The effect of income inequality on political polarization: Evidence from European regions, 2002–2014

This article investigates whether income inequality leads to political polarization and provides new evidence that an increase in the Gini coefficient at the local level increases the probability of supporting a political party at the extreme left and right of the ideological distribution. Using individual data for 25 European countries from 2002 to 2014, I find that increasing inequality leads on average to more support for left‐wing parties. I also find that increasing inequality leads to more support for far‐right parties among older individuals. Support for far‐right parties seems to be driven by rising anti‐immigrant sentiments. The results are robust to different specifications, including an instrumental variable that addresses the endogeneity of income inequality.     

POLITICAL INEQUALITY,CENTRALIZED SANCTIONING INSTITUTIONS,AND THE MAINTENANCE OF PUBLIC GOODS

Centralized sanctioning institutions cultivate cooperation by eradicating the gains from free‐riding. Studies show that electing a community member to operate a centralized sanctioning institution further increases support for the public good. These studies have overlooked an all‐too‐common attribute of non‐laboratory elections: political inequality. In this paper, we replicate those studies and, then, introduce novel experimental treatments that examine how political inequality influences the cooperation‐enhancing effect of a democratic election to centralized sanctioning institutions. In our novel treatment conditions, participants receive either a random allotment of votes that they can use to elect a centralized sanctioning authority or an allocation of votes proportional to their earnings in a previously‐executed public goods game. We find that political inequalities created via the random allocation of votes do not hinder cooperation, whereas political inequalities created via past game play undermine elected authorities and diminish contributions to the public good from individuals advantaged by political inequality.     

The Political Cause of the Movement of RMB Exchange Rate：A Research Based on the Spillover Effects of US Political Cycle

Movement of the renminbi (RMB) exchange rate is not only affected by economic factors, but also by political factors home and aboard. This paper analyzes the transmission mechanism of political cycles on the RMB exchange rate first, and then sets up a “political cycle spillover effect model” followed by an empirical analysis. We find that: (1) the US political cycle has a direct effect on the RMB exchange rate in the short run, which is mainly transmitted by capital flows and China’s exchange rate policy control; (2) the RMB exchange rate changes periodically in accordance with the US presidential election and midterm election cycle, with the appreciation ratio significantly lower in the first year of the election cycle, while significantly higher in the year after the midterm election; (3) The effect of the political cycle will not be affected by which party holds power, though it will be affected if the president and parliament are ruled by the same party. This paper not only extends the research of the influencing factors of the RMB exchange rate to the political field, but also sets up a use theoretical model to analyze the impact of political issues on the RMB exchange rate, providing a new perspective to fully understand the external environment of RMB exchange rate reform.     

Income Distribution, Redistributive Politics, and Economic Growth

This article studies the political economy of inequality and growth by combining the political economy approach with an imperfect capital market assumption. In the present model, there emerges a class of individuals whose members do not invest privately beyond the state-financed schooling, due to their initial wealth constraint. We show that inequality affects private investment not only through the political effect, which relates inequality to private investment negatively, but also through what we call the threshold effect, which associates inequality to private investment positively. In general, private investment and inequality do not show a monotone negative relationship.     

Inequality Beyond GDP: A Long View

This paper addresses international inequality in multidimensional well-being during the last one-and-a-half centuries. Inequality fell in health and education since the late 1920s, due to the globalization of mass schooling and the diffusion of the health transition, but only dropped in population-weighted terms from 1970 onward for political and civil liberties, as the emergence of authoritarian regimes increased its dispersion since the end of World War I. In terms of augmented human development inequality declined since 1900. These results are at odds with per capita income inequality that rose over time and only shrank from 1990 onward. The gap between the OECD and the Rest of the world accounted only partially for inequality in well-being since the dispersion within developing regions became its main driver from the mid-20th century onward. Countries in the middle and lower deciles of the world distribution achieved the largest relative gain over the past century.     

中国企业对外投资的政治风险及 量化评估模型

后金融危机时代,中国企业的对外投资也正处于一个新的发展阶段,在拥有广泛发展前景的同时也面临着巨大的政治风险,由于政治风险影响力大、辐射面广、破坏力强,已严重影响我国海外投资的安全和利益,同时也影响着我国的经济发展和国家安全。然而,我国企业海外投资无论从历史还是经验看,往往对政治风险认识不足,也缺乏防范工具和防范策略。因此,中国企业对外投资如何对东道国政治风险进行界定、分析和评估,显得愈加重要和迫切。虽然国内学者已就政治风险分析评估做了大量研究,但主要以定性分析为主。本文盘点了我国企业遭遇的政治风险种类,并通过引入理论模型对东道国的政治风险进行量化分析,有助于我国企业对世界各国政治风险的量化评估;在此基础上结合趋势分析法充分反映现代政治风险的特性,有效预测东道国政治风险。     

Inequality Perceptions,Distributional Norms,and Redistributive Preferences in East and West Germany

This paper analyzes differences in inequality perceptions, distributional norms, and redistributive preferences between East and West Germany. As expected, there are substantial differences with respect to all three of these measures. Surprisingly, however, differences in distributional norms are much smaller than differences with respect to inequality perceptions or redistributive preferences. Moreover, individuals from East Germany tend to be more supportive of state redistribution and progressive taxation and they are less likely to have a conservative political orientation. I finally show that a substantial part of these differences in political preferences can be explained by underlying differences in redistributive preferences.     

