Earnings Surprises in Analysts' Forecasts,Mandatory Disclosure,and Share Repurchases

This paper examines the impact of forecast errors and the mandatory disclosure of repurchase transactions required by 2003 Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) regulations on share repurchases. We define forecast errors as the difference between analysts' forecasted earnings and actual earnings. We argue that firms with positive forecast errors imply greater information asymmetry, which may induce them to signal through share repurchases. We show that both the repurchase target and analysts' forecast revision are positively related to forecast errors. Furthermore, these associations are more pronounced in the low disclosure period (1989–2003) where greater information asymmetry between managers and outside investors is found, while increased transparency in the high disclosure period (2004–2006) leads to more significant improvement in long‐term performances for firms with positive forecast errors. The results are consistent with our expectations that the information asymmetry implied in forecast errors, along with a shock change from the introduction of the 2003 SEC regulation, affect both corporate and analysts' behaviour.     

Disclosure Prominence and the Quality of Non‐GAAP Earnings

The SEC prohibits the presentation of non‐GAAP measures before corresponding GAAP measures; however, a large proportion of non‐GAAP reporters present non‐GAAP EPS before GAAP EPS in their earnings announcements. This noncompliance raises questions about whether firms use prominence to highlight higher or lower quality non‐GAAP information. For firms reporting non‐GAAP EPS between 2003 and 2016, prominent non‐GAAP EPS is associated with higher quality non‐GAAP reporting. Further tests reveal that nonregulatory incentives, rather than regulatory costs, explain this relation. Specifically, prominence is associated with higher quality non‐GAAP reporting in settings where prominence is not regulated, investors ignore prominence when non‐GAAP reporting quality is lower, and the minority of firms using prominence to mislead exhibit characteristics associated with weaker investor monitoring. Overall, we provide evidence that regulatory noncompliance can reflect an intent to inform, and that most firms use prominence to highlight higher quality non‐GAAP information despite prohibitive regulation.     

Time‐Varying Capital Requirements and Disclosure Rules: Effects on Capitalization and Lending Decisions

We investigate how banks’ capital and lending decisions respond to changes in bank‐specific capital and disclosure requirements. We find that an increase in the bank‐specific regulatory capital requirement results in a higher bank capital ratio, brought about via less asset risk. A decrease in the requirement implies more lending to firms but also less Tier 1 capital and higher bank leverage. We do not observe differences between confidential and public disclosure of capital requirements. Our results empirically illustrate a tradeoff between bank resilience and a fostering of the economy through more bank lending using banks’ capital requirement as policy instrument.     

Extreme Uncertainty and Forward‐looking Disclosure Properties

This study investigates the effect of extreme uncertainty on disclosure behaviour by analyzing the quality and quantity of forward‐looking disclosures during the global financial crisis and pre‐crisis periods, controlling for other determinants of disclosure behaviour. Prior research has struggled to distinguish between the quality and quantity dimensions of forward‐looking disclosures. Also, the impact of the recent financial crisis on these forward‐looking disclosure attributes has not yet been examined systematically. We address this gap by exploiting the unique setting of German publicly traded firms. These firms must provide forward‐looking information within their audited financial statements, although relevant regulation is sufficiently vague to allow great variation in the quality, scope and quantity of forward‐looking disclosures actually observed. Using hand‐collected data from 2005 to 2009, we provide evidence of a significantly negative association between crisis and disclosure quality. This finding is robust to several different disclosure quality proxies and regression specifications. In contrast, we find no negative significant relation between crisis and disclosure quantity; rather, there is evidence that reported volume increases during the crisis. Our results are consistent with extreme uncertainty, as occurring during times of crisis, negatively affecting the quality of voluntary disclosures, while firms maintain or increase disclosure quantity, ultimately diluting the information density of forward‐looking disclosures.     

Risk Shifts Following Sarbanes‐Oxley: Influences of Disclosure and Governance

The Sarbanes‐Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) aimed to improve financial reporting by enhancing corporate disclosure and governance. We find statistically significant increases, from before to after the passage of SOX, in total return variance, market risk and idiosyncratic risk. The risk increases are consistent with predictions that the legislation would cause firms to disclose more negative information, resulting in increased investment risk. However, in cross‐sectional tests, post‐SOX improvements in information certainty, board independence and monitoring are associated with smaller increases or greater decreases in risk. If SOX is responsible for these improvements, its effects are consistent with its purpose.     

