An analysis of bargaining power for milk cooperatives and milk processors in Florida

The Florida dairy market has a few fluid milk processors and many dairy farmers. The dairy farmers are represented in negotiation with the processors by a cooperative. This research builds a theoretical model of bargaining between the processors and a cooperative. The model is applied to the Florida dairy market to examine price negotiations between Florida milk processors and a dairy cooperative. An expectation maximization (EM) algorithm along with maximum likelihood estimation is used to estimate the econometric disequilibrium model with time series data for the period of October 1998 to May 2009. The results show that the class I price set by the Federal Milk Marketing Order is the major factor influencing the cooperative’s supply reservation price. Negotiated quantity and production seasonality affect the processors’ demand reservation price. The processors appear to be more patient and have higher average bargaining power (0.8804) than the cooperative (0.1196). The highest (lowest) bargaining power for the cooperative (processors) occurred in 2008 and the lowest (highest) bargaining power for the cooperative (processors) occurred in 2001.     

UNION–FIRM BARGAINING AGENDA REVISITED: WHEN UNIONS HAVE DISTINCT PREFERENCES

In this paper we revisit the issue of the scope of bargaining between firms and unions by considering a more general union's utility function with distinct preferences and sequential negotiations. First, we compare exogenously given labour market institutions; i.e., right‐to‐manage (RTM) and sequential efficient bargaining (SEB). We show that the conventional wisdom, which states that firms always prefer RTM, no longer holds. In fact, when unions are adequately wage aggressive and have strong enough bargaining power, firms may prefer SEB negotiations; however, firms switch their preference to RTM when unions are very strong. Moreover, we show that a conflict of interest between the parties may emerge when unions are sufficiently employment oriented as well as sufficiently wage aggressive and not too strong or too weak in bargaining. Second, we analyse the endogenous choice of the bargaining agenda. We show that a rich plethora of equilibria may occur and new situations of conflict/agreement of interests between the bargaining parties arise in particular when unions are sufficiently wage‐aggressive.     

COOPERATIVE FIRMS AND THE CRISIS: EVIDENCE FROM SOME ITALIAN MIXED OLIGOPOLIES

We investigate how cooperative firms reacted to the current crisis. This allows us to compare the behaviour of cooperative and conventional firms facing exogenous shifts in demand. After a short survey of a stream of theoretical literature, we analyze a large group of Italian production cooperatives in the periods 2003–2010 and 1994–2011 and we contrast co‐ops behaviour with the overall trend in the industries in which they operate. Our sample's evidence suggests that the cooperative's behaviour has a stabilizing effect on employment with respect to shocks in output demand. Unlike profit‐maximizers, cooperative firms seem to be adjusting pay more than employment when facing shocks. Production co‐ops look better equipped than their profit‐maximizing counterparts in tackling the long recession also because they have been very cautious in their profit policies over time. Unlike conventional firms, they have significantly increased their own equity during ‘good’ years instead of distributing large dividends to their members.     

Bargaining with Multinationals: Why State Capacity Matters

Dominant models of bargaining between states and multinational corporations (MNCs) have widely held that bargaining relations, especially in high-technology manufacturing, have changed from confrontational to cooperative. It is consequently argued that there is little formal entry bargaining among these actors. However, there are three primary weaknesses in this literature. First, the understanding of outcomes is limited to the terms of investment agreements. This static view ignores the dynamics of bargaining processes and decisions not to invest, which also deserve explanation. Second, it is MNC-centric, ignoring state's privileged role in relation to the governance of entry bargaining in domestic policy-making processes. Third, it views state as a monolithic entity, ignoring the bargaining that occurs inside states. To redress these issues, this article offers a state-centric bargaining model. It identifies administrative and institutional capacity as two critical components of state capacity. It chooses the entry bargaining from 2005, when Hyundai Motors Corporation considered establishing a USD1.5 billion car-manufacturing plant in Turkey. It shows that state capacity in the governance of a domestic policy-making process affects the outcome of entry bargaining: When state capacity is weak, an MNC's decision not to invest is a more likely outcome.     

