Unique equilibrium in rent-seeking contests with a continuum of types

It is shown that rent-seeking contests with continuous and independent type distributions possess a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.     

Ranking of signals in multitask agency models

A lift zonoid criterion is proven to be necessary and sufficient for ranking signals in multi-task agency models, and can be applied to a broader set of signals than a multivariate MPS criterion. The two criteria coincide under certain conditions.     

Agency conflicts in the presence of random private benefits from project implementation

We study a contracting problem where a principal delegates the decision to implement a “project” to an agent who obtains private information about the value of the project before making the implementation decision. Moral hazard arises because the agent gets private random non-contractible benefits, or incurs private random non-contractible costs, if the project is implemented. This contracting problem is pervasive, when “project” and “benefits” are interpreted broadly.     

Asymmetry and revenue in first-price auctions

We show by an example that in first-price IPV auctions, asymmetry in bidders' valuations need not reduce the revenue compared to a benchmark symmetric model with the same amount of social surplus. Asymmetry need not reduce competition in first-price auctions.     

An additively separable representation in the Savage framework

This paper proposes necessary and sufficient conditions for an additively separable representation of preferences in the Savage framework (where the objects of choice are acts: measurable functions from an infinite set of states to a potentially finite set of consequences). A preference relation over acts is represented by the integral over the subset of the product of the state space and the consequence space which corresponds to the act, where this integral is calculated with respect to an evaluation measure on this space. The result requires neither Savage's P3 (monotonicity) nor his P4 (weak comparative probability). Nevertheless, the representation it provides is as useful as Savage's for many economic applications.     

Search and endogenous concentration of liquidity in asset markets

We develop a search-based model of asset trading, in which investors of different horizons can invest in two assets with identical payoffs. The asset markets are partially segmented: buyers can search for only one asset, but can decide which one. We show the existence of a “clientele’’ equilibrium where all short-horizon investors search for the same asset. This asset has more buyers and sellers, lower search times, and trades at a higher price relative to its identical-payoff counterpart. The clientele equilibrium dominates the one where all investor types split equally across assets, implying that the concentration of liquidity is socially desirable.     

Contract renegotiation in a continuous state space

Summary. When players are unable to write complete state contingent contracts it is shown, within the context of a non-cooperative contracting-renegotiation game, that the only subgame perfect equilibrium allocations are those that correspond to the set of first-best allocations. Players are able to implement this set of allocations by signing an initial contract that is subsequently renegotiated in all states of the world. The contracting-renegotiation problem is complicated in an interesting way by assuming that the state space is continuous. The issue of the existence of an initial contract, that is subsequently renegotiated to the set of first-best allocations, must be resolved. Unlike Aghion, Dewatripont and Rey [1994], the results here do not require nor depend upon the comonotonicity of the objective functions. Received: January 27, 1995; revised version July 1, 1996     

Monitoring a common agent: Implications for financial contracting

Multiple principals want to obtain income from a privately informed agent and design their contracts non-cooperatively. The degree of coordination between principals shapes the contracts and affects the amount of monitoring. Equity-like contracts and excessive monitoring emerge when principals coordinate or verify each other's monitoring efforts. When this is not possible, free riding weakens monitoring incentives, so that flat payments, debt-like contracts, and very low levels of monitoring appear. Free riding may be so strong to induce even less monitoring than if the principals cooperated with each other; that is, non-cooperative monitoring does not necessarily lead to excessive monitoring.     

Strategic delay in market entry

Abstract.  Two firms are contemplating entry into a market that is viable for only one firm in a good state. We show that even if each firm receives a signal that perfectly reveals a good state, both might strategically delay entry, owing to the fear that the other firm might enter in the same period as well. We also find the conditions where the informed firm will let the rival firm know about the market's profitability and the two will merge to enter the market. We discuss the applications of this model to the oil industry and the generic drug industry.     

Terrorism risk concern in Europe

Motivated by the Bayesian framework, we explore terrorism risk perception differences across European countries. Perception variation is explained by the long-term terrorism countries face, while the cyclical part of terrorism does not seem to play any role.     

