Uncertainty and Fiscal Policy in an Asymmetric Monetary Union

We examine monetary and fiscal interactions in a monetary union model with uncertainty due to imperfect central bank transparency. It is first shown that monetary uncertainty discourages excessive taxation and may thus reduce average inflation and output distortions. However, as countries enter the monetary union, this tax-restraining effect of uncertainty is mitigated. The monetary union may hence lead to higher fiscal distortions in some member countries, depending on governments’ spending targets and on the change in the degree of uncertainty implied by common monetary policy.     

Rules,discretion, and international monetary and fiscal policy coordination

This paper considers the implications of international policy coordination when both monetary and fiscal policy choices are endogenous. We show that a movement from insular monetary commitment to international monetary policy coordination will, if fiscal policies are not coordinated, produce higher output and public expenditure levels at the expense of higher inflation rates. We also show that the concurrent coordination of monetary and fiscal policies raises output and inflation while lowering public expenditure relative to a regime of monetary coordination alone. We conclude that the arguments for concurrent monetary and fiscal policy coordination fail to have a clear-cut theoretical basis.     

A Macroeconomic Policy Game for a Monetary Union with Adaptive Expectations

We consider a dynamic game model of a two-country monetary union. Governments (fiscal policies) pursue national goals while the common central bank’s monetary policy aims at union-wide objectives. For a symmetric demand shock, we derive numerical solutions of the dynamic game between the governments and the central bank. We consider conflicting (non-cooperative Nash equilibrium) and coordinated policy-making (cooperative Pareto solutions). We show that there is a trade-off between the deviations of instruments and targets from desired paths; the volatility of output and inflation increases when private agents react more strongly to changes in actual inflation.     

Inflation and Business Cycle Convergence in the Euro Area: Empirical Analysis Using an Unobserved Component Model

The literature on optimum currency areas states that large inflation differentials can undermine monetary union. In the euro area, inflation rates diverged after the creation of the single currency, but started to converge again from mid-2002. Against this background, we assess the convergence of inflation rates and business cycles and study the relationship between them. The analysis is made using an unobserved component model estimated with the Kalman filter. In general, from 1980 to 2008 inflation rates and business cycles became more aligned in the euro area, but inflation rates converged more quickly than business cycles. The output gap is found to be a better indicator of the business cycle than unit labour cost when studying convergence. By looking at the causality between the convergence of inflation and output gap, it is found that inflation divergence has a limited destabilising economic impact.     

Structural Reform and Transparency in a Monetary Union

We assess how central bank transparency affects the incentives for labour market reform in a monetary union. We introduce transparency as affecting unemployment forecasts that provide information that the central bank has to the private sector and the governments. Under conditions of monetary policy opaqueness and inflation bias, we show that monetary union may induce more reform (as governments mitigate inflation surprises under idiosyncratic shocks), albeit to a lesser extent when inflation bias is only present at the national level. In the absence of inflation bias, central bank transparency, by eliminating inflation surprises in the face of idiosyncratic shocks, induces less reform in a currency union relative to monetary autonomy. Altogether, these results point to the need for a strong political commitment to reform so that member states benefit most from the combination of a credible and transparent single monetary policy with measures aimed at improving competitiveness and enhancing long-term growth.     

Multiple wage-bargaining systems in the single European currency area

Little attention in the EMU literature has been paid to theinteraction between central bank monetary rules and systemsof collective wage bargaining. Analytically and empirically,coordinated wage-bargaining systems respond with real wage restraintto non-accommodating monetary policy. Since wage determinationis dominated by collective bargaining in all the EMU memberstates and wage coordination within the member states has grownsince 1980, this is a topic of potential importance. In particular,the replacement of the Bundesbank, directly targeting Germaninflation, by a European Central Bank (ECB) targeting Europeaninflation will remove a major institutional support of wagerestraint in Germany. The consequences of this for EMU are workedout under two scenarios, that inflation expectations will begenerated by ECB monetary policy and that they will reflectGerman inflation outcomes. Possible institutional developmentsare discussed including government union bargains. The Bundesbankalso played a major role in maintaining fiscal rectitude: forunderlying structural reasons, therefore, it is possible thatGermany will move to a period of fiscal activism with wage restraintand low inflation purchased through social contract negotiations.     

