Uniform versus Discriminatory Tariffs: When Will Export Taxes Be Used?

This paper examines the noncooperative interactions between two exporting countries and one importing country when all of them are seeking the optimal policies to improve their welfare. Whereas the importing country has the incentive to impose tariffs on the goods coming from the two exporting countries, the export policies chosen by the exporting countries depend on the tariff regime, whether uniform or discriminatory tariffs are used. It is argued that export taxes are chosen by both exporting countries in some cases, and that whereas the importing country prefers a uniform tariff regime, the exporting countries find a discriminatory tariff regime preferable.     

Tariff valuation,transport cost and the establishment of trade preferences among developing countries

While there are various reasons for believing that the establishment of trade preferences among developing countries would convey important benefits, previous efforts along these lines have produced few concrete accomplishments. The preference-creating system proposed in this paper is based on the proposition that developing countries are often at a transport cost disadvantage in intra-trade and the following observations: (1) almost all developing countries employ a cost-insurance-freight (c.i.f.) valuation base for tariff assessment, and (2) tariffs in the developing countries are generally much higher than in developed countries and may range from 20 to 200% or more. From this, it is demonstrated that a situation exists in which the normal c.i.f. tariff base often has a potentially important discriminatory effect on intra-trade. Specifically, if customs duties are applied to an unfavourable transport margin, the tariff system will result in a higher duty collected on intra-trade than on shipments from a developed country. However, by shifting to a two-tier valuation base, the present system's discriminatory effects can be neutralized and preferences generated for developing countries. Simulations with international trade data support the proposition that the two-tier system has these desired effects.     

International R&D Rivalry with Spillovers and Tariff Policies

This paper investigates the effects of R&D spillovers on the R&D choices of foreign exporters when the importing country adopts either uniform or discriminatory alternative tariff regimes. We show that the importing country should optimally choose a uniform tariff regime. A uniform tariff regime is also advantageous for foreign exporters if the R&D spillovers are sufficiently large. A comparison of free trade with the two tariff regimes reveals that there are some situations in which both the importing country and foreign exporters are better off under free trade, which supports trade liberalization.

中国—俄罗斯FTA的贸易、关税及福利效应——基于WITS-SMART的模拟分析

当前,中国与俄罗斯亟需通过FTA夯实双方战略伙伴关系的经贸基础。文章利用WITS-SMART模型估算了中俄FTA的贸易、关税以及福利效应,结果显示:随着FTA框架下关税不断削减,中俄两国大多数产品部门都将从贸易规模扩张中受益,尽管两国的关税收入会出现下降,但是整体的经济福利都将获得提升。如果两国能够尽快实现零关税,那么两国之间的贸易往来会获得快速增长。因此,中俄两国需要从战略层面把握中俄FTA建设的重要意义,尽快推动中俄FTA谈判与建设。     

Revenue enhancing tariff reform

Revenue Enhancing Tariff Reform. - Programmes of gradual trade policy reform have been included in most of the structural adjustment packages adopted by developing countries. So far the literature on piecemeal trade policy reform has concentrated on finding reform programmes that improve the welfare of a representative individual. Yet trade taxes are an important source of government revenue in many developing countries. This paper therefore examines tariff reform programmes that are both welfare improving and revenue enhancing. It first determines general conditions under which such a reform will exist and then considers specific reforms of both single tariffs and groups of tariffs. The standard welfare improving reform programmes — proportional and concertina reforms - are also discussed.     

Vertical trade and free trade agreements

We investigate the effects of free trade agreements (FTAs) on tariffs and welfare in vertical trade. We consider a three-country model, where an FTA is formed between a country exporting a final good and a country exporting an intermediate good. The FTA unambiguously leads to a reduction in the member country’s tariff, but may cause the non-member country’s tariff level to increase. In the case, where FTA raises the non-member country’s tariff level, the FTA increases that country’s welfare. In contrast, the FTA may render its member countries better off. This result implies that the formation of an FTA may not always be Pareto-improving.     

Trade and Tax Reforms in a Cash‐in‐Advance Economy

We examine the effects of both tariff‐only and coordinated trade‐tax reforms on market access, government revenue, and welfare for a small monetary economy, under the assumption that a certain fraction of purchases of each good must be financed with cash held in advance. We show that if the cash requirement ratio in the exportable sector is greater than that in the importable, then, contrary to previous results, (i) a uniform radial reduction of tariffs has ambiguous effects on both welfare and market access, (ii) tariff and consumption tax reforms that leave consumer prices unchanged may be more efficient in improving market access and welfare than a reform that involves only tariffs, and (iii) export and production tax reforms that keep producer prices unchanged may be welfare deteriorating.     

