Using Psychology to Improve Economic Policy

In this Australian Treasury seminar, I discuss the contributions that psychology could make to public policy formation via a new field: public policy psychology. Behavioural economics provides a precedent for my new field of public policy psychology. Unlike economics, psychology provides a solid scientific model of how individuals make decisions. I discuss shortcomings of economics in policy formation: model blindness, the focus on evidence supporting theories, the focus on markets, plus the importance of elements left out of conventional economic models (for example, irrational decision‐makers). I end by discussing two Treasury case studies: the mining tax and government responses to the Global Financial Crisis.     

‘On the Econ within’: a reply to Daniel Hausman

This note replies to a comment by Daniel Hausman on our paper ‘Preference purification and the inner rational agent: a critique of the conventional wisdom of behavioural welfare economics’. We clarify our characterisation of behavioural welfare economics and acknowledge that Hausman does fully endorse this approach. However, we argue that Hausman’s response to our critique, like behavioural welfare economics itself, implicitly uses a model of an inner rational agent.     

Applying behavioural economics to public policy in Canada

Behavioural economics incorporates ideas from psychology, sociology and neuroscience to better predict how individuals make long‐term decisions. Often the ideas adopted include present or inattention bias, both potentially leading to suboptimal outcomes. But these models also point to opportunities for effective, low‐cost government policies that can have meaningful positive effects on people's long‐term well‐being. The last decade has been marked by a growing interest from governments the world over in using behavioural economics to inform policy decisions. This is true of Canada as well. In this paper we discuss the increasingly important role behavioural economics plays in Canadian public policy. We first contextualize government policies that have incorporated insights from behavioural economics by outlining a collection of models of intertemporal choice. We then present examples of public policy initiatives that are based upon findings in the field, placing particular emphasis on Canadian initiatives. We also document future opportunities, challenges and limitations.     

A cognition paradigm clash: Simon,situated cognition and the interpretation of bounded rationality

Simon’s notion of bounded rationality is deeply intertwined with his activity as a cognitive psychologist and founder of so-called cognitivism, a mainstream approach in cognitive psychology until the 1980s. Cognitivism, understood as ‘symbolic information processing,’ provided the first cognitive psychology foundation to bounded rationality. Has bounded rationality since then fully followed the development of cognitive psychology beyond symbolic information processing in the post-Simonian era? To answer this question, this paper focuses on Simon’s opposition during the 1990s to a new (paradigmatic) view of cognition called situated cognition, which has since put into question the entire view in cognitive psychology of humans as symbolic information processors. This paper then reads the cognitivism/situated cognition debate through the lens of current bounded rationality research in economics, in order (i) to inquire into whether it has tackled the issues in that controversy; (ii) to envisage possible new foundations for a cognitive psychology-based bounded rationality.     

Preference purification and the inner rational agent: a critique of the conventional wisdom of behavioural welfare economics

Neoclassical economics assumes that individuals have stable and context-independent preferences, and uses preference satisfaction as a normative criterion. By calling this assumption into question, behavioural findings cause fundamental problems for normative economics. A common response to these problems is to treat deviations from conventional rational choice theory as mistakes, and to try to reconstruct the preferences that individuals would have acted on, had they reasoned correctly. We argue that this preference purification approach implicitly uses a dualistic model of the human being, in which an inner rational agent is trapped in an outer psychological shell. This model is psychologically and philosophically problematic.     

Richard H. Thaler: A Nobel Prize for Behavioural Economics

ABSTRACT

This paper provides an overview of Richard Thaler’s career and the contributions to behavioural economics that earned him the 2017 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences. It focuses on his role in exposing and making sense of empirical anomalies in orthodox economics, his analysis of mental accounting, and his work with Cass Sunstein on the notion of libertarian paternalism and the ‘nudge’-based behavioural approach to economic policy. It then considers his contributions critically and explores how, unlike previous behavioural economics, Thaler succeeded in getting his new approach to behavioural economics accepted by mainstream economists.     

How is β related to asset returns?

Existing empirical evidence for the relevance of the β in modelling asset returns is mixed. Drawing on conditional tests of β first proposed by Pettengill, Sundaram and Mathur (1995) and extended by Bollen (2010), empirical evidence employing monthly data is presented that indicates that β is highly related to variability of asset returns but not to the level of asset returns. This result is consistent with the predictions of the market model but not with the predictions of the CAPM. It is concluded that β remains a useful construct in financial economics but may have a differing role in financial economics than the conventional wisdom asserts.     

