An Alternative View on Regulatory Distortions in a Competitive Financial Services Industry

We present an alternative view on regulatory distortions in the banking industry. We use the duopoly model developed by Boot, Dezelan, and Milbourn (BDM, 2000), where a bank with low monitoring costs faces a bank with high monitoring costs. We show that when the initial level of the capital requirement is low, an increase of the minimum ratio between capital and total assets causes a higher decrease in profits at the bad bank than at the good bank. This finding contrasts with BDM's theorem 1, which predicts that a regulation imposing an identical increase in production costs on both banks will cause a greater loss in profits at the good bank than at the bad bank. We also look at the impact of an increase in the minimum ratio between capital and total assets on the profits of a representative bank in three other competitive environments identified in BDM. We find that the decrease in the representative bank's profit caused by an increase in the capital requirement is larger when the bank faces competition from an unregulated firm than when it faces a regulated competitor or no competitor at all. This result is consistent with BDM's theorem 2.     

Effects of the New Basel Capital Accord on Bank Capital Requirements for SMEs

Using data from three countries (US, Italy and Australia) and surveying related studies from several other countries in Europe, we investigate the effects of the New Basel Capital Accord on bank capital requirements for small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs). We find that, for all the countries, banks will have significant benefits, in terms of lower capital requirements, when considering small and medium sized firms as retail customers. But they will be obliged to use the Advanced IRB approach and to manage them on a pooled basis. For SMEs as corporate, however, capital requirements will be slightly greater than under the existing Basel I Capital Accord. We believe that most eligible banks will use a blended approach (considering some SMEs as retail and some as corporate). Through a breakeven analysis, we find that for all of our countries, banking organizations will be obliged to classify as retail at least 20% of their SME portfolio in order to maintain the current capital requirement (8%). JEL classification: G21, G28     

Dwarf banks

This study examines the business model and the viability of very small commercial banks in emerging market context. Using a unique sample of 141 Russian banks with less than a $10 million in assets, I trace performance, survival, recapitalization and growth patterns of these dwarf banks in response to the sharp increase in the minimum capital requirements. I find that dwarf banks are, on average, low-risk financial intermediaries that perform simple operations and have significantly higher survival rates in local markets with poor economic and banking services outreach characteristics. I also find that the average dwarf banks withstand the regulatory capital shock surprisingly well by securing fresh capital injection followed by a twofold asset size increase. The results of this study contribute to the literature on the relationship between the small bank business model, local banking markets characteristics and long-term viability. They also provide new evidence on the expected and unexpected outcomes of the “too small to survive” regulatory intervention into the banking market size structures.     

The cyclical effects of the Basel II capital requirements

Capital requirements play a key role in the supervision and regulation of banks. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision is in the process of changing the current framework by introducing risk sensitive capital charges. Some fear that this will unduly increase the volatility of regulatory capital. Furthermore, by limiting the banks’ ability to lend, capital requirements may exacerbate an economic downturn. The paper examines the problem of capital-induced lending cycles and their pro-cyclical effect on the macroeconomy in greater detail. It finds that the capital buffer that banks hold on top of the required minimum capital plays a crucial role in mitigating the impact of the volatility of capital requirements.     

Theories of bank behavior under capital regulation

This paper reviews academic studies of bank capital regulation in an effort to evaluate the intellectual foundation for the imposition of the Basel I and Basel II systems of risk-based capital requirements. The theoretical literature yields general agreement about the immediate effects of capital requirements on bank lending and loan rates and the longer-term impacts on bank ratios of equity to total or risk-adjusted assets. This literature produces highly mixed predictions, however, regarding the effects of capital regulation on asset risk and overall safety and soundness for the banking system as a whole. Thus, the intellectual foundation for the present capital-regulation regime is not particularly strong. The mixed conclusions in the academic literature on banking certainly do not provide unqualified support for moving to an even more stringent and costly system of capital requirements. These widely ambiguous results do suggest, however, that assessing the implications of capital regulation for balance-sheet risk and monitoring effort in diverse banking systems is an important agenda for future theoretical research in the banking area.     

1980—1994年间美国银行危机及其启示

1980-1994年间,美国经历了一次大的银行危机,大批银行在危机中倒闭。总体来看,宏观经济、区域经济和行业经济衰退,监管机构放松监管,银行业自身经营管理的不规范是引发这次银行危机的主因。虽然危机已经过去,但这次银行危机中暴露的问题对我国银行业的发展仍具有启示意义。     

How Offshore Financial Competition Disciplines Exit Resistance by Incentive-Conflicted Bank Regulators

This paper studies the impact of technological change and regulatory competition on governmental efforts to generate rents for banks in two stylized regulatory environments. In the first environment, incentive-conflicted regulators attempt to create rents by restricting the size and scope of individual banking organizations. In the second, rents come from efforts to supply deposit guarantees to troubled banks. In both cases, innovations in financial technology and in competing domestic and offshore regulatory arrangements make the costs of delivering rents to banks more transparent to taxpayers and encourage customers to push rent-dependent banking systems into crisis. This analysis portrays the banking crises that have roiled world markets in recent years as information-producing events that identify and discredit inefficient strategies of regulating banking markets.     

基于创业投资资本利得的税收激励政策研究

创业投资收益主要体现在资本利得上,本文应用了Keuschnigg-Nielsen模型证明了创业投资与资本利得课税成反向关系,研究发现对资本利得税课税越重,对创业投资活动就越具有抑制作用.因此不少国家或地区纷纷制定了针对资本利得的税收激励政策,对创业投资的发展起到积极的推动作用.文章最后指出了对我国设计针对创业投资资本利得的税收激励政策的启示.     