Monetary Union in West Africa: An Agency of Restraint for Fiscal Policies?

Could a monetary union in West Africa (either an informal monetaryunion of the non-CFA countries, or a possible future monetaryunion of all ECOWAS members) be an effective ‘agency ofrestraint’ (Collier, 1991) on fiscal policies? We discussthe ways, both positive and negative, that monetary union couldaffect fiscal discipline and the arguments for explicit fiscalrestraints considered in the literature about the European MonetaryUnion (EMU), and consider their applicability to West Africa.The empirical evidence, EMU literature and CFA experience allsuggest the possibility that monetary union could create thetemptation for fiscal profligacy through prospects of a bail-out,or costs that are diluted through the membership. We concludethat a monetary union in West Africa can be an effective agencyof restraint on fiscal policies only if the hands of the fiscalauthorities are also tied by a strong set of fiscal restraintcriteria, applicable not just for accession to monetary union,but throughout the life of the union.     

Inflation Dynamics of Franc-Zone Countries Determinants,Co-movements and Spatial Interactions

This paper shows the uneven role played in the inflation dynamics of African franc zone countries by their integration in a regional monetary union. We obtain three main results sharply contrasting the central- (CEMAC) and west-African (WAEMU) regions. First, differences in the structure of economies and national fiscal stances play a similar role in both unions and appear as potential sources of inflation differentials. Second, even though co-movements are the principal drivers of inflation dynamics in both subregions, global factors dominate regional ones in WAEMU while both play an equal role in CEMAC. Thirdly, spatial interactions are unimportant in CEMAC due to little intra-zone trade, but take an asymmetric form in WAEMU due to the large size of Ivory Coast and Senegal.     

Optimal Monetary Policy in China

Using the structural vector autoregression model, we estimate the current responses of monetary policy to contemporaneous shocks from macroeconomic variables. Our findings indicate that the People's Bank of China responded to inflation and output changes, but did not react to asset price fluctuations during the period from January 1997 to March 2010. The optimal monetary responses to exogenous shocks are also examined. It is revealed that using asset prices to formulate monetary policy would not help to improve monetary authorities' performance in lowering the volatilities of output growth and inflation while keeping output growth and inflation in their safety zones. The effectiveness of monetary policy and fiscal policy in reacting to external shocks is also discussed.     

Designing Fiscal Institutions in a Monetary Union

This article explores the policy and wealth consequences of alternative institutional arrangements through which fiscal policy interacts with monetary policy in a monetary union such as the EMU. The central issue of the article is the design of the appropriate monetary and fiscal institutions through a comparison of alternative arrangements to distribute power over monetary and fiscal authorities between the central authority of the union and the individual members of the union and evaluating their performance. The main results of this article reveal that delegation of the fiscal policy to a council of country representatives and the monetary policy to a council of governors is the appropriate institutional design to reduce inflation bias and better stabilize regional, idiosyncratic supply and demand shocks in a monetary union.     

One Money and Sixteen Needs: Has the ECB’s Monetary Policy Become More Balanced Towards the Needs of the Member States?

