CAPITAL ADEQUACY AND THE VALUATION OF LARGE COMMERCIAL BANKING ORGANIZATIONS

Bankers argue that regulatory agencies require excessive capital adequacy. As a consequence, banks cannot achieve optimal capital structure. This study investigates the capital adequacy issue for bank holding companies over the 1974—1983 period, one of the most turbulent periods in recent banking history. During this time, capital is never excessive from the stockholders' viewpoint, and financial markets, on average, perceive capital levels as inadequate. Assuming the public wants no lower capital levels than shareholders, recent regulatory action to require higher capital ratios is a Pareto superior decision.     

AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF SOME DETERMINANTS OF THE TARGET SHAREHOLDER PREMIUM IN TAKEOVERS

While a considerable amount of research in Australia, the United States and elsewhere shows that takeovers create value for target shareholders, there is relatively little research investigating the explanations for cross-sectional differences in the size of the premium paid to target shareholders. This paper tests various arguments proposed to explain some of the sources of this premium. One such explanation is the removal of inefficient target management. Takeovers have been recognised as a mechanism that allows management teams to compete for the right to manage corporate assets. We test the associations between bidder and target managerial ownership (proxied by director's holdings), the prior performance of the bidder and target and the size of the premium paid to target shareholders. Other potential influences on the premium include a reduction in the agency costs of free cash flow and the provision of financial slack or reserve borrowing capacity to the target firm by the bidder. Using a sample of seventy-eight Australian takeovers occurring between 1981 and 1989 our tests indicate that the provision of financial slack to the target is associated with a significantly higher premium, while high bidder ownership results in a significantly lower premium. The premium is found to be positively related to the performance of the bidder in the period prior to the bid. The tests disclose an association between the agency costs of free cash flow and the target premium which is inconsistent with the theory, and reveal only weak evidence that the takeover premium is higher when inefficient target management is removed.     

PERSONAL TAXES,INFLATION AND MARKET VALUATION

In an inflation-non-indexed progressive tax system, inflation results in a “bracket-creep” effect that reduces the demand for corporate debt while the tax-deductibility of nominal interest makes the use of debt financing cheaper. The interactive effect of inflation and differential dividend and capital gains taxes on the value of a levered firm is analyzed in this paper. Under a non-indexed progressive tax system, inflation decreases the value of the unlevered firm but the effect of inflation on the firm's debt-to-asset ratio is theoretically indeterminate. The gain from leverage is also derived and compared with other valuation models.     

VALUE-AT-RISK AND CORPORATE VALUATION

Although first used mainly by financial institutions to evaluate their trading risks, Value-at-Risk (VAR) can also be used to enhance an industrial corporation's understanding and management of its market risks. To illustrate this broader application of VAR analysis, the authors present a simple example focusing on the valuation of a closely held company. In this case, VAR is used to analyze the sensitivity of the firm's value to movements in uncertain exchange rates, commodity prices, and interest rates.     

INDUSTRY PROSPECTS AND ACQUIRER RETURNS IN DIVERSIFYING TAKEOVERS

We use a sample of 816 diversifying takeovers from 1978 to 2003 to examine whether takeover announcements release negative information about the future prospects of the acquirer's main industry. We find that rivals that are most similar to the acquirer (homogeneous rivals) experience significant negative cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) around takeover announcements. Takeovers that result in negative wealth effects to acquirers are associated with negative abnormal revisions in analysts' forecasts of homogeneous rivals' earnings per share. We also find a decline in the posttakeover operating performance of rival firms. The decline is especially pronounced for homogeneous rivals and for takeovers with negative wealth effects to acquirers. Our findings imply that CAR-based estimates of acquirer wealth gains from takeovers that do not account for industrywide information releases are significantly biased downward.     

VALUATION AND RISK-ADJUSTED DISCOUNT RATES

There is a continuing controversy as to whether the use of a constant risk adjusted discount rate in capital budgeting decisions implies that the risk of the cash flows increases over time. This paper shows that valuation using these discount rates implies an increasing premium for risk over time but that the increasing premium is due to the net impact of the uncertainty in the cash flow; uncertainty in future market expectations of the cash flow; and changes in the market price of risk. The risk of the cash flow itself need not be increasing over time.     

FOREIGN EXCHANGE AND CROSS-BORDER VALUATION

Should a corporate financial manager analyze a cross-border investment proposal from the perspective of the foreign currency or the home currency? The conventional wisdom among economists is that it doesn't matter–the valuation of an asset should be the same in one currency as in another, given the spot FX rate. This assertion implies that it is irrelevant whether we analyze an overseas investment's NPV in the home currency or the foreign currency, as long as we use consistent cross-border conversions.
But what happens if managers' foreign exchange forecasts differ from the efficient markets forecast that is implicit in interest rates? In that case, as this article demonstrates through a series of examples, managers' FX forecasts can affect their investment, hedging, and financing decisions.