Resource-envy-free and efficient allocations: A new solution for production economies with dedicated factors

I consider the problem of determining an equitable and efficient allocation of resources in production economies with factors which must be dedicated to production and cannot be consumed directly. First, I show that in such economies envy-free and efficient allocations exist under standard assumptions. However, I argue this notion of fairness is unsuitable for the present context. I then introduce a new notion of fairness, which I call resource-envy-freeness. First, I associate with each consumption bundle its resource footprint consisting of the vector of factors used to produce it. I then show that preferences over consumption bundles can be extended to preferences over factor bundles. An allocation is resource-envy-free if no agent prefers another agent’s resource footprint to its own. The analysis of resource-envy-free allocations in production is exactly analogous to the analysis of envy-free allocations in exchange. I establish that resource-envy-free and efficient allocations exist under standard assumptions, and I demonstrate that such allocations are intuitively appealing.     

Forecasting demands for inpatient services in a large public health care delivery system

This paper studies the use of autoregressive integrated moving average (ARIMA) time-series models for forecasting demands for inpatient services in a large public health care delivery system. Here, demands are measured in terms of monthly admissions and patient days by services and forecasts are made yearly. This paper emphasizes the implementation aspect of ARIMA models when they are used on a large scale basis in an institutional setting, and compares forecasts with actuals. For forecasting patient days, the adequacy of an indirect approach using the formula L = λW is also evaluated. Finally, we briefly describe how the forecasts are used in the context of resource allocation.     

二氧化碳排放空间分配与使用

本文从资源的定义人手,分析了二氧化碳排放空间的资源性,提出二氧化碳排放空间是一种新型资源。并对二氧化碳排放空间分配与使用进行了具体的阐述。     

A model of population distribution,traffic congestion,and neighborhood crowding in a circular city

An idealized static equilibrium model of a circularly symmetric city is presented. The model allows one to compute the spatial distribution of residences, given certain simple and plausible assumptions about the “costs” of transport, housing and neighborhood crowding. The model is chosen so as to guarantee that in first approximation, the residential population distribution which would be considered optimal by a perfect planner is identical to the distribution reached in a push-shove, laissez-faire equilibrium. This aspect of the construction is shown to be related in a simple way to the familiar “external diseconomy” situation in which a free resource is allocated among alternative uses by equating average, rather than marginal products. The existence of an infinite class of models in which the associated planner's optimum and laissez-faire equilibria are equivalent follows naturally from the standard theory of the private and social costs of highway congestion. The model leads naturally to exponentially falling population distributions which exhibit an “urban-suburban” dichotomy, to a particular overall city size, and to an optimal allocation of land between transport and residential uses.     

Swap-flexibility in the assignment of houses

A house allocation rule should be flexible in its response to changes in agents’ preferences. We propose a specific notion of this flexibility. An agent is said to be swap-sovereign over a pair of houses at a profile of preferences if the rule assigns her one of the houses at that profile and assigns her the other house when she instead reports preferences that simply swap the positions of the two houses. A pair of agents is said to be mutually swap-sovereign over their assignments at a profile if the rule exchanges their assignments when they together report such ‘swap preferences’. An allocation rule is individually swap-flexible if any pair of houses has a swap-sovereign agent, and is mutually swap-flexible if any pair of houses has either a swap-sovereign agent or mutually swap-sovereign agents. We show for housing markets that the top-trading-cycles rule is the unique strategy-proof, individually rational and mutually swap-flexible rule. In house allocation problems, we show that queue-based priority rules are uniquely strategy-proof, individually swap-flexible and envy non-bossy. Varying the strength of non-bossiness, we characterise the important subclasses of sequential priority rules (additionally non-bossy) and serial priority rules (additionally pair-non-bossy and pair-sovereign).     

Local and global consistency properties for student placement

In the context of resource allocation on the basis of priorities, Ergin (2002) identifies a necessary and sufficient condition on the priority structure such that the student-optimal stable mechanism satisfies a consistency principle. Ergin (2002) formulates consistency as a local property based on a fixed population of agents and fixed resources—we refer to this condition as local consistency and to his condition on the priority structure as local acyclicity. A related but stronger necessary and sufficient condition on the priority structure such that the student-optimal stable mechanism satisfies a more standard global consistency property is unit acyclicity.     

