Exclusivity Contracts,Insurance and Financial Market Foreclosure

We study the trade‐off between the positive effects (risk‐sharing) and negative effects (exclusion) of exclusivity contracts. We revisit the seminal model of Aghion and Bolton [ 1987 ] under risk‐aversion and show that although exclusivity contracts induce optimal risk‐sharing, they can be used not only to deter the entry of a more efficient rival into the product market but also to crowd out financial investors willing to insure the buyer at competitive rates. We further show that in a world without financial investors, purely financial bilateral instruments, such as forward contracts, achieve optimal risk‐sharing without distorting product market outcomes. Thus, risk‐sharing alone cannot be invoked to defend exclusivity contracts.     

The Role and Determinants of Concession Sales in Movie Theaters: Evidence from the Spanish Exhibition Industry

The importance of concession sales in the movie exhibition industry is widely acknowledged among economists and other social scientists that have studied this industry in the past. Despite this recognition, the lack of appropriate data has constrained existing studies that document the role that concessions play in movie theaters. Using detailed weekly movie theater data on concession sales, box office revenues and transaction characteristics from a major exhibitor in Spain, we shed light on the relation between concession sales and the following factors (i) theater attendance, (ii) non-traditional channels of ticket distribution, (iii) audience composition, and (iv) theater and market specific factors.      

Analyzing the Welfare Impacts of Full‐line Forcing Contracts

Theoretical investigations have examined both anti‐competitive and efficiency‐inducing rationales for vertical bundling, making empirical evidence important to understanding its welfare implications. We use an extensive dataset on full‐line forcing contracts between movie distributors and video retailers to empirically measure the impact of vertical bundling on welfare. We identify and measure three primary effects of full‐line forcing contracts: market coverage, leverage and efficiency. We find that bundling increases market coverage and efficiency, but has little impact on one distributor's gaining leverage over another. As a result, we estimate that full‐line forcing contracts increased consumer and producer surplus in this application.     

TIME CONSISTENCY AND SELLER COMMITMENT IN INTERTEMPORAL MOVIE DISTRIBUTION: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF THE VIDEO WINDOW*

We study the determinants of the ‘video window’ (the interval between a movie's theatrical and video releases), based on a sample of 1,157 films released on video between 1988 and 1997. For subsets of films having shorter theater run lengths (1 to 17 weeks), windows were generally longer than, and largely invariant to, measures of the time required to exhaust the theater market. One interpretation of our results is that U.S. movie distributors resolved a time consistency problem by coordinating their behavior to maintain longer windows than would have otherwise resulted, but different explanations are also plausible.     

MEASURING THE BUSINESS STEALING,CANNIBALIZATION AND MARKET EXPANSION EFFECTS OF ENTRY IN THE U.S. MOTION PICTURE EXHIBITION MARKET*

Using a large and comprehensive theater level database covering over $18 billion in theater revenues over a five year period, I document the extent and nature of business stealing, revenue cannibalization and market expansion that occurred during the height of the 1990's boom in movie theater construction.     

Optimal Sharing of Interest‐Rate Risk in Mortgage Contracts: The Effects of Potential Prepayment and Default

Much of the literature on the economics of mortgage markets has studied the fixed vs. adjustable‐rate mortgage choice made by individual borrowers. However, to decide if the outcome of such a choice is efficient or approximately so, it is necessary to explore the question of optimal risk‐sharing in mortgage contracts. But because only a small literature has studied this question, more research is clearly warranted. The present article helps fill this gap by developing a simplified version of Arvan and Brueckner's model, using it to characterize optimal contracts in the absence of mortgage termination, and then exploring how termination via prepayment or default affects optimal risk‐sharing. The broad conclusion of the analysis is that potential mortgage termination makes higher risk exposure for borrowers optimal.     

Flexible Contract Workers in Inferior Jobs: Reappraising the Evidence

There is concern that the increase in flexible employment contracts witnessed in many OECD economies is evidence of a growth in low‐pay, low‐quality jobs. In practice, it is difficult to evaluate the ‘quality’ of flexible jobs. Previous research has primarily investigated objective measures of job quality such as wages and training or subjective measures such as job satisfaction. We jointly evaluate these elements of flexible employment contracts using a job quality index. Analysis of this index demonstrates that flexible jobs are of a lower quality. Differences in the subjective and objective assessment of factors like pay and hours are evident.     

Price Dispersion in Mortgage Markets

Using transaction‐level data on Canadian mortgage contracts, we document an increase in the average discount negotiated off the posted price and in rate dispersion. Our aim is to identify the beneficiaries of discounting and to test whether dispersion is caused by price discrimination. The standard explanation for dispersion in credit markets is risk‐based pricing. Our contracts are guaranteed by government‐backed insurance, so risk cannot be the main factor. We find that lenders set prices that reflect consumer bargaining leverage, not just costs. The presence of dispersion implies a lack of competition, but our results show this to be consumer specific.     

