Conditional conservatism and trade credit during the global financial crisis

We investigate conditional conservatism and firms’ access to trade credit during the 2007–2008 global financial crisis. Previous studies argue that suppliers prefer conservative customers because of information asymmetry in production networks; we extend this line of research by focusing on trade credit during the 2007–2008 global financial crisis, a period that was characterized by a credit supply shock. We first document a positive association between conditional conservatism and firms’ access to trade credit both before and after the onset of the crisis, which indicates suppliers’ demand for conditional conservatism. Meanwhile, the association between conditional conservatism and trade credit experienced a significant decline following the onset of the crisis, and this only held when suppliers and customers had frequent transactions or were in close proximity, when transacted goods were standardized rather than differentiated, when customers were financially constrained and had high bargaining power, and when suppliers had sufficient liquidity. It implies that, when information asymmetry along the supply chain was low and customers had strong bargaining power, liquid suppliers increased their tolerance to less conservative customers, and they were even willing to grant trade credit to the less conservative customers that were financially constrained. Overall, this study adds to previous literature by demonstrating suppliers’ multifaceted demand for conditional conservatism.     

Islamic and conventional banks' soundness during the 2007–2008 financial crisis

The recent global financial crisis has induced a series of failure of many conventional banks and led to an increased interest in the Islamic banking business model. This paper attempts to answer empirically the following question: What was the effect of the 2007–2008 financial crisis on the soundness of Islamic banks and their conventional peers? Using the Z-score as an indicator of bank stability, our regression analysis (covering a matched sample of 34 Islamic Banks (IBs) and 34 conventional banks (CBs) from 16 countries) shows that there is no significant difference in terms of the effect of the financial crisis on the soundness of IBs and CBs. This finding reveals that IBs are diverging from their theoretical business model which would have allowed them to keep the same level of soundness even during the crisis.     

Trade credit and supplier competition

This paper examines how competition among suppliers affects their willingness to provide trade credit financing. Trade credit extended by a supplier to a cash constrained retailer allows the latter to increase cash purchases from its other suppliers, leading to a free rider problem. A supplier that represents a smaller share of the retailer’s purchases internalizes a smaller part of the benefit from increased spending by the retailer and, as a result, extends less trade credit relative to its sales. In consequence, retailers with dispersed suppliers obtain less trade credit than those whose suppliers are more concentrated. The free rider problem is especially detrimental to a trade creditor when the free-riding suppliers are its product market competitors, leading to a negative relation between product substitutability among suppliers to a given retailer and trade credit that the former provide to the latter. We test the model using both simulated and real data. The estimated relations are consistent with the model’s predictions and are statistically and economically significant.     

Bank lending during the financial crisis of 2008

This paper shows that new loans to large borrowers fell by 47% during the peak period of the financial crisis (fourth quarter of 2008) relative to the prior quarter and by 79% relative to the peak of the credit boom (second quarter of 2007). New lending for real investment (such as working capital and capital expenditures) fell by only 14% in the last quarter of 2008, but contracted nearly as much as new lending for restructuring (LBOs, M&As, share repurchases) relative to the peak of the credit boom. After the failure of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, there was a run by short-term bank creditors, making it difficult for banks to roll over their short term debt. We find that there was a simultaneous run by borrowers who drew down their credit lines, leading to a spike in commercial and industrial loans reported on bank balance sheets. We examine whether these two stresses on bank liquidity led them to cut lending. In particular, we show that banks cut their lending less if they had better access to deposit financing and thus, they were not as reliant on short-term debt. We also show that banks that were more vulnerable to credit-line drawdowns because they co-syndicated more of their credit lines with Lehman Brothers reduced their lending to a greater extent.     

Bank CEO incentives and the credit crisis

We investigate whether bank performance during the recent credit crisis is related to chief executive officer (CEO) incentives before the crisis. We find some evidence that banks with CEOs whose incentives were better aligned with the interests of shareholders performed worse and no evidence that they performed better. Banks with higher option compensation and a larger fraction of compensation in cash bonuses for their CEOs did not perform worse during the crisis. Bank CEOs did not reduce their holdings of shares in anticipation of the crisis or during the crisis. Consequently, they suffered extremely large wealth losses in the wake of the crisis.     

Risk management,corporate governance,and bank performance in the financial crisis

The recent financial crisis has raised several questions with respect to the corporate governance of financial institutions. This paper investigates whether risk management-related corporate governance mechanisms, such as for example the presence of a chief risk officer (CRO) in a bank’s executive board and whether the CRO reports to the CEO or directly to the board of directors, are associated with a better bank performance during the financial crisis of 2007/2008. We measure bank performance by buy-and-hold returns and ROE and we control for standard corporate governance variables such as CEO ownership, board size, and board independence. Most importantly, our results indicate that banks, in which the CRO directly reports to the board of directors and not to the CEO (or other corporate entities), exhibit significantly higher (i.e., less negative) stock returns and ROE during the crisis. In contrast, standard corporate governance variables are mostly insignificantly or even negatively related to the banks’ performance during the crisis.     

