STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES FOR STATE‐OWNED ENTERPRISES AS A MEANS TO MITIGATE POLITICAL INTERFERENCE: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF TWO SWISS STATE‐OWNED ENTERPRISES

When governments act as owners of state‐owned enterprises (SOEs), they are both principal and agent at the same time. The literature on steering SOEs has mainly focused on the government as the principal that must control SOEs. However, the government is also an agent, vis‐à‐vis the parliament, because democratic constitutions stipulate some form of parliamentary oversight of the government. This oversight includes checks on how the government steers SOEs. However, this oversight function gives the parliament the power and opportunity to interfere into steering SOEs, which may lead to parliamentary interventions that are not coherent with governmental steering. We draw on principal–agent literature and public‐accountability literature to show that arbitrary and hands‐on parliamentary interference pose problems for steering SOEs. We analyze whether strategic objectives for SOEs, as recommended by public corporate governance guidelines, are appropriate to minimize parliamentary interference. We hypothesize that the Swiss government avoids or mitigates parliamentary interference by mid‐term strategic objectives for SOEs, which counteract short‐term parliamentary requests. We find that the Swiss government uses mid‐term strategic objectives, particularly financial ones, to reject parliamentary demands for more intervention into SOE activities.     

THE RESPONSE OF STATE‐OWNED ENTERPRISES TO IMPORT COMPETITION: EVIDENCE FROM CHINESE MANUFACTURING FIRMS

We examine the wage and employment impact on Chinese firms of an increase in import competition associated with China's WTO accession in December 2001, with an emphasis on state‐owned enterprises (SOEs). We find that both wage and employment are negatively impacted by an increase in import competition, but firms with high state ownership cut employment less and reduce wages more than their private counterparts, suggesting that they prioritize the protection of employment over that of wages. This finding supports the notion that SOEs may have ‘multitask’ responsibilities in terms of protecting employment as well as achieving efficiency. We also find that firms with higher capital intensity reduce their wages less but cut employment more in response to intensified import competition. This provides empirical support for the efficiency wage theory.     

QUALITY AND WELFARE IN MIXED DUOPOLY: EFFECTS OF CAPACITY REDUCTION*

Under rationing of a public service due to its lower price and higher quality, the “privatization” could be regarded as a reduction in the capacity of the public service. We develop a model of mixed duopoly in which the service is vertically differentiated, a public firm is in a Stackelberg leader position, rationing happens, and the market is not covered. In one of two possible cases, it is shown that any reduction in the capacity of a public service will lower total surplus unless the price of the public service is too low and its quality is too high.     

政策协同视角下的中央企业重组与国有资本配置效率

基于深化国企改革的政策协同视角,本文系统地考察了中央企业重组对国有资本配置效率的影响及作用机制。研究发现,中央企业重组能够长期性地改善国有资本效益,并且这一结果在不同重组方式下存在差异。机制检验表明,中央企业重组是通过降低成本、提高效率而非加剧市场垄断来提高国有资本效益的。进一步检验表明,深化国企改革,尤其是国有企业分类改革和改组组建国有资本投资、运营公司试点能够对中央企业重组起到政策协同效应。最后,中央企业重组还能够通过退市清算、产权转让等形式促使国有资本淘汰落后产能、化解过剩产能,同时布局重要行业并聚焦主业。本文的研究结论不仅及时回应了国企重组特别是央企重组效果及必要性的重要关切,而且为深入推进国企改革提供了有益启示。     

QUALITY DIFFERENTIATION,WELFARE, AND THE MODE OF COMPETITION IN A VERTICALLY DIFFERENTIATED PRODUCT MARKET: A NOTE*

We analyse the implications of quality differences in a vertically differentiated product market for social welfare by employing an endogenous quality choice model. We find that in of Bertrand and Cournot duopolies, the degree of quality differentiation at equilibrium in an unregulated market is larger or smaller, respectively, than that of the socially second‐best optimum. This implies that a reduction in quality difference, respectively, increases or decreases social welfare in the case of Bertrand or Cournot duopolies.     

