TECHNOLOGICAL LEARNING AND LABOR MARKET DYNAMICS

The search‐and‐matching model of the labor market fails to match two important business cycle facts: (i) a high volatility of unemployment relative to labor productivity, and (ii) a mild correlation between these two variables. We address these shortcomings by focusing on technological learning‐by‐doing: the notion that it takes workers' time using a technology before reaching their full productive potential with it. We consider a novel source of business cycles, namely, fluctuations in the speed of technological learning, and show that a search‐and‐matching model featuring such shocks can account for both facts. Moreover, our model provides a new interpretation of recently discussed “news shocks.”     

技术供需主体的混合型多指标双边匹配决策方法

针对技术交易中技术供需主体满意度评价信息是多粒度语言评价信息、区间数、精确数的混合型多指标双边匹配决策问题,定义了技术供需主体的满意度函数,设计了最低可接受满意度选取规则,构建了双边匹配多目标优化模型,提出了实现技术供需主体双边匹配的决策方法。最后,通过算例,验证了该方法的有效性和可行性。     

TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT IN WHOLESALE INTERNATIONAL ROAMING: TOWARDS A MORE EFFICIENT MARKET?*

Despite a general trend of lower charges for mobile calls, in Europe, prices for international roaming calls have remained at levels that are surprisingly high. The apparent reluctance of mobile network operators to lower roaming tariff is generating many antitrust concerns. This paper presents in a two‐country two‐firm framework the functioning of the current system governing wholesale international roaming agreements based on interoperator tariffs. The focus is on the role of traffic management; thanks to the emergence of traffic direction techniques, mobile network operators are allowed to select the roaming partner. We show that, unless these techniques do not allow for perfect control on traffic flows, traffic management does not improve the market's efficiency. In line with the regulatory mechanism recently adopted by the European Commission, we show that a simple price cap mechanism may restore partial efficiency in the wholesale market. We also show that although cross‐border cooperation at the wholesale level is Pareto efficient, it will not emerge as an equilibrium of a two‐sided matching game.     

Truthtelling in Matching Markets

We analyze a search and matching model with non‐transferable utility and asymmetric information. Randomly paired agents go through an evaluation phase, at the end of which they discover each other's types and choose to match or not. Before deciding to enter this phase, agents can communicate through cheap talk. We provide conditions for this communication to be informative, and we examine how it affects agents' welfare. We show that communication is Pareto‐improving only when the matching is assortative in the absence of communication and left unchanged by information transmission.     

α‐SERIAL MECHANISMS FOR THE PROVISION OF AN EXCLUDABLE PUBLIC GOOD

We present a new class of “α‐serial mechanisms” for the provision of an excludable public good. Those mechanisms have a similar structure to the serial mechanism, but may let the non‐consumers pay a positive cost. They inherit desirable properties such as anonymity, envy‐freeness, Maskin monotonicity, and population monotonicity from the serial mechanism. We calculate the “maximal efficiency loss” and “maximal manipulation” of α‐serial mechanisms and point out a trade‐off between these two properties.     

互联网金融背景下风险投资双边匹配选择问题研究

针对互联网金融背景下风险投资双边匹配选择问题,考虑到风险投资者与风险企业在双向选择时的心理期望,提出一种基于前景理论的风险投资双边匹配决策模型;最后,通过实例分析,验证了该方法的可行性与有效性。     

THE FACE VALUE OF ARGUMENTS WITH AND WITHOUT MANIPULATION

A sender wishes to persuade a receiver with a (surprising) result that challenges the prior belief. The result stems either from sequential private experimentation or manipulation. The incentive to experiment and to manipulate depends on the quality threshold for persuasion. Higher thresholds make it harder to find a surprising outcome via experimentation and may encourage manipulation. Suppose there are observable nonmanipulable and manipulable research methods. For the decision quality, the quality threshold for persuasion for nonmanipulable methods should be higher than for manipulable methods. We discuss philosophy of science implications, such as field contingent quality standards and P‐value adjustments.     

