Long-duration bonds and sovereign defaults

This paper extends the baseline framework used in recent quantitative studies of sovereign default by assuming that the government can borrow using long-duration bonds. This contrasts with previous studies, which assume the government can borrow using bonds that mature after one quarter. We show that, when we assume that the government issues bonds with a duration similar to the average duration of sovereign bonds in emerging economies, the model generates an interest rate that is substantially higher and more volatile than the one obtained assuming one-quarter bonds. This narrows the gap between the predictions of the model and the data, which indicates that the introduction of long-duration bonds may be a useful tool for future research about emerging economies. Our analysis is also relevant for the study of other credit markets.     

Private capital flows, capital controls, and default risk

What has been the effect of the shift in emerging market capital flows toward private sector borrowers? Are emerging market capital flows more efficient? If not, can controls on capital flows improve welfare? This paper shows that the answers depend on the form of default risk. When private loans are enforceable, but there is the risk that the government will default on behalf of all residents, private lending is inefficient and capital controls are potentially Pareto-improving. However, when private agents may individually default, capital flow subsidies are potentially Pareto-improving.     

Monetary policy and welfare in a small open economy

This paper analyzes optimal monetary policy in a small open economy featuring monopolistic competition and nominal rigidities. It shows that the utility-based loss function for this economy can be written as a quadratic expression of domestic inflation, output gap and real exchange rate. The presence of an internal monopolistic distortion and a terms of trade externality drives optimal policy away from domestic inflation targeting and affects the optimal level of exchange rate volatility. When domestic and foreign goods are close substitutes for each other, the optimal policy rule implies lower real exchange rate volatility than a domestic inflation targeting regime. The reverse is true when the elasticity of substitution between goods is low.     

Habit formation and fiscal transmission in open economies

In this paper we analyze the ability of an open economy version of the neoclassical model to account for the time-series evidence on fiscal policy transmission. Revisiting the evidence, we find that i) government spending raises output, while inducing a simultaneous decline of investment and the current account and ii) the responses of output and investment are more muted in more open economies while current account deficits tend to be larger. Turning to the model, we explore the role of habit formation for fiscal policy transmission. Specifically, we show that the model can account for the evidence if consumption behavior is characterized by habit formation and the terms of trade adjust endogenously.     

Analytics of sovereign debt restructuring

This paper develops a simple theoretical model to analyse recent proposals on restructuring of sovereign bonds. We find that collective action clauses (CACs) inserted in bonds resolve the inefficiencies caused by intra-creditor coordination problems providing that all parties have complete information about each other's preferences. In such a world, statutory mechanisms, such as international bankruptcy courts, are unnecessary. This is no longer the case when the benefits from reaching a restructuring agreement are private information to the debtor and its creditors due to inefficiencies caused by the debtor-creditor bargaining problem.     

The real effects of financial integration

This paper shows how correlations in GDP fluctuations rise with financial integration. Finance serves to increase international correlations in both consumption and GDP fluctuations, which explains the persistent gap between the two in the data, a “quantity puzzle”. The positive association between financial integration and GDP correlation constitutes a puzzle, as theory suggests a negative relation if anything. Nevertheless, it prevails in the data even after the effects of finance on trade and specialization are accounted for.     

Currency depreciations, financial transfers, and firm heterogeneity

The present paper investigates five episodes of currency collapse from the perspective of non-financial firms operating in Argentina, Brazil and Mexico. We focus on two aspects: wealth and income transfers from borrowing firms to lenders and firm heterogeneity. At the firm level, we find that the currency collapses are preceded and associated with sharply rising financial transfers from firms to lenders. The debt and income structure is central in explaining the asymmetric firm dynamics. Most affected are firms with high levels of unhedged foreign-currency debt. At the country level, Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico display three contrasting examples. Argentina has a large currency mismatch, Brazil balances the currency denomination of debt and income (natural hedge), and Mexico occupies an intermediate position.     