Liquidity risk management and credit supply in the financial crisis

Liquidity dried up during the financial crisis of 2007-2009. Banks that relied more heavily on core deposit and equity capital financing, which are stable sources of financing, continued to lend relative to other banks. Banks that held more illiquid assets on their balance sheets, in contrast, increased asset liquidity and reduced lending. Off-balance sheet liquidity risk materialized on the balance sheet and constrained new credit origination as increased takedown demand displaced lending capacity. We conclude that efforts to manage the liquidity crisis by banks led to a decline in credit supply.     

Trade credit,collateral liquidation,and borrowing constraints

Assuming that firms’ suppliers are better able to extract value from the liquidation of assets in default and have an information advantage over other creditors, the paper derives six predictions on the use of trade credit. (1) Financially unconstrained firms (with unused bank credit lines) take trade credit to exploit the supplier's liquidation advantage. (2) If inputs purchased on account are sufficiently liquid, the reliance on trade credit does not depend on credit rationing. (3) Firms buying goods make more purchases on account than those buying services, while suppliers of services offer more trade credit than those of standardized goods. (4) Suppliers lend inputs to their customers but not cash. (5) Greater reliance on trade credit is associated with more intensive use of tangible inputs. (6) Better creditor protection decreases both the use of trade credit and input tangibility.     

Market discipline by bank creditors during the 2008–2010 crisis

We investigate whether uninsured depositors, insured depositors, and general creditors exhibit evidence of quantity market discipline during the recent financial crisis. To establish which types of creditors expect to incur loss, we evaluate the FDIC's expectations about losses to creditors at banks that failed between 2008 and 2010. Our results show that quantity market discipline tends to begin far enough in advance to signal to both banks and supervisors that corrective actions can and should be taken. Furthermore, creditors are able to distinguish between banks of different risk levels. Our findings support several policy implications for encouraging market discipline.     

Trade credit and bank credit: Evidence from recent financial crises

This paper studies the effect of financial crises on trade credit for a sample of 890 firms in six emerging economies. Although the provision of trade credit increases right after a crisis, it contracts in the following months and years. Firms that are financially more vulnerable to crises extend less trade credit to their customers. We argue that the decline in aggregate trade credit ratios is driven by the reduction in the supply of trade credit that follows a bank credit crunch, consistent with the “redistribution view” of trade credit provision, whereby bank credit is redistributed via trade credit from financially stronger firms to weaker firms.     

Trade credit and the joint effects of supplier and customer financial characteristics

We examine how access to bank credit affects trade credit in the supplier–customer relationships of U.S. public firms. For identification, we use exogenous liquidity shocks to supplier firms in the form of staggered changes to interstate bank branching laws. Using a variety of tests, we show that supplier firms with greater access to banking liquidity offer more trade credit to their customers. We also show that when bank branching restrictions are relaxed in the supplier’s state, the supplier–customer relationship is more likely to survive.     

Costly external finance,corporate investment,and the subprime mortgage credit crisis

We study the effect of the recent financial crisis on corporate investment. The crisis represents an unexplored negative shock to the supply of external finance for non-financial firms. Corporate investment declines significantly following the onset of the crisis, controlling for firm fixed effects and time-varying measures of investment opportunities. Consistent with a causal effect of a supply shock, the decline is greatest for firms that have low cash reserves or high net short-term debt, are financially constrained, or operate in industries dependent on external finance. To address endogeneity concerns, we measure firms’ financial positions as much as four years prior to the crisis, and confirm that similar results do not follow placebo crises in the summers of 2003–2006. Nor do similar results follow the negative demand shock caused by September 11, 2001. The effects weaken considerably beginning in the third quarter of 2008, when the demand-side effects of the crisis became apparent. Additional analysis suggests an important precautionary savings motive for seemingly excess cash that is generally overlooked in the literature.     

Meta-analysis of the impact of financial constraints on firm performance

A large number of studies have investigated the relationship between financial constraints and firm performance. However, due to heterogeneity in study design factors, such as choice of measures for constraints and performance, control variables, estimation methods and study sample, the empirical results have been mixed. To mitigate this issue, this paper reports a meta-analysis of the association between financial constraints and firm performance. To assess the overall direction of the relationship and the sources of heterogeneity, we apply meta-analytic methods to 26 studies (providing 189 effect sizes) on the association between financial constraints and financial performance in listed companies. Our result shows that, overall, there is a positive relationship between financial constraints and firm performance. In addition, meta-regression results suggest that return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE) as measures of financial performance, and external finance and size as measures of financial constraints, have a significant negative impact on the relationship between financial constraints and firm performance relative to the mean impact on effect size. Similarly, all of North America and Asia as regional differences, control of size and corporate governance as control variables, and journal quality as strength of results, also have a significant negative impact. On the other hand, market value as a measure of financial performance, and the Whited & Wu index as a measure of financial constraints, have significant positive impact relative to the mean impact. Similarly, cross-country and Europe as regional differences, and publication status as strength of results, all have significant positive impact. Given that firm performance is of fundamental importance to investors, this study therefore helps researchers and policymakers to understand the variation in the empirical results on the impact of financial constraints.     

