Corporate social performance,ownership structure,and corporate governance in France

Empirical evidence of the influence of shareholders and governance practices on corporate social responsibility (CSR) policies is mixed, and most studies have been conducted in the United States. This study of the French market and its unique characteristics reveals the forms of shareholding and CSR implementations, thereby shedding new light on the influence of shareholders on corporate social performance (CSP). Specifically, with a sample of French listed companies, the authors investigate how ownership concentration, ownership type, and governance practices relate to CSP. The geography of capital is relevant, but little evidence arises of the importance of shareholders’ identity. That is, neither family nor institutional shareholders influence CSP, and large shareholders seem to place less emphasis on CSR, suggesting that they are reluctant to invest in it. Finally, the results related to good governance practices are mixed, but board independence provides a foundation for good CSR.     

The acquisitiveness of youth: CEO age and acquisition behavior

I demonstrate that acquisitions are accompanied by large, permanent increases in Chief Executive Officer (CEO) compensation, which create strong financial incentives for CEOs to pursue acquisitions earlier in their career. Accordingly, I document that a firm's acquisition propensity is decreasing in the age of its CEO: a firm with a CEO who is 20 years older is ∼30%$\sim 30\%$ less likely to announce an acquisition. This negative effect of CEO age on acquisitions is strongest among firms where CEOs likely anticipate or can influence high post-acquisition compensation, and is absent for other investment decisions that are not rewarded with permanent compensation gains. The age effect cannot be explained by the selection of young CEOs by acquisition-prone firms, nor by a story of declining overconfidence with age. This paper underscores the relevance of CEO personal characteristics and CEO-level variation in agency problems for corporate decisions.     

Monitoring by the financial press and forced CEO turnover

This paper examines Wall Street Journal news stories about 79 firms that forced CEO turnover and a matched sample of firms that did not force CEO turnover. In the two years prior to turnover, firms in the forced-turnover sample were the subjects of 76% more news stories about poor firm performance despite being from the same industry, of similar size, and similar performance as a sample of matched firms. Overall, the evidence suggests that scrutiny of poor firm performance by the financial press increases the likelihood of forced CEO turnover.     

The differential CEO dominance-compensation and corporate governance-compensation relations: Pre- and post-SOX

We examine the relationship between corporate governance (as measured by traditional corporate governance variables and a new measure of corporate governance, called CEO dominance) and executive compensation, pre- and post-SOX. We conceptualize CEO dominance as a measure of a CEO's power and define it as the difference between CEO pay and the next highest executive's pay divided by the CEO's pay. We argue that for traditional corporate governance variables, the inverse governance-compensation relation that exists pre-SOX will improve post-SOX. On the other hand, we expect a strong and positive CEO dominance-compensation relation to exist both pre- and post-SOX. Consistent with expectations, our results indicate that SOX has changed the relationship between CEO duality and compensation relation, but it has not changed the CEO dominance-compensation relation. This suggests that SOX regulatory reforms do not limit the ability of CEO power to obstruct traditional corporate governance mechanisms in extracting compensation-related rents.     

Corporate ownership,corporate governance reform and timeliness of earnings: Malaysian evidence

This paper provides the first evidence showing that ownership concentration and the identity of the largest shareholder matter to the timeliness of corporate earnings, measured by a stock price-based timeliness metric and the reporting lag. Using panel data of 1276 Malaysian firms from 1996 to 2009, we find a non-linear relationship between concentrated ownership, measured by the largest shareholding in a firm, and the reporting lag but not the timeliness of price discovery. Although firms with government as the largest shareholder and political connections have a significantly shorter reporting lag, only the former are timelier in price discovery. Firms with family and foreigners as the largest shareholder however are less timely in price discovery. While the reporting lag is shorter in the period after the integration of the Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance (MCCG) into Bursa listing rules, its impact on the timeliness of price discovery is mostly immaterial.     