COGNITIVE ABILITIES,ANALYTIC COGNITIVE STYLE AND OVERCONFIDENCE: A COMMENTARY ON DUTTLE (2016)

In his recent paper, Duttle (2016) showed that individuals with higher cognitive abilities show less overconfidence. In these findings, cognitive abilities were equated with an analytic cognitive style (as measured by a cognitive reflection test, or CRT), although recent works in the field of cognitive psychology suggest separating these two constructs. In particular, it is argued that the analytic cognitive style, but not cognitive abilities, decreases susceptibility to cognitive biases. Analyses of data from Duttle's study support this assertion. Implications for cognitive psychology and behavioural economics are discussed.     

Nudging Merit Goods: Conceptual,Normative, and Practical Connections

Abstract

Mainstream economics has traditionally maintained a respect for preferences and the choices that individuals make based on them. But recent advances in psychology and behavioral economics have led scholars and policy-maker to doubt if people make wise choices in their own interests. Based on this, libertarian paternalists endorse choice interventions—nudges—designed to steer people to decisions that will better promote their interests. However, the complex, multifaceted, and subjective nature of interests implies that policy-makers are imposing externally chosen interests for people’s own when designing nudges. In this sense, policy-makers are treating the interests they choose to advance like merit goods as described by Richard Musgrave, goals or ends that are explicitly judged by policy-makers to be worth advancing even if they are not ranked highly or chosen consistently by individuals themselves. This paper will make explicit the conceptual and normative connections between nudges and merit goods, arguing that nudges can be considered delivery mechanisms for merit goods, and recommending that libertarian paternalists abandon their claim to be advancing people’s true interests and instead adopt the objective theories of good used to justify merit goods.     

Foucault on the Marginal Revolution in Economics: Language and the Cartesian Legacy

Scholars have long debated the ‘revolutionary’ character of the ‘Marginal Revolution’ in economics, focusing on theoretical foundations, methodological devices, social context and political aspects. This article offers a new perspective by investigating ontological and epistemological conditions of that intellectual movement. This requires, in turn, a characterization of those conditions, for which purpose we will draw on Foucault's configurations of thought into ‘epistemes’ in The Order of Things. Although not mentioning those conditions, there have been few references in economics to Foucault's approach. They have mainly claimed that he neglected its importance because he did not see it as a ‘revolution’ in The Order of Things. It is argued here that he actually considered it a ‘revolution’ in The Archaeology of Knowledge. A revision of Foucault's account provides some ideas regarding deep philosophical conditions of the emergence of neoclassical theory and defies some usual interpretations of the circumstances that led to the mathematization of economics. The main conclusion is that its revolutionary character did not stem from a change of ontological beliefs, but—just as many historians of economics have defended—it was a methodological revolution. This study suggests a reinterpretation of that event, claiming that it resulted from a new conception of language and a crisis of Descartes's project of a mathematical unifying science. Going beyond that debate, these reflections proffer ideas that deserve an appraisal in economics.     

Philosophy of Economics Rules: introduction to the symposium

ABSTRACT

Economists have long been criticized for their use of highly idealized models. In Economics rules: Why economics works, when it fails, and how to tell the difference [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015] Dani Rodrik responds to this criticism by offering an account of models that emphasizes the diversity of models in economics. Rodrik’s account presents a rare opportunity for economists and philosophers of economics to engage in a mutually beneficial exchange that could improve our understanding of the power and limits of economics, and the rights and wrongs of the dismal science. The symposium on Rodrik’s Economics Rules is the first attempt to seize this opportunity.     

Commodity Prices and the New Inflation

The intention of the article is to explore trends in economics and sociology, as well as other science disciplines, like history, psychology and anthropology, and investigate the interdisciplinary exchanges that have taken place, leading to convergences and divergences between academic subjects. The “imperialism of economics” is increasingly approaching traditional academic fields of history, psychology, and sociology. However, the article concludes that sociology’s public reputation may have declined, while simultaneously economics is shifting its attention to the social dimension of economic behavior and moving toward the other social sciences; a process which has been coined “social-scienciation.” The argument is that those developments can also be seen as chances to upgrade the social sciences “around” economics. The described process also aligns with recent talk about a need for interdisciplinary studies when this article adopts a different take on the issues of interdisciplinarity and embeddedness.     

Rational Actor Theory in Politics: A Critical Review of John Quiggin*

John Quiggin's paper attacks public-choice theory. among other things, for its us? of the assumption of ‘rational egoism’. The object of our response is twofold. First. to distinguish egoism from rationality, and to indicate that rationality postulates, when faithfully applied, provide reasons for believing that political behaviour and market behaviour will be systematically different, and specifically that the former will be less egoistic than the latter. Second, to indicate that comparative static propasitions in public-choice theory (and in economics more generally) can be sustained on rather weaker behavioural assumptions than homo economicus embodies, and that consequently some of the public-choice orthodoxy would survive any attack on the egoism assumption.     

