The effects of irreversibility on the timing and intensity of lumpy investment

This paper examines how changes in irreversibility of investment affect the timing and intensity of lumpy investment. We develop a continuous-time model wherein a firm is endowed with a perpetual option to invest in a project at any time by incurring a partially reversible investment cost at that instant. The amount of the investment cost is directly related to the intensity of investment that is endogenously chosen by the firm at the instant when the investment option is exercised. We show that higher irreversibility of investment induces the firm to raise its optimal investment trigger, thereby deferring the undertaking of the project. Furthermore, we show that changes in irreversibility of investment have no impact on the firm's optimal investment intensity due to two opposing effects that exactly offset each other. Finally, we show that higher irreversibility of investment reduces the value of the investment option and, therefore, makes the firm less valuable.     

Irreversibility,mean reversion,and investment timing

This paper examines the effect of irreversibility on investment under mean reversion. We develop a continuous-time model wherein a risk-neutral firm is endowed with a perpetual option to invest in a project at any time by incurring a fixed investment cost at that instant. The project, once undertaken, generates a stream of cash flows that are governed by a mean-reverting stochastic process. The firm is then allowed to liquidate its project at any time to partially recover the fixed investment cost. The recovery rate of the fixed investment cost inversely gauges the degree of irreversibility of investment. Using a real options approach, we derive an analytical solution to the value of the firm that is analogous with an American compound option. We show that greater irreversibility of investment induces the firm to raise its investment trigger, thereby deferring the undertaking of the project. We further show that greater irreversibility of investment has a detrimental effect that makes the firm less valuable.     

The effects of abandonment options on operating leverage and investment timing

This paper examines how the presence of an abandonment option affects a firm's investment decision in general, and its operating leverage in particular. We show that the value of the abandonment option is a decreasing function of the firm's operating leverage. Upon the introduction of the abandonment option, the firm as such optimally lowers its operating leverage. We further show that there are direct and indirect effects of the abandonment option on the firm's optimal investment trigger, which act against each other. First, the ability to shut down production offers downside protection to the firm, thereby making the firm more eager to exercise the investment option. This is the negative direct effect that pushes down the investment trigger. Second, introducing the abandonment option to the firm induces the firm to lower its operating leverage, thereby making the firm more reluctant to exercise the investment option. This is the positive indirect effect that lifts up the investment trigger. We numerically verify that the overall effect of the abandonment option on the firm's optimal investment trigger is negative.     

Progressive taxation and the intensity and timing of investment

This paper examines the effect of progressive taxation on a firm's investment intensity and timing decisions using a real options approach. The firm possesses a perpetual option to invest in a project at any instant by incurring an irreversible investment cost at that time. The amount of the irreversible investment cost determines the intensity of investment that augments the value of the project. Tax progression is specified in a particular case of a constant marginal tax rate with an exogenously given tax exemption threshold that makes the average tax rate increase with the tax base. We show that the firm's investment decisions are neutral to tax progression only when the exogenously given tax exemption threshold is sufficiently large. When tax neutrality does not hold, we show that progressive taxation has a perverse effect on investment intensity. Finally, we show that progressive taxation induces the firm to invest earlier as compared to the case under proportional taxation (i.e., in the absence of any tax exemption).     

The effects of abandonment options on operating leverage and forward hedging

This paper examines the behavior of the competitive firm under output price uncertainty when the firm is endowed with an abandonment option and has access to a forward market for its output. When the realized output price is less than its marginal cost, the firm optimally exercises its abandonment option and ceases production. The firm lets its abandonment option extinguish, thereby producing up to its capacity, only when the realized output price exceeds its marginal cost. The ex post exercising of the abandonment option as such convexifies the firm's ex ante profit with respect to the random output price. We show that neither the separation theorem nor the full-hedging theorem holds in the presence of the abandonment option. The firm under-hedges its output price risk exposure in the forward market wherein the forward price contains a nonpositive risk premium. When the set of hedging instruments is expanded to include options, we show that both the separation and full-hedging theorems are restored. We further show that the firm prefers options to forwards for hedging purposes when both types of contracts are fairly priced.     

RANDOM SHOCK UNCERTAINTY AND INVESTMENT REVERSIBILITY: REAL OPTION FRAMEWORK

This paper examines, in the presence of random shock, how changes in reversibility of investment affect a firm's optimal investment strategies including the investment timing (trigger) and quantity. Existing results do not consider random shock, where the quantity is independent of the degree of reversibility and the investment trigger is always decreasing with the degree of reversibility. In contrast, we show that with random shock, the quantity exhibits an inverse U‐shape, and the investment trigger is not always monotonically decreasing with the degree of reversibility. Additionally, we show that the firm undertakes a smaller quantity with random shock than without random shock for any degree of reversibility. Finally, we find that the presence of random shock decreases firm value, which implies that random shock is costly for firms.     

