Inward technology licensing and firm performance: a longitudinal study

Inward technology licensing (ITL) is often viewed as an important strategy adopted by firms to achieve innovation. However, relatively limited research has focused on evaluating the contribution of ITL to firm performance. The gap is all the more surprising since the benefits of external technology acquisition on innovation output have been emphasized in a lot of the literature. This study therefore sets out to investigate the extent to which the investment of ITL by firms affects their performance. In view of the relative abundance of data on variables for a longitudinal investigation, this analysis concentrates on the electronics-manufacturing industry. The longitudinal sample allows this examination to control the more extraneous effects and to provide more convincing evidence for examining the relationship of ITL and firm performance. A total of 341 Taiwanese electronics-manufacturing firms balanced over the period from 1998 to 2002 is taken as the analytical sample. The basic statistics indicate that acquiring technology externally shows an increasing tendency within the firms. The analyses, from the least square dummy variable method, reveal that ITL per se does not provide a significant contribution to firm performance; however, the positive impact of ITL on their performance increases with the level of the firms' internal research and development (R&D) efforts. Both the checks for robustness and the split-sample analyses validate the results. The findings not only highlight the importance of internal R&D efforts but also suggest that firms had better use ITL as a complement rather than a substitute of internal R&D for their competence.     

The licensing dilemma: understanding the determinants of the rate of technology licensing

The licensing of technology entails a trade‐off: licensing payments net of transaction costs (revenue effect) must be balanced against the lower price–cost margin and/or reduced market share implied by increased competition (profit dissipation effect) from the licensee. We argue that the presence of multiple technology holders, which compete in the market for technology, changes such a trade‐off and triggers more aggressive licensing behavior. To test our theory, we analyze technology licensing by large chemical firms during the period 1986–96 for 107 chemical products. We find that the rate of technology licensing displays an inverted U‐shaped relationship with the number of potential technology suppliers and is negatively related to the licensor's market share and to the degree of technology‐specific product differentiation. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

On the duration of technology licensing

We model an innovator's choice of payment scheme and duration as a joint decision in a multi-period licensing game with potential future innovations and some irreversibility of technology transfer. We find that it may be optimal to license the innovation for less than the full length of the patent and that royalty contracts can be more profitable than fixed-fee licensing even in the absence of information asymmetry and risk aversion. Moreover, licensing contracts based on royalty have a longer duration than fixed-fee licenses and are more likely to be used in industries where innovations are frequent and intellectual property protection is weak. Our paper also highlights an important link between the study of technology licensing and the theory of durable goods.     

Determinants,causal connections and outcomes of corporate technology licensing: a systematic review and research agenda

Exchanges in markets for technology (MfT) have grown rapidly in recent years. MfT involve transactions for the use, diffusion and creation of technology. In this article, we conduct a systematic review of the emerging market for technology literature and examine one of its most important aspects, corporate technology licensing. Using thematic analysis, we systematically review 78 papers published in 29 journals over 30 years covering the academic disciplines of technology/knowledge management, strategic management, entrepreneurship, innovation management and industrial economics. Based on this analysis, we present an organizing framework for the most prominent determinants, causal connections and outcomes of technology licensing research to date and identify a research agenda highlighting important avenues for future research in this domain.     

RETRACTED: Integrated knowledge exploitation: The complementarity of product development and technology licensing

In light of increasing licensing, we challenge the common assumption that product development and technology licensing are substitutes. We develop a resource‐based framework, which distinguishes a firm's technological resource base and technology exploitation processes. We further combine survey, patent, and financial data of 228 medium‐sized and large industrial companies to examine the interactions of firms' product development processes and technology licensing processes in order to explain heterogeneity in new product revenues, licensing performance, and firm performance. The results underscore that product development, which indicates innovative capacity, and technology licensing, which indicates desorptive capacity, are complements rather than substitutes in integrated knowledge exploitation in medium‐sized and large firms. This complementarity is particularly pronounced in firms with an emphasis on cross‐licensing and with a strong patent portfolio. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Exclusivity in licensing alliances: using hostages to support technology commercialization

We examine why exclusivity provisions are used in licensing alliances, and when restrictions in licensing scope (e.g., by product or geography) accompany these exclusivity provisions. We find broad support for the proposition that these features are associated with the contractual challenges of allying with licensees when they contribute valuable complementary capabilities toward the commercialization of licensed technologies. Evidence from our data suggests that exclusivity is used as a contractual hostage to safeguard licensee investments in complementary assets and to enable contracting over early stage technologies. Scope restrictions are employed to balance the tradeoffs between the value creation made possible by licensee complementary capabilities and the transactional hazards entailed in working exclusively with licensees. Our results also suggest that scope restrictions and other formal safeguards may be substitute mechanisms for managing similar transactional concerns in licensing alliances. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

