ON THE EMERGENCE OF NON‐PROFIT FIRMS AS ALTERNATIVES TO THE GOVERNMENT*

It is well known that many non‐profit firms coexist with government firms in industries that provide collectively consumed goods and services, such as education, healthcare, social services, and art and culture. This paper explores the specific circumstances under which non‐profit firms can emerge as alternatives to the government. We show that a non‐profit firm emerges only when the residents’ median preference for a collective good is significantly low. This finding implies that, somewhat paradoxically, a non‐profit firm emerges to replace the government and provide a collective good only when the majority of residents consider the good non‐essential.     

TIMING OF LUMPY INVESTMENT,PRICING AND TECHNICAL PROGRESS

In equipment‐intensive sectors – such as water utilities, power generation, and gas – billions of dollars are spent in capital equipment. The nature of the investment is often lumpy: at some point a plant has to be replaced and a large investment is required. We characterize the dynamic optimal investment policy of profit‐maximizing and welfare‐maximizing firms. We first show that, when there is no technical progress, the duration of the plant is longer for a profit‐maximizing firm. We then consider technical progress leading to either capacity expansion or to operating costs reduction. We show that duration tends to increase when the installed capacity increases over time, while it tends to decrease when technical progress reduces operating costs, both for profit‐maximizing and welfare‐maximizing firms. Under some conditions, when capacity expands over time the duration of the plant is longer for a profit‐maximizing firm than for a welfare‐maximizing firm.     

Capital Commitment and Cournot Competition with Labour-managed and Profit-maximising Firms

The behaviour of labour managed and profit seeking firms in a Cournot duopoly with capital strategic interaction is analysed. When a pure labour managed duopoly is considered, firms choose their capital commitments according to the level of the interest rate, unlike what usually happens when only profit maximising firms operate in the market. If we consider a mixed duopoly, the profit maximising firm under-invests while the labour managed firm over-invests regardless of the rental cost of capital     

LABOUR‐MARKET ATTACHMENT AND TRAINING PARTICIPATION*

This paper examines how expected attachment to the labour market and expected tenure at a specific firm affect training participation. The results, based on cross‐sectional data from Japan, indicate that expected attachment to the labour market affects participation in both employer‐ and worker‐initiated training, while expected tenure at a specific firm mainly explains participation in employer‐initiated training. These two attachment indices explain more than two‐thirds of the sex gap in training participation. Employers in less‐competitive labour markets are more likely to offer employer‐initiated training to their workers.     

INSUFFICIENT ENTRY OF EMPLOYEE‐CONTROLLED FIRMS IN A FREE‐ENTRY OLIGOPOLY

This study is a theoretical examination of whether employee‐controlled firms (ECFs) enter a free‐entry oligopolistic market excessively or insufficiently, from the viewpoint of welfare maximization. The excess entry theorem is well known in oligopoly theory. According to this theorem, a greater number of profit‐maximizing firms enter a free‐entry oligopolistic market than is optimal for welfare maximization. We demonstrate the possibility that insufficient entry arises when ECFs compete in a free‐entry market. In particular, we show that if both the demand and cost functions are convex, insufficient ECF entry necessarily occurs. Our results suggest that competition among firms seeking purposes other than profit might lead to insufficient entry because differences in competing firms’ objectives affect the intensity of market competition.     

STRATEGIC INVESTMENT IN A LABOUR‐MANAGED DUOPOLY

Developing a Cournot two‐stage game model with strategic capital interaction, we compare two different kinds of equilibrium in a labour‐managed (LM) duopoly. An LM firm's reaction function is negatively sloped when capital and output are simultaneously determined, while the slope of its reaction function in the second stage changes in sign depending on the magnitude of its labour‐expansion elasticity. Hence, whether the LM firms employ more capital and produce greater output at the equilibria in the two‐stage game model than at the equilibria resulting from the simultaneous selection of capital and output depends on the magnitude of their labour‐expansion elasticity.     

PRECAUTIONARY DEMAND FOR LABOUR AND FIRM SIZE

This paper studies firms' job creation decisions in a labour market with search frictions. A simple labour market search model is developed in which a firm can search for a second employee while producing with a first worker, and this creates the equilibrium size distribution of firms. A firm expands employment even if the instantaneous payoff to a large firm is less than that of staying small – a firm has a precautionary motive to expand its size. In addition, this motive is enhanced by a greater market tightness. Because of this effect, firms’ decisions become interdependent – a firm creates a vacancy if it expects other firms to do the same, creating strategic complementarity among firms and thereby self‐fulfilling multiple equilibria. An increase in productivity can cause a qualitative change in labour market tightness and the rate of unemployment.     