Optimal reserve management and sovereign debt

Most models currently used to determine optimal foreign reserve holdings take the level of international debt as given. However, given the sovereign's willingness-to-pay incentive problems, reserve accumulation may reduce sustainable debt levels. In addition, assuming constant debt levels does not allow addressing one of the puzzles behind using reserves as a means to avoid the negative effects of crisis: why do not sovereign countries reduce their sovereign debt instead? To study the joint decision of holding sovereign debt and reserves, we construct a stochastic dynamic equilibrium model calibrated to a sample of emerging markets. We obtain that the reserve accumulation does not play a quantitatively important role in this model. In fact, we find the optimal policy is not to hold reserves at all. This finding is robust to considering interest rate shocks, sudden stops, contingent reserves and reserve dependent output costs.     

Quantitative implications of a debt-deflation theory of Sudden Stops and asset prices

This paper shows that the quantitative predictions of an equilibrium asset-pricing model with financial frictions are consistent with key features of the Sudden Stop phenomenon. Foreign traders incur costs in trading assets with domestic agents, and a collateral constraint limits external debt to a fraction of the market value of domestic equity holdings. When this constraint does not bind, standard productivity shocks cause typical real-business-cycle effects. When it binds, the same shocks cause strikingly different effects depending on the leverage ratio and asset market liquidity. With high leverage and a liquid market, the shocks force “fire sales” of assets and Fisher's debt-deflation mechanism amplifies the responses of asset prices, consumption and the current account. Precautionary saving makes these Sudden Stops infrequent in the long run.     

Renegotiation, collective action clauses and sovereign debt markets

Collective action clauses (CACs) are provisions specifying that a supermajority of bondholders can change the terms of a bond. We study how CACs determine governments' fiscal incentives, sovereign bond prices, and default probabilities in environments with and without contingent debt and IMF presence. We claim that CACs are likely to be an irrelevant dimension of debt contracts in current sovereign debt markets because of the variety of instruments utilized by sovereigns and the implicit IMF guarantee. Nonetheless, under a new international bankruptcy regime like that recently proposed by the IMF, CACs can increase significantly the cost of borrowing for sovereigns, contrary to what is suggested in previous empirical literature.     

Are asset price guarantees useful for preventing Sudden Stops?: A quantitative investigation of the globalization hazard-moral hazard tradeoff

An implication of the globalization hazard hypothesis is that ‘Sudden Stops’ caused by global financial frictions could be prevented by offering foreign investors price guarantees on emerging markets assets. These guarantees create a tradeoff, however, because they weaken globalization hazard while creating international moral hazard. We study this tradeoff using a quantitative, equilibrium asset-pricing model. Without guarantees, margin calls and trading costs cause Sudden Stops driven by a Fisherian deflation. Price guarantees prevent this deflation by propping up foreign demand for assets. The effectiveness of price guarantees, their distortions on asset markets, and their welfare implications depend critically on whether the guarantees are contingent on debt levels and on the price elasticity of foreign demand for domestic assets.     

Currency mismatches and monetary policy: A tale of two equilibria

We develop a model of a small economy whose residents choose whether to borrow in domestic or foreign currency. The central bank, in turn, chooses fixed or flexible exchange rates, taking the currency denomination of debts as given. We characterize the simultaneous determination of portfolios and exchange rate regime. Both floating and fixed rates can occur as equilibrium outcomes. “Fear of floating” may emerge endogenously and in association with a currency mismatch in assets and liabilities. If equilibria with both fixed rates and floating rates coexist, the latter is Pareto superior. Lessons for current “de-dollarization” proposals are discussed.     

“Rules of thumb” for sovereign debt crises

This paper investigates the economic and political conditions that are associated to the occurrence of a sovereign debt crisis. We use a new statistical approach (Classification and Regression Tree) that allows us to derive a collection of “rules of thumb” that help identify the typical characteristics of defaulters. We find that not all crises are equal: they differ depending on whether the government faces insolvency, illiquidity, or various macroeconomic risks. We also characterize the set of fundamentals that can be associated with a relatively “risk-free” zone. This classification is important for discussing appropriate policy options to prevent crises and improve response time and prediction.     

