碳排放配额初始分配的经济效应及启示

碳排放权初始分配方式是影响碳排放交易有效运行的重要因素,本文利用局部均衡框架分析了三种不同碳排放权初始分配方式的经济效应,在此基础上,提出了中国在碳排放交易发展初期采取可升级的免费分配和拍卖分配相结合的混合分配方式的建议。     

中国发展碳排放权交易市场核心机制设计研究

碳排放权交易是全球应对气候变化的政策创新和金融创新工具。对国内外碳排放权市场的运行机制和发展状况进行了分析,剖析了碳排放权市场配额分配、法规创设、监督与处罚等核心机制设计问题,并以期为中国碳排放权交易市场的发展提供政策性思路。     

碳排放权交易初始配额分配国内外研究综述

为应对气候变暖以及环境恶化问题,在碳交易市场上对碳排放物进行买卖成为了热点关注对象。碳排放权交易中处于基础地位且至关重要的一环是对碳排放权的初始分配。当前研究碳排放权交易以初始配额为研究对象的较少,但碳排放权初始配额分配机制和影响力的探讨与研究具有重要的现实意义,有利于碳排放权交易的有效进行,从而为保护环境、促进全社会的可持续发展提供帮助。对碳排放权交易初始配额基于不同主体、基于分配方式和基于福利效果的相关文献进行了整理和简单评述,并在此基础上对我国建立全国统一碳排放权交易市场进行展望。     

全国碳排放权交易体系与节能和可再生能源政策的协调

我国碳排放权交易政策与节能和可再生能源等政策在管制范围上存在相互交叉和重叠,实施效果之间存在相互影响,需要对它们之间的相互作用进行分析,并据此改进和完善其设计,避免不同政策之间的冲突。本文首先分析了全国碳排放权交易体系关键要素的设计,然后分别介绍了我国的相关节能政策和主要可再生能源政策,并通过分析发现全国碳排放权交易体系与相关节能政策和主要可再生能源政策之间可能存在的影响。具体影响有:全国碳排放权交易体系与相关节能政策之间存在相互促进的作用,但也可能存在政策"冗余"、影响彼此实施的政治可行性等负面效应;我国主要可再生能源政策可以促进全国碳排放权交易体系发挥作用,但反之则取决于配额分配方法和全国碳排放权交易体系的抵消机制设计。本文建议为了避免节能政策和全国碳排放权交易体系的冲突,应该在不同的层级进行两者之间的协调,把握有关政策制定中的协调机会;在全国碳排放权交易体系配额分配方法设计时,应该使化石燃料发电机组从整体上而言有一定的短缺,从而促进可再生能源的发展。     

公共建筑碳排放权交易体系研究

"十二五"规划提出了逐步建立国内碳排放交易市场的要求,为了响应这一要求,推动建立全国碳排放权交易市场工作的顺利展开。文章在全国碳排放权交易体系的框架下,尝试构建针对公共建筑的碳排放权交易体系。本文首先对我国公共建筑发展现状和碳排放情况进行分析,在此基础上,构建了公共建筑碳排放权交易体系,并从配额管理,实施路线,监测、报告、核证(MRV),履约机制等方面分别展开研究。最后对该体系可能存在的一些问题提出针对性的建议,以期为建立全国碳排放权交易体系提供参考。     

碳排放权交易政策对制造业企业绿色技术创新的影响

文章基于2011—2020年沪深A股上市企业数据样本，检验碳排放权交易政策对制造业企业末端治理型、清洁生产型和能源节约型绿色技术创新的影响，并分析影响效应的异质性特征。结果表明：碳排放权交易政策的实施可有效推动制造业企业末端治理型、清洁生产型和能源节约型绿色技术创新。碳排放权交易政策对民营制造业企业绿色技术创新的影响最大，对国有和中外合资制造业企业绿色技术创新的影响较小。对此，研究提出实施多元化碳排放权交易政策、打造制造业企业创新能力培养长效机制、推动国有和中外合资制造业企业增加绿色技术创新投入，以期助力企业可持续发展。     

发达国家碳排放交易机制构建及启示

面对日益严峻的全球气候问题,世界上越来越多的国家和地区都在积极开发和实施碳排放交易机制。对现阶段世界上主要排放权交易中心——欧盟和北美的碳排放交易机制经验进行研究,能为我国发展和改善碳排放交易机制提供借鉴。今后,我国要注重国家间或区域间碳排放交易机制的联动作用,进行科学的碳排放交易制度顶层设计,保证碳排放市场信息的充分性和准确性。     