On regulations for 5G: Micro licensing for locally operated networks

Future 5G networks aim at providing new high-quality wireless services to meet stringent and case-specific needs of various vertical sectors beyond traditional mobile broadband offerings. 5G is expected to disrupt the mobile communication business ecosystem and open the market to drastically new sharing based network operational models. 5G technical features of network slicing and small cell deployments in higher carrier frequencies will lower the investment barrier for new entrants to deploy local radio access networks and offer vertical specific services in specific areas and allow them lease the remaining required infrastructure on demand from mobile network operators (MNO) or infrastructure vendors. To realize the full vision of 5G to benefit the society and promote competition, innovation and emergence of new services when the 5G end-to-end network spans across different stakeholders administrative domains, the existing regulations governing the mobile communication business ecosystem are being refined. This paper provides a tutorial overview on how 5G innovations impact mobile communications and reviews the regulatory elements relevant to 5G development for locally deployed networks. This paper expands the recent micro licensing model for local spectrum authorization in future 5G systems and provides guidelines for the development of the key micro licensing elements. This local micro licensing model can open the mobile market by allowing different stakeholders to deploy local small cell networks with locally issued spectrum licenses ensuring pre-defined quality guarantees for the vertical sectors’ case specific needs.     

Patent pools in 5G: The principles for facilitating pool licensing

Patent pools collect patents from multiple patentees and license them out as a package. They offer one-stop-shop licensing efficiencies, reduce transaction costs, and increase the predictability of the licensing environment for the benefit of innovation diffusion. However, pools failed to take off for previous cellular standards. This article analyses both retrospectively the reasons for such failures and prospectively what makes the 5G environment more conductive to pool formation and licensing. Avanci, a patent pool for licensing cellular standards in the Internet of Things (IoT), is a significant development but has limited licensing coverage so far. The article then recommends five policy principles to facilitate pool licensing in the IoT. They include recognising that only enough upstream SEP owners need to join the 5G pool to create a market signalling effect. Some vertically integrated SEP owners may remain outsiders, and some bilateral licensing may co-exist without damaging the pool's success. To encourage upstream SEP owners to join the pool, they should be allowed to set ‘high enough’ royalty rates and divide pools' royalties among members under value proportionality rules. 5G pools must also be flexible and adopt different licensing programs that consider the specificities of each IoT market. Finally, pool administrators should consult with IoT implementers before establishing licensing programs for them and have infringement legal standing if everything else fails. These principles would go a long way in spurring the broader use of 5G pool licensing for a more efficient, straightforward, and predictable IoT licensing environment.     

The influence of firm and industry characteristics on returns from technology licensing deals: evidence from the US computer and pharmaceutical sectors

This study examines the relationships between firm and industry characteristics and firms' abnormal stock market returns accompanying the announcement of technology licensing deals. In particular, I examine the fit among firms' licensing activities, their resource endowments, and their industry context, and develop hypotheses on its impact on abnormal stock market returns after licensing deals. Analyzing 11 years of inward and outward licensing transactions in the US computer and pharmaceutical industries between 1990 and 2000, I find support for my argument that while firms profit from both inward and outward licensing, the magnitude of such profits is determined by licensing firms' resource endowments, and that these determinants have a different impact in different industry contexts. Understanding these relationships helps explain when firms should use licensing to exploit their proprietary technologies and make better predictions about the impact of licensing transactions on firm performance.     

Unionization structure, licensing and innovation

We show the effects of the unionization structure (viz., decentralized and centralized unions) on a firm's incentive for technology licensing and innovation. The incentive for technology licensing is stronger under decentralized unions. We identify circumstances under which the benefit from licensing creates a stronger incentive for innovation under decentralized unions. If the union's preference for employment is high, the benefit from licensing may create higher incentive for innovation under decentralized unions. However, if the union's preference for wage is high enough, the incentive for innovation is higher under a centralized union irrespective of licensing ex-post innovation. If the centralized union decides whether or not to supply workers to all firms, the possibility of higher innovation under decentralized unions increases. We further show that perfectly substitutable workers can be better off under decentralized unions if the labor productivity depends on the unionization structure, which occurs in our analysis when, e.g., licensing after innovation occurs only under decentralized unions or innovation (with no licensing) occurs only under a centralized union.     

Managerial perceptions of technology licensing as an alternative to internal R&D in new product development: an empirical investigation

Increasingly, companies are using the licensing approach to acquire external technology as an alternative to internal new product development. However, the licensing literature presents lists of benefits and costs without identifying either their relative importance or the underlying dimensions. This article presents the results of a survey of Australian licensee firms designed to fill this gap in the literature. The results show that the major reason for licensing relates more to the immediate need to gain competitive advantage than the relative low cost advantage of technology licensing or having access to future technology. The major impediments to licensing are the entry and exit costs and the loss of decision-making autonomy resulting from licensor-imposed restrictions. Further, only two factors, perceived search costs and low cost market entry advantage of licensing appear to vary among the industries studied. Future research and managerial implications of the results are discussed.     