TARIFF POLICY AND WELFARE IN AN INTERNATIONAL DUOPOLY WITH CONSUMER‐FRIENDLY INITIATIVE

The purpose of this paper is to explore how strategic tariff policy and welfare are affected by the consumer‐friendly initiative of foreign exporting firms. We define a firm that is consumer‐friendly or non‐profit‐based if it considers both its own profit and consumer surplus. This paper extends Brander and Spencer by taking the consideration of consumer‐friendly firms into an international duopoly, and within such context examining the tariff policy and welfare. The consumer‐friendly initiative that leads to trade liberalization is a ‘Win‐Win‐Win’ solution in the sense that it is not only beneficial for foreign exporting firms, but also for the government and consumers of the importing country.     

BANK PERFORMANCE,FINANCIAL STABILITY AND MARKET CONCENTRATION: EVIDENCE FROM COOPERATIVE AND NON‐COOPERATIVE BANKS

Relying upon highly territorially disaggregated data taken at labour market areas, the paper explores the relationship between bank performances and financial stability of the banking system taking into account the role of market concentration. The z‐score is used as financial stability indicator, while the performance of financial intermediaries is measured using a parametric method recently developed (Kumbhakar et al. 2014). The empirical evidence shows a positive relationship between bank performance and financial stability and supports the ‘concentration–stability’ view for non‐cooperative banks only when concentration is measured on the whole sample of banks. Differences in the performance–stability nexus seem to depend more on the type of banks rather than different levels of market concentration. Higher market concentration of cooperative banks affects systemic stability by reducing the z‐scores of non‐cooperative banks, supporting the hypothesis that the presence of non‐profit‐maximizing entities can pull down stability of other financial institutions.     

COMPARATIVE STATICS OF A MONOPOLISTIC FIRM FACING RATE‐OF‐RETURN AND COMMAND‐AND‐CONTROL POLLUTION CONSTRAINTS

The intrinsic comparative statics properties of a general rate‐of‐return regulated, profit‐maximizing model of a monopolist facing a command‐and‐control pollution constraint are derived. Recent advances in the theory of comparative statics are used to derive the basic comparative statics of the model, which are contained in an observable negative semi‐definite matrix and possess the form of Slutsky‐like expressions. We consider several command‐and‐control pollution constraints that are commonly implemented in practice, and conclude that the intrinsic comparative statics properties of the model are qualitatively invariant to the type of command‐and‐control pollution constraint imposed. We compare our results with those extant, and find that several basic results from the standard A–J model no longer hold in our model.     

POST‐PRIVATIZATION OWNERSHIP AND FIRM PERFORMANCE: A LARGE META‐ANALYSIS OF THE TRANSITION LITERATURE

This paper aims to perform a large‐scale meta‐analysis of the relationship between post‐privatization ownership and firm performance in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Baseline estimation of a meta‐regression model that employs a total of 2,894 estimates drawn from 121 previous studies indicated the superior impact of foreign ownership on firm performance in comparison with state and domestic private entities. Furthermore, the estimation of an extended meta‐regression model that explicitly controls for the idiosyncrasies of transition economies and privatization policies strongly suggested that differences between countries in location, privatization method, and speed of policy implementation strongly influence the link between post‐privatization ownership structure and firm performance. We also found that these factors not only cause a remarkable gap between countries in terms of ex post improvement in firm performance but also significantly affect the interrelationship between foreign investors, domestic outsider owners, and firm managers, and the relative superiority of various domestic outsiders. Conclusive evidence of the harm caused to ex post firm performance by voucher privatization is one of the most noteworthy empirical findings in this paper.     

Pyramidal structure,risk‐taking and firm value

This article investigates the relationship among pyramidal layers, risk‐taking and firm value using a sample of local state‐owned enterprises (SOEs) in China. We find that state‐pyramidal layers have a positive and significant impact on firm risk‐taking and firm value, suggesting that the pyramidal structure formed by the state protects SOEs from political intervention. Risk‐taking is conducive to enhancing firm value and is one of the important channels through which state‐pyramidal layers increase firm value. By exploring the role of state‐pyramidal organizational structures in improving SOEs' risk‐taking, our results contribute to both corporate governance and corporate finance literature.     

THE EFFICIENCY OF THE STATE‐OWNED FIRM AND SOCIAL WELFARE: A NOTE

We consider a mixed market where a state‐owned firm competes with private firms. If the number of firms is exogenous, then a deterioration of the efficiency of the state‐owned firm might improve social welfare. This situation occurs when the state‐owned firm is inefficient and private firms are efficient. However, if the number of firms is endogenous, then a deterioration of the efficiency of the state‐owned firm must reduce social welfare.     