Minimum income in a transition economy

The Albanian Ndihma Ekonomike is one of the first poverty reduction programmes launched in transitional economies. Its record has been judged positively during the recession period of the 1990s and negatively during the more recent growth phase. This article reconsiders the programme using a regression‐adjusted local linear matching estimator first suggested by Heckman et al. (1997, 1998). We find the programme to have a weak targeting capacity and a non‐significant impact on different household outcomes.     

ON THE INFORMATIONAL CONTENT OF WAGE OFFERS*

This article investigates signaling and screening roles of wage offers in a single‐play matching model with two‐sided unobservable characteristics. It generates the following predictions as matching equilibrium outcomes: (i) “good” jobs offer premia if “high‐quality” worker population is large; (ii) “bad” jobs pay compensating differentials if the proportion of “good” jobs to “low‐quality” workers is large; (iii) all firms may offer a pooling wage in markets dominated by “high‐quality” workers and firms; or (iv) Gresham's Law prevails: “good” types withdraw if “bad” types dominate the population. The screening/signaling motive thus has the potential of explaining a variety of wage patterns.     

Product Differentiation,Competitive Toughness,and Intertemporal Substitution

Standard measures of competitive toughness fail to capture the fact that, as consumers optimize intertemporally, firms operating today compete with (as yet non‐existent) businesses, which will be started tomorrow. We develop a two‐tier constant elasticity of substitution (CES) model of dynamic monopolistic competition in which the impact of product differentiation on the market outcome depends crucially on the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS). The degree of product differentiation per se fails to serve as a meaningful indicator of competitive toughness: what matters is its cross‐effect with EIS. We also extend the model to the case of non‐CES preferences in order to capture variable mark‐ups.     

Wage posting: evidence from job ads

Abstract Recent studies of search theory examine how employers use a wage‐setting mechanism – either by bargaining or through the posting of a non‐negotiable wage offer in a job ad – to facilitate search. We contribute to this literature by examining wage posting in job ads in the US, the UK, and Slovenia. Despite considerable differences in the incidence of wage posting, employers in all three markets are less likely to post a wage offer when searching for skilled workers. The decision on whether or not to post a wage offer is only weakly related to the outcomes of employers’ search.     

The welfare effects of pre-arrangements in matching markets

We study the welfare effects of different types of pre-arrangements (as identified in Sönmez in J Econ Theory 86:148–156, 1999) under the intern-optimal and hospital-optimal stable mechanisms in matching markets. First, both mechanisms are manipulable via Type-2 pre-arrangements. Regarding the welfare consequences, they might cause inefficient outcomes to arise, and the welfare effects on each side are ambiguous in the sense that there might be agents from each side, apart from pre-arranging ones, being better and worse off. Then, for Type-1 pre-arrangements, due to Kojima and Pathak (Am Econ Rev 99(3):608–627, 2009), we know that the intern-optimal stable mechanism is immune to this type of manipulations. In contrast to this result, the hospital-optimal stable mechanism turns out to be manipulable. More interestingly, they do not result in inefficient outcomes, and the welfare effects on each side are unambiguous: All hospitals (interns) are better (worse) off.     

DETERMINANTS OF FINANCIAL DISTRESS IN LARGE FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS: EVIDENCE FROM U.S. BANK HOLDING COMPANIES

We investigate determinants of financial distress in large financial institutions based on the Distance‐to‐Default and Z‐Scores measures. Using data of U.S. bank holding companies (BHCs), we find that the housing price index is a consistently significant factor across all BHCs and the non‐performing loan ratio is the most powerful indicator for financial distress. Short‐term wholesale funding is also a reliable default risk indicator. We additionally find that all the three regulatory capital requirements are very important for controlling default risk, particularly in the post‐crisis period. (JEL C53, G14, G21, G28)     