Farmers’ organizations and sustainable development: An introduction

This special issue features 14 new research papers investigating the role of farmers’ organizations (e.g., collective action, self-help groups, producer companies/organizations, and cooperatives) in supporting sustainable development. The key findings include: (1) farmer groups and cooperatives promote farmers’ adoption of good farm management practices, new agricultural technologies and sustainable farming practices, although not substantially improving farm yield; (2) outsourcing services provided by agricultural cooperatives help to increase the technical efficiency of crop production; (3) cooperative membership enhances members’ bargaining power and enables them to sell their products at higher prices; (4) cooperatives motivate rural laborers to work in off-farm sectors, while self-help groups empower rural women in decision-making; (5) internet use improves agricultural cooperatives’ economic, social, and innovative performances; (6) direct administrative intervention supporting cooperative development may lead to the emergence of shell cooperatives; (7) participation in forest farmer organizations enables wood value chain upgrading; (8) increasing the cooperative size in terms of income, equity, and assets increases the profitability of savings and credit cooperatives; and (9) creating cross-border cooperation between cooperatives generates benefits for all parties involved. These findings can inspire the design of policies aimed to support farmers’ organizations in achieving sustainable development goals.     

WAGE BARGAINING AND MERGER INCENTIVES WITH ASYMMETRIC COSTS

This paper examines how wage bargaining within each firm influences the relationship between an equilibrium ownership structure and the most preferred ownership structure from the viewpoint of social welfare, in a unionized oligopoly of asymmetric firms with respect to productivity of capital. We consider the merger incentive of each firm’s owner when the wage level is determined through bargaining between the firm’s owner and union. We derive a condition for both the degree of cost asymmetry among existing firms and the relative bargaining power of each firm’s owner to her/his union such that each ownership structure can be observed in equilibrium. We also show that although the two types of ownership structures with the merger involving the least efficient firm can be equilibria and socially optimal, these structures are observed only when both the degree of cost asymmetry and the relative bargaining power of each firm’s owner are moderate. Finally, we analyse the relationship among the cooperative game approach employed in this paper and two non‐cooperative merger formation approaches, and examine the robustness of the results obtained in this paper against the change in the assumption regarding each firm’s cost function.     

Valuations and dynamics of negotiations

This paper analyzes three‐party negotiations in the presence of externalities. We obtain a closed‐form solution for the Markov perfect equilibrium of a multilateral non‐cooperative bargaining model, yielding an equilibrium value and dynamics of negotiations that are supported by experimental studies. Players’ values are monotonically increasing (or decreasing) in the amount of negative (or positive) externalities that they impose on others. Moreover, players’ values are continuous and piecewise linear on the worth of bilateral coalitions, and are inextricably related to their negotiation strategies: the equilibrium value is the Nash bargaining solution when no bilateral coalitions form; the Shapley value when all bilateral coalitions form; or the nucleolus, when either one bilateral coalition among “natural partners” or two bilateral coalitions including a “pivotal player” form.     

Asia and the Reform of Global Governance

Asia's growing economic weight in the world economy is unlikely to produce substantial changes in global economic governance. National economic capabilities are not easily translated into influence over governance outcomes or institutions. Governments must deploy strategies of engagement with key institutions; incumbent powers will attempt counterstrategies. Coalition-building within and outside the region confronts substantial obstacles that reduce Asia's bargaining leverage. Asian preferences over institutional design and policies are unlikely to diverge from the status quo. A more pessimistic scenario includes resistance to global surveillance, spillover from other issue-areas, and defensive regionalism that undermines global institutions.     

Returns from income strategies in rural Poland

In order to stabilize and improve their income situation, rural households are strongly encouraged to diversify their activities both in and outside the agricultural sector. Often, however, this phenomenon takes on only moderate proportions. This article addresses issues of rural households' income diversification in the case of Poland. It investigates returns from rural households' income strategies using propensity score matching methods and extensive datasets spanning 1998–2008. Results suggest that returns from combining farm and off‐farm activities were lower than returns from concentrating on farming or on self‐employment outside agriculture. This differential is stable over time although returns from diversification have relatively improved after the accession of Poland to the European Union. This is also visible in the fact that since 2006, returns from combining farm and off‐farm activities have equalized with returns from relying solely on hired off‐farm labour, thus smoothing away the difference observed before the accession. Further, over the analysed period, households pursuing a diversification strategy performed better than those relying solely on unearned income. Finally, in general, incomes in households combining farm and off‐farm activities were higher than in those combining off‐farm income sources.     

