Effects of the New Basel Capital Accord on Bank Capital Requirements for SMEs

Using data from three countries (US, Italy and Australia) and surveying related studies from several other countries in Europe, we investigate the effects of the New Basel Capital Accord on bank capital requirements for small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs). We find that, for all the countries, banks will have significant benefits, in terms of lower capital requirements, when considering small and medium sized firms as retail customers. But they will be obliged to use the Advanced IRB approach and to manage them on a pooled basis. For SMEs as corporate, however, capital requirements will be slightly greater than under the existing Basel I Capital Accord. We believe that most eligible banks will use a blended approach (considering some SMEs as retail and some as corporate). Through a breakeven analysis, we find that for all of our countries, banking organizations will be obliged to classify as retail at least 20% of their SME portfolio in order to maintain the current capital requirement (8%). JEL classification: G21, G28     

Bank Portfolio Allocation: The Impact of Capital Requirements, Regulatory Monitoring, and Economic Conditions

This paper develops a structural, dynamic model of a banking firm to analyze how banks adjust their loan portfolios over time. In the model, banks experience capital shocks, face uncertain future loan demand, and incur costs based on their proximity to regulatory minimum capital requirements and the intensity of regulatory monitoring. Implications of the model then are estimated using panel data on large U.S. commercial banks operating continuously between December 1989 and December 1997. The estimated model is used to simulate the optimal bank response to (1) past and proposed changes in capital requirements, (2) changes in regulatory monitoring intensity, and (3) economic downturns. The simulation results are used to shed light on the decline in loan growth and the rise in bank capital ratios witnessed over a decade ago as well as the possible impact of the current proposed modification to capital requirements.     

An Analysis of Bank Charter Value and Its Risk-Constraining Incentives

Valuable bank charters have been hypothesized to provide bank managers self-regulatory incentives to constrain their risk taking. However, this paper presents evidence that charter value itself may derive from high-risk activities, indicating that minimizing risk taking also would limit the value of the charter. During economic expansions, bank charter values increase to reflect growth opportunities. In turn, high-charter-value banks gain easier access to equity capital sources for expansion. The result is a positive relationship between charter value and capital ratios during expansions. However, this relationship may invert during economic contractions. Panel regressions demonstrate that the charter value and bank leverage relationship is sensitive to market conditions.     

Value of Multinationality: Internalization, Managerial Self-interest, and Managerial Compensation

In this paper, we examine the impact of managerial self-interest on the value of multinationality. Since agency theory also suggests that a divergence between the interests of managers and shareholders can be aligned by effective managerial incentive, we also examine the effect of managerial compensation on the value of multinationality. Our results show that for high- Q (Tobin's Q > 1 ) firms, investors do not associate the spending of free cash flow on multinationality with the problem of overinvestments. For high- Q firms, it is also found that the value of multinationality can be enhanced by effective managerial incentives. For low- Q firms (Tobin's Q < 1 ), it is found that the concern of managerial self-interest overwhelms the benefits of internalization, making multinationality a value-decreasing event. For low- Q firms, managerial compensation is also ineffective in promoting value-enhancing foreign direct investments.     

中国银行资本监管模式选择研究

有效银行资本监管涉及降低银行倒闭风险所得到的社会收益与抑制金融业发展所产生的社会成本之间的平衡问题,理想的银行资本监管应随着这些成本和收益的变化而调整,设计一种激励相容的银行资本监管制度成为对银行资本监管的现实需要,无论是标准化模式还是内部模型法都是对银行具体风险评价和风险管理方法的约束,整体监管模式建立在预先承诺制的基础之上,注重激励相容、发挥市场约束和银行自身管理的作用,在适用性、稳定性、可操作性等方面都比内部模型法具有优势.     

The Interaction between Capital Requirements and Monetary Policy

The interaction between capital requirements and monetary policy is assessed by means of simple rules in a dynamic general equilibrium model featuring a banking sector. In “normal” times, when economic dynamics are driven by supply shocks, an active use of capital requirements generates modest benefits in terms of volatility of the target variables compared to the case in which only the central bank carries out stabilization policies. The lack of cooperation between the two policymakers may result in excessive volatility of the monetary policy rate and capital requirements. The benefits of introducing capital requirements become sizeable when financial shocks, which affect the supply of loans, are important drivers of economic dynamics; the availability of capital requirements as a policy tool yields a significant gain in terms of macroeconomic stabilization, regardless of the type of interaction between monetary and capital requirements policies.     