融资结构、企业异质性与研发投资*——来自中国上市公司的经验证据

企业融资结构影响研发投资强度吗？是否存在能促进企业研发投资强度提升的最优融资结构？对不同类型的企业而言,最优融资结构是否存在差异呢？本文运用中国上市公司2007—2015年的面板数据进行实证研究,结果表明：（1）企业越偏向于股权融资,研发投资强度就越高;（2）存在有利于促进研发投资强度提升的最优融资结构;（3）企业的最优融资结构随企业所属的产业性质、股权集中程度、银企关系强度及所有权性质的不同而呈现显著的差异。本文的研究发现有助深入理解融资结构与研发投资的关系,也为决策者制定宏观金融结构优化政策提供了来自微观企业层面的证据。     

Does R&D spending boost tangible investment? An analysis on European firms

This article investigates the relationship between firm’s R&D intensity, expressed as R&D expenditure over sales, and investment intensity in tangible assets. It is commonly acknowledged that R&D requires additional physical investment to be implemented. R&D increases a firm’s productivity and return to tangible investments, thus, providing to the firm incentives to bear high tangible capital costs and to invest more. This represents a crucial issue for a firm’s growth, particularly considering the strong interaction between physical capital accumulation and technological progress. The analysis is based on a large sample of manufacturing firms across seven European countries in the period 2007–2009. Since the sub-sample of firms performing R&D might not be random, there may potentially be an endogeneity issue. The analysis also considers that firms may decide to spend on R&D and investment in physical capital simultaneously. The questions of both endogeneity and simultaneity are dealt with by employing an instrumental variable two-step procedure. We find a positive and significant impact of R&D intensity on firms’ tangible investment intensity. The econometric results highlight the importance of financial factors, particularly with respect to firms’ internal resources. Exposure to international trade has a negative impact on investment, possibly depending on the time-span of the sample used.

Abbreviations: Technological Innovation and R&D; Investment Capital; Industry Studies; Firm Behavior; Empirical Analysis     

On the Separability of Real and Financial Decisions

The financial manager faces two basic problems: first, the firm’s investment or capital budgeting decision, and second, the financing decision. Capital investment and financing decisions are typically analyzed independently. Capital budgeting criteria proceeds under the simplest possible assumption about financing, namely all-equity financing. The only link between investment and financing decisions is the cost of capital. The basic idea behind Modigliani and Miller’s famous proposition I is that in perfect markets, changes in capital structure do not affect value. As long as the total cash flow generated by the firm’s assets is unchanged by capital structure, value is independent of capital structure. This paper is the first attempt to prove that leverage affects the mathematical structures of the cash flow of financing, and that different mathematical structures of financing cash flows may change the total cash flows generated by the firm or the project, thus altering the value of the firm even in perfect markets. The purpose of this paper is to explore the validity of the separation rule through net present value (NPV) and internal rate of return (IRR) rules, as representatives of academic and business practice, and compare their results with simulations that will include the financial decision of the firm. A singular experiment proving that we can change the IRR or NPV of an investment modifying the financial structure cannot be used to affirm a universal statement, but it can be used to show that a theory is wrong.     

R&D and foreign direct investment with asymmetric spillovers

This paper analyzes how firms’ R&D investment decisions are affected by asymmetries in knowledge transmission, considering different sources of asymmetry such as unequal know-how management capabilities and spillovers localization within an international oligopoly. We show that a better ability to manage knowledge flows incentivizes the firm to invest more in R&D. By introducing geographically bounded spillovers, we also find that one-way foreign direct investment (FDI) stimulates the multinational enterprise to raise its own R&D and that an FDI equilibrium is more likely to occur. Finally, spillovers localization leading to two-way FDI is welfare improving when compared with non-localized spillovers.     

Welfare‐reducing Domestic Cost Reduction*

We show that cost reduction by a domestic firm may reduce domestic welfare if it changes a foreign firm’s production strategy from foreign direct investment to export. Domestic cost reduction can be welfare reducing when the domestic market is sufficiently small and domestic firm’s marginal cost of production is higher than the foreign firm’s marginal cost of production under foreign direct investment, which is a usual feature of trade between developed and developing countries. So, developing countries with small domestic markets need competent competition policies when encouraging domestic innovation and also trying to attract foreign direct investment.     

Liquidity default,liquidity management and smooth dividends policy

Our article models liquidity financing constraints with the real options framework. By conducting a comprehensive investigation of the effects of shocks to liquidity constraints on the firm’s optimal investment, financing and dividend policies, our model highlights the importance of liquidity management and extends the liquidity management approach to hedge liquidity default risk. We find that being concerned about liquidity default risk will significantly change a firm’s behaviours, including those related to investment and the optimal capital structure. A firm that is concerned about its liquidity default risk will become more cautious: it will choose to delay investment and have higher leverage when internal liquidity is very low, but choose earlier investment and lower leverage when liquidity is high enough. The dividends policy can alleviate risks from both the external market and internal project volatility and provides an alternative explanation for the ‘smooth dividends policy puzzle’ commonly reported in empirical research.     