MOVIES,MASS CONSUMERS,AND CRITICS: ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF A TWO‐SIDED MARKET

Most analyses of the film market treat it as a single entity where producers make films based on average consumer interest while critics serve as forecasters or signalers of film quality to these consumers. We describe the film market as two‐sided—a mass market (average consumer) side and a high quality/artistic (cineaste) side—that each influence film maker production decisions and critical reviews as critics balance the preferences of mass market consumers and their own more artistic inclination. Using 1,824 films released during 2000–2014, we examine determinants of box office revenues and critical reviews, while addressing the overlap between them. Our results indicate that consumers and critics respond differently not only to film rating but also to film budgets, story sources, genre, and political content. We then use the dichotomy between average and high quality, artistic film consumers as a basis for understanding the normative views of the film markets relative to other two‐sided markets as well as the political economy of film regulation. (JEL C30, D10, Z11)     

Aid,non‐traded goods,and growth

Abstract We examine the effects of foreign aid in a small recipient country with two traded goods, one non‐traded good, and two factors. Learning by doing and intersectoral knowledge spillovers contribute to endogenous growth. We obtain two main results. First, a permanent increase in untied aid raises (or lowers) the growth rate if and only if the non‐traded good is more capital intensive (or effective labour intensive) than the operating traded good. Second, a permanent increase in untied aid raises welfare if the non‐traded good is more capital intensive than the operating traded good; otherwise, it may raise or lower welfare.     

Influence Of Over‐ And Underconfidence On A Marriage Market*

This paper examines misconfidence (over‐ or underconfidence) and marriage proposal strategies in a two‐sided search model with non‐transferable utility. Single agents are vertically heterogeneous—there exists a ranking of marital charm (types). It is shown that there are two externalities to over‐ or underconfident behaviour: someone's over‐ or underconfidence affects: (i) the duration of search for others who directly meet over‐ or underconfident agents; and (ii) the marriage decision of others who directly or indirectly meet over‐ or underconfident agents. Furthermore, these externalities prevent the lowest‐type agents from marrying in an equilibrium.     

Measuring the Underground Economy with the Currency Demand Approach: A Reinterpretation of the Methodology,With an Application to Italy

We contribute to the debate on how to assess the size of the underground (or shadow) economy by proposing a reinterpretation of the traditional Currency Demand Approach (CDA) à la Tanzi. In particular, we introduce three main innovations. First, we take a direct measure of the value of cash transactions—the flow of cash withdrawn from bank accounts relative to total non‐cash payments—as the dependent variable in the money demand equation. This allows us to avoid unrealistic assumptions on the velocity of money and the absence of any irregular transaction in a given year, overcoming two severe critiques to the traditional CDA. Second, in place of the tax burden level, usually intended as the main motivation for non‐compliance, we include among the covariates two direct indicators of detected tax evasion. Finally, we control also for the role of illegal production considering crimes like drug dealing and prostitution, which—jointly with the shadow economy—contributes to the larger aggregate of the non‐observed economy and represents a significant component of total cash payments. We propose then an application of this “modified CDA” to a panel of 91 Italian provinces for the years 2005–08.     

The Displacement Effect of Labour‐Market Programs: MONASH Analysis*

A key question concerning labour‐market programs is the extent to which they generate jobs for their target group at the expense of others. This effect is measured by displacement percentages. We describe a version of the MONASH model designed to quantify the effects of labour‐market programs. Our simulation results suggest that: (i) labour‐market programs can generate significant long‐run increases in employment; (ii) displacement percentages depend on how a labour‐market program affects the income trade‐off faced by target and non‐target groups between work and non‐work; and (iii) displacement percentages are larger in the short run than in the long run.     

COMMERCIAL ACTIVITY AS INSURANCE: THE INVESTMENT BEHAVIOUR OF NON‐PROFIT ORGANIZATIONS

ABSTRACT ** : We provide a new explanation for commercial activities by non‐profit organizations whose primary concern is to supply mission output. Starting from the observation that donations to individual non‐profits are often highly volatile, we show how investment in commercial activity can constitute a form of insurance for mission activity. Although investment in commercial activity has an opportunity cost in terms of capacity to produce mission output, if donations turn out to be low the commercial revenue will enable cross‐subsidization of mission output. The equilibrium commercial investment is (weakly) positively related to the degree of risk aversion.