合并财务报表抵销前的报表调整

合并财务报表时，除应按规定抵销企业集团内部交易对合并财务报表的影响外，还应对涉及母、子公司个别财务报表列报的各项财务指标的确认和计量的方法和金额进行调整。而且，这些调整往往属于编制抵销分录的前置必经程序。以新会计准则的相关规定为依据，结合具体会计实务，分析研究这些调整的共同特点和基本操作，并分别介绍涉及会计政策、会计期间的调整、涉及子公司资产负债公允价值的调整、与子公司资产负债公允价值相关的损益调整、涉及企业合并商誉的调整，以及按权益法调整对子公司的长期股权投资等。     

非同一控制下企业长期股权投资的会计处理

非同一控制下企业合并可分为一次交换交易实现企业合并和通过多次交换交易实现企业合并。本文对非同一控制下企业合并形成的长期股权投资以及后续计量中涉及到的对被投资单位净利润的调整及公允价值变动的确认的会计处理进行了探讨。     

长期股权投资新旧会计准则比较研究

一、长期股权投资内容范围界定的比絗`舷旧投资准则主要包括短期投资、长期债权投资、长期股权投资.投资会计核算主要解决的问题是投资的计价、投资损益的确认以及投资减值的核算.投资的计价包括投资成本的确定和投资账面价值的调整.该准则不涉及:(1)外币投资的核算;(2)证券经营业务;(3)合并会计报表;(4)企业合并.     

企业会计准则———投资

引言１本准则规范投资的会计核算和相关信息的披露。投资会计核算主要解决的问题是投资的计价，以及投资损益的确认。投资的计价包括投资成本的确定和投资账面价值的调整。２本准则不涉及：（１）外币投资的折算；（２）证券经营业务；（３）合并会计报表；（４）企业...     

金融股权投资业务会计处理与税务处理的异同分析及纳税调整

新的《企业会计制度》中对企业金融投资业务的会计处理方案,与税法有关条文及国家税务总局关于《企业股权投资业务若干所得税问题》的通知(以下简称《通知》)对投资所得的确认计量有许多不同,从而使得会计税前利润与应纳税所得额之间,产生了很大差异,为了避免会计人员进行纳税申报或税务机关征收税款时出现差错,本文就企业金融投资业务的会计处理与税务处理的异同进行了比较分析,旨说明此类业务所涉及应纳税所得额的调整问题。     

金融股权投资业务会计处理与税务处理的异同及纳税调整

新的<企业会计制度>中对企业金融投资业务的会计处理方案,与税法有关条文及国家税务总局关于<企业股权投资业务若干所得税问题>的通知(以下简称<通知>)对投资所得的确认计量有许多不同,从而使得会计税前利润与应纳税所得额之间,产生了很大差异,为了避免会计人员进行纳税申报或税务机关征收税款时出现差错,本文就企业金融投资业务的会计处理与税务处理的异同进行了比较分析,旨说明此类业务所涉及应纳税所得额的调整问题.     

存在未确认投资损失情况下的合并抵销分录辨析

读了《中国注册会计师》今年第6期谢岷的文章《未确认投资损失科目核算方法的探讨》,对文章中合并会计报表项目“未确认的投资损失”及所涉及的一些抵销分录有不同看法。《企业会计准则——投资》规定,长期股权投资采用权益法核算时,投资企业确认被投资单位发生的净亏损,以投资账面价值减记至零为限。因此,当被投资单位资不抵债,由于投资企业仅承担有限责任,不应确认享有权益的负数。根据《财政部关于资不抵债公司合并报表问题的请示的复函》(财会函字[1999]10号),母公司在编制合并会计报表时,其投资账面价值减记至零后的未确认被投资单位的…     

分析权益法核算与成本法核算范围的改变

为了进一步规范企业的对外投资业务,反映对外投资状况,我国相关部门对投资业务处理进行了再次修订,推出了最新投资准则,相对以往,修订后的投资业务准则在规范长期股权投资的确认以及准确披露投资业务信息中表现出很大优势。投资准则的最新修订中对权益法核算与成本法核算的长期股权投资适用范围进行了调整,本文针对权益法核算与成本法核算范围的改变进行分析、探讨。     

新旧准则长期股权投资减值比较研究

长期股权投资是新会计准则变化的亮点之一,其减值涉及到<资产减值>和<金融工具确认与计量>两个准则,会计实务处理的难度大,本文从新旧准则比较角度对长期股权投资减值问题进行了探讨,以期对长期股权投资的减值给出实务指导.     

权益法下股权投资损益和应交所得税

对于股权投资损益，由于会计和税法的确认时间和确认标准不同，会造成所得税差异。分析了产生差异的原因，论述了纳税调整和所得税的账务处理。     

How Firms Make Capital Expenditure Decisions: Financial Signals, Internal Cash Flows, Income Taxes and the Tax Reform Act of 1986

This paper empirically assesses the determinants of future net capital expenditures for a broad cross-section of COMPUSTAT firms from 1973 to 1989. We explore three general categories of factors expected to affect investment: (1) external equity financing, (2) internally generated accounting information, and (3) tax incentives. We find that external financing and information plays a role in that both positive stock returns and equity issuances indicate future increases in investment. The results suggest that high stock prices not only lower the cost of capital, but also signal good investment opportunities. Accounting information about internal sources and uses of funds are also important in the investment decision. In particular, net income and depreciation are positive indicators of future investment while there is a tradeoff between the payment of dividends and investment. Further, positive changes in available cash liquidity also motivate future investment. While taxes are not important in the investment decision on average, we find that firms with previously higher income taxes invested substantially more in 1985 and 1986. This coincides with the repeal of the investment tax credit and the accelerated depreciation schedules in the Tax Reform Act of 1986. We view this as evidence that federal tax policy in the 1980's induced firms with high income tax obligations to accelerate capital expenditures just before the favorable tax treatment of capital expenditures was eliminated.     