An Alternative View on Regulatory Distortions in a Competitive Financial Services Industry

We present an alternative view on regulatory distortions in the banking industry. We use the duopoly model developed by Boot, Dezelan, and Milbourn (BDM, 2000), where a bank with low monitoring costs faces a bank with high monitoring costs. We show that when the initial level of the capital requirement is low, an increase of the minimum ratio between capital and total assets causes a higher decrease in profits at the bad bank than at the good bank. This finding contrasts with BDM's theorem 1, which predicts that a regulation imposing an identical increase in production costs on both banks will cause a greater loss in profits at the good bank than at the bad bank. We also look at the impact of an increase in the minimum ratio between capital and total assets on the profits of a representative bank in three other competitive environments identified in BDM. We find that the decrease in the representative bank's profit caused by an increase in the capital requirement is larger when the bank faces competition from an unregulated firm than when it faces a regulated competitor or no competitor at all. This result is consistent with BDM's theorem 2.     

Optimal Dynamic Capital Requirements

We characterize welfare maximizing capital requirement policies in a quantitative macrobanking model with household, firm, and bank defaults calibrated to Euro Area data. We optimize on the level of the capital requirements applied to each loan class and their sensitivity to changes in default risk. We find that getting the level right (so that bank failure risk remains contained) is of foremost importance, while the optimal sensitivity to default risk is positive but typically smaller than under Basel internal ratings based (IRB) formulas. Starting from low levels, savers and borrowers benefit from higher capital requirements. At higher levels, only savers prefer tighter requirements.     

The Impact of the 2007 Liquidity Shock on Bank Jumbo Mortgage Lending

This paper explores the consequences of the collapse of the private‐label residential mortgage‐backed securities market in 2007 on banks’ originations of jumbo mortgages. We show that jumbo lending declined by more at banks that were more dependent on this market and were less well capitalized. In contrast, banks that had little dependence on this market and were well capitalized increased jumbo originations. These findings highlight how dependence on the secondary market may cause amplification of financial shocks, and the potential value of capital requirements that are higher during periods of economic growth in mitigating the amplification effects.     

Minimizing Basel III Capital Requirements with Unconditional Coverage Constraint

The new Basel III framework increases the banks’ market risk capital requirements. In this paper, we introduce a new risk management approach based on the unconditional coverage test to minimize the regulatory capital requirements. Portfolios optimized with our new minimum capital constraint successfully reduce the Basel III market risk capital requirements. In general, portfolios with value-at-risk and conditional-value-at-risk objective functions and underlying empirical distribution yield better portfolio risk profiles and have lower capital requirements. For the optimization we use the threshold-accepting heuristic and the common trust-region search method.     

基于创业投资资本利得的税收激励政策研究

创业投资收益主要体现在资本利得上,本文应用了Keuschnigg-Nielsen模型证明了创业投资与资本利得课税成反向关系,研究发现对资本利得税课税越重,对创业投资活动就越具有抑制作用.因此不少国家或地区纷纷制定了针对资本利得的税收激励政策,对创业投资的发展起到积极的推动作用.文章最后指出了对我国设计针对创业投资资本利得的税收激励政策的启示.     

Jointly Optimal Regulation of Bank Capital and Liquidity

In an economy with financial frictions, banks endogenously choose excessive leverage and maturity mismatch in equilibrium, as they fail to internalize the risk of socially wasteful fire sales. Macroprudential regulators can achieve efficiency with simple linear constraints, which require less information than Pigouvian taxes. The liquidity coverage and net stable funding ratios of Basel III can implement efficiency. Additional microprudential regulation of leverage is required when bank failures are socially costly. Micro‐ and macroprudential rules are imperfect substitutes. Optimally, macroprudential policy reacts to systematic risk and credit conditions over the cycle, while microprudential policy reacts to systematic and idiosyncratic risk.     