Compliance with pension‐related mandatory disclosures and debt financing

Using hand‐collected data on the level of pension‐related mandatory disclosures required by International Accounting Standard 19 Employee Benefits, we test whether compliance levels with these disclosures convey information that affects firms’ access to the public instead of the private debt market, as well as the cost of their new debt issues. We document a higher tendency to access the public debt market for firms with higher levels of pension‐related disclosure. Furthermore, we find that firms with higher levels of pension‐related disclosure enjoy a lower cost in terms of issuance of public debt, but not a lower cost for private debt issues. Thus, the benefits of disclosure in reducing information risk are only realisable when creditors rely heavily on financial statements in their decision making, due to the limited access to private information. Additional tests reveal that high compliance levels effectively mitigate the negative effect of pension deficits on the cost of public debt. These findings provide novel evidence in the extant literature on the role of mandatory (and, in particular, pension‐related) disclosures on firms’ debt financing. They also have important policy implications.     

CAP Forum on E‐Business: The Management of Financial Disclosure on Corporate Websites: A Conceptual Model*

This paper addresses the impact of Internet financial reporting (IFR) on financial accounting theory by incorporating it into the general Gibbins, Richardson, and Waterhouse (GRW) (1990) disclosure‐management framework. The GRW model assumes that the firm has a relatively stable process of disclosure management. This process varies between two positions: one ritualistic and the other opportunistic. These dimensions can coexist in the same firm but, on average, the policy of a firm will be either more ritualistic or more opportunistic. Our survey of the financial information disclosed in traditional financial reporting (TFR) as compared with the website disclosures of a random sample of Canadian companies documents a significant difference between TFR and IFR, as well as a wide variability among the sample firms in their use of IFR content, format, and technology. We interpret this variability in the incremental difference of IFR over TFR as an indication that a firm's ritualistic or opportunistic behaviour under IFR is not different from its behaviour under TFR. Thus, the adapted GRW (1990) conceptual model appears to have the potential to support future research in the management of financial disclosure on corporate websites.     

Disentangling Managers’ and Analysts’ Non‐GAAP Reporting

Researchers frequently proxy for managers’ non‐GAAP disclosures using performance metrics available through analyst forecast data providers (FDPs), such as I/B/E/S. The extent to which FDP‐provided earnings are a valid proxy for managers’ non‐GAAP reporting, however, has been debated extensively. We explore this important question by creating the first large‐sample data set of managers’ non‐GAAP earnings disclosures, which we directly compare to I/B/E/S data. Although we find a substantial overlap between the two data sets, we also find that they differ in systematic ways because I/B/E/S (1) excludes managers’ lower quality non‐GAAP numbers and (2) sometimes provides higher quality non‐GAAP measures that managers do not explicitly disclose. Our results indicate that using I/B/E/S to identify managers’ non‐GAAP disclosures significantly underestimates the aggressiveness of their reporting choices. We encourage researchers interested in managers’ non‐GAAP reporting to use our newly available data set of manager‐disclosed non‐GAAP metrics because it more accurately captures managers’ reporting choices.     

Corporate Governance,Companies’ Disclosure Practices and Market Transparency: A Cross Country Study

We examine the link between corporate governance, companies’ disclosure practices and their equity market transparency in a study of more than 5,000 listed companies in 23 countries covering the period 1 January 2003 to 31 December 2008. Our results confirm the belief that better‐governed firms make more frequent disclosures to the market. We also find greater disclosure in common law relative to code law countries. However firms with better governance in both code and common law countries make more frequent disclosures. We measure market transparency by the timeliness of prices. In contrast to single country studies, results show, for the 23 countries collectively, better corporate governance is associated with less timely share prices. This would suggest that a firm substitutes better corporate governance for transparency. We are thus led to the conclusion that even if information is disclosed more frequently by better‐governed firms, it does not necessarily follow that information is reflected in share prices on a timelier basis.     

