SOCIAL STATUS,EDUCATION AND GOVERNMENT SPENDING IN A TWO‐SECTOR MODEL OF ENDOGENOUS GROWTH*

This paper extends the relative wealth specification of status preference to the two‐sector Uzawa (1965 )– Lucas (1988 ) model and examines the effectiveness of government spending on economic growth. It is found that the desire for relative wealth‐induced social status and/or the education component of relative wealth‐induced social status are important ingredients in determining the growth rate effects of government spending. Provided that the agent is concerned with his or her relative social position, the education‐induced social status plays a more important role than the physical‐asset‐induced social status in determining the validity of public spending on growth. If individuals do not care about their education‐driven social rewards, then an increase in government spending has no effect on the balanced growth rate regardless of the presence of the physical‐asset‐induced social status. A rise in government spending reduces the long‐run growth rate if the education‐induced social status is present.     

Identifying fiscal policy (in)effectiveness from the differential counter‐cyclicality of government spending in the interwar period

Differences across decades in the counter‐cyclical stance of fiscal policy can identify whether the growth in government spending affects output growth and so speeds recovery from a recession. We study government‐spending reaction functions from the 1920s and 1930s for twenty countries. There are two main findings. First, surprisingly, government spending was less counter‐cyclical in the 1930s than in the 1920s. Second, the growth of government spending did not have a significant effect on output growth, so that there is little evidence that this feature of fiscal policy played a stabilizing role in the interwar period.     

ON DECREASING MARGINAL IMPATIENCE*

One of the most controversial assumptions in endogenous time preference theory is that the degree of impatience is marginally increasing in wealth. We examine the implications of an empirically more relevant specification whereby time preference exhibits decreasing marginal impatience (DMI). With DMI, there are multiple steady‐state non‐satiated and satiated equilibria. In a constant interest rate economy, the non‐satiated steady‐state point is necessarily unstable. In a capital economy with decreasing returns technology, both the non‐satiated and satiated steady‐state points can be saddlepoint stable. The model is used to examine policy implications for the effects of capital taxation and government spending.     

THE TWO‐WAY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GOVERNMENT SPENDING AND CORRUPTION AND ITS EFFECTS ON ECONOMIC GROWTH

The existing empirical evidence suggests that in low‐income economies, an increase in government spending leads to a reduction of growth. This article aims to explain this empirical fact by considering a growth model that incorporates a two‐way relationship between corruption and government spending. That is, government spending gives rise to corruption and rent seeking, which feeds back by distorting the structure and size of government spending. In addition, the cost of corruption depends on the wage rate. Therefore, in low‐income economies, increases in government spending tend to generate larger social losses caused by a higher level of rent dissipation and a concomitant rise in corruption and government inefficiency. Consequently, in such economies, an increase in government spending is more likely to result in a decline of economic growth. (JEL H3, O11, O41)     

Public Expenditures on Education and Cultural Affairs in the West German States: Does Government Ideology Influence the Budget Composition?

Abstract. This paper examines whether government ideology influenced the allocation of public expenditures on education and cultural affairs in the West German states in the 1974–2006 period. I explicitly consider the allocation of policy responsibilities between the federal and the states' governments. The results suggest that leftist governments slightly increased public spending for schooling, whereas rightwing governments spent somewhat more on universities and cultural affairs. This spending pattern appears to be in line with the preferences of the governing parties' constituencies and indicates political competition in a time of declining electoral cohesion.     

Redistributive innovation policy,inequality, and efficiency

We examine the efficiency and distributional effects of regressive and progressive public R&D policies that target high‐tech and low‐tech sectors using a heterogenous‐agent growth model with in‐house R&D and incomplete capital markets. We find that such policies have important implications for efficiency and inequality. A regressive public R&D investment financed by income tax could boost growth and welfare via a positive effect on individual savings and effort. It could, however, also lower growth and welfare via its effect on the efficiency–inequality trade‐off. Thus, the relationship between public R&D spending and welfare is hump‐shaped, admitting an optimal degree of regressivity in public R&D spending. Using our baseline model, and the US state‐level GDP data, we derive the degree of regressiveness of public R&D investment in US states. We find that US states are more regressive in their R&D investment than the optimal regressiveness implied by our growth model.     