Offshoring,computerization, labor market polarization and top income inequality

This paper proposes a model of occupational choice with heterogeneous agents in terms of human capital to quantify the role of offshoring and computerization in labor market polarization and increased top income inequality. We find that both offshoring and computerization played a major role regarding labor market polarization in the US over the period 1975–2008. We further show that the last decades can be decomposed into two subperiods. Computerization is the main driver of labor market polarization from 1975 to the mid 1990s, after which globalization (through decreased costs of offshoring) explains more than 70% of job and wage polarization. Our model can also explain around 40% of the observed increase in top income inequality since 1975.     

INFRASTRUCTURE PROVISION,POLITICS AND RELIGION: INSIGHTS FROM TUNISIA'S NEW DEMOCRACY

This paper analyzes the relationship between access to infrastructure services and support for religious parties based on the evidence produced by a recent democratic experience in Tunisia in which a religious political party, Ennahdha, governed from 2011 to 2014. The experience points to a complex relationship. In the 2011 election, areas with higher access are associated with higher support for Ennahdha than areas with lower access. In the 2014 election, however, infrastructure access is positively correlated with support for the party in areas where access had improved but negatively correlated with support for the party in areas that already had high access. A possible pragmatic general implication is that, to be politically competitive, religious parties, cannot bet solely on their religious commitment to provide basic services, including infrastructure, to the poor. They need to recognize the multiplicity of voter's concerns and their evolving agenda.     

The Political Economy of Clientelism*

In this paper, we argue that the political‐commitment problem provides an explanation for why much income redistribution takes an inefficient form, particularly employment in the public sector. A job is a credible way of redistributing when it provides rents (such as in situations with moral hazard), and employment is optimal ex post. Moreover, a job is selective and reversible, and thus ties the continuation utility of a voter to the political success of a particular politician. We show that the need to make offers of employment incentive‐compatible leads to inefficiencies in the supply of public goods. We also show that such inefficient redistribution becomes relatively attractive in situations with high inequality and low productivity. Inefficiency is increased when the stakes from politics are high, when inequality is high, and when money matters less than ideology in politics.     

Income Inequality and Political Polarization: Time Series Evidence Over Nine Decades

Rising income inequality and political polarization have led some to hypothesize that the two are causally linked. Properly interpreting such correlations is complicated by multiple factors driving these phenomena, potential feedback between inequality and polarization, measurement issues, and the statistical challenges of modeling non‐stationary variables. We find that a more precise measure of inequality (the inverted Pareto–Lorenz coefficient) is more consistently and statistically related to polarization in the short and long runs than the less precise top 1 percent share of income. We find bi‐directional causality between polarization and inequality, consistent with theoretical conjecture and less formal evidence in previous studies.     

Social Justice in Comparative Political Economy: Lessons from Habermas and the Contemporary German Case

This article critiques recent operationalisations of social justice theories in empirical research in comparative political economy from an epistemological entry point. It offers an alternative epistemic framework based on Habermas’s system and lifeworld distinction to reconcile normative theory with empirical research before developing a critical theory of social justice based on two principles: Nancy Fraser’s parity of participation and Hauke Brunkhorst’s notion that functional differentiation in systems cannot generate asymmetric moral standards. These principles are then operationalised for regimes of welfare capitalism before exploring the contemporary German labour market in these terms, drawing on original qualitative research. It demonstrates that parity of participation cannot be achieved when the moral duty to participate is asymmetrically applied. It concludes capitalism is inherently unjust in any variety due to the inequality of wealth and free movement of capital reinforcing the inequality of moral expectations characterising the lived experience of welfare-mediated labour markets. Therefore, accepting this inherent injustice and whether institutions of the welfare state exacerbate or mitigate it should be the central focus of future research on social justice in comparative political economy.     

资源诅咒传导机制的研究述评

资源诅咒是开发自然资源引起的一系列经济、社会问题的统称,比如经济增长缓慢、贸易保护、教育投资不足、物质资本积累下降、创新不足、不平等、寻租、腐败、体制不健全、内战等问题。因其明显的政策含义,资源诅咒传导机制成为研究的重点。本文以经济增长源泉为线索,区分经济学和政治学,从理论和实证两方面给出资源诅咒传导机制的全面说明,以帮助找出我国资源诅咒的关键因素,制定相应政策提高资源开发绩效。     

A Monstrous Hybrid: The Political Economy of Housing in Early Twenty-first Century Sweden