POST‐PRIVATIZATION OWNERSHIP AND FIRM PERFORMANCE: A LARGE META‐ANALYSIS OF THE TRANSITION LITERATURE

This paper aims to perform a large‐scale meta‐analysis of the relationship between post‐privatization ownership and firm performance in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Baseline estimation of a meta‐regression model that employs a total of 2,894 estimates drawn from 121 previous studies indicated the superior impact of foreign ownership on firm performance in comparison with state and domestic private entities. Furthermore, the estimation of an extended meta‐regression model that explicitly controls for the idiosyncrasies of transition economies and privatization policies strongly suggested that differences between countries in location, privatization method, and speed of policy implementation strongly influence the link between post‐privatization ownership structure and firm performance. We also found that these factors not only cause a remarkable gap between countries in terms of ex post improvement in firm performance but also significantly affect the interrelationship between foreign investors, domestic outsider owners, and firm managers, and the relative superiority of various domestic outsiders. Conclusive evidence of the harm caused to ex post firm performance by voucher privatization is one of the most noteworthy empirical findings in this paper.     

COMPETITION,REGULATION AND WELFARE IN THE PRESENCE OF NETWORK EXTERNALITIES*

In this paper we consider a simple model of an industry with network externalities, where a benefit to each consumer from network services depends on the size of the network. We first consider a single network and cover the cases with and without fixed cost of entry. We then turn to the two‐network industry, where the incumbent network and a new entrant network compete for the market and may differ both in their marginal costs and demand structures. In addition, we identify several situations where public policy may play a crucial role in sustaining socially advantageous network service provision.     

COMPARATIVE STATICS OF A MONOPOLISTIC FIRM FACING RATE‐OF‐RETURN AND COMMAND‐AND‐CONTROL POLLUTION CONSTRAINTS

The intrinsic comparative statics properties of a general rate‐of‐return regulated, profit‐maximizing model of a monopolist facing a command‐and‐control pollution constraint are derived. Recent advances in the theory of comparative statics are used to derive the basic comparative statics of the model, which are contained in an observable negative semi‐definite matrix and possess the form of Slutsky‐like expressions. We consider several command‐and‐control pollution constraints that are commonly implemented in practice, and conclude that the intrinsic comparative statics properties of the model are qualitatively invariant to the type of command‐and‐control pollution constraint imposed. We compare our results with those extant, and find that several basic results from the standard A–J model no longer hold in our model.     

MUTUAL AND SOCIAL EFFICIENCY OF ITALIAN CO‐OPERATIVE BANKS: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

In this study we analyze the concept of efficiency in co‐operative banks (CBs) from the points of view of the mutuality and sustainability of business. According to the extant literature, CBs are often less efficient than traditional banks, but the reason for this apparently higher inefficiency is strictly correlated to their statutory commitments. The purpose of this paper is to verify, through an empirical survey of 33 Tuscan ‘Banche di Credito Cooperativo’ (BCC), if a particular type of Italian CB is less or more competitive compared to non‐co‐operative ones by using and adapting two financial indicators: the financial value added and the cost‐income ratio. Our findings show that by implementing appropriate corrections to the value‐added indicator and to the cost‐income ratio, BCC appear efficient and mission‐oriented, with a significantly reduced performance gap in comparison to non‐co‐operative credit institutions.     

THE EFFECTS OF FIRM BOUNDARY AND FINANCING CONSTRAINTS ON UTILITY COSTS: THE CASE OF MUNICIPALLY OWNED ELECTRICITY DISTRIBUTION UTILITIES

