研发合作中的产权结构与投资激励

不完全合同背景下,产权分配在参与方的投资决策中至关重要。利用产权理论讨论了研发合作中的序贯投资决策和创新的产权分配问题。研究表明,最优产权结构随着参与方的谈判力变动,谈判力较低的一方单独拥有产权能够平衡其投资积极性;随着投资关系专用性程度的增加,最优产权为联合产权在产品开发者谈判力区间的范围更广。为了提高双方合作效率,可考虑采用由一个产品开发者出价并按照研究单位投资积极性分配初始产权的期权合同。比较分析发现：期权合同能够缓解投资不足问题,并进一步提高双方合作效率。     

Strategic union delegation and strike activity

Abstract.  We develop a model of wage determination with private information, in which the union has the option to delegate the wage bargaining to either surplus‐maximizing delegates or to wage‐maximizing delegates (such as senior union members). We show that the wage outcome in case of surplus‐maximizing delegates is not necessarily smaller than the wage outcome in case of wage‐maximizing delegates, even when the wage bargaining with private information is close to one with complete information. However, if it is commonly known that the union is stronger than the firm and the demand is sufficiently elastic, then delegating to wage‐maximizing delegates definitely increases the wage at equilibrium. The maximum delay in reaching an agreement is greater whenever the union chooses wage‐maximizing delegates instead of surplus‐maximizing delegates and remains finite even when the period length shrinks to zero. JEL classification: C70, C71, C72, C78     

Enterprise Bargaining and Productivity in Australia: What do We Know?

There appears to be widespread consensus, at least in industry and government, that enterprise bargaining has been beneficial for productivity. Many academics, however, have argued that the link between bargaining structure and workplace productivity is a contentious one, and that research has been unable to establish a relationship. The present paper re-examines the existing evidence. The review reinforces the need to exercise caution before asserting that enterprise bargaining is necessarily beneficial for workplace productivity. The main conclusion that emanates from this review, however, is not the absence of a clear-cut finding, but how poorly developed the relevant research literature is.     

A weak bargaining set for contract choice problems

In this paper, we consider the problem of choosing a set of multi-party contracts, where each coalition of agents has a non-empty finite set of feasible contracts to choose from. We call such problems, contract choice problems. The main result in this paper states that every contract choice problem has a non-empty weak bargaining set. The need for such a solution concept which is considerably weaker than the core arises, since it is well-known that even for very simple contract choice problems, the core may be empty. We also show by means of an example that an analog of the bargaining set due to Mas-Colell [Mas-Colell, A., 1989. An equivalence theorem for a bargaining set. Journal of Mathematical Economics 18, 129–139], as well as the natural analog of the bargaining set due to Aumann and Mashler [Aumann, R., Maschler, M., 1964. The bargaining set for cooperative games. In: Dresher, M., Shapley, L., Tucker, A. (Eds.), Advances in Game Theory. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ] may be empty for contract choice problems.     

Exporting and performance: evidence from Chilean plants

Abstract.  Recent empirical evidence documents the superior characteristics of exporters relative to non‐exporters. Three explanations for this phenomenon have been proposed: self‐selection; learning‐by‐exporting; and conscious self‐selection. We test these three hypotheses using plant‐level data from Chile. We find that plants that enter international markets show superior initial performance compared with non‐exporters, consistent with self‐selection; we observe increases in productivity after plants begin to export, which is consistent with learning‐by‐exporting. We also find strong evidence supporting the idea that self‐selection is a conscious process by which plants increase productivity with the purpose of becoming exporters. JEL classification: F14; O54; D21     

Cross‐Border Intellectual Property Rights: Contract Enforcement and Absorptive Capacity

This article studies the cross‐border protection of intellectual property rights (IPR) as an outcome of a contract obtained through a Nash bargaining process between an innovative North and an imitative South. The level of disclosure required in such contract is higher, the more capable is the South in copying if bargaining breaks down. This raises questions about the suitability of universal IPR standards through a single contract. The threat of a penalty in case of non‐compliance can, however, reduce the outside option of more advanced countries and make a stricter IPR regime enforceable by harmonizing their interests with relatively less developed nations.     