Sovereign default, private sector creditors, and the IFIs

The data reveal that emerging market sovereign borrowing from International Financial Institutions (IFIs) is small, intermittent and countercyclical compared to that from private sector creditors. The IFI loan contracts offered to sovereigns differ from the private ones in that they are more enforceable and have conditionality arrangements attached to them. Taking these contractual differences as given, this paper builds a quantitative model of a sovereign borrower and argues that better enforceability of IFI loan contracts is the main institutional feature that explains the size and cyclicality while conditionality accounts for the intermittency of borrowing from the IFIs.     

Gunboats, reputation, and sovereign repayment: lessons from the Southern Confederacy

Many states that formed the Southern Confederacy defaulted on sovereign debt sold in international capital markets during the 1840s. The Confederacy also elected President Jefferson Davis, who openly advocated the repudiation of U.S. states' debts while a member of Congress. Despite its poor credit record, the Confederate government managed to float cotton bonds in England that constituted under 2% of its expenditures. The bonds were largely issued to settle overdue debts with gun contractors who had cut off trade credit. The South serviced the bonds as late as March 1865, a time of domestic hyperinflation and weeks before the fall of Richmond. Although the Confederate experience shows that trade sanctions can promote debt repayment, the gunboat model can only account for a small amount of lending. A reputation or another type of sanction would be necessary to support higher levels of lending in international capital markets.     

Monetary autonomy in emerging market economies: The role of foreign reserves

This paper examines trends in monetary autonomy and their interactions with financial integration, currency regimes and foreign reserves for recent decades in emerging Asian and Latin American economies. Our main findings are the following: First, most emerging Asian economies have increased monetary autonomy mainly due to changes in currency regimes toward floating regimes, while emerging Latin American economies have shown mixed results on monetary autonomy. Second, in all sample economies, the accumulation of foreign reserves has contributed to retaining monetary autonomy, probably implying the role of foreign reserves as an anchor for monetary autonomy in emerging market economies.     

Business cycles and monetary regimes in emerging economies: A role for a monopolistic banking sector

This study shows that the presence of imperfect competition in the banking system propagates external shocks and amplifies the business cycle. Strategic limit pricing, aimed at protecting retail niches from potential competitors, generates countercyclical bank markups. Markup increments during recessions directly increase borrowing costs for firms and indirectly damage the financial position of firms' balance-sheets, increasing the risk perception of lenders. I use Bayesian techniques and data from Argentina to show that the inclusion of monopolistic banking improves the fit of the New Keynesian small open economy model.     

Closing large open economy models

A large class of international business cycle models admits multiple locally isolated deterministic steady states, if the elasticity of substitution between traded goods is sufficiently low. I explore the conditions under which such multiplicity occurs and characterize the dynamic properties in the neighborhood of each steady state. Models with standard incomplete markets, portfolio costs, a debt-elastic interest rate, or an overlapping generations framework allow for multiple steady states, if the model features multiple steady states under financial autarchy. If the excess demand for the foreign traded good is increasing in the good's own price in a given steady state, the equilibrium dynamics around this steady state are unbounded. Otherwise, the dynamics are bounded and unique. By contrast, with Uzawa-type preferences, the steady state is always unique and the associated equilibrium dynamics are always bounded and unique. The same results obtain under complete markets.     

Relative price volatility under Sudden Stops: The relevance of balance sheet effects

Sudden Stops are associated with increased volatility in relative prices. We introduce a model based on information acquisition to rationalize this increased volatility. An empirical analysis of the conditional variance of the wholesale price to consumer price ratio using panel ARCH techniques confirms the relevance of Sudden Stops and potential balance sheet effects as key determinants of relative price volatility, where balance sheet effects are captured by the interaction of a proxy for potential changes in the real exchange rate (linked to the degree of external leverage of the absorption of tradable goods) and a measure of domestic liability dollarization.