Price or Quantity Competition? Oligopolistic Structures in International Commodity Markets

International commodity markets may be characterized by price or quantity competition and by product differentiation. As an illustration, this paper presents a set of models of the Japanese market for imported beef. The models are evaluated using a non-nested econometric test. The one which best fits the data is a Stackelberg model with price leadership by Australia. This result provides evidence on the explicit nature of the game being played by exporters, unlike the applied conjectural variations approach which provides only an index of how competitive the market is.     

Oligopolistic Trade and Competition in Wages Legislations

Wages legislation, or selective enforcement of such legislation, may be used to enhance the competitiveness of domestic firms. We show that, if domestic and foreign firms produce close substitutes and are Bertrand rivals, then wages legislation and enforcement display the characteristics of a Prisoner's Dilemma game. Other scenarios are also investigated.
JEL Classification: F13     

Formula Apportionment and Transfer Pricing under Oligopolistic Competition

This paper demonstrates that under conditions of imperfect (oligopolistic) competition, a transition from separate accounting (SA) to formula apportionment (FA) does not eliminate the problem of profit shifting via transfer pricing. In particular, if affiliates of a multinational firm face oligopolistic competition, it is beneficial for the multinational to manipulate transfer prices for tax–saving as well as strategic reasons under both FA and SA. The analysis shows that a switch from SA rules to FA rules may actually strengthen profit shifting activities by multinationals.     

Oligopolistic Competition and New Technology Adoption under Uncertainty

The paper examines the adoption of a new technology in oligopoly, where there is ex ante uncertainty about variable costs of the new technology. Each firm can either adopt the new process by bearing some up-front investment or may continue to use the old one, after which firms play a Cournot market game. If in equilibrium both technologies are employed, more uncertainty about the new technology increases (decreases) the number of innovating firms and decreases (increases) the product price if the up-front investment is large (small). Our model applies readily to vertical integration if integrated firms neither buy nor sell the intermediate good on the market. However, if buying and selling is allowed, the number of integrated firms is independent of input price uncertainty.     

Oligopolistic Competition, Technology Innovation, and Multiproduct Firms

Firms' proliferation behavior in a differentiated product market is studied using an oligopolistic competition model with multiproduct firms. The model has the following characteristics: (1) the elasticity of substitution across firm's own products and the elasticity of substitution across different firms are allowed to differ; (2) the product managers of the same firm behave cooperatively rather than independently; (3) the number of firms is determined by a free-entry condition and so is endogenous. If the elasticity of substitution across the firm's own products increases, it is shown that the firm proliferates less and the number of firms in the market increases. If the elasticity of substitution across different firms increases, firms proliferate more and the number of firms in the market decreases.     

Oligopolistic Competition and Intra-industry Trade: Evidence From the OECD

This paper develops a general reciprocal-markets model of intra-industry trade in oligopolistic industries. It shows that the effects of industry characteristics on the extent of bilateral intra-industry trade, as measured by the Grubel-Lloyd index, are invariant to whether firms compete over homogeneous or differentiated products. Based on this model, we investigate industry determinants of bilateral intra-industry trade, using internationally comparable industry data for 22 manufacturing industries in 12 OECD countries during 1970–1985. Our estimates indicate that, even after controlling for idiosyncratic industry and country-pair effects, our measures of the industry determinants explain variations in the intensity of bilateral intra-industry trade, for the most part, in accord with what the theory predicts.     

Wages and International Tax Competition

We introduce wage bargaining and private information into a model of profit shifting and tax competition between a large and a small country. Shifting profits to the small country not only reduces a firm's tax bill but also creates private information on profitability, altering the wage bargaining in favor of the firm. This additional shifting incentive makes the tax base of the large country more elastic and leads to higher outflows, lower wages, higher firm profits and lower equilibrium tax rates. Tax rates are no longer the only determinant of the direction and extent of profit shifting.     

Advertising, Generic Competition and Price Regulation in Pharmaceutical Markets

The effect of price regulation on generic market entry and welfarein the presence of (persuasive) advertising is analysed. Anincumbent has the possibility to invest in advertising targetedat the physician. Advertising creates vertical product differentiationbetween brand-name drugs and its generic substitutes. This differentiationcreates the possibility to make positive profits for both firms.The presence of price regulation, however, reduces the anticipatedgeneric profits. If price regulation is too strict, then thegeneric firm will refrain from market entry. Hence, the modelconfirms the empirical observation that generic market sharesare lower in countries with strict price regulation. (JEL: I11,L13)     

International Technology Transfers and Competition*

This paper analyzes North–South technology transfers in a model of oligopolistic competition and spatial product differentiation. Two firms in the North supply a high‐tech good and a technically related low‐tech good. They decide about licensing the low‐tech good to suppliers in the South. With the license Southern firms get access to technology from the North, which enables them—with a certain probability—to enter the market for the high‐tech good. Northern firms may therefore license strategically to influence the competitive environment in the high‐tech market. In this setting, multiple equilibria with and without licensing may arise, and the resulting outcomes may be inefficient from the viewpoint of the Northern firms.     

