And a populist New Year: global hopes and fears framework

• Get ready for more populist governments. There is now sufficiently widespread backing for global populism that at least one further victory in a major economy is very likely in the next year or so, our analysis of populist policies and support in 20 large economies shows.
• While there are no populist electoral front‐runners, many large economies have elections coming up in which populists have a decent chance of capturing sizeable votes. If you roll the dice enough times, the populist number is likely to come up somewhere – there is now around a 50% chance of a populist government in one key Eurozone country; bookmakers' odds suggest an even higher probability.
• Donald Trump's victory showed how market reaction to populism is hard to predict. Our survey provides a framework for assessing the diverse and complex channels.
• We see limited possibilities of Trump‐like, populist‐propelled fiscal expansions elsewhere in the world, which are typically market positive. Even where populist‐leaning politicians have a chance of power, they have shown little appetite for fiscal expansion.
• Globally, populist policies are focussed more on immigration, trade, and governance, which are typically market negative. As such, populist electoral victories would imply modest downward revisions to baseline growth forecasts and risk greater instability.
• Populist electoral victories in Europe would result in unsettling brinksmanship and provide an existential threat to the EU, though compromise is the most likely outcome and subsequent risks are two‐sided. For example, (i) reductions in free movement in labour could make Brexit softer; (ii) populism could challenge unhelpful pro‐cyclicality in the Stability and Growth Pact.

     

Populist Syndrome and Nonmarket Strategy

Although recognized as a defining feature of the current political era, populism and its implications for non-market strategy remain undertheorized. We offer a framework that (a) conceptualizes populism and its progression over time; (b) outlines the risks populism generates for firms; and (c) theorizes effective nonmarket strategies under populism. Our framework anchors the political risk profile of populism in three interdependent elements: anti-establishment ideology, de-institutionalization, and short-term policy bias. These elements jointly shape the policymaking dynamics and institutional risks for firms under populism. Our analysis shows how firms can calibrate two nonmarket strategies – political ties and corporate social responsibility – to mitigate populism-related risks. We specify how particular configurations of political ties and CSR activities, aimed at the populist leadership, bureaucrats, political opposition, and societal stakeholders, minimize risk under populism. Further, we theorize how the effectiveness of specific attributes of political ties and CSR – namely their relative covertness (more vs. less concealed) and their relative focus (narrowly vs. widely targeted) – varies as a function of firm type (insiders vs. outsiders) and the probability of populist regime collapse. Finally, we address how motivated reasoning may bias firms' assessments of regime fragility and resulting strategy choices.     

Measuring populist discourse with semantic text analysis: an application on grassroots populist mobilization

Populism is a concept employed to qualify the political behavior of a large number of actors at a worldwide scale, with scientists classifying the latter into populists and non-populists according to dimensions such as ideology, strategy, discourse, economic policy, and even style. This article analyzes existing schools of thought on the nature of populism and argues that conceptualizing populism as a specific type of anti-elite discourse in the name of the People is both conceptually and methodologically the most coherent and useful way to understand the phenomenon. Additionally, it suggests discarding crude, dichotomous classification in favor of a gradated view of populist mobilization by means of quantifying populist discourse and observing its spatial and temporal variation. It adds value to current methods of measurement by demonstrating why and how clause-based semantic text analysis can provide optimal quantitative results while retaining qualitative elements for mixed-methods analysis. Aiming, moreover, at expanding the scope of populism studies by overcoming a narrow view that focuses exclusively at party system developments, it applies semantic text analysis to the study of grassroots mobilization during the Great Recession. Results point to the wide use of populist discourse on the part of movement activists seeking an inclusive language when framing disparate social grievances in a given constituency, a finding with important implications with regards to how populism can facilitate straddling the divide that purportedly distinguishes institutionalized party system behavior from the social movement milieu.     

Beyond antitrust populism: Towards robust antitrust

The populist use of competition policies is on the rise again, associated with the growth of big-tech companies in the era of digital platforms. This article sees antitrust populism as a re-emerging force in the United States and Europe via greater politicisation of competition law enforcement. It addresses the basic tenets of antitrust populism in order to expose the fundamental problems that populist use of competition law entails. I argue for a rethink of antitrust policy on the intellectual foundations laid down by what Mark Pennington describes as ‘robust political economy’. We need greater regulatory humility and antitrust enforcement which takes both innovation and welfare seriously.     

The long‐run effect of government ideology on economic freedom

According to popular attitudes in Western democracies, the choice between right‐wing and left‐wing parties is a choice between socialism and unbridled free markets. In contrast, the cold and staid research of academia has frequently concluded that particular political parties do not really matter, as whichever party is elected will be closely tethered to the will of the median voter. This article considers the effects of the ideology of parties in power over the long run (1928–95) on economic freedom in subsequent periods. Right‐wing governments are found to have modest, positive effects on economic freedom, but the effects are not particularly robust. The findings here are consistent with others elsewhere, which conclude that there is minor, uneven evidence of an effect. Nonetheless, historically small effects may not be indicative of the future, should these effects be poorly indicative of today's tumultuous political landscape.     

