Regulation of a Spatial Externality: Refuges versus Tax for Managing Pest Resistance

We examine regulations for managing pest resistance to pesticide varieties in a temporally and spatially explicit framework. We compare the performance of the EPA’s mandatory refuges and a tax (or subsidy) on the pesticide variety under several biological assumptions on pest mobility and the heterogeneity of farmers’ pest vulnerability. We find that only the tax (or subsidy) restores efficiency if pest mobility is perfect within the area. If pest mobility is imperfect and when farmers face identical pest vulnerability, only the refuge might restore efficiency. With simulations we illustrate that complex outcomes may arise for intermediate levels of pest mobility and farmers’ heterogeneity. Our results shed light on the choice of regulatory instruments for common-pool resource regulations where spatial localization matters.     

Determinants of farmers’ willingness to participate in subsidy schemes for pesticide-free buffer zones—A choice experiment study

Danish farmers have been far less interested in agri-environmental subsidy schemes (AES) than anticipated. In order to examine how to improve the appeal of such schemes, a choice experiment was conducted concerning 444 Danish farmers’ preferences for subsidy schemes for pesticide-free buffer zones. A random parameter logit framework was used to capture heterogeneity among farmers. Our results indicate that 1) the vast majority of farmers are willing to trade off the size of the subsidy for less restrictive scheme requirements and that 2) the amount of the subsidy they are willing to trade off varies with specific scheme requirements, suggesting which features are most important for successful policy design. Our results suggest that farmers value flexible contract terms higher than reduced administrative burdens. Finally, we suggest a practical approach to estimating a monetary value of farmers’ reluctance to participate in AES. While the trade off's that farmers are willing to make between subsidy size and individual scheme requirements are case specific, our results concerning increased use of farm advisors, farmers ability of valuing different types of flexibility, and our attempt to place a monetary value on farmers’ reluctance to engage in regulatory subsidy schemes have a potentially broader application platform.     

Quality distortions in vertical relations

This paper examines how delivery tariffs and private quality standards are determined in vertical relations that are subject to asymmetric information. We consider an infinitely repeated game where an upstream firm sells a product to a downstream firm. In each period, the firms negotiate a delivery contract comprising the quality of the good as well as a non-linear tariff. Assuming asymmetric information about the actual quality of the product and focusing on incentive compatible contracts, we show that from the firms’ perspective delivery contracts lead to more efficient contracts and thus higher overall profits the lower the firms’ outside options, i.e. the higher their mutual dependency. Buyer power driven by a reduced outside option of the upstream firm enhances the efficiency of vertical relations, while buyer power due to an improved outside option of the downstream firm implies less efficient outcomes.     

Constitutional interests in the face of innovations: how much do we need to know about risk preferences?

In constitutional political economy, the citizens’ constitutional interests determine the social contract that is binding for the post-constitutional market game. However, following traditional preference subjectivism, it is left open what the constitutional interests are. Using the example of risk attitudes, we argue that this approach is too parsimonious with regard to the behavioral foundations to support a calculus of consent. In face of innovative activities with pecuniary and technological externalities in the post-constitutional phase, the citizens’ constitutional interests vary with their risk preferences. To determine what kind of social contract is generally agreeable, specific assumptions about risk preferences are needed.

The Efficiency of Stock-Based Incentives: Experimental Evidence

The authors report the results of laboratory experiments in which subjects are offered contracts structured similar to equity compensation packages and result in subjects receiving cash payments that are a function of their effort and random factors. The authors compare the outcomes from alternative contractual forms to theoretical benchmarks and report the efficiency of the contracts to provide evidence on whether options or stocks that have same economic cost to the employer yield the same or different effort levels from the managers. Both contracts elicit lower levels of effort than would be chosen by an expected-payoff-maximizing decision maker. Effort choices under the option contract did not differ significantly from effort choices under the stock contract except for male subjects. The option contract elicits a higher effort level for these subjects and condition than the stock contract. Effort choices reflect loss aversion and regret based on past stock price realizations.     

A conjoint analysis of farmer preferences for community forestry contracts in the Sumber Jaya Watershed, Indonesia

A wide range of policy instruments have been devised and applied to support the goals of sustainable forestry management. Community forestry programs can contain elements of several of those instruments. This paper considers the design of community forestry contracts in the Sumber Jaya area of Indonesia where community forestry contracts are agreements between the Forestry Department and community groups that provide group members with time-bound leasehold rights to protection forests, on the condition that farmers abide by specified land-use restrictions and pay any required fees. Farmers perceive that the contracts represent a bundle of restrictions and inducements, some of which are explicitly stated in the contract and others that are implied by the contract. Conjoint analysis was used to quantify farmers' tradeoffs among the explicit and implicit attributes of the contracts. The results of logit and ordered logit models show that farmers are most concerned about the length of the contract, and relatively unconcerned about requirements on tree density and species composition. An implicit attribute, greater access to forestry and agroforestry extension, emerges as an important implicit attribute. The results imply that farmers in this part of Indonesia would be willing to abide by fairly strict limitations on land use, provided that they can be assured of long-term rights to the planted trees.     