欧盟碳排放权交易体系第三阶段改革对碳价格的影响

欧盟碳排放权交易体系第三阶段改革成效显著,研究其关键改革政策对碳市场的影响,将为我国的碳市场建设提供一定的经验借鉴。本文选取了第三阶段三项主要改革政策——配额总量递减、折量拍卖、市场稳定储备机制作为评估对象,以第三阶段欧盟碳配额期货价格的日度数据为被解释变量,三大改革政策为解释变量,采用时间序列协整模型和向量误差修正模型对各因素的影响作出评估。研究结果表明,各项改革政策都与碳配额期货价格呈正向协整关系,通过改善市场供求失衡状况,有效推动了第三阶段碳价格的提高,对减排企业形成了长效的激励和约束,提高了欧盟碳排放权交易体系的运行效率。因此,我国在建立和完善碳排放权交易体系进程中,要根据本国情况合理设置配额总量和配额分配方式,设置配额柔性调整机制,不断提高市场流动性,促进碳价格的提高,保证碳排放权交易市场的稳定发展。     

碳排放交易研究综述

碳排放交易被认为是一项重要的以市场为导向的碳减排环境政策工具,不仅可以带来环境和经济福利效益,还能影响到经济、财务活动。根据国内外学者围绕碳排放权的历史及研究,本文首先分析了自然环境转变为资源以及碳交易市场的由来;其次,分析了碳交易带来的环境与经济福利效益;再次,分析了碳交易形成的市场的有效运行需要碳交易政策及市场机制的联动;最后,在总结前述研究的基础之上,归纳了一些目前研究存在的不足以及建议,为进一步碳排放交易的研究提供方向。     

论碳排放权交易的法律规制及其改进

碳排放权交易制度是一种通过市场机制解决外部性问题的环境制度安排,其对我国气候变化应对和以雾霾污染为代表的大气污染治理都是最为有效的途径之一。我国应按照"用制度保护生态环境"的要求,在新《环境保护法》中将碳排放权交易制度定位为环境保护基本法律制度,并从碳排放总量控制机制的合理确定、碳排放权交易配额的分配、定价机制的选择、政府监管机制的健全等方面,来健全中国语境范式的碳排放权交易制度。     

The Nonequivalence of Import and Export Quotas in Strategic Equilibrium

The authors use a standard general‐equilibrium trade model to show that export and import policies are not symmetric in the equilibrium of a strategic game with quotas. It is assumed that N (identical) large countries, without cooperation, set their import (or export) quotas to maximize domestic welfare. It is shown that the equilibrium in which all countries use import quotas differs from, and is superior to, the equilibrium in which countries use export quotas. The difference arises because the elasticity of the residual foreign export supply schedule differs between the two equilibria. The authors also study the properties of the sequential equilibrium of the game. In a simultaneous‐move game, each country is indifferent as to whether it uses an import or export quota, given the policy of the other country. However, in a sequential‐move game, the first mover will prefer to use an import quota rather than an export quota.     

Cooperative R&D and Strategic Trade Policy with Bertrand Competition

This paper uses a strategic trade policy model to analyze the welfare effects from allowing cooperation in R&D when firms compete in a price‐setting game in the product market. A policy game between two governments is analyzed, where each government chooses a particular cooperative R&D policy in order to maximize national welfare. At the Nash equilibrium to this game only one government allows cooperation in R&D. This equilibrium is both individually and jointly optimal. International cooperation in R&D is superior to no cooperation in R&D but is inferior to the Nash equilibrium of the government policy game.     

Dynamic Games of Environmental Policy in a Global Economy: Taxes versus Quotas

The effects of environmental policy on the global environment as an international public good with a stock externality and national welfare are examined in a model with trade in a polluting commodity. The welfare effects of environmental policy, decomposed into terms of trade, abatement cost, and environmental damage effects, induce governments to adopt a strategic use of their policy measures. In the absence of international cooperation on environmental policy, it is demonstrated that the emission tax game brings about larger strategic distortions than the emission quota game.     

Climate Policy under Technology Spillovers

We study climate policy when there are technology spillovers between countries, as there is no instrument that (directly) corrects for these externalities. Without an international climate agreement, the (non-cooperative) equilibrium depends on whether countries use tradable quotas or carbon taxes as their environmental policy instruments. All countries are better-off in the tax case than in the quota case. Two types of international climate agreements are then studied: One is a Kyoto type of agreement where each country is assigned a specific number of internationally tradable quotas. In the second type of agreement, a common carbon tax is used domestically in all countries. None of the cases satisfy the conditions for the social optimum. Even if the quota price is equal to the Pigovian level, R&D investments will be lower than what is socially optimal in the quota case. It is also argued that the quota agreement gives higher R&D expenditures and more abatement than the tax agreement.     