Public sector innovation in a context of radical populism

This article discusses the effect of radical populism on public sector innovation. It begins by considering the origins and components of radical populism and of public sector innovation. It is shown that the Trump Administration has been undercutting each of the factors research suggests facilitate public sector innovation. While radical populists have gained ground in Europe, they are constrained by being part of governing coalitions, and have a more limited policy agenda, primarily focused on reducing immigration. The paper concludes with suggestions for further research on the effect of populism on public sector innovation, both in the US and Europe.     

Ethnography and the Making of “The People”: Uncovering Conservative Populist Politics in the United States

The election of Donald Trump, the Brexit vote, and rise of conservative populism in countries around the world has led to an abundance of scholarship on populism and the white working class. Much of this work seeks to explain the underlying cause of this conservative populist politics, focusing on globalization and economic precarity, racism and anti‐immigrant sentiment, or failures of political leadership. Survey data and polling analyses, in particular, explain relationships between demographics, political opinions, and voting results. Though quantitative data on the social groups or activists most involved in populist politics are important, missing from this research are ethnographies of populism that explore how local, state, and national actors influence the meaning of “the people.” In this article, I will argue that ethnography is particularly well‐suited for exploring the coming together of local and national politics and the subtle ways that economic insecurity, racism, sexism, and Islamophobia intersect in the making of “hard working taxpayers” or “ordinary folks.” I draw from research in a predominantly white, former manufacturing town in central Maine to illustrate the significance of this ethnographic approach to populism.     

Peripheries well able to cope with wider bond spreads

• While a four‐year golden period for many peripheral Eurozone governments of rising GDP growth and falling global bond yields may be coming to an end, we doubt that we will see a sharp widening of Eurozone bond spreads in 2017.
• Although higher yields are clearly not positive news for heavily indebted peripheral governments, our view is that the pace of increase in risk‐free long‐term yields will be fairly gradual this year – we expect ten‐year Bund yields to climb to just 0.6% or so by the end of 2017. Such a development is unlikely to prompt markets to demand far higher compensation for the higher risk associated with holding peripheral debt.
• Indeed, both the Italian and Spanish governments should be able to borrow at long maturities and at rates comfortably below their average rate on their outstanding stock of debt of 3% or so, throughout this year and probably beyond, even if spreads rise.
• Meanwhile, a key factor behind the rise in bond yields – the prospect of higher inflation – will have some positive effects. Higher inflation will erode the real value of outstanding debt and make it easier for intra‐Eurozone imbalances to be resolved. At the margin, a steeper yield curve will also help to boost banks' profits on lending.
• Finally, although populists support has grown, the risk of populist governments taking power in the periphery are fairly low. Italy and Spain may hold early elections, but it is not a given that elections will be held this year. And in the event of an election, we do not attach a high chance to the election of populist parties in either economy.
• Overall, while 2017 may be a bumpy one for spreads, particularly in Italy, we see only a modest widening from their current levels, reflecting improvements in the debt sustainability positions of the peripheral governments. But even these modest gains will mean Bunds would still outperform Italian and Spanish government bonds over the next year on a total returns basis.

     

Modern American Populism: Analyzing the Economics Behind the “Silent Majority,” the Tea Party,and Trumpism

Modern American populism (MAP) was born out of the political upheaval of the civil rights movement of the 1960s. The article examines the causes of populism. Economic anxiety is found to be the main cause, but there is also evidence supporting an alternative theory that racial resentment is an important driving force behind populism. The article analyzes the role of populism in the 1972 election of Richard Nixon, the Tea Party election of 2010, and the 2016 election of Donald Trump using data provided by the American National Election Studies (ANES). There is ample qualitative evidence that economic anxiety caused the populist voting patterns that elected Nixon, Tea Party candidates, and Trump. Statistical data supported the same conclusion in the 2010 and 2016 elections, but the 1972 data were inconclusive. The data show that both economic anxiety and racial resentment played a role in the 2010 and 2016 elections, but the findings suggest that economic anxiety is the underlying factor that generates both racial resentment and support for populism.     

Populism in South America: Democratic Panacea or Pitfall?

