenous determination of tariffs and allowing additionally for lobby formation itself to be endogenous, this paper analyzes the impact of unilateral trade liberalization by one country on its partner's trade policies. We find that such unilateral liberalization may induce reciprocal tariff reductions by the partner country. Intuitively, unilateral liberalization by one country has the effect of increasing the incentives for the export lobby in the partner country to form and to lobby effectively against the import-competing lobby there for lower protection.     

美欧贸易壁垒调查立法及应对机制的制度分析

WTO争端解决机制与成员方通过国内立法建立的贸易壁垒调查制度共存的现状,影响着WTO规则改革的方向。美欧贸易壁垒调查应对机制在实践中具有不同战略构想,同时也存在相似的政策取向。它对于WTO其他成员国建设自身贸易预警机制具有重要借鉴价值,中国应研究美欧关于贸易壁垒调查立法的改革及调整,不断完善贸易壁垒调查制度,赋予国内企业提出贸易壁垒调查申请的充分权利。     

绿色贸易措施的政治博弈

随着贸易自由化和全球经济一体化,世界各国出于维护本国国际竞争比较优势战略目标和实现贸易与环境协调发展的客观需要,以可持续发展为口号,以保护环境和人类健康为目的或借口,以产品标准、环境标志、绿色包装、贸易制裁等为手段的绿色贸易措施正在成为国际社会特别是发达国家越来越频繁使用的新的国际贸易保护手段。形形色色的绿色贸易措施正在向系统化、制度化和国际化方向演进。本文通过对近期一些国外经济学家的相关文献回顾,对绿色贸易措施产生的政治博弈过程进行简单的综述,为我国参与新一轮的WTO谈判提供一些理论参考。     

国家贸易保护政策的聚类分析

由于全球经济增长的压力,各国有利用各种政策干预贸易的可能,本文通过对各国的有关贸易政策的考察,选择了15个国家,对其贸易保护状况进行了聚类分析和结构分析,发现中国香港和台湾地区开放度最高,保护强度最低,美国、欧盟等一些国家保护强度较低,日本、中国、印度保护强度较高,俄罗斯保护强度最高。     

Costly revenue-raising and the case for favoring import-competing industries

A standard finding in the political economy of trade policy literature is that we should expect export-oriented industries to attract more assistance than import-competing industries. In reality, however, trade policy is heavily biased toward supporting import industries. This paper shows how the costliness of raising revenue via taxation makes trade subsidies less desirable and trade taxes more desirable in a standard protection for sale framework. The model is then estimated and its predictions tested using U.S. tariff data. An empirical estimate of the costliness of revenue-raising is also obtained.     

从历史视角看美国贸易政策的本质

美国的贸易政策是指能直接影响美国进出口地理方向和进出口商品结构、跨国投资的政府措施。必须从经济和政治结合的角度去理解美国的贸易政策,美国贸易政策的本质是实现美国国内外经济利益和政治利益的工具或手段。贸易保护主义和贸易自由化都是美国利益的实现方式。认识美国贸易政策的本质为认识中美贸易方面存在的问题提供一种思路。     

Endogenous political organization and the value of trade agreements

In a bargaining model of endogenous protection, I introduce fixed costs of political-organization that need to be incurred by capitalists prior to actual lobbying. Unlike Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare [J. Pol. Econ. 106(3) (1998) 575] intersectoral capital mobility is disallowed. Nevertheless, I am still able to obtain their main result that a government with low bargaining power vis-à-vis the import-competing lobby precommits to a free-trade agreement. Further, with high fixed organizational costs, the government prefers to stay out of such agreements. Its maximum bargaining power consistent with signing a trade agreement has an inverse-V-shaped relationship with respect to the size of fixed costs.     

Trade and foreign direct investment in China: a political economy approach

We view the political process in China as trading off the social benefits of increased trade and foreign direct investment against the losses incurred by state-owned enterprises due to such liberalization. A model drawing on Grossman and Helpman [Am. Econ. Rev. 84 (1994) 833; The Political Economy of Trade Policy: Papers in Honor of Jagdish Bhagwati, MIT Press, Cambridge (1996) 199] is used to derive an empirically estimable government objective function. The key structural parameters of this model are estimated using province-level data on foreign direct investment and trade flows in China, over the years 1984-1995. We find that the weight applied to consumer welfare is between one-seventh and one-quarter of the weight applied to the output of state-owned enterprises.     

Strategic bargaining for the control of a dynamic system in state-space form

The partition of a pie model is integrated into a two-player difference game in state-space form with a finite horizon, in order to derive strategic bargaining outcomes in the framework of difference games. It is assumed that agreements are binding. In contrast to the model for the partition of a pie, the outcomes are not necessarily Pareto-efficient. For one-dimensional, linear-quadratic difference games, the subgame perfect bargaining outcome is unique, Paretoefficient, and analytically tractable. However, for higher dimensions the linear-quadratic structure breaks down and one has to resort to numerical methods.The authors thank Joseph Plasmans, Jacob Engwerda, and Herbert Hamers for valuable suggestions. A large part of this research is financed by the Dutch Organization for Scientific Research, grant 450-228-018.     