Incentive Contract and Weather Risk

We study contracts designed to remunerate a farmer for the production of an ecosystem service with the payment dependent on the results of the farmer’s actions and on weather conditions. Two contracts are proposed: the first takes into account both the results of the farmer’s actions and a weather variable that reflects the actual atmospheric conditions during the life of the contract; the second bases the payment on the results alone incorporating only the average effect of weather. Social welfare is optimal when both the results and the specific atmospheric conditions are taken into account; however, this type of contract may be less acceptable to the farmer due to his perception of the level of risk involved.We thank two referees for valuable comments.     

契约农业与养殖户收入：理论线索和经验证据

契约农业是小农户衔接现代农业的有效途径,也是我国农业产业化发展的主导形式。本文构建契约农业影响养殖户收入的理论分析框架,利用610份肉牛养殖户的微观调查数据,运用倾向得分匹配法,实证检验了契约农业对养殖户收入的影响及其作用机制。参加契约农业能显著提升养殖户收入水平,销售合同和生产管理合同均能显著增加养殖户收入,其中生产管理合同的影响程度更大。组群差异分析发现,契约农业对养殖年限、养殖规模和养殖培训等不同组群养殖户收入具有异质性影响。养殖成本和养殖技术在契约农业与养殖户收入之间起到显著的中介作用,即契约农业通过规模效应和技术效应促进养殖户增收。养殖接力在契约农业对养殖户收入提升的过程中起到正向调节作用。政府应积极创造有利条件鼓励和引导契约农业的发展;根据养殖户资源禀赋特征,完善公司与养殖户利益分配机制;通过“干中学”效应,推进新技术的推广和应用;在契约农业中着力推广“母畜分户饲养、仔畜集中育肥”的接力式养殖经营方式,以推动畜牧产业的可持续、高质量发展。     

Staged financing: a trade-off theory of holdup and option value

This paper investigates financial contract design in venture capital investments and shows that staged financing is the implementation of optimal contracts. In designing contracts, venture capitalists consider the value of real options and the costs of holdup. This consideration boils down to contract rigidity and flexibility: rigid contracts mitigate the holdup problem of entrepreneurs, but have little option values, whereas flexible contracts create real options for venture capitalists in corporate decision-making, but yield weak bargaining power when ventures appear promising. In optimal contracts, venture capitalists choose flexibility by separating capital into stages and then strategically allocating control rights at each stage. This strategy creates option value in corporate governance, and can protect sunk investments in distress while capturing the potential benefits of good outcomes.     

The simple analytics of information and experimentation in dynamic agency

Summary. The dynamics of a stochastic, two–period principal–agent relationship is studied. The agent's type remains the same over time. Contracts are short term. The principal designs the second contract, taking the information available about the agent after the first period into account. Compared to deterministic environments significant changes emerge: First, fully separating contracts are optimal. Second, the principal has two opposing incentives when designing contracts: the principal ‘experiments,’ making signals more informative; yet dampens signals, thereby reducing up–front payments. As a result, ‘good’ agents' targets are ratcheted over time. Received: November 28, 2000; revised version: December 1, 2000     

Present-biased preferences,self-awareness and shirking

We model a mechanism design problem in which the principal owns a project that requires work effort by an agent, but agents may have time-inconsistent, present-biased preferences and lack complete self-awareness of these preferences. The self-control problem and naïveté of an agent may lead him to agree to a contract but later shirk or slack-off, even though doing so is observable. When the principal cannot severely punish shirking and agents are completely naïve, the second-best solution entails allowing a present-biased agent to slack-off in order to avoid a greater loss due to shirking. With greater self-awareness among present-biased agents, the principal may do better by screening some from accepting the contract. Furthermore, when shirking can be severely punished, this does not lead to contracts that eliminate effects of the self control problem. Instead the principal may exploit present-biased agents by offering a contract that allows them to slack-off (which agents fail to foresee they will choose to do) but at the expense of foregoing much compensation.     

Limited observability as a constraint in contract design

Limited observability is the assumption that economic agents can only observe a finite amount of information. Given this constraint, contracts among agents are necessarily finite and incomplete in comparison to the ideal complete contract that we model as infinite in detail. We consider the extent that finite contracts can approximate a complete contract. The objectives of the paper are: (i) to identify properties of agents’ preferences that determine whether or not finiteness of contracts causes significant inefficiency; (ii) to evaluate the performance of finite contracts against the ideal optimal contract in a bilateral bargaining model.     