商业信用、融资约束与公司价值

以我国 A 股非金融类上市公司为样本,就商业信用变动对公司价值的影响进行分析,并以投资效率损失作为融资约束程度分类标准,对融资约束程度不同公司的商业信用变动的边际价值进行对比分析。研究发现：商业信用有利于提高公司价值;融资约束公司的商业信用变动的边际价值小于非融资约束公司;对于融资约束类公司,商业信用变动的边际价值会随着商业信用存量的增加而增加;而对于非融资约束类公司,商业信用变动的边际价值会随着商业信用存量的增加而减小。     

Hedge fund liquidity and performance: Evidence from the financial crisis

We investigate how share restrictions affect hedge fund performance in crisis and non-crisis periods. Consistent with prior research, we find that in the pre-crisis period more illiquid funds generate a share illiquidity premium compensating investors for limited liquidity. In the crisis period, this share illiquidity premium turns into an illiquidity discount. Hedge funds with more stringent share restrictions invest more heavily in illiquid assets. While share restrictions enable funds to manage illiquid assets effectively in the pre-crisis period, they seem insufficient to ensure effective management of illiquid portfolios in the crisis. In a crisis period, funds holding illiquid portfolios experience lower returns and alphas, also when share restrictions are controlled for. Funds with an asset–liability mismatch perform particularly poorly and experience the strongest outflows. Share restrictions are also a proxy for incentives as investors cannot immediately withdraw their money after poor performance. We show that higher incentive fees can offset the share illiquidity discount in the crisis period.     

Relationship lending,hierarchical distance and credit tightening: Evidence from the financial crisis

This paper examines the firms’ credit availability during the 2007–2009 financial crisis using a dataset of 5331 bank–firm relationships provided by borrowers’ credit folders of three Italian banks. It aims to test whether a strong lender–borrower relationship can produce less credit rationing for borrowing firms even during a credit crunch period. The results show that exclusivity of the relationship can mitigate the firm credit rationing. We also verify the influence of lending organizational structure during crisis. A new measure of distance in lending technologies has been introduced: the hierarchical distance calculated as the distance between the branch that originates the loan and the location of the hierarchical level responsible for financing decision. Our findings document a negative impact of distance on credit availability, consistent with the idea that proximity facilitates the transmission of soft information.     

Did the value premium survive the subprime credit crisis?

We provide evidence that value stocks significantly underperformed growth stocks during the subprime credit crisis, despite a positive value premium before the crisis. The reversal in the value premium concentrates in financially constrained firms, suggesting it was due to the adverse influence of the crisis rather than confounding effects. These findings are robust to alternative financial constraint proxies and asset pricing models. The observation that value stocks are vulnerable to losses during extreme downturns like the crisis is consistent with them being riskier than growth stocks. Our findings have implications for the academic debate on the underlying cause of the value premium and for investors on the profitability of value investing strategies.     

Individual investor perceptions and behavior during the financial crisis

Combining monthly survey data with matching trading records, we examine how individual investor perceptions change and drive trading and risk-taking behavior during the 2008–2009 financial crisis. We find that investor perceptions fluctuate significantly during the crisis, with risk tolerance and risk perceptions being less volatile than return expectations. During the worst months of the crisis, investors’ return expectations and risk tolerance decrease, while their risk perceptions increase. Towards the end of the crisis, investor perceptions recover. We document substantial swings in trading and risk-taking behavior that are driven by changes in investor perceptions. Overall, individual investors continue to trade actively and do not de-risk their investment portfolios during the crisis.     

The 2008 financial crisis: Stock market contagion and its determinants

In this paper, we investigate worldwide contagion and its determinants during the 2008 financial crisis. Utilizing an international sample of returns from 2003 to 2009, we consider both uni- and bi-directional contagion. After controlling for crisis-related volatility, we find strong evidence that cross-market linkages increase among many financial markets. In contrast to previous crises, contagion following the 2008 global financial crisis is not confined to emerging markets. The United States and other mature financial markets in the sample transmit and receive contagion. Country markets are less influenced by regions than they are by other country markets. We also construct variables that represent relative changes in economic variables before and during the crisis. We find that both economic fundamentals such as trade structure, interest rates, inflation rates, industrial production, and regional effects, and investors’ risk aversion contribute to international contagion.