In this paper we analyze whether the ECB’s monetary policy has become more balanced towards the needs of the individual member states with the passage of time. We assume that the ECB’s monetary policy stance is in line with a Taylor rule and based on the overall situation in the Euro area, more specifically on the Euro area inflation rate and the overall business cycle position in the area. The question therefore boils down to investigating whether inflation and business cycles have converged since the start of the monetary union. We show that the ECB, if in existence in the 1990s, would have had an impossible task. This is because inflation and business cycles still strongly differed in that time, although convergence substantially increased in the run up to the monetary union. In this respect, the decade under EMU drastically differs from the preceding one. This being said, the evidence for a further improvement in the course of the first decade of the new millennium is mixed. This is because although inflation has further converged, business cycles have shown a tendency for increased divergence. If, however, we are willing to put weights on inflation and output gap divergence (as implied by the Taylor rule), we conclude that also in the course of the period under EMU in general the ECB’s monetary policy has become more in line with the needs of the individual members. Looking at individual countries, we show that during the first decade of its existence the ECB’s interest rate was most fitted to the needs of France and Italy, and least to the needs of Ireland and Greece (both too low) and Germany (too high). To a lesser extent there were also mismatches for Spain and Portugal (both too low). In the more recent period since 2005, the mismatch between the desired domestic interest rate and the desired ECB rate has come down for most countries (most noticeable Germany). For Belgium (for which a higher interest rate was more appropriate), on the other hand, the mismatch increased. These overall positive findings, however, offer no guarantee that the task of the ECB will become easier in the future.     

Speculative attacks and currency crises: The Mexican experience

By using data from the Mexican economy, this paper estimates a speculative attack model of currency crises in order to identify the role of macroeconomic fundamentals and early warning signals of a potential currency crisis. A deterioration in fundamentals appears to generate high one-step-ahead probabilities for the observed regime changes during the sample period 1982–1994. Particularly, foreign reserve losses, expansionary output, monetary and fiscal policies, an increase in inflation differentials and the share of short-term foreign currency-indexed debt, and an appreciation of the real exchange rate appear to have contributed to the speculative pressures and the associated regime changes.     

Bailouts,Inflation, and Risk-Sharing in Monetary Unions

This paper presents a new rationalization for bailouts of sovereign debt in monetary unions, such as those observed during the recent Euro crisis. It introduces a model where member countries of the monetary union are ex-ante identical, and each derives utility from consumption and disutility from the union-wide inflation rate. The union’s central bank is utilitarian and lacks commitment. Countries borrow or save in a market for nominal sovereign debt in response to idiosyncratic income shocks, with countries that receive positive income shocks saving and countries that receive negative income shocks borrowing. Ex post, the monetary union’s central bank will attempt to devalue sovereign debt through surprise inflation, as this will redistribute income from rich creditor countries to poor debtor countries. Creditor countries choose to bailout debtor countries because bailouts will weaken the redistributive motives of the central bank and forestall surprise inflation. As bailouts in this environment constitute a payment from lucky creditor countries to unlucky debtor countries, they mimic a risk-sharing arrangement that insures against income shocks. The payments made by creditor countries are incentive-compatible due to the shared currency and inflation rate in the monetary union. This ability of countries to provide each other with incentive-compatible insurance constitutes a novel theory of optimal currency areas. This insurance benefit of the monetary union is largest for countries with negatively correlated income shocks, in contrast to the classic Mundell-Friedman optimal currency area criterion.

     

Macro policy in the tropics: How sensible people stand

A model for macro policy analysis is set out, incorporating an inflation theory based on distributional conflict, output and current account adjustment mechanisms, and the money market. Classic structuralist results about contractionary devaluation and stagflationary monetary restriction are derived. Alternative closures of the model are considered — monetarism and external strangulation (or foreign exchange bonanzas) — and it is extended to deal with interest rate reform. Short-term stabilization issues are analyzed — monetary and fiscal policy, import quotas and export subsidies as opposed to devaluation, financial market complications, food subsidies and public sector pricing, and orthodox and heterodox anti-inflationary programs. Finally, medium-term processes of inflation, distribution and growth are described. An example of an irreversible contractionary shock which leads the economy from a distributionally favorable to an unfavorable steady state is presented.     

