Cross-sectional performance and investor sentiment in a multiple risk factor model

Economists have long recognized the importance of information veracity in valuing risky securities. Market participants concerned about the credibility of information measures may require additional compensation to entice them to hold stocks with less transparent information. These same securities are expected to display greater sensitivities to measures of market sentiment. We find that investor sentiment sensitivities increase directly with multiple measures of opacity in the cross-section. Next we examine the extent to which sentiment sensitivities are priced in an asset pricing context. Using the Jha et al. (2009) model of conditional performance evaluation, we find an inverse relation between ex ante known investor sentiment and the marginal performance of opaque stocks. In contrast, translucent stocks exhibit relatively little variability in performance across levels of sentiment.     

The effect of US holidays on the European markets: when the cat’s away…

This paper presents evidence of the existence of a return effect on European stock markets coinciding with New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) holidays, which is particularly marked after positive closing returns on the NYSE the previous day. The effect is large enough to be exploited by trading index futures. This anomaly cannot be explained by seasonal effects, such as the day of the week effect, the January effect or the pre‐holiday effect, nor is it consistent with behavioural finance models that predict positive correlation between trading volume and returns. However, examination of factors such as information volume or investor mix provides a reasonable explanation.     

Stock‐Split Post‐Announcement Returns: Underreaction or Market Friction?

We explore the relationship between stock splits and subsequent long‐term returns during the period from 1950 to 2000. We find that, contrary to much previous research, firms do not exhibit positive long‐term post‐split returns. Instead, we find that significant positive returns after the announcement date do not persist after the actual date of the stock split. We also observe that abnormal returns are correlated with the price‐delay or market friction. We conclude that the stock‐split post‐announcement “drift” is only of short duration, and it is attributable to trading frictions rather than behavioral biases.     

Shiller's CAPE: Market Efficiency and Risk

Robert Shiller shows that Cyclically Adjusted Price to Earnings Ratio (CAPE) is strongly associated with future long‐term stock returns. This is often interpreted as evidence of market inefficiency. We present two findings contrary to such an interpretation. First, if markets are efficient, stock returns should be higher than the risk‐free rate. We find that even when CAPE is in its ninth decile, future 10‐year stock returns, on average, are higher than future returns on 10‐year U.S. Treasurys. Thus, the results are largely consistent with market efficiency. Second, consistent with a risk–return tradeoff, we find that CAPE is negatively associated with future stock market volatility.     

IPO first‐day returns: Skewness preference,investor sentiment and uncertainty underlying factors

In this paper, we investigate the initial public offering (IPO) first-day returns. Our focus is to examine the irrational component of the agent behavior towards IPO lotteries. Based on 234 French IPOs performed between 2002 and 2012, we find that IPOs with high initial returns have higher idiosyncratic skewness, turnover and momentum. This finding provides empirical evidence for investors' preference for stocks with lottery-like features and investor sentiment. In addition, we show that the skewness preference and the investor sentiment effect are stronger during periods of favorable market conditions. Our results are robust to the integration of uncertainty underlying factors.     

Real‐Time Forecasting and Political Stock Market Anomalies: Evidence for the United States

Using monthly data from 1953 to 2003, we apply a real‐time modeling approach to investigate the implications of U.S. political stock market anomalies for forecasting excess stock returns in real‐time. Our empirical findings show that political variables, chosen on the basis of widely used model‐selection criteria, are often included in real‐time forecasting models. However, political variables do not contribute systematically to improving the performance of simple trading rules. For this reason, political stock market anomalies are not necessarily an indication of market inefficiency.     

Barron’s most respected companies

In this study, we investigate the performance of firms selected to Barron’s Most Respected Companies against the S&P 500 and a matched sample over a short‐term, long‐term and operational basis. The most respected companies exhibit a statistically significant announcement effect associated with their selection and outperform the S&P 500 over longer‐holding periods. The overall sample and those firms identified as top picks outperform a matched sample of firms. In addition, as measured by changes in the return on assets, the post‐selection operational performance of the most respected firms was better than that of the matched firms.     

Stock Market Comovements and Industrial Structure

We use monthly stock indices for 58 countries to construct pairwise correlations of returns and explain these correlations with risk‐adjusted differences in industrial structure across countries. We find that countries with similar industries exhibit higher stock market comovements. The results are robust to the inclusion of other regressors such as differences in income per capita, stock market capitalizations, measures of institutions, as well as various fixed time, country, and country‐pair effects. Our results are consistent with models where the impact of each industry‐specific shock is proportional to the share of this industry in the overall industrial output of the country.     

Winners in the spotlight: Media coverage of fund holdings as a driver of flows

We show that media coverage of mutual fund holdings affects how investors allocate money across funds. Fund holdings with high past returns attract extra flows, but only if these stocks were recently featured in the media. In contrast, holdings that were not covered in major newspapers do not affect flows. We present evidence that media coverage tends to contribute to investors? chasing of past returns rather than facilitate the processing of useful information in fund portfolios. Our evidence suggests that media coverage can exacerbate investor biases and that it is the primary mechanism that makes fund window dressing effective.     

SEASONED EQUITY ISSUERS’ R&D INVESTMENTS: SIGNALING OR OVEROPTIMISM

It is well known that investors often react negatively to the announcements of seasoned equity offerings (SEOs). We posit that issuers can use positive discretionary (higher than expected) R&D investments before the SEO to signal their investment prospects to mitigate the negative announcement effect. Alternatively, positive discretionary R&D may be attributed to managerial overoptimism about future returns of R&D investments. We find strong support for the signaling hypothesis among high‐tech issuers: investors respond more favorably to the SEO announcements of high‐tech issuers with positive discretionary R&D; these issuers are more likely to use new capital in future R&D and they produce better post‐SEO operating performance. In contrast, we find some evidence of managerial overoptimism among low‐tech issuers: investors tend to penalize low‐tech firms with positive discretionary R&D at SEO announcements; they are more likely to hold new capital as cash and they fail to produce better post‐SEO operating performance.     

