Trend Inflation, Taylor Principle, and Indeterminacy

Positive trend inflation shrinks the determinacy region of a basic New Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model when monetary policy is conducted by a contemporaneous interest rate rule. Neither the Taylor principle, which requires the inflation coefficient to be greater than one, nor the generalized Taylor principle, which requires that the nominal interest rate to be raised by more than the increase in inflation in the long run, is a sufficient condition for local determinacy of equilibrium. This finding holds for different types of Taylor rules, inertial policy rules, and price indexation schemes. Therefore, regardless of the theoretical setup, the monetary literature on interest rate rules cannot disregard average inflation in both theoretical and empirical analyses.     

On the aggregate welfare cost of Great Depression unemployment

The potential benefit of policies that eliminate a small likelihood of economic crises is calculated. An economic crisis is defined as an increase in unemployment of the magnitude observed during the Great Depression. For the U.S., the maximum likelihood estimate of entering a depression is found to be about once every 83 years. The welfare gain from setting this small probability to zero can range between 1% and 7% of annual consumption in perpetuity. For most estimates, more than half of these large gains results from a reduction in individual consumption volatility.     

The Government Spending Multiplier in a (Mis)Managed Liquidity Trap

I study the impact of a government spending shock in a New Keynesian model when monetary policy is set optimally. In this framework, the economy is at the zero lower bound but expectations are well managed by the central bank. As such, the multiplier effect of government spending increases on expected inflation is close to zero while the one on output can be larger than one. This is consistent with recent empirical evidence on the effects of the 2009 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act.     

Withering Government Spending Multipliers

The empirical literature has documented a weakening of the consumption and output responses to an increase in government spending during the last 30 years. We show that a New Keynesian model in which real government spending is observed with measurement errors can account for the reduction in the size of government spending multipliers. The model implies—consistent with empirical evidence presented by Ilzetzki, Mendoza, and Vegh (2010)—that the evolution of monetary policy and greater globalization (increasing international trade and decreasing capital controls) are key factors in this development.     

Taxation and the Taylor principle

A nominal tax system is added to a sticky-price monetary business cycle model. When nominal interest income is taxed, the coefficient on inflation in a Taylor-type monetary policy rule must be significantly larger than one in order for the model economy to have a determinate rational-expectations equilibrium. When effective tax rates are raised by inflation, the stability of the economy's equilibrium can be adversely affected. Finally, when depreciation is treated as a charge against taxable income, an even larger weight on inflation is required in the Taylor rule in order to obtain a determinate and stable equilibrium.     

The Taylor Principle and Monetary Policy Approaching a Zero Bound on Nominal Rates: Quantile Regression Results for the United States and Japan

This paper offers a new approach that estimates the response of interest rates to inflation and the output gap at various points (quantiles) on the conditional distribution of interest rates. This offers an improvement on empirical estimates conducted only at the mean and also allows us to test the propositions that policy shows greater aggression to inflation in the reaction function in terms of a greater response coefficient as interest rates reach low levels, and increasing aggression as the lower bound is approached. We find support for the Taylor principle, a more aggressive response to inflation than under a Taylor rule, but no detectable evidence of increasing aggression as the zero lower bound is approached in the US and Japan.     

Taylor rules and the term structure

The expectations model of the term structure has been subjected to numerous empirical tests and almost invariably rejected, with the failure generally attributed to systematic expectations errors or to shifts in risk premia. Rules for monetary policy designed along the lines of Taylor [1993. Discretion versus policy rules in practice. Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy 39, 195-214] specify that the central bank adjusts short-term yields in response to deviations of inflation and output gaps from target level. Such rules give a good empirical account of the behavior of the short-term interest rate. Combining the Taylor rule and expectations theory, it is possible to generate—along lines pioneered by Campbell and Shiller [1987. Cointegration and tests of present value models. Journal of Political Economy 95, 1062-1088]—a series of theoretical long-term interest rates. When such theoretical rates are calculated for the US over 1980-2004, considerable support for the expectations theory emerges.     