新农村建设:一个政治经济学视角的解析

新农村建设是对城乡经济社会发展不平衡的一个积极回应,它包含经济增长和社会发展两个层面.从政治经济学视角出发,在经济增长方面,户籍、土地、保障等制度性因素制约到农村劳动力的有效流转,从而对劳动生产率提升和农业发展产生负面影响;在社会福利方面,农民的数量优势没有转化为谈判优势,对市场价格和政策制定的影响力较小,其社会福利获取以及发展程度处于不利地位.据此,新农村建设必须对相关制度性、组织性因素进行完善和改革,部分农民的真正流转和留守农民的自发组织将尤其重要.     

Reciprocity Game

This paper shows that reciprocity comes from the desire to cooperate in finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma game. Before playing the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma game, players choose the reciprocity level and commit to it, and the reciprocity level is public information. There are T equilibria if the prisoner's dilemma game is repeated for T periods, and each equilibrium is associated with different levels of cooperation. Further, if players choose their reciprocity levels sequentially, then the most cooperative equilibrium will be the unique equilibrium. However, reciprocity does not matter for the one‐period game and the infinitely repeated game.     

Bilateral bargaining, unverifiable quality, and options to return

Summary. The paper investigates an alternating-offers bargaining game between a buyer and a seller who face several trading opportunities. These items (goods or services) differ in their non-verifiable quality characteristics which gives rise to a moral hazard problem on the seller's part. For the special case of two goods, we completely characterize the set of subgame-perfect equilibria. We find that the seller always extends an option to return the good, while the buyer may suffer from this warranty. Also, qualitatively different types of equilibrium outcomes occur depending on the parameters of the model: (a) the seller may obtain a larger share of the surplus although the parties ex ante have symmetric bargaining positions, (b) the subgame-perfect equilibrium may entail inefficient trade, and (c) multiple equilibria may exist including equilibria with delay in negotiations. Finally, we analyze a situation where bargaining proceeds after the good was returned which is shown to reestablish uniqueness and efficiency of equilibrium.Received: 23 August 2001, Revised: 3 April 2003, JEL Classification Numbers: C78, L14, L15, D82. Correspondence to: Christoph LülfesmannThis paper has greatly benefitted from discussions with Avner Shaked and Timothy von Zandt. We also wish to thank Wolfgang Leininger, Zvika Neeman, Clemens Puppe, Wolfram Richter, Karl Schlag, Ilya Segal, and seminar participants in Dortmund, Bonn and Berkeley for helpful comments and discussions. Financial support by Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, SFB 303 at the University of Bonn is gratefully acknowledged.     

The Women's Movement Against Sexual Harassment,by Carrie N. Baker

This paper examines some of the effects of East and West German family policy on women's economic position by analyzing intrahousehold bargaining power, defined here as based on co-resident partners' relative fall-back positions, which in turn depend on the individuals' access to income in the event that the partnership ends. East German policy sought to integrate women into the labor force through programs such as free public child care and liberal maternity leave. West Germany based its family policy on the assumption of a stark gender division of labor, with one lifetime breadwinner per family and a second parent who temporarily leaves the labor force to raise children. On the basis of her findings and analysis, the author argues that while East German institutions increased women's bargaining power, gender-specific policies interfered with women's ability to use this power to bring about changes in the household division of labor. West German family policy did not assign gender roles, but it offered women less bargaining power with which to negotiate. The author maintains that society's refusal to address women's greater child-rearing costs is not based on an assessment of such costs and the costs of redistributive government programs, but on the assumption that women should absorb the risks and burdens of reproduction.     