In the leftist Western political imagination, Sweden continues, for many, to represent a vision of a ‘better’, more egalitarian political-economic model than the neoliberal capitalism that has come to dominate the Anglo-American world in particular; and its housing system is widely regarded as an integral component of this alternative, social-democratic model. The present paper argues that this envisioning of the political economy of Swedish housing is thoroughly outdated. Yet it insists, equally, that the competing envisioning of Swedish housing advanced by prominent scholars within Sweden – of a radically (neo)liberalised domestic housing system – is not accurate either. Rather, Swedish housing in the early twenty-first century constitutes a complex hybrid of legacy regulated elements on the one hand and neoliberalised elements on the other. Recognising this hybridity is essential, the paper submits, to understanding the nature and source of the most pressing issues facing the Swedish housing sector today. The system's hybridity, moreover, is ‘monstrous’ – following Jane Jacobs's coining of the term – in the sense that those issues reveal the pivotal role currently played by the Swedish housing system in the creation, reproduction and intensification of socio-economic inequality.     

A TREATMENT OF ABSOLUTE INDICES OF POLARIZATION*

Absolute polarization indices remain unchanged under equal absolute augmentation in all incomes. This paper identifies the class of absolute polarization indices whose orderings of alternative income distributions agree with the rankings generated by nonintersecting absolute polarization curves. We explore the possibility of using the Kolm (1976) – Blackorby‐Donaldson (1980) ethical absolute inequality index in polarization measurement. We establish that although inequality and polarization are dissimilar concepts, different absolute inequality indices can be employed to design alternative absolute polarization indices. A numerical illustration is provided using Indian data and it is shown that inequality and polarization are different issues in income distribution analysis.     

INCOME INEQUALITY,MEDIA FRAGMENTATION,AND INCREASED POLITICAL POLARIZATION

The increasing polarization of congressional voting has been linked to legislators' inability to reach consensus on many pressing economic issues. We examine two potential factors driving polarization: greater income inequality and the increasingly fragmented state of American media. Using cointegration techniques, we find evidence indicating that media fragmentation has played a more important role than inequality. Periods of rising media fragmentation are followed by increased polarization. If recent patterns of media structure and income inequality persist, a polarized policymaking environment will likely continue to impede efforts to address major challenges, such as the long‐run fiscal imbalances facing the United States. (JEL D72, D31)     

The Limitations of Karl Marx' Social Economics ∗

Studies of the relationship between political democracy and economic inequality have produced diverse findings. This study attempts to mitigate some conceptual and methodological problems inherent in such studies by using multi-indicator concepts of inclusive democracy and economic inequality. Data from the five major historically and culturally homogeneous South Asian countries covering 1980–2003 suggest some bidirectional, positive relationship between inclusive democracy and economic inequality indicating that democracy and equality may not be fully compatible in this region. The paper offers contextual explanations and some mechanisms that may have led to these findings for the region, somewhat deviating from the conventional arguments.     

Party hacks and true believers: The effect of party affiliation on political preferences

This paper examines the effect of party affiliation on an individual's political views. To do this, we exploit the party realignment that occurred in the U.S. due to abortion becoming a more prominent and highly partisan issue over time. We show that abortion was not a highly partisan issue in 1982, but a person's abortion views in 1982 led many to switch parties over time as the two main parties diverged in their stances on this issue. We find that voting for a given political party in 1996, due to the individual's initial views on abortion in 1982, has a substantial effect on a person's political, social, and economic attitudes in 1997. These findings are stronger for highly partisan political issues, and are robust to controlling for a host of personal views and characteristics in 1982 and 1997. As individuals realigned their party affiliation in accordance with their initial abortion views, their other political views followed suit.     

Inequality and Participative Democracy: A Self-Reinforcing Mechanism

During the last three decades, a notable increase in economic inequality is observed, accompanied by a decline in people's engagement in politics and electoral participation. This is an unsatisfactory phenomenon as it undermines the legitimacy of democratic representation. This negative association is produced by a complex salient mechanism. This study aims at investigating this issue. Using data from a panel of 28 OECD and European countries, this paper identifies a two-way causal relationship between inequality and political participation. The results show that greater income inequality alienates and discourages people from engaging with common affairs, thus leading to lower political participation. Yet, lower electoral participation leads towards a less equitable distribution of income. Hence, this study reveals a self-reinforcing mechanism where the unequal distribution of income leads to political exclusion, which in turn leads to more inequality.     

TRENDS IN LONG-RUN VERSUS CROSS-SECTION EARNINGS INEQUALITY IN THE 1970s AND 1980s

This paper uses the PSID to assess the changes in earnings mobility and to compare the changes in cross-section and long-run inequality in the 1970s and 1980s. Previous inequality studies have primarily used measures of cross-section inequality. However, long-run inequality depends not only on cross-section inequality, but also on the degree of earnings mobility, which equalizes earnings over time. I find that earnings mobility increased during the 1970s, but fell during the 1980s. Consistent with this result, the increase in cross-section inequality overstated the true increase during the 1970s, but understated the true increase in inequality during the 1980s.