School Attainment, Completion, and Economic Development: A Cross-Country Analysis

The primary aim of this paper is to examine the relationship between school attainment, school completion, and economic development. In doing so it also examines the effect of other macroeconomic variables on school attainment and completion. Estimation is conducted using a panel dataset of 138 countries. Our results show that income levels, government expenditure on education, and political instability all have significant effects on school completion and attainment. In addition these variables have different effects on male and female schooling. Our results have important policy implications and in particular allow policymakers to identify different instruments to target the problem of non‐completion of schooling.     

RELIGIONS,FERTILITY, AND GROWTH IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

We investigate the extent to which the pronatalism of religions impedes growth via the fertility/education channel. Using Southeast Asian censuses, we show empirically that being Catholic, Buddhist, or Muslim significantly raises fertility, especially for couples with intermediate to high education levels. With these estimates, we identify the parameters of a structural model. Catholicism is strongly pro‐child (increasing total spending on children), followed by Buddhism, whereas Islam is more pro‐birth (redirecting spending from quality to quantity). Pro‐child religions depress growth in its early stages by lowering savings and labor supply. In the later stages of growth, pro‐birth religions impede human capital accumulation.     

Decentralization and sectoral expenditures in Europe

This article presents an empirical analysis of the recent impact of fiscal decentralization in Europe on total expenditure for specific government functions as well as on total government size. A panel data set for the years 2000–2009 for European countries has been constructed from EUROSTAT data. The effects of decentralization interact with the degree of vertical imbalances and tend to be negative as predicted by the Leviathan view of government. Effects vary strongly across government functions and are strongest in relative terms for social spending and infrastructure. Moderate restraining effects are found for education, while health spending is not significantly affected. This is consistent with competition between subnational entities, which try to attract taxpayers and shift expenses away from policies that benefit neighbouring jurisdictions.     

The dual nature of public goods and congestion: the role of fiscal policy revisited

Abstract The role of fiscal policy is examined when public goods provide both productive and utility services. In the presence of congestion, the consumption tax is shown to be distortionary. Optimal fiscal policy involves using consumption‐based instruments in conjunction with the income tax. An income tax‐financed increase in government spending dominates both lump‐sum and consumption tax‐financing. Replacing the lump‐sum tax with an income tax to finance a given level of spending dominates introducing an equivalent consumption tax. These results contrast sharply with the literature, where the consumption tax is generally viewed as the least distortionary source of public finance.     

Public spending and outcomes: Does governance matter?

This paper studies the links between public spending, governance, and outcomes. We examine the role of governance–measured by the level of corruption and the quality of bureaucracy–in determining the efficacy of public spending in improving human development outcomes. Our analysis contributes to our understanding of the relationship between public spending, governance and outcomes, and helps explain the surprising result that public spending often does not yield the expected improvement in outcomes. We show empirically that the differences in the efficacy of public spending can be largely explained by the quality of governance. Public health spending lowers child mortality rates more in countries with good governance. Similarly, public spending on primary education becomes more effective in increasing primary education attainment in countries with good governance. More generally, public spending has virtually no impact on health and education outcomes in poorly governed countries. These findings have important implications for enhancing the development effectiveness of public spending. The lessons are particularly relevant for developing countries, where public spending on education and health is relatively low, and the state of governance is often poor.     

Asymmetric output growth effects of government spending: Cross-sectional and panel data evidence

Using a model that accommodates asymmetric adjustments of output growth to changes in growth of government spending, the effects of aggregate and disaggregate government spending variables on output growth are examined. Both cross-section and panel regression estimations are conducted. Robustness of results to joint-endogeneity of output and government spending, alternative conditioning variables, and cointegration is investigated. Aggregate government spending appears to have positive output growth effects particularly in periods of below-trend growth in this variable. The government sector's productivity appears to be higher than non-government sector's productivity when spending growth is below-trend growth and only for non-OECD countries; no differences in sectoral productivities are detected for OECD countries. Government consumption spending has no significant output growth effects, but government investment spending has positive output growth effects particularly when its growth falls below its trend-growth; this favorable effect turns negative when government investment spending growth exceeds its trend-growth. Results are robust across alternative model specifications and estimation methods.     

Government Size and Stochastic Growth

This paper analyses the effects of the size of government on economic growth in a stochastic endogenous growth model involving the supply‐side effect and demand‐side effect produced by government spending. We show that a rise in the government spending affects economic growth through three channels, including the crowding‐out effect, the spin‐off effect and the resource mobilisation effect. We demonstrate that there exists an optimal size of government that maximises the economic growth rate.     