When Good News Is Not So Good: Economy‐wide Uncertainty and Stock Returns

This paper shows that variation in economy‐wide uncertainty causes asymmetric stock price responses to firm earnings surprises. The uncertainty that attends bad earnings news that arrives during expansions with greater economy‐wide uncertainty occasions larger price declines. This is because news inconsistent with investors’ prior beliefs about the state of the economy increases uncertainty, which amplifies the negative cash flow effects contained in bad earnings news. Asymmetrically, the positive cash flow effect of good earnings news that arrives during recessions is offset by increased investor uncertainty, which results in relatively smaller price reactions to the good news. This is consistent with Veronesi's rational expectations equilibrium model, which shows that investors demand higher expected returns in the face of greater uncertainty.     

Mind the gap: CEO–employee pay ratios and shareholder say‐on‐pay votes

We examine the Securities and Exchange Commission's assertion in the pay ratio disclosure rule that the ratio of Chief Executive Officer to employee pay is useful to shareholders for say‐on‐pay (SOP) voting decisions. Using an estimated pay ratio for a broad panel of commercial banks from 2010 to 2017, we find that voting dissent on SOP proposals is significantly higher in the top pay ratio decile, particularly when institutional ownership is high. Results are robust to controlling for a number of other determinants of voting dissent, including proxy advisor recommendations and executive compensation. Additionally, inferences using the first year of disclosed pay ratios in 2017 for S&P 1500 firms are consistent. However, we do not find similar results in the other deciles of the pay ratio in either sample, calling into question whether a cost‐benefit analysis would support the disclosure requirement imposed by Dodd‐Frank and implemented by the SEC.     

Capital gains tax,supply‐driven trading and ownership structure: direct evidence of the lock‐in effect

This study investigates the effect of differential capital gains tax rates on investor trading and share prices in a unique market setting that facilitates the resolution of conflicting prior evidence of holding period tax incentives. In particular, we examine whether the concessionary tax treatment of long‐term capital gains increases the supply of shares that qualify for long‐term status, thereby causing downward price pressure. We find evidence of abnormal seller‐initiated trading following the 12‐month anniversary of listing for IPO firms that appreciate in price (‘winners’) and report no such evidence for firms that decline in price (‘losers’). Consistent with the tax concessions being greater for individual than institutional investors, we report that abnormal seller‐initiated trading is mitigated by higher levels of ownership by institutional investors. We also report limited evidence, for winners, of declining share prices upon qualifying for long‐term tax status.     

International Cross‐Listings and Subsequent Security‐Market Choices: Evidence from ADRs

We study the link between the attributes of American depositary receipt (ADR)‐listed firms and their post‐listing security‐market choices. We find that developed market firms are more likely to issue equity and debt than their emerging market counterparts. Furthermore, we find that large firms are more likely to issue debt and less likely to issue equity. When we examine locations where ADR firms raise their capital, we find that firms originating from countries where the protection of minority shareholders is weak are more likely to issue debt on their home markets and less likely to issue debt on international markets (excluding U.S. markets). Furthermore, ADR firms originating from developed (emerging market) countries are more (less) likely to issue their equity on their domestic markets and less (more) likely to issue equity on international markets (excluding U.S. markets).     

The climate change‐related disclosures and accountability practices of NGOs: Evidence from Australia

This paper focusses on non‐governmental organisations’ (NGOs) broader social accountability, investigating their public disclosures on climate change commitment and performance. Using a synthesised disclosure index, we analyse the annual reports of 30 NGOs, all signatories to the Australian Council for International Development's Code of Conduct. Overall disclosure rates from 2008 to 2013 were higher for commitment than performance, but were very low overall. However, the number of NGOs disclosing information rose markedly over the period. Although it is not directly possible to attribute the change in disclosure levels to the implementation of the Code, the enactment of the new Code could be one of the motivating factors for NGOs’ disclosure practices and their demonstrations of greater social accountability.      