Engaging the inventor: exploring licensing strategies for university inventions and the role of latent knowledge

A significant portion of knowledge generated by university inventors remains latent (uncodified but codifiable), even though this information is valuable to firms that have licensed their inventions and famously strong incentives exist to disseminate academic findings widely. However, the licensee may access and exploit this latent knowledge by engaging the inventor during the development phase. This paper examines the hypothesis that licensing strategies that directly engage the inventor increase the likelihood and degree of commercialization success. While this may seem somewhat apparent, firms in the sample under investigation vary substantially in the degree to which they engage the inventor: one third of the sample does not engage the inventor at all. On the other hand, the hypothesis might seem surprising given the norms of open science under which university labs are expected to operate. Regression analyses based on a unique dataset of 124 license agreements associated with inventions from MIT support the hypothesis and generate results that are robust to a variety of controls. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Towards a signature pedagogy for design and technology education: a literature review

International Journal of Technology and Design Education - Drawing on the work of Lee Shulman, this article reviews literature exploring the concept of signature pedagogies, which are described as...     

动漫品牌授权高峰期来临零门槛成为新尝试

日前,在长三角、珠三角、京津等25个省市区,拥有6亿受众的上海炫动卡通与泉州一动漫企业达成了代理合作,由该动漫企业代理上海炫动产业旗下相关动漫品牌和形象的授权事宜。这也意味着,以产业为基础的动漫品牌授权在泉州将迎来一个发展高峰。     

Labour market impacts of occupational licensing and delicensing: New evidence from China

We examined the recent occupational regulation changes in China and their labour market impacts. Using data from the China Labor-Force Dynamic Survey from 2014 to 2018, we found an earning premium of approximately 10 per cent, as well as more employment-based benefits, for those with an occupational license compared to those without one. Licensed workers reported higher skill-job task match than unlicensed workers. Our data cover the period of occupational regulation reform in China, when 70 per cent of occupations previously licensed or certified were deregulated. Over this period, the licensing status remained associated with positive earning and employment benefits premiums, and better skill-job task match at the labour market level. However, delicensing led to a distributional shift in the earning dispersion, especially at the bottom of the earning distribution; earning premiums rose sharply for the 10th to 30th percentiles. Workers directly affected by the licensing reform reported a significant decrease in employment benefits and in subjective job quality measures (i.e. skill-job task match and voice at work) after delicensing, relative to never-licensed workers. We suggest that non-wage compensation is lost in the short term because the signal of competency is no longer valued by employers after delicensing.     

Managing technology and innovation: a review

This paper reports the first phase of a major study into the linkages between technology and strategy, with particular reference to smaller firms. As a preliminary step, a wide review of relevant literature was undertaken.
Two main strands of knowledge have been identified. First, a number of high profile issues have dominated the field of technology management starting with Schumpeter's 'creative destruction'. This seminal work has been refined, notably by Pavitt and Porter, culminating in the view that technology has become one of the principal determinants of competition. Second, a number of models were examined that assess development of technology within the firm over time.
The principal implication for R&D managers is the authors' conclusion that the various constructs must be used pro-actively in formulating technology strategy, thus providing a basis for better assessing acquisitions and disposals of technology-intensive operations.     

Patent hold-out and licensing frictions: Evidence from litigation of standard essential patents

The theory of patent “hold-out” posits that frictions in the market for licensing standard-essential patents (SEPs) provide incentives for prospective licensees to opportunistically delay taking licenses with the goal of avoiding or reducing royalty payments. We construct measures of pre- and in-litigation hold-out from information disclosed in U.S. cases filed 2010–2019. Relying on both SEP and a matched control set of non-SEP disputes, we explore whether frictions in the market for licensing are associated with hold-out. We find some evidence of an association between hold-out and both SEP portfolio size and enforcement uncertainty; however, we find no evidence associating pre- or in-litigation hold-out with the international breadth of SEP rights.     

The (low) power elite : Deregulated licensing criteria for low-power television in the USA

This article examines the policy context within which Low Power Television (LPTV) has developed in the USA, analysing the political, legal, aesthetic and technical considerations used to determine station ownership preferences among competing applicants. Although only a few LPTV stations are in commercial operation, the FCC has received over 32 000 applications from community, minority and commercial interest groups from every state. Unfortunately, this impressive growth potential has been stalled amidst debates concerning the constitutionality of various policy models governing station licensing and operation. At stake in the debate over who should own these outlets are myriad political, social and economic interests among public and private concerns vying for airspace. If the government allows corporate interests to compete against or challenge minority applicants, LPTV may follow the lead of VHF TV with respect to ownership concentration and programme content. Conversely, policies favouring community and minority applicants should promote innovative programme ideas featuring local talent, and address local issues.