Feasible multilateralism and the effects of regionalism

Recent research shows that the GATT/WTO negotiating rules are capable of delivering a politically efficient equilibrium. Such an equilibrium is, however, economically inefficient. Global free trade, in particular, is unattainable even in a fully cooperative world, if governments have political motivations. In such a context, we show that regional trade agreements can help move the world towards a welfare-superior equilibrium. The reason is that, when members of regional trade agreements lower trade barriers against one another, they tend to reduce their multilateral tariffs as well. Once we account for these endogenous changes—and only then—we find that regionalism can raise world welfare even in a fully cooperative (but political) world. Regional integration can, however, harm outsiders.     

贸易保护政策的动态不一致性 ——以我国出口退税政策为例

本文从企业与政府之间博弈的视角,揭示贸易保护政策的动态不一致性问题。理论分析表明,在理性预期与信息不对称的假设前提下,政府在与私人企业的博弈中,往往处于劣势地位,容易受企业行为的牵引,其结果将导致贸易保护政策的动态不一致性。本文以我国出口退税政策的实施作为上述论断的经验证据,结果表明,出口企业的策略性行为可能是导致我国出口退税政策频繁变动的内在原因之一。     

自由贸易港区的立法模式:台湾地区的实践及其对海南自贸港的借鉴意义

为规划自由贸易港区,台湾地区构建了以《自由贸易港区设置管理条例》为核心的分立式立法模式,具体内容表现为以行政法规范为主、经济法规范为辅的特征。在行政法规范方面,首先规制自由贸易港区的设置要件;其次是对企业的监管采取许可方式规制企业准入,区内允许自主经营,但固定资产与经营业务的变动仍需核准;至于货物的监管,除非关涉公共安全,否则货物入区不受限制;货物在区内的活动仍须备案,出区时则根据货物去向实行不同的监管模式。在经济法规范方面则规制税收与金融两个领域。基于台湾地区自由贸易港区与海南自由贸易港在本质上并无差异,上述立法模式值得借鉴。事实上,已列入全国人大立法计划的《海南自由贸易港法》就采用了分立式立法模式。在分立式立法模式下,亦可移植以自由贸易港的设置、对企业的监管及对货物的监管等行政管理为主,以税收与金融等经济管控为辅的相关规制。     

我国幼稚产业发展政策与贸易政策的协调研究

产业政策传统上被认为是一国内部的宏观经济管理政策,但是在世贸组织框架下产业政策已经受到世贸组织多边贸易政策体系的严格约束。我国汽车产业政策案的发生使我国对幼稚产业的促进政策不得不面临诸如世贸组织基本原则及例外、TRIMs协定等诸多方面的检验。以汽车产业为例,我国幼稚产业的发展政策必须考虑贸易政策的协调作用,必须研究和灵活运用世贸组织规则。     

中国钢铁产业的国际贸易政策选择

入世以后,中国钢铁贸易面临更加复杂的国际环境,同时随着国内钢铁市场的快速发展和国家经济政策的调整,进出口形势也在发生变化。本文着重研究了未来中国钢铁贸易的趋势,分析了相关经济政策变化对钢铁贸易的影响,并提出钢铁贸易政策调整的价值取向和政策建议。     

我国生物医药产业国际贸易的政策选择

文章通过对我国2000-2004年生物医药产品进出口数据的研究,揭示了我国生物医药产品进出口贸易的基本状况,探究了生物医药产品进出口存在的问题。根据生物医药产业国际贸易的发展趋势及政策特点,提出了我国生物医药产业贸易政策的价值取向,以期对我国生物医药企业国际竞争能力的增强有所帮助。     

管理贸易政策调整与经贸可持续发展问题探讨——基于青岛市管理贸易政策的研究

管理贸易政策是各贸易主体参与国际分工中为追求最大化贸易利益而实施的政策。随着各国政府宏观调控的加强,管理贸易政策成为一个国家或地区经贸可持续发展的重要支撑之一。青岛是典型的以对外贸易拉动经济增长的城市,通过研究青岛市经贸发展中存在的问题,探讨通过管理贸易政策调整寻求实现经贸可持续发展的路径,为地方经济提供具体政策建议同时对我国类似的地区经贸发展提供可借鉴的经验。     

我国应对技术性贸易壁垒（TBT）的措施

技术性贸易壁垒是国际贸易中新兴的保护贸易措施，它具有广泛性、差异性、灵活性、隐蔽性等特点，很大程度上影响了我国的出口贸易。我国应采用合理有效的策略，应对技术性贸易壁垒对我国出口贸易的挑战。     

Some concepts of distributive justice in bargaining problems

In this article we study the problems associated with distributive justice in an abstract framework originally conceived for the analysis of social choice and bargaining problems. Induced social choice correspondences are derived by considering alternatives which are invariant under permutations of the status quo point. We study in particular the fairness correspondence and a generalized Walrasian bargaining solution and establish links between the two concepts. The analysis in this article can be extended far beyond the point at which it ends.