Tax distortions and the case for price stability

We investigate the case for price stability in the general version of the New Keynesian (NNS) model with capital and several shocks. The model includes, in addition to the standard imperfect competition and monetary frictions, a non-trivial, endogenous tax distortion. We find that the case for perfect price stability is not significantly weakened. Optimal policy tolerates a small amount of output gap and price variability by reacting less strongly to supply and fiscal shocks in comparison to a policy that aims at perfect price stabilization.     

Fundamental Economic Shocks and the Macroeconomy

We ask how macroeconomic and financial variables respond to empirical measures of shocks to technology, labor supply, and monetary policy. These three shocks account for the preponderance of output, productivity, and price fluctuations. Only technology shocks have a permanent impact on economic activity. Labor inputs have little initial response to technology shocks. Monetary policy has a small response to technology shocks but "leans against the wind" in response to the more cyclical labor supply shock. This shock has the biggest impact on interest rates. Stock prices respond to all three shocks. Other empirical implications of our approach are discussed.     

House Prices and Government Spending Shocks

We show that dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models with housing and collateralized borrowing predict a fall in house prices following positive government spending shocks. By contrast, we show that house prices in the United States rise persistently after identified positive government spending shocks. We clarify that the incorrect house price response is due to a general property of DSGE models—approximately constant shadow value of housing—and that modifying preferences and production structure cannot help in obtaining the correct house price response. Properly accounting for the empirical evidence on government spending shocks and house prices using a DSGE model therefore remains a significant challenge.     

The Great Inflation of the 1970s

The two leading explanations for the poor inflation performance during the 1970s are policy opportunism ( Barro and Gordon 1983 ) and "inadvertently" bad monetary policy ( Clarida, Gali, and Gertler 2000 , Orphanides 2003 ). The main models of the latter category are that of Orphanides (loose monetary policy was the outcome of mis-perceptions about potential output rather than of inflation tolerance) and of Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (weak policy reaction to expected inflation led to indeterminacies). We show that both of these models can account for high and persistent inflation and also have satisfactory overall performance if an exceptionally large decrease in productivity took place at that time.     

Inflation targeting,credibility, and non-linear Taylor rules

In this paper we systematically evaluate how central banks respond to deviations from the inflation target. We present a stylized New Keynesian model in which agents' inflation expectations are sensitive to deviations from the inflation target. To (re-) establish credibility, monetary policy under discretion sets higher interest rates today if average inflation exceeded the target in the past. Moreover, the central bank responds non-linearly to past inflation gaps. This is reflected in an additional term in the central bank's instrument rule, which we refer to as the ”credibility loss.” Augmenting a standard Taylor (1993) rule with the latter term, we provide empirical evidence for the interest rate response for a sample of five inflation targeting (IT) economies. We find, first, that past deviations from IT feed back into the reaction function and that this influence is economically meaningful. Deterioration in credibility (ceteris paribus) forces central bankers to undertake larger interest rate steps. Second, we detect an asymmetric reaction to positive and negative credibility losses, with the latter dominating the former.     

Optimal simple and implementable monetary and fiscal rules

Welfare-maximizing monetary- and fiscal-policy rules are studied in a model with sticky prices, money, and distortionary taxation. The Ramsey-optimal policy is used as a point of comparison. The main findings are: the size of the inflation coefficient in the interest-rate rule plays a minor role for welfare. It matters only insofar as it affects the determinacy of equilibrium. Optimal monetary policy features a muted response to output. Interest-rate rules that feature a positive response to output can lead to significant welfare losses. The welfare gains from interest-rate smoothing are negligible. Optimal fiscal policy is passive. The optimal monetary and fiscal rule combination attains virtually the same level of welfare as the Ramsey-optimal policy.     