Populism has become a buzz word in recent years, used widely by journalists, political pundits, and academics. Much of the discussion presents the global phenomenon as a recent one. However, one version or another has existed in South America for nearly a century. In this article, I put forth a political strategic definition of populism that includes an actor's political style, relationship with followers, political organization, and political history. Using this conceptualization, I score several presidential candidates’ campaign behavior during recent elections, between the years 2011 and 2015. I also consider the democratic consequences of two of the continents’ most visible and longest‐serving populists, Evo Morales in Bolivia and Rafael Correa in Ecuador. I examine the change over time in both countrie's political systems regarding the respect for civil liberties and political rights, changes in citizens’ attitudes towards the democratic quality of their respective countries, and the variation in socioeconomic inequality. I conclude with an assessment of each populist's democratic consequence and discuss potential for future research.     

‘Get out of Traian Square!’: Roma Stigmatization as a Mobilizing Tool for the Far Right in Timişoara,Romania

Post‐communist Central and Eastern Europe has seen far right movements and parties gain considerable ground by drawing on nativist and ethnic claims to call for a return to an imagined past. In Romania, far right groups have been able to capitalize on a sense of injustice while also playing on historically negative feelings towards the Roma community. These patterns have been observed in Timi?oara, where the group Noua Dreapt? (New Right) has established a foothold over the past decade by emphasizing claims that blame the Roma for loss of built heritage and corruption in the administration of property restitution. The aims of this article are to examine the emergence of Noua Dreapt? and its use of Roma stigmatization, and to consider the ways in which extreme views are normalized by appealing to beliefs and perceptions. The findings of the article show that pre‐existing prejudices can be a powerful force that not only targets marginalized communities, but also challenges administrative practices and builds organizational support. At the level of the city, it is possible to identify the way in which these claims can be more precisely calibrated to draw on concerns that circulate within the community.     

Political and Institutional Determinants of Credit Booms

The literature that investigates credit booms has essentially focused on their economic determinants. This paper explores the importance of political conditionings and central bank independence and provides some striking findings on this matter. Estimating a fixed effects logit model over a panel of developed and developing countries for the period 1975q1–2016q4, we find that credit booms are less likely when right‐wing parties are in office, especially in developing countries, and when there is political instability. However, they have not proven to depend on the electoral cycle. More independent Central Banks are also found to reduce the probability of credit booms. Moreover, they seem to be more likely to occur and spread within a monetary union.     

Union militancy and left‐wing leadership on London Underground

The article provides evidence from case study research into trade union organisation and activity on the London Under‐ground during the 1990s. It explores the extent to which left‐wing political leadership influenced the collectivisation and mobilisation of workers in an adversarial direction, and whether or not this militant trade unionism was self‐defeating compared with a more moderate approach.     

Hamburg's Spaces of Danger: Race,Violence and Memory in a Contemporary Global City

Germany today is experiencing the strongest upsurge of right‐wing populism since the second world war, most notably with the rise of Pegida and Alternative für Deutschland. Yet wealthy global cities like Hamburg continue to present themselves as the gatekeepers of liberal progress and cosmopolitan openness. This article argues that Hamburg's urban boosterism relies on, while simultaneously obscuring, the same structures of racial violence that embolden reactionary movements. Drawing on the work of Walter Benjamin and Allan Pred, we present an archaeology of Hamburg's landscape, uncovering some of its ‘spaces of danger’—sites layered with histories of violence, many of which lie buried and forgotten. We find that these spaces, when they become visible, threaten to undermine Hamburg's cosmopolitan narrative. They must, as a result, be continually erased or downplayed in order to secure the city as an attractive site for capital investment. To illustrate this argument, we give three historical examples: Hamburg's role in the Hanseatic League during the medieval and early modern period; the city under the Nazi regime; and the recent treatment of Black African refugees. The article's main contribution is to better situate issues of historical landscape, collective memory and racialized violence within the political economy of today's global city.     

Development by Decree: The Limits of ‘Authoritarian Modernization’ in the Russian Federation

The apparent success of state‐managed market economies has challenged the conventional wisdom that liberal democracy is the norm around which all capitalist countries tend to converge. If the link between democracy and development is more tenuous than we often think, the authoritarian variety of capitalism is not without its own problems, especially with respect to political legitimacy, innovation and regional development. This article explores these issues through the prism of ‘authoritarian modernization’ in Russia. We argue that this strategy is unlikely to succeed, even in its own terms, because (1) the political system fails to create favourable institutional conditions for modernization; (2) the economic system is beset by deeply embedded structural problems; and (3) the regional policy apparatus is torn between the goals of spatial equalization and spatial agglomeration. The article focuses on the Skolkovo Innovation Centre, the main symbol of Russian modernization, to demonstrate the territorial repertoire of the mega‐project, a state‐sponsored development strategy to create innovation clusters from above because they cannot emerge from below.     