The Biodiversity Bargaining Problem

We employ cooperative bargaining theory and Nash’s ‘rational threats’ idea to cast light on the biodiversity bargaining problem. The problem of global environmental negotiations is argued to be of the nature of a bargaining problem, in which bargainers must agree on the distribution of cooperative surplus in order to move to the bargaining frontier. We discuss the importance of both efficiency (bargaining frontier) and fairness (recognition of characteristics of bargainers) in the choice of the appropriate contract. We show that the incremental cost contract, used to resolve the biodiversity bargaining problem, is of the form of an extreme point contract that fails to recognise the contributions of the South to the production of cooperative surplus. A rational response to such a contract is the use of threats of biodiversity destruction. Contracts must evince both efficiency and fairness in order to represent lasting solutions.     

Output and wages with inequality averse agents

Abstract.  We analyse a two‐task work environment with risk‐neutral but inequality averse individuals. For the agent employed in task 2 effort is verifiable, while in task 1 it is not. Accordingly, agent 1 receives an incentive contract that, owing to his wealth constraint, leads to a rent that the other agent resents. We show that greater inequality aversion unambiguously decreases total output and therefore average labour productivity. More specifically, inequality aversion reduces effort, wage, and payoff of agent 1. Effects on wage and effort of agent 2 depend on whether effort levels across tasks are substitutes or complements in the firm's output function. JEL classification: D2, J3     

Counter intuitive results in a simple model of wage negotiations

Summary. Short-term contracts and exogenous productivity growth are introduced in a simple wage bargaining model. The equilibrium utilities corresponding to militant union behaviour are independent of the contract length. Necessary and sufficient conditions for monotonic convergence to a unique steady state are derived. Otherwise, cyclic behaviour of wage shares is inevitable. A wage decrease can occur if strike is credible, but never when strike is not credible. In the limit, as time between bargaining rounds vanishes, this paradox survives. Received: September 3, 1998; revised version: February 10, 2000     

Works Councils and Collective Bargaining in Germany: The Impact on Productivity and Wages

This paper investigates the interaction between establishment‐level codetermination and industry‐level collective bargaining in Germany. Based on a bargaining model, we derive our main hypothesis: In establishments covered by collective bargaining agreements, works councils are more likely to be engaged in productivity‐enhancing activities and less engaged in rent‐seeking activities than their counterparts in uncovered establishments. Our empirical analysis confirms this hypothesis. The presence of works councils exerts a positive impact on productivity within the covered industrial relations regime but not within the uncovered regime. The presence of works councils has a positive effect on wages within the uncovered regime but not to the same degree within the covered regime.     

Inward Investment and Technical Progress in the United Kingdom Manufacturing Sector

This paper investigates the impact of direct investment by foreign‐owned companies on technical progress and hence labour productivity in the UK manufacturing sector. Using an industry‐level panel data set we find that foreign‐owned firms have a significant positive effect on the level of technical efficiency in domestic firms. There is evidence of significant intra‐industry and inter‐industry spillovers from inward investment. These findings remain robust even when other factors such as imports and domestic R&D expenditures are allowed for. Inward investment appears to be a much more important source of technical progress than foreign trade.     

Export‐market participation and productivity performance in Canadian manufacturing

Abstract.  In this paper, we explore the linkages between export‐market participation and productivity performance in Canadian manufacturing plants. We also examine differences in the relationship between exporting and productivity for foreign‐controlled as opposed to domestic‐controlled plants, and between younger and older plants. Export participation is associated with improved productivity. The effect is much stronger for domestic‐controlled plants than for foreign‐controlled plants and for younger businesses than for older businesses. We interpret this as evidence that there is a learning effect associated with export activity but that the potential for improving productivity with entry to export markets differs across firms. JEL Classification: F1, O4     