Monetary conservatism and fiscal policy

Does an inflation conservative central bank à la Rogoff (1985) remain desirable in a setting with endogenous fiscal policy? To provide an answer we study monetary and fiscal policy games without commitment in a dynamic, stochastic sticky-price economy with monopolistic distortions. Monetary policy determines nominal interest rates and fiscal policy provides public goods generating private utility. We find that lack of fiscal commitment gives rise to excessive public spending. The optimal inflation rate internalizing this distortion is positive, but lack of monetary commitment generates too much inflation. A conservative monetary authority thus remains desirable. When fiscal policy is determined before monetary policy each period, the monetary authority should focus exclusively on stabilizing inflation. Monetary conservatism then eliminates the steady state biases associated with lack of monetary and fiscal commitment and leads to stabilization policy that is close to optimal.     

Determinacy and expectational stability of equilibrium in a monetary sticky-price model with Taylor rule

Recent studies show that the Taylor rule possesses desirable properties in terms of generating determinacy and E-stability of rational expectations equilibria under sticky prices. This paper examines whether this policy rule retains these properties within a discrete-time money-in-utility-function model, employing three timings of money balances of the utility function that the existing literature contains: end-of-period timing and two types of cash-in-advance timing. This paper shows: (i) even a small degree of non-separability of the utility function between consumption and real balances causes the Taylor rule to be much more likely to induce indeterminacy or E-instability if this rule responds not only to inflation but also to output or the output gap; (ii) differences among the three timings strongly alter conditions for the Taylor rule to ensure both determinacy and E-stability.     

Changes in the Federal Reserve's Inflation Target: Causes and Consequences

This paper estimates a New Keynesian model to draw inferences about the behavior of the Federal Reserve's unobserved inflation target. The results indicate that the target rose from 1 1/4% in 1959 to over 8% in the mid to late 1970s before falling back below 2 1/2% in 2004. The results also provide some support for the hypothesis that over the entire post-war period, Federal Reserve policy has systematically translated short-run price pressures set off by supply-side shocks into more persistent movements in inflation itself, although considerable uncertainty remains about the true source of shifts in the inflation target.     

Propagation Mechanisms for Government Spending Shocks: A Bayesian Comparison

The inability of a simple real business cycle model to predict a rise in consumption in response to increased government expenditures, observed in many empirical studies, has stimulated the development of alternative theories of government spending shocks. Using the Bayesian approach, we evaluate the quantitative performance of five extant models, and find that neither of the considered transmission mechanisms for government spending helps improve the fit of the baseline model. Moreover, we find that consumption decreases in all estimated models in response to a rise in government spending.     

Self-fulfilling expectations and the inflation of the 1970s: Evidence from the Livingston Survey

Using survey data on expectations, we examine whether the response of monetary policy to sudden movements in expected inflation contributed to the persistent high inflation of the 1970s. The evidence suggests that, prior to 1979, the Fed accommodated temporary shocks to expected inflation, which then led to persistent increases in actual inflation. We do not find this behavior in the post-1979 data. Among commonly cited factors, oil and fiscal shocks do not appear to have triggered an increase in expected inflation that eventually resulted in higher actual inflation.     

The Cost of Nominal Rigidity in NNS Models

We present a model with Calvo wage and price setting, capital formation, and estimated rules for government spending and monetary policy. Our model captures many aspects of U.S. data, including the volatility that has been observed in various efficiency gaps. We estimate the cost of nominal rigidity—welfare under flexible wages and prices minus welfare with nominal rigidities—to be as much as 3% of consumption each period. Since there are interest rate rules that virtually eliminate this cost, our model suggests that—contrary to Lucas's (2003) assertion—there is considerable room for improvement in demand management policy.     

The Taylor Rule and “Opportunistic” Monetary Policy

We investigate the possibility that the Taylor rule should be formulated as a threshold process such that the Federal Reserve acts more aggressively in some circumstances than in others. It seems reasonable that the Federal Reserve would act more aggressively when inflation is high than when it is low. Similarly, it might be expected that the Federal Reserve responds more to a negative than a positive output gap. Although these specifications receive some empirical support, we find that a modified threshold model that is consistent with “opportunistic” monetary policy makes significant progress toward explaining Federal Reserve behavior.