Social capital and entrepreneurial process

The paper examines the relationship between social capital and entrepreneurial engagement of individuals in 35 nations from Europe and Asia. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first empirical research that attempts to investigate the influence of three-dimensional social capital concept – trust, networks and norms – on three stages of entrepreneurial process – preference, trial and success – using such large and comprehensive cross-sectional micro data. In general, we find that all three dimensions of social capital matter in the entrepreneurship context, albeit differently. They become beneficial in different ways and at different stages of entrepreneurial involvement. For example, among trust variables, institutional trust in general, and trust in business-oriented and business-supporting actors in particular, exert significant positive effect on entrepreneurial process. Individuals with formal membership in professional associations are more likely to perceive entrepreneurial opportunities, while some close or strong-tie networks might prevent them from progressing in the entrepreneurship ladder. Finally, individual level civic norms appear to be negatively associated with early-stage entrepreneurship, while the success in becoming an entrepreneur is not found to be bound by people’s civic norms.     

Encountering Everyday Racist Practices: Sociospatial Negotiations of Immigrant Settlement in Athens,Greece

This article delineates the ways in which the context of institutional and non‐institutional racist practices, legitimated by the rise of extreme right‐wing populism and racism, affects immigrants’ everyday lives in Athens, Greece. In this research, I explored the transformations of immigrants’ settlement trajectories, coping strategies and tactics, and their bodily interactions when encountering racist violence at the local level, through extensive fieldwork in two case study areas in metropolitan Athens—Omonia and Nikaia. The article is based on previous work on encounters with difference and everyday racism, with the aim of contributing to existing scholarship by examining urban encounters with manifestations of racism in the form of violent practices, which are on a rise not only as exceptional but also as everyday lived events. I demonstrate how immigrants’ encounters with police raids and patrols, and with racist violence perpetrated by neo‐Nazi militias, transform immigrants’ daily lives in the city at the micro‐scale. These encounters have an impact not only on immigrants’ social relationships, strategies and tactics of settlement, but also on the reconstruction of urban space. My argument is that urban encounter remains an open and dynamic field for negotiation of interethnic cohabitation, as it produces both violent confrontations and sociospatial embodied opportunities for coexistence.     

Victim or Victimizer: Firm Responses to Government Corruption

What is the relationship between government corruption and firm performance? To address this question, I conduct a review of articles published in the leading management journals on government‐business interactions pertaining to rent‐seeking activities and integrate findings from the fields of international business, social issues in management, public organization, institutional change, and corporate political activity. I find that while much empirical work corroborates the earlier findings suggesting a corrosive impact of government corruption on firm performance in general, management research also points to the heterogeneous impact of government corruption on individual firm performance, driven by the strategic activities conducted by firms in response to corruption. I propose an integrative model of firm strategy vis‐à‐vis corruption that predicts the activity choice of the firm as predicated by its organizational structure, political resources, industry regulation, and surrounding political and social institutions.     

Corruption as Infrastructure: Rendering the New Saigon Global

Corruption is regularly treated as a barrier to infrastructure, development and growth. However, in Saigon, corruption itself has become an infrastructure in Vietnam's late-socialist urban transformation. This infrastructure facilitates not only growth in the form of transnational investment, property speculation and construction, but allows for different kinds of planning and development practice as well. Perceptions about corruption in Vietnam, and in Saigon specifically, shape market and planning practices that structure the terms on which interested parties from abroad and internally speculate upon and ultimately develop urban projects. This is not a static formulation of corruption. Rather, corruption and the various political and policy responses to it constantly shape how brokers, developers and financiers renegotiate how the city becomes a knowable object for investment, legible to the calculations of both risk and reward used by global investors as well as to those who enact the embedded bureaucratic, legal and political practices that create Saigon's built environment. In this article I argue that different definitions and policy responses to corruption in effect create variable ways of seeing the city (as well as modes of being seen) that have an impact on the material realities of the metropolis—the types of connections produced with transnational finance, the legal and regulatory structure under which urbanization unfolds, and the types of players, firms and officials involved.     

THE URBAN LEFT IN POWER: Comparing the Profiles of ‘Municipal Socialists’ and the ‘New Urban Left’ in Swiss Cities

Today, many cities in post-industrial societies are strongholds of left and progressive political forces. Almost 100 years ago, left parties had instituted municipal socialism in several European cities. In this article, we compare these two periods of left urban rule by focusing on the long-term changes over the last 120 years in the socio-demographic profile of urban left elites in four major Swiss cities. Our analysis of left elected representatives at six key dates highlights the main differences between the municipal socialists of the interwar period and the new urban left that rules contemporary cities. The former are members of the working class, blue-collar workers without university education, while the latter are members of the upper-middle class, highly educated sociocultural professionals. The results of our analysis contribute to a better understanding of the sociological composition of urban left-progressive political forces, an aspect that is somewhat neglected in recent research on the urban left. We discuss the potential political implications and further research avenues for contemporary debates in urban studies, in terms of urban policy priorities and political mobilization.