Media coverage,board structure and CEO compensation: Evidence from Taiwan

This paper investigates the relationship between CEO cash compensation and media coverage of firms, analyst forecasts and board structure using data from the Taiwan Stock Exchange. We find that, other things being equal, CEO cash compensation is much higher for firms with greater media coverage, firms with more positive news, firms with more analyst forecasts, and firms with larger institutional holdings. There is little evidence that board size and board independence affect CEO cash compensation, and CEO duality is negatively associated with CEO cash compensation     

Compensation consultants and CEO pay

The study examines the practice of employing multiple compensation consultants. Examining data of a sample of UK companies over the period 2003–2006 we find that CEOs receive higher equity-based pay when firms employ more than one compensation consultant. An increase in the number of compensation consultants is also associated with an increase in CEO equity-based pay, whereas no decline in CEO pay takes place when firms reduce the number of pay consultants. We also observe that the market shares of compensation consultant are positively related to CEO equity-based pay.     

Governance structure and the weighting of performance measures in CEO compensation

We empirically examine how governance structure affects the design of executive compensation contracts and in particular, the implicit weights of firm performance measures in CEO’s compensation. We find that compensation contracts in firms with higher takeover protection and where the CEO has more influence on governance decisions put more weight on accounting-based measures of performance (return on assets) compared to stock-based performance measures (market returns). In additional tests, we further find that CEO compensation in these firms has lower variance and a higher proportion of cash (versus stock-based) compensation. We further find that CEOs’ incentives (measured as changes in CEO annual wealth which includes expected changes in the value of the CEO’s equity holdings in addition to yearly compensation) do not vary across governance structures. These findings are consistent with CEOs in firms with high takeover protection and where they have more influence on governance negotiating different contracts.

CEO age and tax planning

This study investigates the association between CEO age and corporate tax planning. Using a sample of 11,537 firm‐year observations from the fiscal year 1997–2013, I find CEO age exerts an economically significant influence on firms’ tax policies, incremental to economic determinants identified in prior research. Specifically, CEO age is positively related to cash and GAAP effective tax rates, and negatively related to permanent book‐tax difference, suggesting that older CEOs are less likely to take actions to lower tax burden. The results hold across different model specifications and robustness tests to address potential bias arising from endogeneity, sample selection issue, and the confounding effect of CEO tenure.     

Antitakeover provisions and CEO monetary benefits: Revisiting the E-index

We analyze and group antitakeover provisions as they relate to CEO’s monetary benefits. We specifically focus on the determinants of the six E-index provisions that were proposed by Bebchuk et al. (2009) to conversely affect firm value. The six provisions are split into two indices: those that provide managers with a monetary benefit if a takeover was successful (MB provisions) and those that do not (TP provisions). Results indicate that CEOs with a role duality use their power to influence the adoption of MB provisions and resist the adoption of TP provisions. Moreover, in the presence of CEO duality, the relationship between MB provisions and firm value worsens. On the other hand, the relationship between TP provisions and firm value is unaffected by the presence of CEO duality. This suggests that CEOs having a role duality do not feel the need to work in the shareholders’ best interest when entrenched with MB provisions. Our findings suggest that studying all the provisions of the E-index as a whole can be misleading in some cases.     

Executive stock option vesting conditions,corporate governance and CEO attributes: evidence from Australia

We investigate the association between executive stock option (ESO) vesting conditions, corporate governance and CEO attributes. Using observations from the 250 largest Australian firms, we find that stronger corporate governance is positively associated with the length of the vesting period and the use of performance hurdles. We also find that when CEOs approach retirement, firms are more likely to grant longer time‐vesting options but are less likely to impose performance hurdles. Further, more powerful CEOs appear to influence the granting of ESOs with less restrictive vesting conditions. Our findings suggest that both corporate governance and CEO attributes significantly shape the design of ESOs.     

