混合所有制、股权激励与融资决策中的防御行为--基于动态权衡理论的证据

文章基于动态权衡理论,以1999-2014年上市公司为样本,运用混合所有制改革这一“自然实验”条件,研究了高管股权激励对其融资决策中防御行为的影响,分离出激励和治理双重效应。研究发现：(1)股权激励有助于抑制高管融资决策中的防御行为,但这种效应只存在于民营企业中;(2)对于国有企业,只在股权分置改革后才观察到类似效果,而股改前高管在减少债务融资的同时,提高了股权激励水平,自我激励问题明显;(3)公司股权混合度越高,其在赋予高管股权激励上越谨慎,但在国有股比例较高的公司中,混合所有制改革显著提高了股权激励水平;(4)股权混合安排显著改进了股权激励契约在抑制高管防御行为方面的效率,这种效应在非国有股比例较高的公司中更强。     

“(MA)LINGERING ON THE DISABLED LIST”

In this article, we examine two offsetting incentives that may affect a baseball player's willingness to play with injuries. We allow for the usual disincentive effects associated with long‐term contracts, while also incorporating the importance of the incentives associated with contract renewal. Our results are consistent with the previous work that showed those likely to retire at the end of their current contracts have an increased incentive to shirk. For those who expect to re‐sign a subsequent contract, however, we find that players tend to step up their effort as they approach the final year of their contract. (JEL L83)     

Ownership and Cost‐Sharing Contracts

We discuss the relative merits of public and private ownership in an incomplete contract framework developed by Hart, Shleifer and Vishney (HSV). We add two new elements to their model. First, the government may offer cost‐sharing contracts when procuring the good. Second, the owner of a private firm may divert resources that increase their own profit/utility but increase total costs. The cost sharing contract allows the government to reduce the private firm's incentives to dump quality in order to save on costs. However, this also leads to resource diversion, which increases total costs. We derive the preferred mode of ownership when the government optimally chooses the power of the cost sharing scheme. We find that the presence of quality‐reducing cost reductions only favours government ownership if the scope for resource diversion is substantial. A discussion of when resource diversion is likely to be important is also provided.     

DOES THE MISSION OF PROVIDERS MATTER ON A QUASI‐MARKET? THE CASE OF THE BELGIAN ‘SERVICE VOUCHER’ SCHEME

ABSTRACT 1 : In 2001, the Belgian government introduced a ‘service voucher’ scheme in the field of domestic (housework) services, following a quasi‐market mechanism which fosters competition between providers of different types as regards sector (for‐profit, public, third sector) and mission (seeking profits, home care provision to vulnerable groups and work integration of the unemployed). Empirical evidence suggests that third sector organizations focusing on a social mission recognized by a tutelary regulation are the best performing with regards to the quality of jobs and service organization, leading to a better ‘triangulation’ of the service relationship. On the other hand, for‐profit providers, especially temporary work agencies, seem to favour their capacity of adaptation to the desiderata of their clients and costs’ minimization to the detriment of the quality of jobs which are made as flexible as possible.     

Moral hazard,competition and contract design: empirical evidence from managerial,franchised and entrepreneurial businesses in Norway

Agency theory emphasizes the role of ownership, control and incentives in encouraging managers to improve efficiency. Owners often tie managers to contracts that reduce conflict of interest between owners and managers. The differences between alternative business ownership structures have been investigated. According to theory, we expect managers with an outcome-dependent dealer contract to be more efficient than managers with a more integrated and less performance based employee dealer contract. We also analyse how competitive pressure might reduce the moral hazard problem and therefore affect contract design. Berle and Means (The Modern Corporation and Private Property, Macmillan, New York, 1932) long ago stated that the market mechanism could constrain the agency problem. Even so, this problem has scarcely been investigated empirically. This paper also considers the contractual effect of potential monitoring costs, education and relationship age in a model tested on data from 175 dealer contracts in a multinational oil company.     

Positive versus negative incentives for loan repayment in microfinance: A game theory approach

In most of the methodologies used so far by microfinance institutions, negative incentives are predominant, which can contrast with these institutions’ social mission. This paper investigates whether the microfinance industry could benefit from using more positive incentives. The main results of our game model are twofold. First, (positive or negative) incentives increase “on‐time” repayments. Second, the client is more likely to repay her loan with the encouragement of a bonus scheme rather than under the pressure of a sanction, regardless of the amount. This paper therefore argues for the increased use of positive incentives in the industry.     

Risking Other People's Money: Experimental Evidence on the Role of Incentives and Personality Traits

Decision-makers often face incentives to increase risk-taking on behalf of others (e.g., they are offered bonus contracts and contracts based on relative performance). We conduct an experimental study of risk-taking on behalf of others using a large heterogeneous sample, and we find that people respond to such incentives without much apparent concern for stakeholders. Responses are heterogeneous and mitigated by personality traits. The findings suggest that a lack of concern for others’ risk exposure hardly requires “financial psychopaths” in order to flourish, but it is diminished by social concerns.     