International Competition for Multinational Investment

We examine the economic justification for providing investment subsidies to foreign-owned multinationals. These provide employment opportunities and generate demand for domestic intermediate inputs, produced by domestic workers with increasing returns to scale. Offering subsidies to multinationals may be in the national interest if the investment raises the net value of domestic production. When agglomerative forces are sufficiently strong, a subsidy that attracts the first foreign firm may induce several to enter, establishing a thriving modern sector. With a limited number of foreign enterprises, countries may compete to attract investment. This subsidy competition transfers much of the rents to the multinationals.
JEL classification: F 12; F 23     

Market Entry Regulation and International Competition*

We analyze a non‐cooperative two‐country game where each government decides whether to allow free market entry of firms or to regulate market access. We show that a Pareto‐efficient allocation may result in equilibrium. In particular, if the cost difference between home and foreign production is “significant,” production will be located in the cost‐efficient country exclusively; and if this cost difference is even “substantial,” the induced allocation is also Pareto efficient. Only if the cost difference is “insignificant,” production may take place in both countries and the allocation is inefficient.     

品牌效应与债务融资双重影响下的广告竞争行为

本文以广告投入较多的制造业与房地产业为研究对象,选取该行业上市公司2004—2007年的数据,实证分析品牌效应、债务融资双重影响下的企业广告竞争行为。研究结果表明:就强品牌企业而言,债务融资对产品市场具有软承诺作用;而在弱品牌企业中,债务融资表现为对产品市场的硬承诺作用。此外,不论强品牌企业的广告竞争策略存在与否,弱品牌企业的广告投资策略均不受影响。     

国际战略联盟与中国企业国际竞争力

中国企业的竞争力提升是中国经济建设和迎接世界范围内竞争的客观需要 ,而国际战略联盟是提高我国企业竞争力的有效手段。本文阐述了国际战略联盟的概念和特点 ,认为它是一种新型合作竞争理念。文章指出国际战略联盟是当今国际市场中企业竞争之利器 ,以此来提高企业国际竞争力意义巨大 ,并提出了我国企业应采取的对策、措施     

International Commodity Taxation under Monopolistic Competition

We analyze non‐cooperative commodity taxation in a two‐country trade model characterized by monopolistic competition and international firm and capital mobility. In this setting, taxes in one country affect foreign welfare through the relocation of mobile firms and through changes in the rents accruing to capital owners. With consumption‐based taxation, these fiscal externalities exactly offset each other and the non‐cooperative tax equilibrium is Pareto efficient. With production‐based taxation, however, there are additional externalities on the foreign tax base and the foreign price level that lead non‐cooperative tax rates to exceed their Pareto efficient levels.     

International Income Transfer under Imperfect Competition

This paper examines the effects of an international income transfer under international monopoly. One of the markets in the donor country is monopolized and there exist two distinct types of agent: monopolist and factor owners. The transfer is provided by the agents with different lump sum tax (burden‐share) rates. The burden‐share rate plays a key role concerning the welfare effects of a transfer. We show that the government of the donor country can raise both its social welfare and the wellbeing of the recipient country by providing a further transfer and by simultaneously adjusting the burden‐share rates.     

Beat 'em or Join 'em? Export Subsidies versus International Research Joint Ventures in Oligopolistic Markets

We compare adversarial with cooperative industrial and trade policies in a dynamic oligopoly game in which a home and foreign firm compete in R&D and output and, because of spillovers, each firm benefits from the other's R&D. When the government can commit to an export subsidy, such a policy raises welfare relative to cooperation, except when R&D is highly effective and spillovers are near-complete. Without commitment, however, subsidisation may yield welfare levels much lower than cooperation and lower even than free trade, though qualifications to the dangers from no commitment are noted.
JEL classification: F 12; F 13     

Competition and Price Dispersion in International Long-distance Calling

This paper examines the relationship between changes in telecommunications provider competition on international long-distance routes and changes in prices. Overall, increased competition is associated with significantly lower prices to consumers of long-distance services. However, the relationship between competition and price varies according to the type of long-distance plan considered. For the plans frequently selected by price-conscious consumers, increased competition on a route is associated with lower prices. In contrast, for the basic international plans that are the default selection for consumers, increased competition on a route is actually associated with higher prices. Thus price dispersion appears to increase as competition increases. The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and not necessarily those of the OECD. I thank two anonymous referees, Joe Farrell, John Harkrider, Jim Lande, Bob Majure, Carl Willner and seminar participants at the FCC for their helpful comments. Special thanks for aid with data to Linda Blake, Mark Uretsky, Jim Lande, R.L. Smith and Carl Willner.     

Advertising and Competition for Market Share between a New Good Producer and a Remanufacturer

We study the strategic interaction between a new good producer and a remanufacturer who use advertising campaigns to compete for a dominant share of the market for a certain good. Each firm chooses one of three possible strategies for running its advertising campaign. The two rival firms care only about capturing a dominant share of the relevant market. Hence, if a firm expects to capture dominant market share with probability p ∈ [0, 1], then its payoff in the game we study is also p. Our analysis leads to four results. First, we provide the normal form representation of the game between the new good producer and the remanufacturer. Second, we specify the game in matrix form. Third, we indicate what happens at each stage of the elimination of strictly dominated strategies. Finally, we show that the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies yields a clear and unique prediction about the outcome of the advertising game.