Income taxes and urban spatial structure

This paper examines the impact of an income tax in a monocentric city where households equilibriate their allocation of time between work, commuting, and leisure. An increase in the income tax rate lowers the implicit value of time, and hence transportation costs. “Compensated equilibrium” comparative statics analysis shows that under certain conditions, this results in a larger, more dispersed urban area, with lower land rents at the city center and less population within any given distance from the center. The welfare effect of an income tax rate change is also studied, and an expression for the marginal excess burden is derived. The income tax produces welfare losses both because it induces substitution in favor of leisure and in favor of travel—the latter accompanied by excessive spatial dispersion and consumption of space. The marginal excess burden depends not only on the compensated demand elasticity for leisure, but also on that for space. Finally, the problem of benefit measurement for transportation projects in this tax-distorted spatial economy is examined. Benefit measures should be deflated to adjust for the fact that further transportation improvements lead to reduction of land use intensity, exacerbating the problem of spatial resource misallocation in an already excessively dispersed urban area.     

A model for resource allocation in complex hierarchies

Most models of resource allocation activity usually assume either a black box or a simple pyramidal hierarchy of black boxes as the organizational context for decision making. However, there are a number of resource allocation activities that take place in more complex hierarchies. These cases have been slighted by researchers, in part, because of a lack of practicable models. This paper presents a multiple-criterion resource allocation model specifically directed towards non-pyramidal hierarchies and other more complex organizational structures. A number of examples are discussed and a numerical example is presented.     

“Do incentives matter to promote high technology-driven entrepreneurial activity?”

A productive human capital is a necessary but not sufficient condition for regional economic growth. An additional condition is the adequate allocation of talented people in innovative entrepreneurial activities, which according to previous literature have a higher social value than traditional ones. Using a large and representative sample of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) located in the Basque Autonomous Community (Spain), we empirically analyze, separately in manufacture and services, whether individual incentives and market conditions are aligned in such a way that the talent is properly allocated in innovative entrepreneurial activities. Through a novel use of existing empirical methods we find that (i) entrepreneurs operating in high-tech sectors have, on average, more entrepreneurial talent and private returns than their counterparts; and that (ii) entrepreneurial talent and private returns are positively and significantly correlated. These novel insights suggest that private and social incentives are adequately aligned.     

A comparative analysis of the economic movements on the basis of a growth matrix

This paper considers the comparative analysis of the economic aggregates on the basis of the growth matrix and the corresponding blocks of growth. The aim is to synthetically encompass and analyze indicators of the aggregates (output, revenue, income, accumulation, etc.) through the blocks of growth. The block of growth represents a general scheme of growth of the ith and jth aggregates and enables the determination of important indicators P, Q, E and K. In other words, the block of growth is used to establish indicators of the ith and jth aggregates and, at the same time, for describing their absolute and relative changes as well as discovering the trends of these changes in the ensuing period. In this way, it is possible to analyze the structural and dynamic changes of aggregates and determine their behaviour in subsequent periods.     

The LeChatelier principle for changes in risk

In this paper, we analyze the comparative statics of changes in risk in the context of problems with multiple decision variables. We demonstrate, in particular, that the Samuelson–LeChatelier principle extends naturally to the comparative statics of changes in risk: in the presence of positive feedbacks between the decision variables, the unrestricted response to an increase in risk is in the same direction and stronger in magnitude than the restricted response (i.e. the choice when other decision variables are fixed). We define the concepts of Nth-degree risk complements and Nth-degree risk substitutes and we show that it is in any one of these two cases (and only in these cases) that we will observe positive feedbacks between the decision variables. We also analyze the extent to which the same principle can be applied to strategic settings under uncertainty.     

How Does Childbirth Alter Intrahousehold Resource Allocation? Evidence from Japan*

Exploiting unique panel data that include direct measurements of resource allocation within households, we investigated the impact of childbirth on intrahousehold allocation for married Japanese couples. Based on a collective model of the household, we developed reduced‐form and structural‐form estimation equations that allow us to focus on private goods to track the changes in intrahousehold resource allocation. We found one additional child is associated with a reduction in the wife's private expenditure share by at least two percentage points. This may be because she substitutes more say in decisions on the children for her own private expenditure share.     

Maximizing political vote in multiple districts

This paper models a resource allocation problem in the political context. Voters and political candidates of two parties are positioned in each of n given electoral districts. We assume that each voter will vote for the candidate he is more attracted to. This attraction is modeled by an attraction function. Each of the parties now attempts to allocate a finite budget to maximize their objective, which is either the popular vote or the number of districts, in which the party has a majority. Individual scenarios are examined with respect to leader-follower solutions and Nash equilibria. The paper then describes a dynamic model that successively allocates existing funds plus additional donations to candidates in different electoral districts.     