The Triple Inefficiency of Uncoordinated Environmental Policies

When pollution is transboundary and there is international trade, a domestic inefficiency may arise in addition to the well‐known inefficiencies at the international level. More precisely, there will be a Nash equilibrium in which each country chooses a policy that gives it lower welfare than would otherwise be possible given the emission levels of all countries. However, there will also be a Nash equilibrium in which each country chooses tradable emission quotas as its policy instrument to achieve its desired level of emissions. In this Nash equilibrium, welfare in each country is maximised given the emission levels of all countries.     

Beat 'em or Join 'em? Export Subsidies versus International Research Joint Ventures in Oligopolistic Markets

We compare adversarial with cooperative industrial and trade policies in a dynamic oligopoly game in which a home and foreign firm compete in R&D and output and, because of spillovers, each firm benefits from the other's R&D. When the government can commit to an export subsidy, such a policy raises welfare relative to cooperation, except when R&D is highly effective and spillovers are near-complete. Without commitment, however, subsidisation may yield welfare levels much lower than cooperation and lower even than free trade, though qualifications to the dangers from no commitment are noted.
JEL classification: F 12; F 13     

DYNAMIC ENVIRONMENTAL TAXES UNDER INTERNATIONAL DUOPOLY

This paper studies a dynamic game of environmental taxes between two countries in the absence of explicit trade policies when both governments and firms act strategically. We demonstrate that the environmental tax in the steady‐state equilibrium in a dynamic environmental tax game is lower than that in a static environmental one. Therefore, the dynamic behaviour of the governments results in an increase in the environmental damage. Further, as a result of international cooperation on environmental taxes between two countries in the beginning of policy competition, there is an increase in the optimal environmental tax. This implies that it is important to set cooperative environmental taxes in the beginning of policy competition because non‐cooperative environmental taxes in the dynamic game result in the race‐to‐the‐bottom, which does not lead to environmental improvement.     

应对新冠疫情冲击的货币政策国际协调

新冠疫情冲击了世界经济增长和金融市场稳定。很多国家推出极度宽松货币政策应对危机。从经典货币政策国际协调的博弈理论来看,应对本次疫情冲击的各国货币政策协调性不足,“以邻为壑”的非合作均衡效果明显。为数不多的货币政策协调也存在执行力不足、深度与广度不够、新兴市场国家话语权低等问题。在世界经济紧密联系、货币政策溢出效应加强的背景下,为了应对疫情冲击,国际组织需要创设协议和合作剩余分配机制,寻找货币政策刺激效果和防止国际资产泡沫之间的平衡,加强政策沟通和信息共享,提高新兴市场国家话语权,建设有效的应对危机的货币政策国际协调机制。中国应在“一带一路”倡议的框架下建立长期货币政策协调机制,在现有的IMF和G20等平台上发挥发达国家与新兴市场国家之间的协调桥梁作用,通过持续开展央行间技术性合作等措施参与和推进协调进程。     

Trade,Growth, and Environmental Quality*

This paper examines linkages between international trade, environmental degradation, and economic growth in a dynamic North–South trade game. Using a neoclassical production function subject to an endogenously improving technology, North produces manufactured goods by employing labor, capital, and a natural resource that it imports from South. South extracts the resource using raw labor, in the process generating local pollution. We study optimal regional policies in the presence of local pollution and technology spillovers from North to South under both non‐cooperative and cooperative modes of trade. Non‐cooperative trade is inefficient due to stock externalities. Cooperative trade policies are efficient and yet do not benefit North. Both regions gain from improved productivity in North and faster knowledge diffusion to South regardless of the trading regime.     

A Public Choice Approach to Strategic and Nonstrategic Environmental Policy

In this paper we take a public choice perspective on strategic environmental policy and international environmental agreements. We examine cooperative and noncooperative environmental policies under governments that are either welfare maximizers (“good dictators”) or tax revenue maximizers (“Leviathans”). We show that Leviathans can perform better in terms of welfare and that good dictators can set higher taxes. We then analyze international environmental agreements and show that the breakdown of environmental cooperation can indeed lead to a welfare gain for all signatory countries. Considering a delegation game between governments, we find that a Pareto‐superior Leviathan outcome can be the unique Nash equilibrium.