Just a Question of Selection? The Causal Effect of Profit Sharing on a Firm's Performance

Using German firm panel data, we analyze the productivity effects of profit sharing. Because selectivity should pose a severe problem in this context, we combine matching with a difference‐in‐differences approach. This method enables us to rule out potential bias. Our results suggest that selectivity does indeed matter. Firms with very special characteristics apply profit sharing. We find that these establishments are already more productive before they decide to implement profit sharing. Nevertheless, after accounting for selection, our results show that the introduction of profit sharing leads to a significantly higher productivity in these firms.     

PIRACY ON THE SILVER SCREEN*

Using survey data on movie consumption by about 500 University of Pennsylvania undergraduate students, we ask whether unpaid consumption of movies displaces paid consumption. A variety of cross‐sectional and longitudinal empirical approaches show large and statistically significant evidence of displacement. In the most appropriate empirical specification, we find that unpaid first consumption reduces paid consumption by about 1 unit. Unpaid second consumption has a smaller effect, about 0.20 units. Our analysis indicates that unpaid consumption, which makes up 5.2 per cent of movie viewing in our sample, reduced paid consumption in our sample by 3.5 per cent.     

Rent‐Sharing under Different Bargaining Regimes: Evidence from Linked Employer–Employee Data

Using Belgian linked employer–employee data, we examine how collective bargaining arrangements affect the relationship between firms' profitability and individual wages via rent‐sharing. In industries where agreements are usually renegotiated at firm‐level (‘decentralized industries’) wages and firm‐level profits are positively correlated regardless of the type of collective wage agreement by which the workers are covered (industry or firm). On the other hand, where firm‐level wage renegotiation is less common (‘centralized industries’), wages are only significantly related to firms' profitability for workers covered by a firm‐level collective agreement. Thus, industry‐wide contracts that are not complemented by a firm‐level collective agreement suppress the impact of firm profits on workers' wages in centralized industries.     

Revenue Sharing and Vertical Control in the Video Rental Industry

Revenue sharing contracts, in which retailers pay a royalty on sales to their suppliers, are now widely used in the video rental industry. We show that revenue sharing is valuable in vertically separated industries in which demand is either stochastic (unpredictable) or variable (e.g., systematically declining), downstream inventory is chosen before demand is realized and downstream firms engage in intrabrand competition. Unlike two-part tariffs, revenue sharing achieves the first best outcome by softening retail price competition without distorting retailers' inventory decisions. Our theories are also consistent with trends in prices and availability following retailers' adoption of revenue sharing contracts.     

Short Notice,Big Difference? The Effect of Temporary Employment on Firm Competitiveness across Sectors

This article is one of the first to examine how the use of fixed‐term employment contracts (FTCs) affects firm competitiveness (i.e. productivity, wages and profits) while controlling for key econometric issues such as time‐invariant unobserved workplace characteristics, endogeneity and state dependence. We apply dynamic panel data estimation techniques to detailed Belgian linked employer–employee data covering all years from 1999 to 2010. Results show that the effects of FTCs on firm competitiveness vary across sectors: while temporary employment is found (at the 10 per cent significance level) to enhance productivity and profits in (labour‐intensive) services, this is not the case in manufacturing and construction.     

Fixed‐Term Contracts: Short‐Term Blessings or Long‐Term Scars? Empirical Findings from the Netherlands 1980–2000

Using a comprehensive longitudinal dataset of prime‐age Dutch workers over the period 1980–2000, we examine how a previously held job with a fixed‐term contract influences both the likelihood and the duration of a future spell of unemployment. Analyses show that Dutch workers with fixed‐term contracts experience higher risks of future unemployment and have no shorter spells of unemployment compared to workers with regular contracts. Results also reveal that swifter employment re‐entries among men with fixed‐term contracts can be explained by their job search efforts before unemployment. Our study (partly) invalidates theoretical positions that claim that fixed‐term contracts foster employment security by shortening unemployment durations; suggesting that fixed‐term contracts are a short‐term blessing that could end, for some workers, in a recurrent unemployment trap.     

How does working-time flexibility affect workers' productivity in a routine job? Evidence from a field experiment

We conducted an experiment in which we hired workers under different types of contracts to evaluate how flexible working time affects on-the-job productivity in a routine job. Our approach breaks down the global impact on productivity into sorting and behavioural effects. We find that flexible arrangements that allow workers to decide when to start and stop working increase global productivity by as much as 50%, 40% of which is induced by sorting, and 60% represents a motivational effect, mainly driven by more effective working time, with workers reducing the length of their breaks. Our findings also suggest that part-time contracts can enhance global productivity, – though not significant at conventional levels –, and that this effect is also driven by a significant drop in the length of breaks taken. We hence contribute to the literature providing causal evidence of flexibility in routine jobs leading to higher productivity.     

