INFORMATION AND THE DEMAND FOR CLEAN AIR

This paper examines the relationship between the relocating household's reaction to air quality and its information on environmental quality. The results suggest households exposed to public information on the environment are more responsive to air quality differences if they also are knowledgeable about local environmental conditions. (JEL Q510, R230, D830)     

AN EXAMINATION OF THE EFFECTS OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS ON RETAIL GASOLINE PRICE SEASONALITY

Stricter environmental standards on gasoline have had impacts on the prices of gasoline including the seasonality of gasoline prices. Using both national data and individual station data, the paper tests for a possible explanation for this increase. Three theories are tested: that gasoline seasonality increases due to higher costs, due to greater market power because of segmented markets, or due to greater asymmetry because of greater inattention on the part of customers. The results suggest that gasoline price seasonality has increased both due to higher costs and greater market power with mixed results on the inattention of consumers.(JEL Q41, Q53, Q58).     

A Dynamic Tiebout Theory of Voluntary vs. Involuntary Provision of Public Goods

This paper considers a dynamic model of Tiebout-like migration between communities that utilize distinct allocation procedures for public goods. At issue is whether voluntary or compulsory procedures are more likely to prevail over time. We model infinitely lived individuals who make repeated, sequential location decisions over one of two communities. Each community uses a distinct mechanism for allocating public goods. The first is one in which contributions are given voluntarily by the citizenry of the community. The second is a compulsory scheme by which individuals are taxed proportionately to wealth with the tax determined by a majority vote. Opportunities to accumulate wealth exist via accumulation of public capital.
The Markov Perfect equilibria of the dynamic game are studied. Our main result shows that when accumulated wealth converges to a steady state, individuals' locational choices eventually "select" the involuntary provision mechanism. This holds despite the fact that unanimous location in the voluntary provision community may in many cases remain as a Nash equilibrium of the static game each period. We also describe conditions under which voluntary provision survives. These conditions require that accumulation of capital fails to decrease wealth dispersion over time. The results are shown to be consistent with findings relating inequality to school choice.     

Public Good Contributions Between Communities

The four fundamental determinants of voluntary contributions to public goods are taste, community size, wealth, and wealth distribution. This paper argues that for policy purposes it is important to discriminate between the four hypotheses. To do this, it is necessary to consider the comparative static effects of the above determinants not only on total contribution, but also on per capita contribution and the participation rate. Furthermore, just as members of a smaller community would contribute more than their identical counterparts in a larger community, we show that members of a community that has more poor members would also contribute more than their identical counterparts in a community that has more rich members.     

USING COMMERCIAL DISCIPLINE TO IMPROVE AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE PROCUREMENT: MISPLACED ENTHUSIASM?

Australia, like other democracies, has long sought to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of procurement for national defence. A recent review exhorted Defence procurement managers to exert greater “commercial discipline.” Similar calls have been made in other countries. This paper tests such public sector emulation of commercial practice by comparing the relative effectiveness of procurement via in‐house arrangements; a public procurement agency detached from Defence; and privatized provision. We show that what matters is not public or private ownership but how ownership and management are integrated and what incentive structures are applied. (JEL H44)     

THE VALUE OF IN‐STREAM WATER TEMPERATURE FORECASTS FOR FISHERIES MANAGEMENT

Water temperature is an important factor affecting aquatic life within the stream environment. Cold water species, such as salmonids, are particularly susceptible to elevated water temperatures. This paper examines the economic value of short‐term water temperature forecasts for salmonid management. Forecasts may have economic value if they allow the water resource manager to make better water allocation decisions. This study considers two applications: water releases for management of Chinook salmon in the Klamath River and leasing water from agriculture for management of steelhead trout in the John Day River. We incorporate biophysical models and water temperature distribution data into a Bayesian framework to simulate changes in fish populations and the corresponding benefit from recreational fishing and opportunity cost of water under different temperature forecast accuracies. Simulation results indicate that use of the forecasts results in increased fish production and that marginal costs decline and net benefits increase as forecast accuracy increases, suggesting that provision and use of such stream temperature forecasts would have value to society. (JEL Q22, Q25, Q28, Q50)     

The Political Economy of Environmental Taxes with an Aging Population

This paper develops a two-period overlapping-generations model with environmental externalities and uncertain lifetimes, and studies how two sources of population aging, greater longevity and a lower rate of population growth, affect the politically determined environmental tax and the quality of the environment. It is shown that greater longevity and a lower rate of population growth have entirely different effects on these factors; greater longevity has no effect on the environmental tax and has a non-positive effect on the environmental quality, whereas a lower rate of population growth has a negative effect on the tax and has a positive effect on the quality. In addition, the political decision-making on the tax leads to an inefficient allocation of capital and environmental quality.JEL classifications: D72, D78, D91, H41, O40, Q20, Q28     

One-sided provision of a public good through bargaining under representative democracy

We examine a trade-off between strategic delegation and the internalization of interregional externalities through bargaining in the context of political economy. We show that in the case of one-sided provision of a public good, if the public good produced by one region generates a sufficiently significant spillover to another region, then interregional negotiation increases the total surplus of the entire economy.     