AUCTIONS,EX POST COMPETITION AND PRICES: THE EFFICIENCY OF PUBLIC‐PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS*

ABSTRACT ** : Using an original database concerning 1102 French local public authorities in 2001, we explore the relationships between prices charged by private operators in water contracts and ex post competition. We show that prices charged in contracts in which operators are in a monopoly situation throughout the duration of the contract, are not affected by a ‘competition effect’ between private operators. However, a competition effect between private operators and public management appears to be crucial in explaining prices combined with a ‘termination effect’, reflecting the fact that the contract is close to being renewed, and hence re‐auctioned.     

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PUBLIC‐PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS AND ANALYSIS OF THEIR SOCIAL VALUE*

ABSTRACT: This article applies political economy theory to public‐private partnerships (PPPs). First, we propose that social welfare is the appropriate normative evaluation criterion to evaluate the social value of PPPs. Second, we specify the goals of PPP participants, including private‐sector partners and governments. Third, we review the observed outcomes of PPPs and analyze them from both a political economy perspective and a social welfare perspective. Fourth, based on a comparison of the actual outcomes of PPPs to normatively desirable social welfare outcomes, we propose some ‘rules for governments’ concerning the design of government PPP institutions and the management of PPPs. We argue that if governments were to adopt these rules there would be fewer PPPs in total, they would be more like traditional government contracts and there would be a greater likelihood of improved social welfare. However, political economy theory also explains why implementation of any reform will be difficult.     

THE ROLE OF MODEL SPECIFICATION IN FINDING THE INFLUENCE OF OWNERSHIP AND REGULATORY REGIME ON UTILITY COST: THE CASE OF SWEDISH ELECTRICITY DISTRIBUTION

The lack of consensus on how utility cost is affected by variation in ownership and regulatory regime has been attributed to sector‐specific conditions and interacting observed heterogeneous factors. This study investigates a further source of ambiguous outcomes as it evaluates different econometric specifications related to variations in utility objective/the design of regulatory regime and influences from unknown/uncertain heterogeneous factors. Consistent with theoretical predictions, 7 years of data from the Swedish electricity distribution sector reveal that private ownership and stronger financial incentives are associated with lower costs. It is also demonstrated that inappropriate model specifications can produce arbitrary conclusions. (JEL D24, K23, L51, L94)     

BOT projects: Incentives and efficiency

In recent years, governments have been increasingly adopting Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) contracts for large infrastructure projects. However, BOT contracts have received little attention from economists. The apparent agency problem in BOT projects has never been analyzed. In this paper, we develop a model to examine the incentives, efficiency and regulation in BOT contracts. We show that a BOT contract with a price regulation during the concession period and a license extension after the concession period is capable of achieving full efficiency. Both license extension and price control are observed in many real-world BOT projects. We also investigate the efficiency in such contracts by considering other factors, including time consistency, price ceiling, foreign ownership, and the lack of price regulation.     

What Motivates Members to Participate in Co‐operative and Mutual Businesses?

Abstract *** : This article reports the findings of a project entitled ‘The participation of members in mutual businesses’. A previous project developed a theoretical model of what makes people participate, focusing on the participation of public service users in council housing and social care services. The current project builds on this work, applying the ‘mutual incentives model’ to a population sample of area committee members and a random sample of non‐participant members of a very large UK consumer co‐operative, the Co‐operative Group. Two arguments are presented as to why such research is needed. First, member participation in co‐operative and mutual businesses is becoming an important issue both for this sector and more generally for public policy. Second, a comparison between a public services setting and a co‐operative setting enables us to extend and further test the theoretical model. Two main features of the model are outlined: a ‘mutual incentives theory’ that goes beyond other models to combine individualistic and collectivistic motivations, and the ‘participation chain’, a synthesis of existing knowledge that joins motivations to three ‘links’ that we call ‘resources’, ‘mobilization’ and ‘dynamics’. The article then summarizes the project methodology, and reports the main findings. As in the public services project, on the ‘demand’ side, collectivistic incentives prove to be dominant over individualistic, but with some individual ‘internal’ benefits also being important. On the ‘supply’ side, skills derived from previous experience were important, as were a positive evaluation of opportunities to participate, and recruitment through existing networks. We then compare the findings to those from the public service users and from a regional co‐operative society; Oxford, Swindon and Gloucester Co‐op. Collective motivations are dominant in all three datasets, but are shown to vary in interesting ways that have important implications for member participation strategies.     

Earnings, Education, and Fixed-Term Contracts

We explore the relationship between earnings, education, and fixed‐term contracts using data from the 1997 British Social Attitudes Survey. We find that the log hourly wage of workers employed under such contracts is approximately 13% lower than that of their ‘permanent’ counterparts, even after controlling for a plethora of personal and job characteristics. Standard decompositions indicate that the vast majority of this differential (more than 70%) is attributable to price effects, which may reflect discrimination on the part of the employer. Such findings may, therefore, suggest that employment protection is appropriate for individuals employed under fixed‐term contracts.     