Exploring the Political Side of Board Involvement in Strategy: A Study of Mixed‐Ownership Institutions*

abstract This article reports on a comparative study of strategic decision‐making and board functioning in nine firms. Findings indicate that the heterogeneity of interests represented on the board, members' possession of relevant knowledge, and the presence of ex‐ante conflict resolution mechanisms combine in shaping if and how board members engage in strategy‐related activities and how strategic decisions are taken. Findings extend current understandings about the strategic functions of the board (monitoring, advice, and resource‐dependence), suggesting how, under certain conditions, boards may act as negotiation forums where directors search for a reconciliation between diverging shareholders' interests and views.     

Diversification discount,information rents,and internal capital markets

While many existing studies report that corporate diversification destroys shareholder value, several recent studies challenge these findings. Schoar [Schoar, A. (2002). Effects of corporate diversification on productivity. The Journal of Finance, 57, 2379?2403] finds that plants in conglomerates are more productive than those in comparable single-segment firms, although conglomerates are traded at discounts. Villalonga [Villalonga, B. (2004a). Diversification discount or premium? New evidence from the business information tracking services. The Journal of Finance, 59, 479–506; Villalonga, B. (2004b). Does diversification cause the “diversification discount”. Financial Management, 33, 5?27] employs a more comprehensive database and statistical techniques than those used in the prior studies, and shows that there is a diversification premium, rather than discount. This paper develops a model that highlights the costs and benefits of corporate diversification. The diversified firm trades off the benefits of more efficient resource allocation through its internal capital market against the costs of information rents to division managers, which are necessary for effective workings of the internal capital market. We provide an argument supporting Schoar's findings, and identify conditions under which there can be a diversification discount or a premium.     

Eliciting the socially optimal allocation from responsible agents

We consider designing a mechanism to allocate objects among agents without monetary transfers. There is a socially optimal allocation, which is commonly known by the agents but not observable by the designer. The designer possibly has information about the existence of responsible agents. A responsible agent, when indifferent between his objects at two different allocations, prefers the first allocation to the second if the first allocation is closer to the optimal allocation than the second, in the sense that all the agents who are allocated their optimal objects in the second allocation are allocated their optimal objects also in the first allocation, and there is at least one more agent in the first allocation receiving his optimal object. We show that, if the designer knows that there are at least three responsible agents, even if the identities of the responsible agents are not known, the optimal allocation can be elicited.     

Population monotonic and strategy-proof mechanisms respecting welfare lower bounds

The significance of population monotonicity and welfare bounds is well-recognized in the fair division literature. We consider the welfare bounds that are central to the fair allocation literature, namely, the identical-preferences lower-bound, individual rationality, the stand-alone lower-bound,   and k$k$-fairness. We characterize population monotonic and incentive compatible mechanisms which allocate an object efficiently and respect a welfare lower bound chosen in the fair allocation problem of allocating a collectively owned indivisible good or bad when monetary transfers are possible and preferences are private information.     

项目管理中资源配置的新思路

本文介绍了目前项目管理中的资源配置现状,指出了资源约束下的进度安排工作中存在的问题和资源平衡中存在的问题,分析了问题的原因。最后针对每一种存在的问题,提出了解决的新思路。     

Strategy-proofness and population-monotonicity for house allocation problems

We study a simple model of assigning indivisible objects to agents, such as dorm rooms to students, or offices to professors, where each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. For these problems population-monotonicity, which requires that agents are affected by population changes in the same way, is a compelling property because tentative assignments are made in many typical situations, which may have to be revised later to take into account the changing population. We completely describe the allocation rules satisfying population-monotonicity, strategy-proofness, and efficiency. The characterized rules assign the objects by an iterative procedure in which at each step no more than two agents “trade” objects from their hierarchically specified “endowments.”     

Planning and Financing Water Resource Development in the United States: A Review and Policy Perspective

Abstract . Since the beginning of the 80s, there has been a discernible decline in federal spending for water resource development. The methods of financing project development at the state level exhibit diverse characteristics across different states. The state and sub-state level agencies and users will have to find and develop additional resources. This might also call for reduction in subsidies in water pricing which might give a greater role to market factors in conservation efforts. The present differentiated cost-sharing formula for different uses on the basis of the federal agency involved in the project development contributes to inefficient allocation of the resource. There is urgent need for financial and water management reform in order to avert a potential water crisis. Use, efficiency and equity considerations need to play a greater role in the distribution of the resource than in the past.