省直管县改革对县域公共物品供给的影响——基于河北省136县(市)面板数据的实证分析

基于河北省136个县(市)2003～2007年的相关社会经济数据,文章建立面板数据实证分析了省直管县改革对县域公共物品供给的影响。研究发现,省直管县改革在显著提高县域生产性公共物品供给水平的同时,显著降低了县域服务性公共物品的供给水平;而且除人口规模外,省直管县改革对县域公共物品供给的影响关系并不会受到县域环境因素的影响。     

Ramsey,Pigou, Heterogeneous Agents,and Nonatmospheric Consumption Externalities

This paper analyzes the effects of nonatmospheric consumption externalities on optimal commodity taxation and on the social cost and optimal levels of public good provision. A negative consumption externality, by lowering the social cost of public good provision, may require the second‐best level of public good provision to exceed the first‐best level. If those households who are most important for building up the consumption reference level respond the least to commodity taxation, the second‐best commodity tax rate may fall short of the first‐best rate. Moreover, in this case, heterogeneity may imply an equity‐efficiency tradeoff. This tradeoff is present only if the consumption externality is of the nonatmospheric type.     

Cournot-Nash and Lindahl equilibria in pure public “bad” economies

Summary. Using a general equilibrium framework, this paper analyzes the equilibrium provision of a pure public bad commodity (for example pollution). Considering a finite economy with one desired private good and one pure public “bad” we explicitly introduce the concept of Lindahl equilibrium and the Lindahl prices into a pure public bad economy. Then, the Lindahl provision is analyzed and compared with the Cournot-Nash provision. The main results for economies with heterogeneous agents state that the asymptotic Lindahl allocation of the pure public bad is the null allocation. In contrast, the asymptotic Cournot-Nash provision of the public bad might approach infinity. Other results were obtained in concert with the broad analysis of the large finite economies with pure public bad commodities. Received: July 26, 2001; revised version: March 12, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" We are indebt to Nicholas Yannelis and anonymous referee for their valuable comments and suggestions. Correspondence to: B. Shitovitz     

An Experimental Investigation of Excludable Public Goods

This paper extends the research on incentive compatible institutions for the provision of public goods by imposing a minimum contribution that must be met in order for an individual to enjoy the benefits of the public good. Excluding individuals who do not contribute at least the minimum transforms the linear n-player pure public goods game to an n-player coordination game with multiple, Pareto-ranked Nash equilibria. The experimental results show that exclusion increases contributions to the public good in most cases. However, an increase in contributions may not be sufficient to increase social welfare because there is a welfare cost to excluding individuals when the good is non-rival. Furthermore, exclusion can decrease both contributions and welfare in environments in which individuals fail to coordinate their contributions. The results are sensitive to the minimum contribution requirement and to the relative returns from the public and private alternatives.     

Effects of political institutions on air quality

We empirically test existing theories on the provision of public goods, in particular air quality, using data on sulfur dioxide (SO₂) concentrations from the Global Environment Monitoring Projects for 107 cities in 42 countries from 1971 to 1996. The results are as follows: First, we provide additional support for the claim that the degree of democracy has an independent positive effect on air quality. Second, we find that among democracies, presidential systems are more conducive to air quality than parliamentary ones. Third, in testing competing claims about the effect of interest groups on public goods provision in democracies we establish that labor union strength contributes to lower environmental quality, whereas the strength of green parties has the opposite effect.     

Local Residential Sorting and Public Goods Provision: A Classroom Demonstration

This classroom exercise illustrates the Tiebout (1956) hypothesis that residential sorting across multiple jurisdictions leads to a more efficient allocation of local public goods. The exercise places students with heterogeneous preferences over a public good into a single classroom community. A simple voting mechanism determines the level of public good provision in the community. Next, the classroom is divided in two, and students may choose to move between the two smaller communities, sorting themselves according to their preferences for public goods. The exercise places cost on movement at first, then allows for costless sorting. Students have the opportunity to observe how social welfare rises through successive rounds of the exercise, as sorting becomes more complete. They may also observe how immobile individuals can become worse off because of incomplete sorting when the Tiebout assumptions do not hold perfectly.     