“碳关税”与中国外贸政策之应对

二氧化碳等温室气体排放导致气候变化问题日益受到人们关注。而美国为了在经济危机中寻找新的增长点,意图在新的节能经济中继续处于有利地位,也迫于其国内贸易保护主义的压力,于2009年6月22日通过《清洁能源安全法》。该法以限制温室气体排放、减缓全球变暖为由正式提出了对进口的高耗能产品征收"碳关税"。西方征收"碳关税"一旦成为现实,不仅会使西方国家在短期内达到贸易保护的目的,也会使其在节能环保的"低碳经济"时代保持经济和技术上的优势。本文首先对"碳关税"的由来以及西方国家的意图进行分析阐述,进而讨论其对中国外贸的不利影响,最后,从外贸政策的角度提出应对之策。     

China and the WTO: Tariff offers,exemptions, and welfare implications

China and the WTO: Tariff Offers, Exemptions, and Welfare Implications. — Trade reforms have opened the Chinese economy and the reforms offered for WTO accession involve further liberalization. To assess the implications of these offers, the authors take into account the tariff exemptions that are especially important in China’s trade regime, and the reductions in the variability of tariffs at the tariff line level required by the WTO offers. The offers will result in real income gains of over $ 50 billion, benefitting China and its major trading partners. Omitting the tariff exemptions is shown to result in over-estimation of the benefits from liberalization, while focusing on average tariff reductions leads to under-estimation.     

Who captures the price rent? The impact of European Union trade preferences on export prices

Preferential trade agreements (PTAs) aim at increasing trade flows via the incentives created by preference margins; this is the difference between the preferential tariff and the tariff of the main competitors. However, an additional impact that is often omitted in PTAs evaluations is the possibility that the wedge between preferential and most favoured nation (MFN) tariffs may induce a preference rent that translates into larger prices for preferential exporters. This paper analyses empirically whether preferential exporters capture this preference rent using a unique dataset of imports in the European Union at a highly disaggregated level linked to information on the preferential regime used and the tariff applied. Our main findings suggest that on average an exporter obtains a larger price margin under a preferential regime than under MFN. However, this preference rent is only partially appropriated by exporters with a pass-through coefficient from preference to price margins that oscillates between 0.17 and 0.8, depending on the size of the margin and the type of product.     

Trade Liberalization and Industry Dynamics

This paper uses a large data set for 28 industries in 40 countries to examine the effects of trade liberalization on the number of firms, the average size of surviving firms, and markups. We extend previous studies by examining not only tariff changes in the liberalizing country but also trade reforms in the rest of the world. In addition, we look at whether these effects differ across industries depending on their degree of comparative advantage. The results show that a reduction in home tariffs decreases the number of establishments, firms average size, and markups. All of these three effects are found to be of lower magnitude for comparative advantage industries. In the case of foreign tariffs, our results show that a reduction in protection in the rest of the world is associated with an increase in the number of establishments (which is likely to be reflecting an increase in export profitability), a decrease in average size, while markups are mostly unaffected. As with home tariffs, these effects tend to be less pronounced in comparative advantage industries.     

资本积累下的动态关税模型——基于互补品贸易的分析

本文是对Calzolari and Lambertini(2007)的模型的一个拓展,尝试性地对在考虑到资本积累下的互补产品进行了动态关税分析。该模型建立在Bertrand-Ramsey竞争的微分对策之上(differential game)。分析表明,该模型同样存在两种稳态:"需求驱动"的稳态和Ramsey的"黄金律"稳态。在"需求驱动"的稳态下,如果只考虑本国厂商的利益且税率足够高,政府就会征税,但降低了本国的总福利;在Ramsey的"黄金律"稳态下,征税提高本国总福利,政府也会征税,前提是对方不征收关税。     

Can Import Tariffs Deter Outward FDI?

In this paper we analyze a country's optimal trade policy when its labor market is unionized and firms are footloose. We show that an important objective for governments to use import protection is to prevent their domestic multinationals to go to a non-unionized location abroad and to serve their country from a distance. A domestic government will set a positive tariff to dissuade its multinational from engaging in outward FDI when the additional profits it repatriates, do not compensate for the loss of domestic union rent. To put it differently, we show that when the domestic labor market is unionized, trade liberalisation between countries with similar wage levels is likely to result in domestic welfare losses as a result of outward FDI. Only when wage differences between countries are large enough, can outward FDI improve domestic welfare and optimal tariffs will be zero. JEL Classification Numbers: L13, F23     

Policy analysis with Melitz-type gravity model: Evidence from Kyrgyzstan

Several governments worldwide aim at fostering agricultural productivity growth by providing investment support. However, the policy’s effect on trade for middle- and low-income countries has not been analyzed so far. This paper analyzes the impact of agricultural policies (credit subsidies and tariffs) on agricultural trade flows by modifying a Melitz-type structural gravity model for a small and open economy. According to the theory, trade flows are expected to increase with credit subsidies and decrease with partners’ applied tariff rates. We analyze bilateral agricultural trade flows between Kyrgyzstan and its 69 trading partners from 2007 to 2018 to test our theoretical findings. Applying the Poisson pseudo maximum likelihood estimator, we find that credit subsidies effectively increase international trade flows while applied tariffs imposed on agricultural products reduce Kyrgyzstan’s export substantially. These results can be applied to similar economies with publicly available data where small budgetary efforts drive trade expansion.     