影子银行对货币政策的影响

随着2007年全球金融危机爆发,学界和社会公众再度提高对金融监管与宏观货币政策的重视。影子银行是金融创新的产物,在给资本市场和产品市场带来活力的同时也使得人们更加关注影子银行对货币市场和货币政策的影响。本文基于信用与宏观经济学理论并利用中国化宏观数据进行论证,将市场利率划分为商业银行体系利率与影子银行体系利率并以贷款基准利率作为商业银行的总体利率,以一年期国债到期收益率作为影子银行利率,以市盈利率作为整个经济体系的实际利率,并利用线性回归给出三者间的关系。结果表明我国的影子银行在一定程度上可以起到降低社会总体融资成本、促进经济增长的作用,但也给物价和金融稳定施加一定的压力,在短期内会加快我国的货币流通速度,降低我国货币政策有效性。     

The Impact of Pillar 3 Disclosure Requirements on Bank Safety

We consider the impact of a mandatory information disclosure on bank safety in a spatial model of banking competition, in which a bank’s probability of success depends on the quality of its risk measurement and management systems. Under Basel capital requirements, this quality is at least partially disclosed to market participants by the Pillar 3 disclosures. We show that the regulator can improve the safety of the banking system by tightening the disclosure requirements. Furthermore, the stricter the disclosure requirements are the bigger is a positive impact of an increase in capital requirements on bank safety.     

人力资本价值计量方法探讨

人力资本的特性决定了其不同于财务资本的价值计量方法.人力资本价值计量应以产出法为主导方法,并体现团队计量、分层计量、动态计量的要求.人力资本价值包含企业整体人力资本价值、团队人力资本价值和个体人力资本价值三个层次.从整体人力资本价值到团队人力资本价值再到个体人力资本价值的逆向评估法符合现代企业生产经营的特点,也具有相当程度的可操作性.     

Liquidity Coinsurance and Bank Capital

Banks can deal with their liquidity risk by holding liquid assets (self‐insurance), by participating in interbank markets (coinsurance), or by using flexible financing instruments, such as bank capital (risk sharing). We use a simple model to show that undiversifiable liquidity risk, that is, the liquidity risk that banks are unable to coinsure on interbank markets, represents an important risk factor affecting their capital structures. Banks facing higher undiversifiable liquidity risk hold more capital. We posit that, empirically, banks that are more exposed to undiversifiable liquidity risk are less active on interbank markets. Therefore, we test for the existence of a negative relationship between bank capital and interbank market activity and find support in a large sample of U.S. commercial banks.     

资本影子价值、资本利用率与上市公司质量

本讨论了在有调整成本存在的情况下上市公司资本品的影子价值（包括实物资本和无形资本的价值）、资本利用率与上市公司质量之间的关系，修正了现有的理论模型。在利用该模型对中国泸深两市有代表性的上市公司的实证研究中发现，（1）资本影子价值的变化能够较好地反映上市公司长期发展状况。（2）资本利用率的波动与上市公司的短期经营状况有着紧密的联系。（3）资本影子价值与资本利用率之间的关系体现了公司长期发展与短期产出水平之间的关系。     

马寅初先生银行资本观的研究与启示

马寅初的银行资本观强调了以资本为银行的基础,以资本约束银行的经营行为。我们通过对马寅初先生关于银行资本观的研究,探讨现代银行如何增强资本管理意识,以加强资本管理实现风险管理。     

The Impact of Corporate Governance on Executive Compensation

This paper examines the relationship between the compensation of the top five executives at a set of over 400 publicly listed Canadian firms and various internal and external corporate governance‐related factors. The media is full of stories suggesting a relationship between large executive compensation packages and failures in governance at various levels within organisations, but there exists little formal analysis of many of these relationships. Our analysis provides empirical evidence supporting some of these assertions, refuting others and documenting new relationships. We find that variances in internal governance related to differences across firms in the characteristics of the CEO, compensation committee and board of directors do influence both the level and composition of executive compensation, especially for the CEO. Considering external measures of corporate governance, we find that different types of shareholders and competitive environments impact executive compensation. We do not find that either the internal or external governance characteristics dominate.     

Capital, Portfolio, and Growth: Bank Behavior Under Risk-Based Capital Guidelines

This paper examines banks' capital, portfolio and growth decisions from 1986 to 1995, when risk-based capital guidelines were proposed and implemented. Overall, we observe complementarity between equity financing and risk. We find no systematic differences in pre- and postregulation behavior consistent with banks reacting to risk-based capital standards implementation. We do find significant differences, however, between low-capital banks and other banks. For example, increases in equity generally do not lead to increases in assets unless the bank has low capital. We also find that the impact of regulatory variables, such as the ratio of equity to total assets or the of ratio risk-weighted assets to total assets, have the predicted, significant effects for low-capital banks but not necessarily for other banks.