ABSTRACT: A number of studies have examined costs and potential for scale and scope economies in electricity distribution; however, few if any, have examined this area in terms of the unique constraints associated with municipal ownership or historical and regulatory constraints associated with former municipal ownership. This paper focuses on 19 distribution‐only municipally owned utilities for a ten‐year period (1988–97). Distortions from variable outputs but largely fixed inputs are minimized. The data used were collected specifically to assess productivity, cost, and efficiency performance and include value‐based capital inputs and service prices. Outputs include energy conveyed and number of connections; inputs include capital, system losses, labour, and materials. We examine the effect of using third‐party financing (e.g., connection charges), with its inherent principal‐agent problems, on utility costs, as well as the effect of shared services and multi‐utility output (e.g., electricity and water). A translog total cost function is estimated. Our findings suggest significant returns to scope but also significant increases in costs associated with the use of third‐party financing. The results also suggest scale diseconomies. Shared outputs, which have been greatly restricted or eliminated under restructuring, may have provided larger, and now lost, economies than the scale returns blindly pursued by some through restructuring or incented/forced mergers or divestitures. Finally, it is clear that third‐party financing can raise costs; such financing is widely used among utilities providing electricity, gas, water, and telecommunications, and should be closely scrutinized.     

PRICE AND QUANTITY COMPETITION WITH ASYMMETRIC COSTS IN A MIXED DUOPOLY: A TECHNICAL NOTE

We consider a mixed duopoly in which private and public firms can choose to strategically set prices or quantities when the public firm is less efficient than the private firm. Thus, even with cost asymmetry, we obtain exactly the same result (i.e., Bertrand competition) of Matsumura and Ogawa (2012) if Singh and Vives’ (1984) assumption of positive primary outputs holds. However, compared to endogenous determination of the type of contract without cost asymmetry, our main finding is that in the wider range of cost asymmetry, different type(s) of equilibrium related to or not related to the limit‐pricing strategy of the private firm can be sustained. Thus, when considering an implication on privatization, we may overestimate the welfare gain of privatization because Cournot competition takes place after privatization even though cost asymmetry exists between firms. While the result of Matsumura and Ogawa (2012) holds true if the goods are complements, we find the novel results in the case of substitutes.     

THE EXTENDED GOVERNANCE OF COOPERATIVE FIRMS: INTER‐FIRM COORDINATION AND CONSISTENCY OF VALUES

This work aims at providing a framework for the analysis of governance in networks of cooperative firms. It builds on four bodies of literature: cooperation, transaction costs, monopoly capitalism, production networks. The framework associates the specific principles that define the identity of cooperative organizations (self‐help, member ownership, democratic control, financial participation, limited capital remuneration) alongside more general governance levels (embodied values, property rights, control, resource allocation). We then apply the same dimensions to production networks and propose a stylized networking model for cooperatives. We introduce market power, and identify two polarized types of networks: (1) heterarchical forms of coordination based on cooperation and mutual help, (2) hierarchical coordination based on exclusive direction. We compare both types with our normative framework providing examples and brief case studies for each network type. Recommendations to scholars and practitioners point at the opportunity to discriminate inter‐firm relations and production development strategy in terms of the values of cooperation, at all governance levels.     

REGIONAL ANTI‐CORRUPTION EFFORT,POLITICAL CONNECTIONS AND FIRM INNOVATION EFFORT: EVIDENCE FROM CHINA

This paper examines how firm characteristics and local anti‐corruption effort moderate the influence of political connections on enterprises’ private R&D investment using data from 2,587 Chinese A‐share listed enterprises. Our results show that the local anti‐corruption institutional environment significantly moderates the strong relationship between political connections and enterprises’ private R&D investment. Firm characteristics (i.e., firm size and firm age) also show a moderating effect on the relationship between political connection and enterprises’ private R&D investment; larger and older enterprises are more likely to have innovative resources and business cooperation partners, and thus are able to reduce their degree of reliance on political connections and government funding. The results of our study suggest the importance of having a transparent and fair institutional environment for enterprise innovation activities.     

FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION AND ECONOMIC VOLATILITY: EVIDENCE FROM STATE‐LEVEL CROSS‐SECTION DATA OF THE USA*

This paper examines the implications of fiscal decentralization for economic stability. It has been discussed that fiscal decentralization reduces the variance of GDP growth, due to the greater diversification of performance across jurisdictions. We examine this theoretical result using a panel data set of the 50 states of the USA over the period of 1992–1997. We show that the theoretical specification of the production function is supported. We also show a negative significant relationship between fiscal decentralization and economic volatility. The results are robust when we take into account the endogeneity of fiscal decentralization.     