Using Forward Contracts to Reduce Regulatory Capture

Optimal incentive regulation uses transfers. If the regulator is corruptible, the regulated firm can benefit by manipulating the regulator's assessment regarding the distribution of payoff relevant variables, which determine the structure and size of optimal transfers. We show how substituting outcome‐contingent transfers by an obligation to sell simple financial contracts to well informed financial investors can reduce the scope for manipulation. A possible application would be an electricity transmission network operator whose actions can affect electricity prices. In a simple moral hazard model, first‐best outcomes can be implemented by forcing the network operator to auction off forward contracts on the electricity price. We study the optimal mixture of financial instruments and regulatory transfers given different informational assumptions and imperfections of financial markets.     

Under a cloud of suspicion: trust,distrust, and their interactive effect in interorganizational contracting

Although considerable research has examined the role of trust in interorganizational relationship (IOR) contracting, scholars have devoted less attention to how trust and distrust jointly influence this process. We propose and test a model wherein trust, based on partner reliability, is constrained to the IOR exchange context where it develops and does not generalize to other contexts. Distrust, rooted in value incongruence, more readily generalizes across exchange contexts. Results support these predictions. In addition, our analysis shows that trust and distrust combine such that managers decrease their preferences for highly specific focal‐context contracts only when in‐context trust is high and distrust is low. We discuss how these findings may provide a more nuanced understanding of the relationship between trust‐based and contract‐based IOR governance. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Estimating the Wage Premium of Collective Wage Contracts: Evidence from Longitudinal Linked Employer–Employee Data

Using a large‐scale linked employer–employee dataset from western Germany, this paper presents new evidence on the wage premium of collective bargaining contracts. In contrast to previous studies, we seek to assess the extent to which differences in wages between workers in covered and uncovered firms arise from the nonrandom selection of workers and firms into collective bargaining coverage. By measuring the relative wage changes of workers employed in firms that change contract status, we obtain estimates that depart considerably from previous results relying on cross‐sectional data. Results from analyzing separate transitions show that leaving industry‐level contracts is associated with subsequent wage losses. However, the results from a trend‐adjusted difference‐in‐difference approach indicate that particularly the transitions to no coverage appear to be associated with negative shocks. Overall, our findings provide no evidence of a “true” wage effect of leaving wage bargaining, once we account for differences in pretransition wage growth.     

The Impact of Innovative Culture on Individual Employees: The Moderating Role of Market Information Sharing

Current innovation literature provides a very limited understanding of the potential impacts of innovative culture on employees. Building on resource‐based view theory, the authors investigate theoretically and empirically how a perceived innovative culture can be a building block for a firm's competitive resource and advantage by creating superior employee‐level outcomes and how a market information‐sharing process may moderate these effects. The authors identify three distinct types of individual‐level outcomes stemming from an innovative culture. The three outcome variables—job satisfaction, organizational dynamism perception, and firm performance perception—reflect employees’ psychological and cognitive reactions to the process of creating organizational innovation and innovative culture. The authors collect survey data from 3960 individual employees in China. Their findings first show that a perceived innovative culture significantly and positively affects employees’ job satisfaction and perceptions of organizational dynamism and firm performance. Moreover, organizational dynamism perception plays an important mediating role among three employee‐level outcomes by converting job satisfaction into firm performance perception. The authors also find support for the direct, positive effect of a perceived market information‐sharing process on job satisfaction but not on perceptions of organizational dynamism and firm performance. Most importantly, their findings on the significant moderating role of a market information‐sharing system contribute to innovation theory by emphasizing the importance of the innovation/marketing interface: bundling market information sharing and innovative culture together enhances employees’ positive attitudes and perceptions. This result also suggests that examining only the direct effects of innovative culture and market information sharing may lead to incorrect conclusions as to how to manage the cultural infusion process: the market information‐sharing process shows only a weak effect on job satisfaction and no effect on perceptions of organizational dynamism or firm performance. Organizational designs should ensure simultaneous consideration of both variables in the cultural transformation process to enhance employees’ derived benefits in the process of creating an innovative culture. We offer a new insight: a perceived market information‐sharing process may strengthen the effect of an innovative culture on employees’ job satisfaction and organizational dynamism perception, while it may weaken the effect of an innovative culture on firm performance perception. This more nuanced view of market information sharing in the cultural infusion process presents new wisdom and calls for further studies in entrepreneurial innovation.     

Infrastructure Contracts: Trust and Institutional Updating

This paper discusses trust and trust perceptions in infrastructure contracts and supporting institutions. We focus on perceptions of the trustworthiness of the government purchasers of infrastructure services by the supplying companies and by the governments themselves. In particular, we allow for trust updating and trust misalignments, which may give rise to ‘undertrusting’ and ‘overtrusting’. The core of the paper sets out a game theoretic model of contracts with dynamic adjustment of trust perceptions, which we use to explore the impact of trust misalignment both on economic efficiency (measured by expected welfare) and on investment levels. We explore flexible contracts with and without pre-payments, rigid contracts (which do not allow for post-investment renegotiation), and hybrid contracts. We then compare the efficiency of the flexible contracts to that of hybrid contracts using as a criterion the expected welfare implications of each contract. The model is used to shed light on current issues on the sustainability of private investment infrastructure contracts in developed and in developing countries, including the role of regulatory institutions.