Coordination and delay in global games

What is the effect of offering agents an option to delay their choices in a global coordination game? We address this question by considering a canonical binary action global game, and allowing players to delay their irreversible decisions. Those that delay have access to accurate private information at the second stage, but receive lower payoffs. We show that, as noise vanishes, as long as the benefit to taking the risky action early is greater than the benefit of taking the risky action late, the introduction of the option to delay reduces the incidence of coordination failure in equilibrium relative to the standard case where all agents must choose their actions at the same time. We outline the welfare implications of this finding, and probe the robustness of our results from a variety of angles.     

Sources of TFP growth in a framework of convergence-evidence from Greece

The main hypothesis tested in the paper is whether technology is a conduit of productivity growth for a country that falls behind the frontier. Although the current analysis focuses on a country growth narrative, the evidence represents a pair of countries (i.e. Greece and Germany) that admittedly form the periphery and the core of Europe. The first lesson taken from the study is that for more than two decades the speed of productivity adjustment was rather low in Greece, underlying a number of unobserved rigidities that exist both at the industry and the institutional level. Even though the speed of technology transfer is low, the adoption of foreign technology remains an important source of productivity growth. Other key findings are that productivity gains from trade exist but their full realization requires a substantial time lag. Additionally, the degree of trade openness improves absorptive capacity, confirming the dual role of trade as recently stressed in the productivity literature. R&D activity is another productivity growth contributor but only through higher rates of innovation.     

A two-person game of information transmission

We consider a statistical decision problem faced by a two player organization whose members may not agree on outcome evaluations and prior probabilities. One player is specialized in gathering information and transmitting it to the other, who takes the decision. This process is modeled as a game. Qualitative properties of the equilibria are analyzed. The impact of improving the quality of available information on the equilibrium welfares of the two individuals is studied. Better information generally may not improve welfare. We give conditions under which it will.     

Preponderance of evidence

This paper investigates the incentive properties of the standard of proof for a finding of negligence when evidence about injurers’ behavior is imperfect. We show that a “more-likely-than-not” decision rule provides maximal incentives for potential tort-feasors to exert care. An injurer is then held liable whenever inadequate care appears more likely than due care, and not liable otherwise. Our analysis provides a deterrence rationale for the exclusionary rules of evidence found in common law and the preponderance of evidence standard of proof.     

On the efficiency of participation with vertically differentiated workers

In this journal Albrecht et al. (2010) assume that the planner problem is constrained by participation decisions. When this constraint is relaxed participation is too high whereas market tightness is too low. Subsidizing non-participants improves market efficiency and reduces unemployment.     

Dynamics in transitory and permanent variation of wages in Germany

We employ covariance structure models to decompose the cross-sectional variance of male wages in Germany into its permanent and transitory parts. We find that the steep growth of cross-sectional inequality during the early 2000s is predominantly driven by transitory factors.     

基于系统动力学的研发投资预算研究

研发投入是一种高风险的投资,研发投入过多或过少都不利于企业的发展,而如何在企业资源有限的情况下,合理安排研发投入以获取持续的竞争能力是企业研发管理的重点。应该说,研发投入系统是一种复杂的系统,本文首先对研发投资预算的方法进行了回顾,继而提出了运用系统动力学编制研发投资预算的思路并构建了基于系统动力学的研发投资预算模型,该模型将研发系统分为研发流程、研发团队和现金流等三个子模块并描述了研发投资预算的影响因素及其作用过程,最后,以电子产品为例运用该模型模拟了四种不同研发投资预算方案的效果。     

Decision-making in competitive framings—Strategic behavior of chess players in mini-ultimatum game chess puzzles

We introduce a competitive framing in the mini-ultimatum game utilizing chess puzzles. Therein, our chess playing participants accept low offers significantly more often compared to a neutral framing. We conclude that in familiar competitive surroundings egoistic behavior is more acceptable.     

Sabotage in teams

We show that a team may favor self-sabotage to influence the principal’s contract decision. Sabotage increases a team member’s bonus and total team effort. If these benefits outweigh the reduction in the success probability, sabotaging the team is rational.