TARIFF POLICY AND WELFARE IN AN INTERNATIONAL DUOPOLY WITH CONSUMER‐FRIENDLY INITIATIVE

The purpose of this paper is to explore how strategic tariff policy and welfare are affected by the consumer‐friendly initiative of foreign exporting firms. We define a firm that is consumer‐friendly or non‐profit‐based if it considers both its own profit and consumer surplus. This paper extends Brander and Spencer by taking the consideration of consumer‐friendly firms into an international duopoly, and within such context examining the tariff policy and welfare. The consumer‐friendly initiative that leads to trade liberalization is a ‘Win‐Win‐Win’ solution in the sense that it is not only beneficial for foreign exporting firms, but also for the government and consumers of the importing country.     

ENDOGENOUS DEBT‐EQUITY RATIO AND BALANCE‐SHEET CHANNEL: IMPLICATIONS FOR GROWTH AND WELFARE

This paper endogenizes the debt‐equity ratio and embodies financial leverage in a cash‐in‐advance model of endogenous growth. Our analysis finds that the debt‐equity ratio is positively related to the balanced‐growth rate, since it serves as a ‘financial accelerator’ to stimulate investment projects. Compared to previous studies, this positive relationship gives rise to an additional balance‐sheet effect, which substantially affects the macroeconomic consequences of monetary and taxation policies. Due to the existence of the balance‐sheet effect, we also find that the Friedman rule is not necessarily optimal.     

THE IMPACT OF ANTI‐TERRORISM EXPENDITURE ON ECONOMIC GROWTH AND WELFARE

This paper examines the effects of increasing anti‐terrorism expenditure on economic growth rate and social welfare. It is shown that: (i) spending the least amount possible on anti‐terrorism expenditure will lead to a maximum economic growth rate; and (ii) to achieve maximum social welfare, the government should allocate its budget to anti‐terrorism expenditure. The results shed light on why the US government has chosen to uphold and pursue its anti‐terrorism policies in recent years to present day.     

中国创新链“国进民进”新格局的形成、障碍与突破路径*

现阶段,无论是从国有企业国家战略定位的内在要求来看,还是从加快落实创新驱动发展战略的内在需求来看,以及从当前中国情景下国有和民营企业各自的能力特征和竞争优势来看,这些因素都决定了必须在中国创新领域打造国有和民营企业协同合作新局面的必要性,也决定了在中国创新领域以及创新链中打造“国进民进”新格局形成的重要性。为此,本文着重分析了在中国创新链的五大环节中所存在的诸多弊端以及国有和民营企业的各自合理定位,并探讨了如何在不同创新链环节构建国有和民营企业协同合作的可能模式和实施路径,在此基础上提出了本文应有的政策建议和今后可能的改革突破口。     

COMPARATIVE EFFICIENCY OF AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVES AND CONVENTIONAL FIRMS IN A SAMPLE OF QUASI‐TWIN COMPANIES

The resilience of cooperatives and their positive contribution to employment in times of crisis is well established. However, their overall economic performance relative to conventional firms is still controversial, casting doubt on the ability of this alternative organizational form to govern the fundamental drivers of productivity. To shed new light on the issue, we study the comparative technical efficiency of agricultural cooperatives (ACs) and conventional firms (CFs), drawing on a unique data set comprising all wine‐producing companies in Sardinia (Italy) from 2004 to 2009. Due to the similarity of the habitats in which the firms operate and the careful measurement of several key inputs, the observed units are ‘twins’ in all non‐organizational respects, providing an ideal setting for comparison. Having generated efficiency scores through Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), we regressed the scores on external covariates and ownership type using a pooled truncated maximum likelihood formulation. Our findings, which survive correction for spatial correlations, indicate that cooperatives are less technically efficient than their capitalist counterparts and struggle more to adapt to extreme weather fluctuations. Both results are particularly worrying in light of the main challenges facing the wine industry in the near future: liberalization of EU planting rights and climate change.