基于盖斯克模型与模糊数的综合模型在风险投资项目中的应用

风险投资项目具有高不确定性,因此将风险投资项目复合实物期权方法中的期望现金流现值和投资成本均假定为确定值是不现实的。因此本文运用了复合实物期权(Geske模型)与模糊数的综合模型。该综合模型较好地解决了风险投资项目中的期望现金流现值和投资成本不为确定值的情况,并结合实例证明了其有效性。     

Progressive taxation and corporate liquidation policies with mean-reverting earnings

This paper develops a real options model of an all-equity financed firm that receives mean-reverting earnings and is subject to progressive taxation. Tax progression arises from an exogenously given tax exemption threshold such that the firm pays no corporate income taxes should its earnings be less than this threshold. The firm possesses a perpetual option to liquidate its operation for a deterministic salvage value at any time. We show that the firm optimally exercises the liquidation option at the first instant when its earnings reach an endogenously determined threshold (the liquidation trigger) from above. Using numerical analysis, we show that the liquidation trigger is higher or lower than the exogenously given tax exemption threshold, depending on whether the tax exemption is below or above a unique critical level, respectively. We further show that the liquidation trigger is strictly decreasing for all tax exemption thresholds less than the critical level, and can be hump-shaped for all tax exemption thresholds greater than the critical level, especially when the salvage value is small. Corporate income taxes as such are not neutral when tax schedules are progressive.     

Preemptive investment game with alternative projects

This paper investigates a duopoly with two alternative investment projects. We examine a situation in which a firm cannot invest in any project that has been taken by the rival firm. The first mover's advantage in project choice leads to an equilibrium quite different from that in previous studies. Specifically, we show that in equilibrium, the investment time and the option value are between those in a duopoly with one project and a monopoly with one project. Moreover, we show that a high correlation between project values, unlike in a monopoly with two projects, plays a positive role in mitigating preemptive competition. The results complement the literature of real options games and of max-options and entail new empirical implications.     

TIMING OF LUMPY INVESTMENT,PRICING AND TECHNICAL PROGRESS

In equipment‐intensive sectors – such as water utilities, power generation, and gas – billions of dollars are spent in capital equipment. The nature of the investment is often lumpy: at some point a plant has to be replaced and a large investment is required. We characterize the dynamic optimal investment policy of profit‐maximizing and welfare‐maximizing firms. We first show that, when there is no technical progress, the duration of the plant is longer for a profit‐maximizing firm. We then consider technical progress leading to either capacity expansion or to operating costs reduction. We show that duration tends to increase when the installed capacity increases over time, while it tends to decrease when technical progress reduces operating costs, both for profit‐maximizing and welfare‐maximizing firms. Under some conditions, when capacity expands over time the duration of the plant is longer for a profit‐maximizing firm than for a welfare‐maximizing firm.     

WAGE BARGAINING AND MERGER INCENTIVES WITH ASYMMETRIC COSTS

This paper examines how wage bargaining within each firm influences the relationship between an equilibrium ownership structure and the most preferred ownership structure from the viewpoint of social welfare, in a unionized oligopoly of asymmetric firms with respect to productivity of capital. We consider the merger incentive of each firm’s owner when the wage level is determined through bargaining between the firm’s owner and union. We derive a condition for both the degree of cost asymmetry among existing firms and the relative bargaining power of each firm’s owner to her/his union such that each ownership structure can be observed in equilibrium. We also show that although the two types of ownership structures with the merger involving the least efficient firm can be equilibria and socially optimal, these structures are observed only when both the degree of cost asymmetry and the relative bargaining power of each firm’s owner are moderate. Finally, we analyse the relationship among the cooperative game approach employed in this paper and two non‐cooperative merger formation approaches, and examine the robustness of the results obtained in this paper against the change in the assumption regarding each firm’s cost function.     

Does Over-credit Stimulate Corporate Investment? Evidence from Listed Companies in China

We define and quantify for the first time over-credit at the firm level, which refers to the case in which the amount of bank credit that a firm obtains exceeds its expenditure on corporate investment for the year. Then, we explore how over-credit affects corporate investment to determine whether credit expansion in China is consistent with the principle of finance serving the real economy. The results show that over-credit promotes firm investment, and this effect was enhanced by the housing boom. However, the effect of the property market reversed after 2012, owing to China’s economic transition from a quantitative to a structural mismatch between supply and demand. Finally, we explore how over-credit affects the capacity utilization ratio and whether it has aggravated the overcapacity problem in China. The results show that over-credit reduces firms’ capacity utilization ratio. This finding indicates that excessive credit expansion has exacerbated the overcapacity problem in China.     

过度投资、公司业绩与债务融资——基于信息对称视角下的持续时间模型研究

基于信息对称的视角,通过建立持续时间模型,并用杠杆比率表示为投资项目进行融资的总成本中债务融资所占的比重来研究债务融资对过度投资和公司业绩的影响.结果发现:当信息是对称的情况下,公司如果发生过度投资便不会出现投资不足,并且债务融资占投资项目总成本的比重越高公司过度投资程度越大.     

The effect of political regimes and technology on economic growth

This study analyses the role of financial constraints on the investment decisions of 497 Brazilian firms. We use panel data, with firm-specific information for different years, allowing for the abandonment of the representative firm model. Information on capital intensity at the firm level is used to group firms. We estimate different models and the results suggest the presence of financial restrictions, especially for capital-intensive firms.