影子银行对货币政策的影响

随着2007年全球金融危机爆发,学界和社会公众再度提高对金融监管与宏观货币政策的重视.影子银行是金融创新的产物,在给资本市场和产品市场带来活力的同时也使得人们更加关注影子银行对货币市场和货币政策的影响.本文基于信用与宏观经济学理论并利用中国化宏观数据进行论证,将市场利率划分为商业银行体系利率与影子银行体系利率并以贷款基...     

商业银行实施激励股票期权若干问题研究

近年来,激励股票期权在我国商业银行中逐渐被重视,并即将成为重要的激励方式.本文在阐述商业银行实施激励股票期权重要意义的基础上,指出应合理定位法律在实施激励股票期权过程中充当的角色,法律不宜过多介入商业银行激励股票期权方案的实施,但对激励股票期权实施过程是否公正、实施结果是否合理等情况则应保留相当程度的审查权与裁判权.同时,指出以股价、财务会计手段作为业绩测量标准来界定银行业绩的含义均存在一定缺陷,授予业绩或指数期权而非固定溢价期权应为更佳选择;本文还对激励股票期权的授予数量、持有时间和期权重新定价等问题进行了剖析.     

商业银行实施激励股票期权若干问题研究

近年来,激励股票期权在我国商业银行中逐渐被重视,并即将成为重要的激励方式.本文在阐述商业银行实施激励股票期权重要意义的基础上,指出应合理定位法律在实施激励股票期权过程中充当的角色,法律不宜过多介入商业银行激励股票期权方案的实施,但对激励股票期权实施过程是否公正、实施结果是否合理等情况则应保留相当程度的审查权与裁判权.同时,指出以股价、财务会计手段作为业绩测量标准来界定银行业绩的含义均存在一定缺陷,授予业绩或指数期权而非固定溢价期权应为更佳选择;本文还对激励股票期权的授予数量、持有时间和期权重新定价等问题进行了剖析.     

Efficiency and Risk in Latin American Banking: Explaining Resilience

Using an unbalanced panel of 272 commercial banks, we estimate cost and revenue efficiency scores for fifteen Latin American and Caribbean countries over the period 2001-8. Using Granger causality techniques, we find evidence that in the face of increased risk and lowered capital, banks have tended to improve cost efficiency. The results also indicate that cost efficiency is negatively related with revenue efficiency, both dynamically and across countries. Market concentration is related to greater revenue efficiency. In the absence of developed capital markets, competitive forces and strengthened regulation seem to be forcing cost-efficiency improvements. Banks with market power, however, seem to be able to pass on to customers the cost of raising capital buffers and provisioning for risk.     

中国银行业资本监管新规的激励相容特性研究

全球金融监管倡导激励相容,强调金融机构自身目标与监管者目标协调一致。在分析中国银行业资本监管新规激励相容特征的基础上,对商业银行“三性”目标与监管机构目标的激励相容程度进行测算,运用 GMM 方法对资本监管目标与商业银行目标模型进行检验,发现资本监管目标与商业银行盈利性目标并不冲突,而且银行自身持有资本的意愿能够降低风险行为,但是资本充足率监管对于流动性的影响并不显著。可见,当前中国银行业资本监管整体上具有激励相容特性,但在流动性和风险性方面激励程度有待加强。     

机构投资者能改进上市公司高管的薪酬激励吗?

次贷危机爆发以来,公司高管的巨额薪酬成为众矢之的。随着我国机构投资者的迅速崛起,市场对机构投资者改进上市公司治理寄予了厚望。我国的机构投资者能否对上市公司高管的薪酬激励和股权激励产生积极影响是本文关注的重点。本文选取2004~2008年度的上市公司作为样本,运用线性概率模型、Probit、Logit、Tobit以及OLS等回归方法对机构持股和上市公司高管薪酬激励,特别是股权激励的关系进行实证检验。实证结果表明中国的机构投资者并未有效限制高管股权激励和固定薪酬的增长,对于薪酬设计的改善作用也有待加强,机构股东积极主义在中国还有待加强。     

Housing Finance GSEs: Who Gets the Subsidy?

Taxpayer subsidies that flow toward housing-finance GSEs are implicit in nature. This makes the size and distribution of subsidy values hard to measure directly. An array of indirect analyses indicates that incentive-conflicted GSE managers can and do extract substantial annual subsidies for GSE stockholders. Currently, stockholders are allowed to encourage managers to exploit taxpayers by tying incentive compensation implicitly to increases in the discounted present value of expected future subsidies. To counteract this inappropriate incentive, managers should be made accountable to taxpayers for returning all compensation that can be fairly attributed to increases in subsidies captured by GSE stockholders.     

Potential Competitive Effects of Basel II on Banks in SME Credit Markets in the United States

We examine the likely competitive effects of implementation of Basel II capital requirements on banks in the market for credit to SMEs in the U.S. Similar competitive effects from Basel II may occur for other credits and financial instruments in the U.S. and other nations. We address whether reduced risk weights for SME credits extended by large banking organizations that adopt the Advanced Internal Ratings-Based (A-IRB) approach of Basel II might significantly adversely affect the competitive positions of other organizations. The analyses suggest only relatively minor competitive effects on most community banks because the large A-IRB adopters tend to make very different types of SME loans to different types of borrowers than community banks. However, there may be significant adverse effects on the competitive positions of large non-A-IRB banking organizations because the data do not suggest any strong segmentation in SME credit markets among large organizations. JEL classification: G21, G28, G38, L51     

中国银行业注资辨析

当前这场国际金融危机下,各国纷纷实施注资行为救助问题银行.而我国政府曾多次向国有银行等金融机构实施过各种形式的注资,中国银行业的注资问题也一直受到了学术界与实务部门的普遍关注.本文旨在从中西方对比的视角,探讨中国银行业注资的背景、方式、期限选择的特殊性所在.