“GATT‐think” with Asymmetric Countries*

We argue that a trade agreement which conforms to GATT’s reciprocity rule benefits the (stronger) less trade‐dependent country at the expense of the (weaker) more trade‐dependent country. Reciprocity is so unfavorable to the weaker country that it may be worse off under reciprocity than under the Nash‐ bargaining solution, a “power‐based” approach to trade negotiations that reflects power asymmetries among trading partners. Our results question Bagwell and Staiger’s (1999 , 2000 ) view of reciprocity as a rule that “serves to mitigate the influence of power asymmetries on negotiated outcomes.”     

The Biodiversity Bargaining Problem

We employ cooperative bargaining theory and Nash’s ‘rational threats’ idea to cast light on the biodiversity bargaining problem. The problem of global environmental negotiations is argued to be of the nature of a bargaining problem, in which bargainers must agree on the distribution of cooperative surplus in order to move to the bargaining frontier. We discuss the importance of both efficiency (bargaining frontier) and fairness (recognition of characteristics of bargainers) in the choice of the appropriate contract. We show that the incremental cost contract, used to resolve the biodiversity bargaining problem, is of the form of an extreme point contract that fails to recognise the contributions of the South to the production of cooperative surplus. A rational response to such a contract is the use of threats of biodiversity destruction. Contracts must evince both efficiency and fairness in order to represent lasting solutions.     

浙江省慈溪、瑞安、建德三市家庭农场发展状况分析

随着浙江省农村土地不断流转和家庭经营规模的扩大,家庭农场将会成为现代农业经营的重要模式选择。文章通过对浙江省慈溪、瑞安、建德三市的实践调查及问卷分析,总结了三市家庭农场的发展状况、特点及政策导向,解析了制约家庭农场发展的难点问题及政策期望,并提出了组建家庭农场协会,加强对年轻农场主的培养,发展合作型家庭农场等政策建议。     

Smartphone-based agricultural extension services and farm incomes: Evidence from Zhejiang Province in China

Smartphone use in rural China has grown rapidly, leading to the fast development of smartphone-based agricultural extension services. However, there is limited research on the income effects of smartphone-based agricultural extension services in rural areas. In this study, we analyze the causal effects of smartphone-based agricultural extension services (“Zhe'yang'shi” WeChat application as an example) on farm incomes in Zhejiang, China, using a staggered difference-in-differences method with panel data from 400 crop farmers. Our results show that adopting smartphone-based agricultural extension services increases farm income from soil testing formula fertilizer fields by 15.39% and total farm income by 16.31%.     

THE HIDDEN COST OF BARGAINING: EVIDENCE FROM A CHEATING-PRONE MARKETPLACE

It is widely believed that successful bargaining helps consumers increase their surplus. We present evidence from a field experiment showing that bargaining over price reduces buyer surplus in a marketplace where sellers cheat on the weight whose value may more than offset the price discount. Our results show that bargaining entails hidden costs since sellers cheat significantly more when buyers bargain than not and they cheat significantly more when bargaining succeeds than fails. Overall bargaining reduces buyer surplus than not bargaining. Our result is relevant for credence goods markets where bargaining over prices may induce sellers to “undertreat” more.     

Women's Intrahousehold Decision-Making Power and Their Health Status: Evidence from Rural Ethiopia

ABSTRACT

This study examines how various determinants of women's decision-making power affect their health status in rural Ethiopia. It identifies the determinants of women's decision-making power using a qualitative survey conducted over 2008–9, and it investigates their effects on women's health status using the Ethiopian Rural Household Survey panel dataset for the period 1994–2004. The study finds that women's health status is positively associated with their education, the number of brothers they have, whether they live in their birthplace, and whether their age is close to that of their husband. In contrast, women's health is negatively associated with whether they are in a marriage of their choice compared to an arranged marriage. The study concludes that multiple factors originating from context-specific gender norms affect women's decision-making power and have differential effects on women's health outcomes.     

不对称雇主学习、外部选择与雇员谈判力

本文在非合作博弈（策略式）单边不对称信息讨价还价框架下,按照外部约束（而不是威胁点）的思路来模型化外部雇主的竞争,以分析不对称雇主学习的程度对处于信息劣势的通用性雇员谈判力的决定作用。本文提出的框架弥补了已有文献的一些不足,同时为不对称雇主学习这一劳动经济学概念提供了一个讨价还价理论基础。