中国应积极面对碳关税

当前气候问题成为世界关注的焦点,美国、法国在全球贸易中对碳关税政策的态度,引起了全球普遍的关注和争议。本文根据碳关税产生的背景和实质,分析了碳关税对中国经济发展的不利影响,考虑到未来低碳经济将成为新的经济增长点,这决定了我国必须在碳关税征收前做好准备,同时提出了我国应对碳关税的政策建议。     

Trade creation,trade diversion,and the general equilibrium effects of regional trade agreements: a study of the European Community–Turkey customs union

This paper presents an industry-level analysis of trade flows in order to estimate the trade effects of Turkey’s customs union with the European Community (EC). The paper is able to distinguish between trade creation and trade diversion by employing tariff data on each good to measure the impact of not only the tariff level but also the difference between tariffs applied to imports from Europe and the most-favored nation tariffs applied to imports from other non-preferential trading partners. The paper estimates the general equilibrium effects of the customs union in addition to the effects of eliminating tariffs on the EC’s exports to Turkey. It concludes that the customs union has generated more than twice as much trade creation as trade diversion but that the overall impact of the customs union has been relatively small.     

How Will the Implementation of Zero Tariffs Affect Employment in China?

This paper studies the employment effect of China's possible implementation of zero tariffs by comparing China's most‐favored‐nation tariffs and the tariff schedules of China's signed free trade agreements (FTAs) with the tariff concessions in a typical high‐standard FTA. It finds that there is a large gap between China's current tariff status and a high‐standard FTA, and the implementation of zero tariffs in China would have a significant negative impact on employment in some industries. However, the employment effect of implementing zero tariffs is heterogeneous. Analysis at the industrial level shows that, although employment would drop in a few industries as a result of the implementation of zero tariffs, more jobs would be created in most industries. The overall employment effect of a zero tariff policy would be positive, creating an estimated 8.05 million jobs in China. Therefore, China should consider the adjustment costs brought by the labor movement in different industries and introduce relevant policies to deal with the employment shocks caused by zero tariffs.     

Currency devaluations and beggar-my-neighbour penalties: evidence from the 1930s

The currency devaluations of the 1930s facilitated a faster recovery from the Great Depression in the countries depreciating, but their unilateral manner provoked retaliatory and discriminatory commercial policies abroad. This article explores the importance of the retaliatory motive in the imposition of trade barriers by gold bloc countries during the 1930s and its effects on trade. Relying on new and existing datasets on the introduction of quotas, tariffs, and bilateral trade costs, the quantification of the discriminatory response suggests that these countries imposed significant beggar-my-neighbour penalties. The penalties reduced trade to a similar degree that modern regional trade agreements foster trade. Furthermore, the analysis of contemporary newspapers reveals that the devaluations of the early 1930s triggered an Anglo-French trade conflict marked by tit-for-tat protectionist policies. With regards to global trade, the unilateral currency depreciations came at a high price in political and economic terms. These costs must have necessarily reduced their benefit to the world as a whole.     

Anglo‐American trade costs during the first era of globalization: the contribution of a bilateral tariff series†

Previous scholarship has suggested that British trade was generally unaffected by foreign tariffs during the period from 1870 to 1913. This article focuses specifically on Anglo‐American trade, which was the largest bilateral flow of trade during the first era of globalization, and finds that tariffs were the sole intertemporal determinant of Anglo‐American trade costs. However, the determinacy of tariffs for Anglo‐American trade costs only becomes apparent when the tariff variable incorporates a measure of the bilateral American tariff toward Britain, which this article reconstructs. The article concludes by claiming that Anglo‐American trade represents a major qualification to any emerging consensus that foreign tariffs were of minor significance to the trade of late nineteenth‐century Britain.     

Measuring the usage of preferential tariffs in the world

The preference utilization ratio, i.e., the share of preferential imports out of total imports, has been a popular indicator for measuring the usage of preferential tariffs vis-à-vis tariffs on a most-favored-nation basis. A crucial shortcoming of this measure is the data requirements, particularly for data on imports classified by tariff schemes, which are not available in most countries. This study proposes another measure for preference utilization, termed the “tariff exemption ratio.” This measure is a good proxy for the value of offered preferences by each importing country to the rest of the world. Importantly, it can be computed by employing only publicly available data, such as those provided by the World Development Indicators, for its computations. We can thus calculate this measure for many countries for an international comparison. Our finding is that tariff exemption ratios differ widely across countries.