EMU Stability: Direct and Indirect Risk Sharing

Our paper aims to analyze the effectiveness of different risk-sharing mechanisms in providing stability to a monetary union. We select two stylized tools with extreme and opposite features. The first is an expansionary but conventional monetary policy that is used to help EMU’s most fragile member states manage their public debts; the second is a centralized fiscal policy that allows for the transfer of a portion of these public debts from EMU’s most fragile member states to those considered EMU’s “core”. By a stylized periphery-core model of a monetary union, we compare the strengths and weaknesses of these two tools in order to reach some welfare implications in terms of union stability.     

Inflation,economic activity and the operation of fiscal,foreign and monetary impulses in the Netherlands — A preliminary analysis, 1953–1973

Summary This paper tests both the strong and weak versions of the fiscal, foreign and monetary impulse hypotheses holding that each of these impulses is either a sufficient or a necessary condition for fluctuations in price and output to occur.Four impulses are distinguished: a fiscal impulse being a linear combination of autonomous changes in government expenditures and taxes, two foreign impulses measured by the growth rates of world trade and import prices, and a monetary impulse measured by (changes in) the growth rate of the stock of domestic or world money.When tested against the Dutch post-war experience of inflation and output fluctuations, all strong impulse hypotheses have to be rejected, as do the weak fiscal and foreign world trade hypotheses with respect to inflation and the weak fiscal hypotheses with respect to output growth. The weak foreign and monetary impulse hypotheses of output fluctuations, however, and the weak foreign import price and monetarist hypotheses of inflation are not rejected.     

European monetary unification: a tour d'horizon

This article takes stock of the literature and debate over Europeanmonetary unification. In contrast to other papers, where itis argued that the issues and prospects remain shrouded in uncertainty,I argue that in a number of important areas, a reasonable degreeof consensus now exists, as the result of a decade of scholarship.The subsequent stock-taking concentrates on areas where significantquestions remain, starting with the implications of surrenderingthe exchange rate and an independent national monetary policyas instruments of adjustment; the conduct of fiscal policy underthe Excessive Deficit Procedure and the Stability Pact; andhow quickly the European union is likely to develop an EU-widesystem of fiscal federalism to accompany its monetary union.Turning from fiscal to monetary issues, I ask whether the EuropeanCentral Bank (ECB) will be as inflation averse as the Bundesbank,what exchange-rate policy the ECB will pursue, and whether theeuro will be a leading reserve currency. I conclude with whatmay be the most contentious issue of all, namely whether Europe'smonetary union could collapse after it begins.     

The Assessment: EMU, Four Years On

This paper reviews the functioning of the Economic and MonetaryUnion over the first 4 years of its existence. Monetary policyis viewed as having been of the ‘inflation-targeting’type, but with a tendency towards delay and conservatism inadjustment, which may also reflect over-optimistic output growthforecasts. The resulting pressure on the Stability and GrowthPact (SGP) illustrates the weakness in the ‘consensusview’ of the harmonious interaction of monetary, fiscal,and supply-side policies, which requires policy in all threeareas to be ‘correct’. In discussing reform of theSGP, a looser but still constraining form of fiscal agreementis advocated. The supply-side and balance-of-payments issuesinvolved in inter-country adjustment also interact importantlywith the SGP and are identified as key areas of difficulty ina still ‘immature’ monetary union, with separatelabour-market structures. Here the mechanisms for coordinationare more or less absent.     

New Keynesian Explanations of Cyclical Movements in Aggregate Inflation and Regional Inflation Differentials

What determines the cyclical behavior of aggregate inflation and regional inflation differentials? The answer has strong implications for monetary policy and in Europe for the Stability and Growth Pact. In the United States, inflation rates move pro-cyclically, and across the Euro Area, inflation differentials are positively correlated with growth differentials. This suggests that demand shocks are the primary determinants of the cyclical behavior of aggregate inflation and regional inflation differentials. In this paper, we discuss New Keynesian explanations of these correlations, and we argue that demand shocks are either missing or inadequately modeled in the in typical New Keynesian model.