Mandatory corporate social responsibility disclosure and dividend payouts: evidence from a quasi‐natural experiment

Employing the enactment of a regulation that mandates a subset of firms to disclose their corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities as a quasi‐natural experiment, we find that mandatory CSR disclosure reduces firms’ dividend payouts significantly. Further analyses indicate that the negative relation is more pronounced for firms with weaker corporate governance mechanisms, where shareholders lack of effective tools to protect themselves against pressures from stakeholders, and a shift of relative power towards stakeholders is more likely to occur. Our paper provides a specific channel through which mandatory CSR disclosure benefits stakeholders at the expense of shareholders.     

Cross‐Border Bank M&As and Risk: Evidence from the Bond Market

The impact of cross‐border bank M&As on bank risk remains an open question. Though geographically diversifying bank M&As have the potential to reduce the risk of bank insolvency, they also have the potential to increase that risk due to the increase in risk‐taking incentives by bank managers and stockholders following these transactions. This paper empirically investigates whether cross‐border bank M&As increase or decrease the risk of acquiring banks as captured by changes in acquirers' yield spreads. This paper also investigates how differences in the institutional environments between bidder and target countries affect changes in yield spreads following M&A announcements. The study finds that bondholders, in general, perceive cross‐border bank M&As as risk‐increasing activities, unlike domestic bank mergers. Specifically, on average, yield spreads increase by 4.13 basis points following the announcement of cross‐border M&As. This study also finds that these yield spreads are significantly affected by the differences in investor‐protection and deposit insurance environments between the transacting countries. However, the study does not find that the regulatory and supervisory environment in the home countries of the transacting parties significantly affects the changes in yield spreads. The overall evidence suggests that regulators should judge the relative environment in both the home and the host countries in evaluating the associated risks of an active multinational financial institution and in setting the sufficiency of the banks' reserve positions.     

The First‐ and Second‐Hand Effect of Analysts' Stock Recommendations: Evidence from the Swiss Stock Market

This paper empirically investigates the impact of both the first release of analysts' stock recommendations to a limited clientele and the subsequent dissemination of the same information in a major newspaper to a broader audience. For a sample of 1460 stock recommendations published in FuW, Switzerland's major financial newspaper, significant positive abnormal returns on the day of the original release of buy recommendations and on the day of publication in FuW are documented. Tests of the price pressure and information hypotheses reveal that analysts' recommendations contain new information, which is quickly incorporated in the stock prices on the first release of this information. In contrast, the statistically significant announcement effects associated with the subsequent publication can be primarily ascribed to price pressure in the underlying securities.     

Real‐Time Forecasting and Political Stock Market Anomalies: Evidence for the United States

Using monthly data from 1953 to 2003, we apply a real‐time modeling approach to investigate the implications of U.S. political stock market anomalies for forecasting excess stock returns in real‐time. Our empirical findings show that political variables, chosen on the basis of widely used model‐selection criteria, are often included in real‐time forecasting models. However, political variables do not contribute systematically to improving the performance of simple trading rules. For this reason, political stock market anomalies are not necessarily an indication of market inefficiency.     

Tax Calendar Effects in the Municipal Bond Market: Tax‐Loss Selling and Cherry Picking by Investors and Market Timing by Fund Managers

Examining municipal bond returns, bond fund flows and buying activities by fund managers over the period 1990–2009, we find evidence of tax calendar‐related rational opportunistic trading patterns by fund investors and fund managers. Specifically, fund shareholders conduct tax‐loss selling in December and re‐invest in January. In April, June, and September, fund investors rationally cherry pick to sell their shares of short‐term bond funds instead of their shares of long‐term bond funds to raise cash to pay estimated taxes. Unlike fund shareholders, fund managers adopt a contrarian strategy of buying in December and selling in January.     

Increasing the Tick: Examining the Impact of the Tick Size Change on Maker‐Taker and Taker‐Maker Market Models

We investigate the effects of an increase in tick size on order and trading flow across market fee models. Using the pilot firms in the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission's Tick Size Pilot Program, we document that trade and order volume declines on maker‐taker fee models after the tick size implementation. We find that the inverted fee models (taker‐maker) experience an increase in both trade and order volume. Additionally, we find that a tick size adjustment has a substantial influence on market participation in maker‐taker fee models. We also find that measures of both hidden and algorithmic trading decline with an increasing tick size, which is strongly moderated by the differences in the maker‐taker and taker‐maker fee models.