城市公园绿地供给的公平性定量评价 ——以重庆市中心城区为例

土地和房地产市场化背景下的公园绿地供给的公平 性研究具有重要意义。以重庆市中心城区为例,居住小区为研 究单元,从可达性、数量、面积和质量４个维度衡量不同价格 级别居住小区的公园供给的公平性。采用高德互联网地图分析 步行、公共交通２种方式下研究范围内4 663个居住小区的 公园供给的可达性、数量、面积和质量状况;非参数秩和检验 判别不同级别居住小区的公园供给差异。结果表明：不同级别 居住小区的公园供给未发现明显的不公平现象,低级别居住小 区在可达性、数量、总面积上占优势,人均公园面积低于高级 别居住小区,各级别居住小区在高质量公园的使用机会上没有 差异。本文所采用的公园绿地公平性定量评价方法,可为城市 绿色空间、公共服务设施绩效评价提供方法借鉴     

At a crossroads: consequential trends in recognition of community-based forest tenure from 2002-2017

ABSTRACT

Insecure, contested, and unjust forest tenure arrangements undermine forest investment and protection, fuel conflict, and jeopardize Indigenous Peoples’, local communities’, and indigenous and community women’s rights, livelihoods, and development prospects. While legally recognized community forests tend to have lower rates of deforestation, store more carbon and benefit more people than forests managed by either public or private entities, evidence shows over two-thirds of forests remain controlled by governments – a significant portion of which is contested by indigenous and local communities who traditionally own, manage, and depend on these forests. It is therefore all the more critical that governments support and advance communities’ forest tenure rights. Using longitudinal tenure data and analysis of global forest ownership trends developed by the Rights and Resources Initiative, this article details the distribution of statutory forest rights across 58 countries covering nearly 92% of global forests over the fifteen-year period from 2002–2017.     

Uncertainty and the Voluntary Provision of a Pure Public Good in a Two‐Moment Decision Model

In this paper, we explore the potential benefits of uncertainty that may arise in a two‐moment model of the voluntary provision of a pure public good. We find that an increase in a given contributor i’s risk associated with the aggregate contribution level of the other contributors (i.e., an increase in social uncertainty) induces that contributor to increase his own contribution level if and only if the uncertainty's incremental effect on the expected value of his net marginal utility is negative. Contributor i’s welfare likewise increases when a closely related condition is met, namely that the uncertainty's marginal effect on his expected marginal utility value of the public good exceeds its countervailing effect on the numeraire. Further, the corresponding aggregate contribution to the public good increases in the presence of free‐riding if and only if the incremental effect of contributor i’s contribution on the aggregate expected value of all other contributors’ net marginal utilities is small‐enough positive. We derive similar conditions for the case of private uncertainty, where the increase in contributor i’s risk is associated with his own marginal valuation of the public good. A simple example illustrates these conceptual results. Numerical analysis demonstrates that an increase in private uncertainty can have a nonmonotonic impact on contributor i’s welfare.     

On the evolution of conditional cooperation

A long series of laboratory and field experiments, as well as conventional empirical studies, has established that (1) individuals voluntarily provide themselves with public goods at levels exceeding those predicted by the Nash voluntary contributions mechanism, and (2) agents reciprocate increases in the contributions of their counterparts in such settings (conditional cooperation). This paper presents a simple model of the evolution of preferences for conditional cooperation in the presence of a public good, which explains these two empirical findings without employing reputational or group selection arguments. In this model, individuals inherit preferences to match other agents' contributions to the provision of a public good, at some specified “matching rate.” Agents whose preferences induce them to be relatively successful – in material terms – increase in number, from one generation to the next. Under complete information and with randomly matched groups of N agents who have quasilinear preferences over the public good and a private good, the unique evolutionarily stable matching rate is 1, leading to Pareto optimal voluntary provision of the public good, regardless of group size N. The evolutionarily stable matching rate can be viewed as an endogenous social norm.     

The Role of Information Provision as a Policy Instrument to Supplement Environmental Taxes

This paper examines, within a dynamic framework, the role of information provision as a policy instrument to supplement environmental taxation. Several products are responsible for health as well as environmental damages. Many consumers do not possess the required information to optimally substitute away from these products. However, as the stock of information regarding the negative effects of these products builds up, an increasing fraction of consumers behaves optimally. The government uses two policy instruments, environmental taxation and information provision. We show that as the accumulated stock of information increases, the optimal tax rate declines over time. Information provision can shift market demand towards environmentally friendly goods over time, and thus reduce the required level of the tax rate. Our results provide strong evidence in support of information campaigns as a policy instrument to supplement traditional environmental policies.     

Economic inequality and burden-sharing in the provision of local environmental quality

A large, but inconclusive, literature addresses how economic heterogeneity affects the use of local resources and local environmental quality. One line of thought, which derives from Nash equilibrium provision of public goods, suggests that in contexts in which individual actions degrade local environmental quality, wealthier people in a community will tend to do more to protect environmental quality. In this paper we report on experiments performed in rural Colombia that were designed to explore the role that economic inequality plays in the ‘provision’ of local environmental quality. Subjects were asked to decide how much time to devote to collecting firewood from a local forest, which degrades local water quality, and how much to unrelated pursuits. Economic heterogeneity was introduced by varying the private returns to these alternative pursuits. Consistent with the Nash equilibrium prediction, we found that the players with more valuable alternative options put less pressure on local water quality. However, the subjects with less valuable alternative options showed significantly more restraint relative to their pure Nash strategies. Furthermore, they were willing to bear significantly greater opportunity costs to move their groups to outcomes that yielded higher average payoffs and better water quality than the Nash equilibrium outcome.