Auctions with costly information acquisition

We characterize optimal selling mechanisms in auction environments where bidders must incur a cost to learn their valuations. These mechanisms specify for each period, as a function of the bids in previous periods, which new potential buyers should be asked to bid. In addition, these mechanisms must induce the bidders to acquire information about their valuations and to reveal this information truthfully. Using a generalized Groves principle, we prove a very general “full extraction of the surplus” result: the seller can obtain the same profit as if he had full control over the bidders’ acquisition of information and could have observed directly their valuations once they are informed. We also present appealing implementations of the optimal mechanism in special cases. For helpful comments we thank George Deltas, David Martimort, an anonymous referee, and seminar participants in Mannheim, Rutgers, Tel Aviv, Toulouse, the Society for Economic Design 2002 conference in New York, and the 2003 North American Summer Meetings of the Econometric Society in Evanston, IL. Yossi Spiegel thanks the IIBR for financial assistance and Charles Zheng thanks the NSF for grant SES-0214471.     

Computationally-feasible truthful auctions for convex bundles

In many economic settings, like spectrum and real-estate auctions, geometric figures on the plane are for sale. Each bidder bids for his desired figure, and the auctioneer has to choose a set of disjoint figures that maximizes the social welfare. In this work, we design mechanisms that are both incentive compatible and computationally feasible for these environments. Since the underlying algorithmic problem is computationally hard, these mechanisms cannot always achieve the optimal welfare; Nevertheless, they do guarantee a fraction of the optimal solution. We differentiate between two information models—when both the desired figures and their values are unknown to the auctioneer or when only the agents' values are private data. We guarantee different fractions of the optimal welfare for each information model and for different families of figures (e.g., arbitrary convex figures or axis-aligned rectangles). We suggest using a measure on the geometric diversity of the figures for expressing the quality of the approximations that our mechanisms provide.     

Dissolving a partnership (un)fairly

Summary. In an incomplete information, common values setting with risk-neutral agents, we consider mechanisms for allocating the assets of a dissolving partnership where the mechanism designer has no information about the distribution of signals of the agents. We find that the divide and choose mechanism systematically favors the chooser and hence fails on the grounds of fairness. We also examine the fairness properties of the winning and losing bid auctions and show that they systematically favor winning (resp. losing) bidder in ex post allocation of surplus. Finally, we show that a binding arbitration mechanism implements fair allocations.Received: 17 May 2002, Revised: 5 June 2003, JEL Classification Numbers: D39, D44I thank an anonymous referee for extremely helpful suggestions. I also gratefully acknowledge the support of the National Science Foundation and the Hoover Institution.     

Towards a complete real-time electricity market design

The general design for the real-time electricity market presented in this paper optimizes and prices both real and reactive power simultaneously in an AC setting, where all assets—generation, load and transmission—are allowed to bid and are financially settled at the locational price times energy consumed or produced. The result is that transmission lines are compensated for both capacity and admittance, providing incentives for efficient operation of transmission-related assets such as FACTS devices, if price-taking behavior is assumed. Losses are incorporated into the design and become an operating cost for transmission. The market design is shown to be revenue neutral and, under some assumptions, nonconfiscatory.      

Auctions for social lending: A theoretical analysis

Prosper, today the second largest social lending marketplace with nearly 1.5 million members and $380 million in funded loans, employed an auction mechanism amongst lenders to finance each borrower's loan until 2010. Given that a basic premise of social lending is cheap loans for borrowers, how does the Prosper auction do in terms of the borrower's payment, when lenders are strategic agents with private true interest rates? We first analyze the Prosper auction as a game of complete information and fully characterize its Nash equilibria, and show that the uniform-price Prosper mechanism, while simple, can lead to much larger payments for the borrower than the VCG mechanism. We next compare the Prosper mechanism against the borrower-optimal auction in an incomplete information setting, and conclude by examining the Prosper mechanism when modeled as a dynamic auction, and provide tight bounds on the price for a general class of bidding strategies.     

License auctions with royalty contracts for (winners and) losers

This paper revisits the licensing of a non-drastic process innovation by an outside innovator to a Cournot oligopoly. We propose a new mechanism that combines a restrictive license auction with royalty licensing. This mechanism is more profitable than standard license auctions, auctioning royalty contracts, fixed-fee licensing, pure royalty licensing, and two-part tariffs. The key features are that royalty contracts are auctioned and that losers of the auction are granted the option to sign a royalty contract. Remarkably, combining royalties for winners and losers of the auction makes the integer constraint concerning the number of licenses irrelevant.     