The Motives for Joint Ventures: A Transaction Costs Analysis of Japanese MNES in the UK

What factors determine the choice of Japanese companies between part and full ownership of their UK subsidiaries? In seeking to answer this question, this study employs data of Japanese foreign direct investment (FDI), through joint ventures, in the UK, not previously used. The main findings of the econometric work presented is that transaction costs are the principal consideration when Japanese firms choose between part and full ownership of their UK subsidiaries{softhyphen}. Variables that have featured prominently in studies relating to either US parents or for subsidiaries in the US do not appear to play a significant role. The European Union (EU) market appears to be the target of Japanese foreign direct investment in the UK.     

THE EFFECT OF WELFARE ASSET RULES ON AUTO OWNERSHIP,EMPLOYMENT, AND WELFARE PARTICIPATION: A LONGITUDINAL ANALYSIS

This paper investigates how asset tests for welfare eligibility affect auto ownership, employment, and welfare participation for single mothers without a college degree. We combine longitudinal data from the 1996 Survey of Income and Program Participation with data on state‐level welfare program rules from the Urban Institute and data on state‐level controls to test whether these single mothers were more likely to (1) own a car, (2) be employed, and (3) be off of welfare, depending on the welfare asset rules instituted in their state. We find evidence that, taken as a group, the asset rules have a statistically significant effect on the probability of car ownership. Ordinary least squares results and cross‐sectional two‐stage least squares (2SLS) results using the asset rules to instrument for car ownership show a large, positive, statistically significant effect of car ownership on employment. However, in 2SLS models controlling for prior car ownership and prior employment, the asset instruments are weaker and we do not find an effect of car ownership on employment. Of significance for policy makers, we find that the asset rules do not have a statistically significant joint effect on welfare participation, even after addressing possible endogeneity. (JEL I38, J68, J08)     

社会资本、创业拼凑与新创企业绩效——双重关系嵌入的调节作用

社会资本作为推动新创企业成长与发展的重要动力，其资源效应是提高新创企业绩效的主要内容。而创业拼凑作为突破新创企业资源约束的关键因素，成为社会资本向绩效转化过程中的重要枢纽。基于社会资本理论，结合双重关系嵌入的差异化表现，分析社会资本对新创企业绩效发挥作用的路径机制以及外部影响。结果表明：社会资本对新创企业绩效具有显著正向影响；创业拼凑在社会资本与新创企业绩效的关系中存在部分中介效应；内外部关系嵌入正向调节创业拼凑和新创企业绩效间关系。     

MODELLING SOCIAL ENTERPRISES

The majority of research concentrates exclusively on the objectives of governments, profit entities or non‐profit organizations, while a significant number of organizations are hybrids. One form of these hybrids is the social enterprise. This paper theoretically describes social enterprises taking into consideration their main aims. Based on the ‘earned income’ school of thought, the principal‐agent theory and considering the nature of social enterprises’ activities we propose the objective functions of their owners (principals) and managers (agents). The maximization problem of the social enterprise is defined as the weighted average of the utilities of two groups of stakeholders who have an influence on the degree of the realization of the social mission and business orientations. We point out the direction which social enterprises should follow in order to obtain the highest value of their objective functions. The desired state for social enterprises should be one in which they reinvest all surpluses in the process of their mission realization and their profit is slightly higher than the required level by the principal's contract.     

The Strategic Social Map of a Nongovernmental Organization

Currently, the traditional states-nation, as far as their social commitments are concerned, are giving way to the nongovernmental organizations (NGO). These organizations have a mission, strategy, and goals different from those organizations looking simply for profits. Nevertheless, NGOs are concerned about using management and information systems at least as good as those used by private companies. Organizations try to develop a social strategy taking their social responsibility as starting point. In this paper, the authors describe how to fix the organization mission, its strategy and goals, and also how to make its action map. A strategy proposal will be described, as well as the way on how to put it into practice. The main goals of this paper is to describe the mission, strategy, and goals of the organization; design its strategic social map; fix the limits of the organization's action; apply the theoretical model to a NGO; and design an information model in order to manage the strategic development. The authors would like to express their gratitude to M. Dolors Celma Benaiges, lecturer at the Escola Universitària del Maresme, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, for her assistance reviewing and translating the paper.     

BIDS AND COSTS IN COMBINATORIAL AND NONCOMBINATORIAL PROCUREMENT AUCTIONS—EVIDENCE FROM PROCUREMENT OF PUBLIC CLEANING CONTRACTS

Combinatorial procurement auctions enable suppliers to pass their potential cost synergies on to the procuring entity and may therefore lead to lower costs and enhance efficiency. However, bidders might find it profitable to inflate their stand‐alone bids in order to favor their package bids. Using data from standard and combinatorial procurement auctions, we find that bids on individual contracts in simultaneous standard auctions without the option to submit package bids are significantly lower than the corresponding stand‐alone bids in combinatorial auctions. Further, no significant difference in procurer's cost as explained by auction format is found. (JEL D44, H57, L15)