OWNERSHIP,CONTROL, AGENCY AND RESIDUAL CLAIMS IN HEALTHCARE: INSIGHTS ON COOPERATIVES AND NON‐PROFIT ORGANIZATIONS

Many issues surrounding healthcare entities’ performance can be traced to their governance and ownership. Increasingly, public services are being provided by non‐profit organizations and/or cooperatives, particularly in the healthcare sector. This is not unproblematic. We draw on the conceptual separation of ownership and control, and the notion of firm ownership to derive a taxonomy of dimensions along which a contractual‐ and property rights theory of the firm can be structured, in order to determine the nature of firms’ differences. We utilize the taxonomy to illustrate important distinctions between non‐profit and cooperative firms in the primary healthcare sector and propose testable hypotheses. Funders and regulators must recognise the differences between these firms, if public funding of healthcare is to achieve the expected outcomes.     

How Profit Shifting May Increase the Tax Burden of Multinationals: A Simple Model with Discrete Investment Choices

This paper models a Stackelberg tax setting game between two revenue‐maximizing countries which compete for the location of a single production plant owned by a multinational firm. We introduce the possibility of profit‐shifting activities by the multinational firm and investigate how a change in the costs of profit shifting affects equilibrium tax rates, revenue, and the tax burden of the multinational firm. We show that in most cases, tax rates of the two countries will be higher under profit shifting than without. If the costs for profit shifting are not too low, the strategic adjustment of profit tax rates will typically harm the multinational firm.     

BUBBLES,CRASHES, AND ENDOGENOUS UNCERTAINTY IN LINKED ASSET AND PRODUCT MARKETS*

In laboratory asset markets, subjects trade shares of a firm whose profits in a linked product market determine dividends. Treatments vary whether dividend information is revealed once per period or in real time and whether the firm is controlled by a profit‐maximizing robot or human subject. The latter variation induces uncertainty about firm behavior, bridging the gap between laboratory and field markets. Our data replicate well‐known features of laboratory asset markets (e.g., bubbles), suggesting these are robust to a market‐based dividend process. Compared to a sample of previous experiments, both real‐time information revelation and endogenous uncertainty impede the bubble‐mitigating impact of experience.     

Employment in family managed firms: Less but safe? Analysing labour demand of German family managed firms with a treatment model for panel data

This paper analyses the differences in labour demand between family and non-family managed firms. These firms seem to have better employment performance than non-family controlled companies. Therefore, this study applies a treatment model for panel data controlling for endogeneities of being a family managed firm or not. The results of the estimations indicate that labour demand is possibly larger because of family members joining the firms as extra employees. Moreover, labour turnover is lower, supporting the assumption that family firms offer some kind of implicit labour contracts. However, in opposite to previous results, it seems that only small family managed firms show different employment behaviour.     

REGIONAL ANTI‐CORRUPTION EFFORT,POLITICAL CONNECTIONS AND FIRM INNOVATION EFFORT: EVIDENCE FROM CHINA

This paper examines how firm characteristics and local anti‐corruption effort moderate the influence of political connections on enterprises’ private R&D investment using data from 2,587 Chinese A‐share listed enterprises. Our results show that the local anti‐corruption institutional environment significantly moderates the strong relationship between political connections and enterprises’ private R&D investment. Firm characteristics (i.e., firm size and firm age) also show a moderating effect on the relationship between political connection and enterprises’ private R&D investment; larger and older enterprises are more likely to have innovative resources and business cooperation partners, and thus are able to reduce their degree of reliance on political connections and government funding. The results of our study suggest the importance of having a transparent and fair institutional environment for enterprise innovation activities.     

JOB FLOWS AND UNEMPLOYMENT IN AN EQUILIBRIUM UNEMPLOYMENT MODEL WITH FIRM‐SPECIFIC SKILL TRAINING*

We introduce productivity enhancing firm‐specific skill training into the labour search model in which the firm‐specific skill training intensity and the job destruction rate are endogenously determined. It is shown that the higher the intensity of such training, the lower the rates of unemployment, job creation and job destruction. The paper's model provides a theoretical framework to understand the often mentioned peculiarity of the Japanese labour market; prevalently low rates of unemployment, job creation and job destruction in Japan are due to its training system which promotes workers to acquire firm‐specific skills.     

TEAMWORK AND INTRA‐FIRM WAGE DISPERSION AMONG BLUE‐COLLAR WORKERS

Using data on a sample of manufacturing establishments in Germany, we find that the use of self‐managed teams is associated with increased intra‐firm wage inequality between skilled and unskilled blue‐collar workers. We also show that moderating factors play an important role. While teamwork interacts positively with employer‐provided further training and a production technology of the most recent vintage, it interacts negatively with the age of the establishment and the coverage by a collective bargaining agreement.