共同代理框架下转售价格控制的反垄断竞争效应研究

转售价格控制一直是备受争议的纵向约束手段，也是反垄断部门重点关注的对象。本文以茅台和五粮液被处罚为出发点，研究在共同代理框架下上游制造商对产品进行广告宣传和推广等活动中采用转售价格控制是否具有反竞争效应的问题。结果表明：如果拥有全部的讨价还价能力，制造商在共同代理框架下没有动机使用转售价格控制；此外，两部定价可以使制造商达到默契合谋的结果，而与是否采用转售价格控制无关。尽管如此，转售价格控制的使用应该被反垄断部门予以禁止。     

Endogenous Choice of Strategic Contracts in a Mixed Duopoly with Bargaining Over Managerial Delegation Contracts

We revisit the endogenous choice problem of strategic contracts for the public firm and the private firm in a managerial mixed duopoly with differentiated goods. We consider the situation wherein the managerial delegation contracts are determined by maximising social welfare within the public firm, which is equal to the objective function of its owner, and through bargaining over the content of managerial delegation contracts between the owner and manager within the private firm. We show that, in equilibrium, when the manager of the private firm has high bargaining power relative to that of the owner, the public firm chooses a price contract, while the private firm chooses a quantity contract. However, there is no equilibrium market structure under the pure strategic contract class when the manager has sufficiently low bargaining power relative to that of the owner.     

Optimal contracts and the role of the government in wage bargaining

This paper introduces a contract between the government and trade unions in a model of strategic wage bargaining à la Lippi (2003). It shows that an optimal contract can be implemented through an appropriately defined inflation target.     

Nash bargaining model of HMO premiums

This paper estimates a model of commercial HMO premiums based on Nash's axiomatic approach to bargaining between HMOs and employers. The bargaining models incorporate variables that measure the?‘power’?of the parties to affect the division of potential gains from a contract. It is found that an increase in the number of competing HMOs increases the employer's bargaining power and leads to lower premiums, especially for for-profit HMOs. It is also found that employers’?bargaining power over non-profit HMOs is positively related to the ratio of the HMO's administrative expenses/total expenses.     

SUPPLIER INNOVATION IN THE PRESENCE OF BUYER POWER

This article analyzes the impact of retailer buyer power on a supplier's incentive to conduct innovation, with a focus on the supplier's investment in product variety and quality improvement. The analysis shows that an increase in buyer power, manifested through either a weakening of the supplier's bargaining position or a strengthening of a large retailer's bargaining power, leads to greater product variety and higher quality if the elasticity of demand is not too large. Increased buyer power, manifested through a strengthening of a large retailer's bargaining position, stimulates the supplier to invest more in quality improvement.     

基于公平心理偏好的投资博弈——敲竹杠问题的一个行为解决

敲竹杠问题是不完全合约理论的中心话题,经典文献认为,如果合约是不完全的,当事人的专用性投资会引发敲竹杠风险从而导致无效率的专用性投资。但是,关于敲竹杠问题的文献通常假定事后谈判结果对事前投资成本不敏感。通过在雇佣双方的投资博弈中引入投资成本相关性这种合作的谈判方式,将传统敲竹杠模型中影响谈判力的因素与当事人对公平偏好的行为因素二者融合,本文证明:与传统的投资博弈相比,在投资成本影响企业(雇员)谈判力的情况下,双方有更强的专用性人力资本投资激励。雇佣双方所面临的敲竹杠风险取决于双方的初始谈判力,且双方有可能在事前做出社会最优甚至过度的投资。这也从一个方面解释了现实中大量存在的有效投资现象。     

Distribution Dynamics and Cross‐Country Convergence: A New Approach

Distribution dynamics is a method for studying the evolution in time of an entire cross‐section distribution and has been initially employed to assess cross‐country convergence of per capita incomes. It has subsequently seen a widespread application in many different economic areas. When describing the law of motion of the distribution as a Markovian stochastic process, working in a discrete state‐space set up has several advantages, but the arbitrary discretisation of a continuous state‐space process has the undesired effect of removing the Markov property. This paper outlines a rigorous method for discretising a continuous state‐space Markov chain. The method is then applied to the distribution of per capita income across countries to reassess the (non‐) convergence phenomenon. It is found that the long run polarisation of per capita incomes across countries emerges even more dramatically than in previous studies.