International Transmission of Government Spending,Monopolistic Competition and North-South Trade

This paper utilises a North–South general equilibrium model where South exports an intermediate good to North in exchange for differentiated goods. The model is used to examine international transmission of government spending and its welfare implications. It is shown that an increase in government spending in North (South) can increase (decrease) the number of differentiated goods produced, thereby decreasing (increasing) the degree of monopoly power in North. Furthermore an increase in government spending in South can decrease the welfare North, but the impact of an increase in government spending in North the welfare of South cannot be unambiguously determined. [F11, H41]     

Generational conflict and education politics: Implications for growth and welfare

This study considers the politics of public education and its impact on economic growth and welfare across generations. We employ probabilistic voting to demonstrate the generational conflict regarding taxes and spending and show that aging shifts the tax burden from the retired to the working generation, reduces public education spending, and ultimately slows economic growth. We subsequently consider a legal constraint that aims to boost education spending: a spending floor for education. This constraint stimulates economic growth but creates a trade-off between current and future generations’ welfare. Finally, the quantitative implications of our results are explored by calibrating the model to the Japanese economy.     

Economic growth,repression, and state expenditure in non-democratic regimes

This paper examines how economic growth affects government spending in non-democracies. A robust finding is that positive growth induces a significant increase in defence spending but a decrease in non-defence spending in dictatorships, with little effect in democracies. Government spending is slightly sensitive to negative growth across regimes. Higher growth rate in a country than its neighbours induces more spending than their average. Corruption causes a reduction in defence spending but an increase in non-defence spending. Primary education stimulates non-defence spending but reduces defence expenditure, secondary education causing the opposite effect. An under-developed country spends less than a developed country.     

Democracy comes to Europe: Franchise extension and fiscal outcomes 1830-1938

This paper examines the relation between public spending and the spread of democracy in Western Europe during the period 1830-1938. Our data set includes measures of the size of the electorate, the election rule, and electoral participation, as well as measures of the size and composition of central government expenditures for 12 countries. We estimate panel regressions, and find that (1) the gradual lifting of socio-economic restrictions on the voting franchise contributed to growth in government spending mainly by increasing spending on infrastructure and internal security; (2) the female suffrage had a weak positive effect, through spending on health, education and welfare; (3) the change from majority to proportional rule, which took place in 10 of the countries, did not contribute to growth in government spending, and held back spending on health, education and welfare; (4) there exists (weak) complementarity between economic development and the spread of democracy.     

Terms of trade volatility,government spending cyclicality,and economic growth

This paper presents estimates of the effects that terms of trade volatility has on real gross domestic product (GDP) per capita growth. Based on 5‐year nonoverlapping panel data comprising 175 countries during 1980 to 2010, the paper finds that terms of trade volatility has significant negative effects on economic growth in countries with procyclical government spending. In countries where government spending is countercyclical, terms of trade volatility has no significant effect on growth. Conditional on the mediating role of government spending cyclicality, the GDP share of domestic credit to the private sector has no significant effect on the relationship between growth and terms of trade volatility.     

Functional components of public expenditure,fiscal consolidations,and economic activity

This paper analyses how the functional components of public expenditure and spending‐driven consolidations affect the economic growth, unemployment, and income inequality. A dynamic panel data least squares dummy variable estimator estimator is employed over a sample of 15 European Union countries during the period 1990–2012. The empirical results show that real GDP growth decreases when fiscal austerity measures are implemented, especially if they are spending‐driven. Cuts in public expenditure undermine economic growth, namely if they slash spending on public order, recreation, and education. Spending cuts on education, in particular, affect the investment in human capital, harming not only growth but also economic, social, and human development. The unemployment rate also proved to be significantly boosted when austerity measures restrict spending on education, whereas income inequality rises when social protection expenditures are cut.     

Corruption and growth in Africa

A major concern in the development of African economies is the impact of corruption on economic growth and while there is general agreement on its detrimental effects, there is considerable debate over its nature and importance. In particular there is little work on the interaction between corruption, government expenditures and how this influences economic growth in countries in the region. This paper takes an endogenous growth model, extends it to include different categories of government spending and then introduces the possibility of corruption, which is allowed to have different effects on each of the categories. The results confirm the negative effect of corruption and military spending, but also show that corruption interacts with military burden, through indirect and complementary effects, to further increase its negative effect. The policy implications are that the effects of corruption on economic growth are worse than was thought in countries which have high military burdens.