The effects of tax provisions on long-run investment prospects

This paper examines the implications of the tax system on the long-run investment prospects for several classes of securities, including short-term debt, long-term debt, and equity. Combining apparently reasonable assumptions with tax provisions that are similar to those of the prevailing federal system, we indicate that equity may be the only investment medium that promises a positive real, after-tax return to a taxable investor.By modifying selected tax provisions that relate to investment activities, such that the recognition of unrealized appreciation is deferred and the investment itself leads to an immediate deduction, substantially different long-run implications are produced. In particular, under reasonable assumptions all classes of investments (with the possible exception of Treasury bills) appear to promise a positive real, after-tax return     

Compliance with flexible accounting standards

We examine to what extent firms adhere to the stated intent of noncompulsory accounting standards when reporting for intercorporate investments. The Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) in Norway strongly recommend that a 20-50% intercorporate investment is accounted for by the equity method rather than the cost method, if the investment is long-term, of strategic importance, and involves significant influence. Even so, we find that the actual use of the equity method is independent of the duration of the investment period, the fraction of equity held, its recent growth, and the investor's voting power. This lack of compliance suggests that one cannot use the observed choice between the cost method and the equity method to infer the underlying characteristics of the investment as specified by the accounting standard. Flexible GAAP may therefore not induce firms to disclose the information that the GAAP were designed to produce.     

Investment income taxes and private equity acquisition activity

Utilizing a novel identification strategy, we uncover evidence that reducing the investment income tax rate increases acquisition activity by private equity acquirers. Applying a difference-in-difference methodology, we find that acquisitions sponsored by private equity firms nearly doubled following the investment income tax rate reductions associated with the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 and the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003. We attribute our findings to private equity fund structures and managing partners’ ability to capture the expected benefit of lower capital gains tax rates. These findings are robust to controlling for target shareholders’ tax incentives, as well as firm, industry, and macroeconomic factors possibly influencing acquisition activity.     

Optimal capital structure under corporate and personal taxation

In this paper, a model of corporate leverage choice is formulated in which corporate and differential personal taxes exist and supply side adjustments by firms enter into the determination of equilibrium relative prices of debt and equity. The presence of corporate tax shield substitutes for debt such as accounting depreciation, depletion allowances, and investment tax credits is shown to imply a market equilibrium in which each firm has a unique interior optimum leverage decision (with or without leverage-related costs). The optimal leverage model yields a number of interesting predictions regarding cross-sectional and time-series properties of firms' capital structures. Extant evidence bearing on these predictions is examined.     

Dividend Taxes and Implied Cost of Equity Capital

We estimate firm‐level implied cost of equity capital based on recent advances in accounting and finance research and examine the effect of dividend taxes on the cost of equity capital. We investigate whether dividend taxes affect firms' cost of capital by testing the relation between the implied cost of equity capital and a measure of the tax‐penalized portion of dividend yield, which we define as the product of dividend yield and the dividend tax penalty. The results generally support the dividend tax capitalization hypothesis. We find a positive relation between the implied cost of equity capital and the tax‐penalized portion of dividend yield that is decreasing in aggregate institutional ownership, our proxy for tax‐advantaged investors. The evidence in this study adds to the understanding of the effect of investor‐level taxes on equity value.     

Equity Risk Incentives and Corporate Tax Aggressiveness

This study examines equity risk incentives as one determinant of corporate tax aggressiveness. Prior research finds that equity risk incentives motivate managers to make risky investment and financing decisions, since risky activities increase stock return volatility and the value of stock option portfolios. Aggressive tax strategies involve significant uncertainty and can impose costs on both firms and managers. As a result, managers must be incentivized to engage in risky tax avoidance that is expected to generate net benefits for the firm and its shareholders. We predict that equity risk incentives motivate managers to undertake risky tax strategies. Consistent with this prediction, we find that larger equity risk incentives are associated with greater tax risk and the magnitude of this effect is economically significant. Our results are robust across four measures of tax risk, but do not vary across several proxies for strength of corporate governance. We conclude that equity risk incentives are a significant determinant of corporate tax aggressiveness.     

Personal taxes,cost of insurer equity capital,and the case of offshore hedge fund reinsurers

Insurer investment returns are taxed in the United States at the corporate level and at the personal level when they are distributed to shareholders. This paper examines the implications of personal taxes for the tax cost on insurers equity capital and how these tax costs have varied over time under different tax regimes and with different asset portfolios. The paper also discusses how personal taxes provide tax incentives to form offshore hedge fund reinsurers, which provide an interesting case study illustrating the relevance of personal taxes. Finally, the paper discusses the tax treatment of alternative capital arrangements, such as collateralized reinsurance and sidecars.     

A Comment on the Viability of the Allowance for Corporate Equity

This article, acknowledging the potentially important general attractions of the allowance for corporate equity (ACE), looks at some of its more specific implications. On corporate taxes, the article looks at questions about the implied revenue-neutral rate of corporation tax (and redistribution of the tax burden); the effects on cash flow of both government and companies; and what would become a crucially important charge on capital gains. On income tax, the article comments on the implications for self-employed earnings (and also, potentially, employees); for investment income and the logically accompanying EXPEP (extended personal equity plan); and therefore for inheritance tax. For international investment, the article notes that unless and until other countries adopt an ACE as the basis for harmonisation, the interaction of the ACE and existing taxes would not always be helpful for outward investment; and on some inward investment, if the most optimistic assumptions are not borne out, the effects could be rather bleak. JEL classification: H25, K34.