我国本息分离债券市场制度设计的若干重点问题

本文在借鉴国外市场成熟经验的基础上,立足我国债券市场的实际情况．对我国本息分离债券市场制度设计的四个重点问题——债券品种设计、合格交易商选择、交易结算模式设计、交易制度规划进行了研究和探讨．构建了未来我国本息分离债券市场的基本框架。     

Financial market integration, labor markets, and macroeconomic policies

We used a dynamic two-country optimizing model featuring a labor–market friction to analyze the implications of financial market integration for the propagation of macroeconomic policies in an open economy. Our main result is that the labor–market friction we analyzed substantially reduces the magnitude of the effect of financial market integration on the propagation of macroeconomic policies.     

Subscription Mechanisms for Network Formation

We analyze a model of network formation where the costs of link formation are publicly known but individual benefits are not known to the social planner. The objective is to design a simple mechanism ensuring efficiency, budget balance, and equity. We propose two mechanisms towards this end; the first ensures efficiency and budget balance but not equity. The second mechanism corrects the asymmetry in payoffs through a two-stage variant of the first mechanism. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C71, C72, D20.     

Effect of substitutes in contingent valuation for a private market good

Economic theory predicts a decrease in valuation as the availability of substitutes increases. This paper describes a contingent valuation (CV) survey that investigates the effect of substitutes on valuation of private market goods. Using an approach that compares willingness to pay (WTP) values elicited from a CV question that accounts for substitutes with WTP values elicited from a similar question without substitutes, we find that allowing for substitutes can moderate WTP values. For the item valued in this study, a hamburger sandwich, allowing for substitutes was associated with a reduction of from 10% to 16% in stated values.     

Optimal bilateral trade of multiple objects

We study a private-values buyer–seller problem with multiple objects. Valuations are binary and i.i.d. We construct mechanisms that span the set of all Pareto-efficient outcomes. The induced trading rules for objects are linked in a simple way.     

The effectiveness of pre-release advertising for motion pictures: An empirical investigation using a simulated market

We use data on a movie’s stock price as it trades on the Hollywood Stock Exchange, a popular online market simulation, to study the impact of movie advertising. We find that advertising has a positive and statistically significant effect on expected revenues, but that the effect varies strongly across movies of different “quality”. The point estimate implies that the returns to advertising for the average movie are negative.     

Testing the efficiency of the futures market for crude oil in the presence of a structural break

The efficiency of the futures market for crude oil has been the subject of significant study, with the basis regression representing a popular methodology. However, the parameters of this model are subject to a structural break, casting doubt on any conclusion regarding the efficiency of the futures market. To address this problem, this article employs a simple generalization which is capable of testing the efficiency of a futures market in the presence of a structural break. Using this approach, strong evidence of inefficiency is found in the one month futures contract for West Texas Intermediate for the period between 1985 and 2013, which is otherwise not detected.     

Optimal private good allocation: The case for a balanced budget

In an independent private value auction environment, we are interested in strategy-proof mechanisms that maximize the agents' residual surplus, that is, the utility derived from the physical allocation minus transfers accruing to an external entity. We find that, under the assumption of an increasing hazard rate of type distributions, an optimal deterministic mechanism never extracts any net payments from the agents, that is, it will be budget-balanced. Specifically, optimal mechanisms have a simple “posted price” or “option” form. In the bilateral trade environment, we obtain optimality of posted price mechanisms without any assumption on type distributions.     

International Evidence for Return Predictability and the Implications for Long‐Run Covariation of the G7 Stock Markets

Abstract. Temporary fluctuations of the US consumption–wealth ratio do not only predict excess returns on the US but also international stock markets at the business cycle frequency. This finding is the reflection of a common, temporary component in national stock markets. Exposure to this common component explains up to 50% of the pairwise covariation among long‐horizon returns on the G7 stock markets for the time period from 1970 to 2008. This latter finding is less pronounced in the post‐1990s period.     

Earnings growth and the bull market of the 1990s: Is there a case for rational exuberance?

This paper examines whether permanent earnings growth, crucial to stock valuation, increased during the 1990s, as suggested by proponents of the new economy. Using S&P 500 earnings for the period of 1951–2000, we do not find strong evidence of either a one-time structural break or gradual change. However, the confidence interval on permanent earnings growth is wide enough to include an increase that is roughly consistent with the bull market of the late 1990s. Thus, we cannot reject a rational basis for that exuberance.