Some Reflections on F.A. Hayek's The Sensory Order

Though F.A. Hayek is principally known for his work in economics, he also made contributions, both positive and critical, to the field of psychology. His most important piece in the latter field is his 1952 book, The Sensory Order. This paper attempts to locate The Sensory Order in relation to some of Hayek's other works. The origins of Hayek's interests in psychology, as revealed by an early student paper that provided a starting point for his later book, is noted. We then examine what may have motivated Hayek some 25 years later to return to psychology. Finally, the larger role that the book came to play in Hayek's overall system is explored. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Narrativity and identity in the representation of the economic agent

We critically survey explicit discussions of the narrativity of economic agents by economists. Narrativity broadly refers to the way humans construct and use stories, notably to define their personal identity. We borrow from debates outside of economics to provide the critical dimension of our survey. Most contributions on the narrativity of economic agents do not discuss one another. To establish communication, we suggest a structure of oppositions that characterize these contributions taken as a whole. These oppositions are notably characterized by three tensions: in terms of methodological attitudes (‘scientism’ vs. ‘humanism’), of underlying theories of personal identity postulating the existence of a unique sense of self or not (‘diachronicity’ vs. ‘episodicity’) and of the normative implications of narrativity (‘welfare-increasing’ vs. ‘welfare-decreasing’). The main goal is to clarify the structure of opposite positions within a more or less explicit debate about the identity of individuals in economics.     

Silvio Gesell: “A strange,unduly neglected” monetary theorist

Abstract

In recent years negative nominal interest rates came to the attention of a wider audience as one instrument to overcome the lower zero bound to conventional monetary policy. Modern proponents trace the origin of the proposal back to Silvio Gesell, a largely forgotten German autodidactic scholar of the interwar period, whose work provides valuable insight into heterodox late nineteenth- and twentieth-century economic thinking. Against this backdrop, the present article provides a comprehensive review of Gesell’s life and social economy, firmly linking him to German anarchism of the interwar period. It suggests that Gesell not only provided a monetary theory of interest, but put forward an independent monetary theory of economic crisis that is essential in understanding the historical origins of depreciative currency proposals. Moreover, the article maintains that Gesell’s monetary theory of interest can be seen as the missing link between heterodox economics, The General Theory, and anarchist economic theory.     

Samuelson’s operationally meaningful theorems: reflections of E. B. Wilson’s methodological attitude

This paper sheds new light on Samuelson’s early methodology as presented in his Foundations of Economic Analysis (1947) by reflecting on the similarity between his mathematical economics and Edwin B. Wilson’s mathematics. Wilson was Samuelson’s professor of advanced mathematical and statistical economics; he was also a protégé of Josiah Willard Gibbs. Wilson defined mathematics as a language that consisted of three interconnected aspects: postulational, axiomatic, and operational. In his Foundations, in a Wilsonian style, Samuelson wrote in the opening page, ‘Mathematics is a Language’ and claimed that he offered operationally meaningful theorems. In this paper, it is argued that these maxims embodied Wilson’s approach, which framed Samuelson’s mathematical and statistical thinking around 1940 and which led him to present his work as being mathematically, theoretically, and empirically well founded. Wilson’s and Percy Bridgman’s operational methodologies are also compared and Wilson is presented as a mediator between Bridgman and Samuelson.     

Neuroeconomics: Infeasible and Underdetermined

Advocates of neuroeconomics claim to offer the prospect of creating a “unified behavioral theory” by drawing upon the techniques of neuroscience and psychology and combining them with economic theory. Ostensibly, through the “direct measurement” of our thoughts, economics and social science will be “revolutionized.” Such claims have been subject to critique from mainstream and non-mainstream economists alike. Many of these criticisms relate to measurability, relevance, and coherence. In this article, we seek to contribute to this critical examination by investigating the potential of underdetermination, such as the statement that testing involves the conjunction of auxiliary assumptions, and that consequently it may not be possible to isolate the effect of any given hypothesis. We argue that neuroeconomics is especially sensitive to issues of underdetermination. Institutional economists should be cautious of neuroeconomists’ zeal as they appear to over-interpret experimental findings and, therefore, neuroeconomics may provide a false prospectus seeking to reinforce the nostrums of homo economicus.     

Does Environmental Economics Produce Aeroplanes Without Engines? On the Need for an Environmental Social Science

In this paper we first critically review conventional environmental economics. We conclude that the standard theory offers too narrow a perspective for many real world problems and that many theories are not empirically tested. Consequently, environmental economics is at risk of producing aeroplanes without engines. Next, we welcome and discuss some recent trends, particularly the rapid developments of behavioural and new institutional economics as well as the increased interest in empirical analysis. Yet, we conclude that more ‘logical duels’ between competing theories, more interaction between theory and empirics, and more integration between the social sciences are needed to achieve a better understanding of real world environmental problems and the development of adequate policy handles. Finally, we present an outline of steps towards the development of an environmental social science and briefly present the papers that make up this special issue as important building stones of such a discipline.