ESO compensation: The roles of default risk, employee sentiment, and insider information

This paper derives a pricing model for employee stock options (ESO) that includes default risk and considers employee sentiment. Using ESO data from 1992 to 2004, the study finds that the average executive's subjective value is about 55% of the Black-Scholes value. Only employees who over-estimate firm returns (or insiders who know that the firm is under-valued) by about 10% per annum will prefer ESOs over cash compensation. Our model also shows that work incentives offered by ESOs may be far lower than those implied by Black-Scholes but that ESOs may induce less risk-taking behavior, contrary to typical moral hazard arguments. Findings may impact relevant accounting regulations as well as compensation decisions.     

The wisdom of crowds: Mutual fund investors’ aggregate asset allocation decisions

We find that the aggregate asset allocation decisions of US mutual fund investors depend on economic conditions. Both anticipated economic downturns and periods of turmoil lead investors to direct flow away from risky equity funds and towards lower-risk money market funds. These patterns are markedly stronger for investors in low cost and low turnover funds relative to investors in high cost and high turnover funds, consistent with sophisticated investors being more sensitive to changing conditions. Benchmarked against a buy-and-hold strategy, these asset allocation strategies reduce risk without degrading the risk-return trade-off. Our evidence suggests that individual investors, often dismissed as noise traders, collectively react to economic signals in a sensible manner when determining asset allocations.     

An examination of Value Line’s long-term projections

Unlike previous papers, which have focused on the timeliness ranks, we examine Value Line’s 3–5 year projections for stock returns, earnings, sales and related measures. We find that Value Line’s stock return and earnings forecasts exhibit large positive bias, although their sales predictions do not. For stock returns, Value Line’s projections lack predictive power; for other variables predictive power may exist to some degree. Our findings suggest the spectacular past performance of the timeliness indicator reflects either close alignment with other known anomalies or data mining, and that investors and researchers should use Value Line’s long-term projections with caution.     

Reflections on the Efficient Market Hypothesis: 30 Years Later

In recent years financial economists have increasingly questioned the efficient market hypothesis. But surely if market prices were often irrational and if market returns were as predictable as some critics have claimed, then professionally managed investment funds should easily be able to outdistance a passive index fund. This paper shows that professional investment managers, both in The U.S. and abroad, do not outperform their index benchmarks and provides evidence that by and large market prices do seem to reflect all available information.     

Retail investors exonerated: the case of the January effect

We dispel the belief that the January effect is due to retail investor trading. Previous studies suggest that retail investors, affected by behavioural biases and disproportionally invested in small capitalization stocks, are the source of the January effect. Furthermore, the literature regards retail investor trading and the tax‐loss selling hypothesis as essentially the same explanation. We separate tax implications and market capitalization to show that retail traders are not the cause of the January effect. Our study is an important direct test of whether retail trading causes market anomalies.     

Currency devaluation and stock market response: An empirical analysis

We study local stock market reaction to currency devaluation by a country's central bank. Devaluations appear to be anticipated by the local stock markets, and there are significant negative abnormal returns even one year prior to the announcement of the devaluation. A negative trend in stock returns persists for up to one quarter following the first announcement, and then becomes positive thereafter, suggesting a reversal. We explore whether changes in macroeconomic variables prior to currency devaluations are related to abnormal stock returns. We find that stock returns are significantly lower if the devaluation is larger and if the country is a developing nation. Furthermore, stock markets decline more around devaluations if reserves are lower, if the real exchange rate has depreciated over the prior years, if the capital account has declined, if the current account deficit has gone up, or if the country credit rating has deteriorated.     

‘Hot’ Debt Markets and Capital Structure

This paper examines the motives of debt issuance during hot‐debt market periods and its impact on capital structure over the period 1970–2006. We find that perceived capital market conditions as favourable, an indication of market timing, and adverse selection costs of equity (i.e., information asymmetry) are important frictions that lead certain firms to issue more debt in hot‐ than cold‐debt market periods. Using alternative hot‐debt market issuance measures and controlling for other effects, such as structural shifts in the debt market, industry, book‐to‐market, price‐to‐earnings, size, tax rates, debt market conditions and adjustment costs based on debt credit ratings, we find that firms with high adverse selection costs issue substantially more (less) debt when market conditions are perceived as hot (cold). Moreover, the results indicate that there is a persistent hot‐debt market effect on the capital structure of debt issuers; hot‐debt market issuing firms do not actively rebalance their leverage to stay within an optimal capital structure range.     

A comprehensive long-term analysis of S&P 500 index additions and deletions

We investigate the long-term effects of S&P 500 index additions and deletions on a sample of stocks from 1962 to 2003 and find a significant long-term price increase for both added and deleted stocks, with deleted stocks outperforming added stocks. The long-term price increase for added stocks can be attributed to increases in institutional ownership, liquidity, and analyst coverage, and a decrease in the shadow cost in the long-term. However, while deletion has no significant effect on analyst coverage and shadow cost, we find a rebound in the institutional ownership and liquidity of deleted stocks. The difference in the long-term price increase of added and deleted stocks can be explained by analyst coverage and operating performance.