会计信息相关性与可靠性的分离——基于契约理论的一种解释

文章从企业契约视角解释了会计信息相关性与可靠性分离的原因。企业作为契约而存在,会计系统在企业契约中发挥重要作用。文章通过分析股东—经理管理契约在不同会计信息质量特征下的结果表明,股东、经理在会计信息相关性和可靠性要求上存在冲突,原因在于不同信息质量特征下双方的效用不同。除此之外,借贷契约、公共产品和税收契约、劳务契约以及其他契约的各方主体对会计信息质量要求均存在冲突。正是这些冲突,导致了会计信息相关性与可靠性的分离。     

Stock options and managerial optimal contracts

Summary. In this paper we are concerned with the performance of stock option contracts in the provision of managerial incentives. In our simple framework, we restrict the space of contracts available to the principal to those conformed by a fixed payment and a call option on the firms stock. As compared to the fixed payment and the option grant, we find that the strike price plays an intermediate role in the provision of insurance and incentives. We also develop some methods for the calibration of a standard principal-agent model based upon observed CEO earnings schedules and the volatility of the firms value in the stock market. These methods are useful to address some important issues such as the performance of stock option contracts, the degree of risk aversion compatible with current earnings profiles and the sensitivity of compensation to changes in firms characteristics.Received: 9 April 2003, Revised: 13 September 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: C6, D83. Correspondence to: Manuel S. SantosWe have benefitted from helpful discussions with Marco Celentani, Hector Chade, Alejandro Manelli and Ed Schlee. We are especially grateful to an anonymous referee for very detailed comments.     

Why banks should keep secrets

Summary. We show that it is sometimes efficient for a bank to commit to a policy that keeps information about its risky assets private. Our model, based upon Diamond-Dybvig (1983), has the feature that banks acquire information about their risky assets before depositors acquire it. A bank has the option of using contracts where the middle-period return on deposits is contingent on this information, but by doing so it must also reveal the information. We derive the conditions on depositors preferences and banking technology for which a bank would prefer to keep information secret even though it must then use a non-contingent deposit contract.Received: 5 November 2002, Revised: 19 December 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: D8, G21, G28.I would like to thank an anonymous referee, Sudipto Bhattacharya, Ed Green, Chandra Kanodia, Andy McLennan, Arijit Mukherji, Bradley Ruffle, Neil Wallace, Warren Weber, and especially Nobu Kiyotaki for useful comments and suggestions.     

Option contracting in the California water market

Temporary water transfers, as achievable under option contracts, capture gains from trade that would go unrealized if only permanent transfers of water rights were possible. This paper develops a bilateral option contracting model for water which includes the possibility of conveyance losses and random delivery. Seller-optimal and socially optimal option contracts are characterized in terms of relevant base and strike prices, as well as contract volumes, from an ex-ante and an ex-post point of view. Lastly, welfare gains are estimated, and actual contract prices in California are compared to model-predicted prices.     

Double Moral Hazard,Monitoring, and the Nature of Contracts

generalized double-sided moral-hazard model, with risk-averse parties who mutually monitor each other (to get a reasonable idea of outcome/effort). The model considers trade-off between monitoring costs and moral hazard costs, which are endogenously determined by the extent of monitoring. Using this model, we formally prove a generalized version of Coase's conjecture – that the optimal contract minimizes the agency and risk costs. We then show how varying assumptions about the feasibility or cost of monitoring of the outcome or the worker's effort lead to different contracts being optimal. The analysis is then used to explain the nature of contracts observed in practice under many different situations. We will give an explanation as to why industrial workers typically work under wage contracts, while share contracts are common in agriculture and will explain why profit sharing is more common for senior managers than for the production workers. Received September 19, 2000; revised version received October 30, 1997     

The Clean Development Mechanism’s Low-hanging Fruit Problem: When Might it Arise,and How Might it be Solved?

It is widely recognized that industrialized countries’ commitments under the Kyoto Protocol to reduce their greenhouse-gas emissions will be far less costly to achieve if they can be met at least in part through investment in cheap abatement options available in developing countries, as is permitted under the Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism. Developing-country NGOs and others involved in the policy debate on the CDM have frequently raised concerns, however, about the so-called “low-hanging fruit” problem. The standard characterization of this problem is that if developing countries allow their cheap abatement options to be used now, they may find themselves worse off in future when they take on emissions-reduction commitments of their own, because only expensive abatement options will remain. We show that under plausible CDM-market imperfections a low-hanging fruit problem may indeed arise, but that the standard characterization of the problem is incorrect. We also present a potential solution, based on mandating a “virtual” option clause in CDM-investment contracts.     

Contracts without memory in multiperiod agency models

Settings are considered in which optimal multiperiod contracts can have no memory, i.e., where second period payments do not need to depend on first period outcomes. If contracts have no memory, a repeated agency game can be played myopically; there are no gains to long-term relationships. Conditions on preferences for a no memory contract are presented. In an agency game with moral hazard on the act selection, preference separability and domain additivity imply the existence of a no memory contract. In a setting without moral hazard but with asymmetric information on the outcome, domain additivity implies no memory.