CEO power and annual report reading difficulty

We examine the impact of CEO power on reading difficulty of corporate annual reports. We find that CEO power is positively related to reading difficulty, implying that annual reports of corporations with powerful CEOs are difficult to read and understand. More importantly, we find that the relation between CEO power and reading difficulty is moderated by earnings performance or corporate governance. Additional findings suggest that this relation becomes stronger for firms with lower financial reporting quality or for CEOs with shorter tenure. Our study not only joins the debate on the consequences of powerful CEOs but also uncovers several factors that moderate the relation between CEO power and annual report reading difficulty.     

A note on board characteristics,ownership structure and default risk in Taiwan

This study applies dynamic generalized method of moments estimation to examine the influences of ownership structure and board characteristics on default risk for a full samples and two subsamples (high‐tech and conventional) of publicly listed firms in Taiwan. Our findings reveal that certain characteristics of corporate governance have explanatory power for default probability, but the impact is not straightforward. In particular, the impact of internal and external governance structures on default risk is industry dependent. Accordingly, governance proposals that encourage higher ownership among directors and large block shareholdings in high‐tech firms or reduce managerial ownership in conventional companies can have a counterproductive effect on corporate governance and result in higher bankruptcy possibility.     

Changes to the ownership and control of East Asian corporations between 1996 and 2008: The primacy of politics

We investigate changes to the ownership and control of East Asia's largest companies in 1996 and 2008. Newly compiled data for 1386 publicly traded companies at the end of 2008 are supplemented with existing data on 1,606 publicly traded companies at the end of 1996. Two main findings stand out. First, where status quo political arrangements persist, preexisting ownership arrangements go unchanged or become more entrenched. Where major political changes occurred, corporate ownership would undergo substantial changes. Second, the state has become increasingly important as an owner of domestic firms as well as foreign firms.     

Type of earnings management and the effect of ownership structure, firm size, and corporate-governance practices: Evidence from Indonesia

The purpose of this study is to investigate whether companies listed on the Jakarta Stock Exchange (JSE) conduct efficient or opportunistic earnings management and to examine the effect of ownership structure, firm size, and corporate-governance practices on it.Using multiple regressions, we find evidence that the type of earnings management selected by JSE listed firms tends toward efficient earnings management. This evidence is inconsistent with the common view that earnings management in Indonesia is opportunistic. Family ownership has a significant influence on the type of earnings management selected. Firms with a high proportion of family ownership and non-business groups are more inclined to choose efficient earnings management than other types of firms. We find inconsistent evidence with regard to the impact of institutional ownership, firm size, and corporate-governance practices on type of earnings management.     

Does ownership matter in the presence of strict antiactivism legislation? Evidence from equity transactions in Denmark

This study analyzes the effects of institutional and strategic investor equity transactions on the behavior of stock prices on the Copenhagen Stock Exchange (XCSE). Unlike the positive relationship between managerial ownership and security performance, we find that the relationship between ownership and performance is a bell-shaped curve. There is an optimal threshold level of ownership at which security performance, measured by abnormal returns, is maximized. At the threshold level, the management can take advantage of the shared benefit of control. Beyond the threshold level of ownership, the security performance decreases. We attribute this threshold level to an increasing entrenchment benefit.     

Related Party Transactions,Corporate Governance and CEO Compensation

Examining the years 2001–2012, we document a decrease in reported CEO related party transactions (RPTs) and an increase in reported outside director RPTs, with the largest change occurring around the 2006 Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) RPT disclosure changes. Our analysis of the determinants of RPTs and their association with CEO compensation also shows an impact of the SEC disclosure change, as we find support for the weak governance hypothesis in the pre‐2006 period and some support for the efficient contracting hypothesis post‐2005. While our results vary by model, pre‐2006, consistent with weak governance we find that outside director RPTs are positively associated with CEO compensation, with our estimates of the impact ranging from 8 to 18% depending on the model. In the post‐2005 period, this result dissipates, and we find some evidence consistent with the efficient contracting hypothesis. Overall we find that the SEC RPT disclosure change appears to have had a significant impact on reported RPTs, the determinants of those RPTs, and the impact of those RPTs on CEO compensation.     

CEO年龄、公司风险与风险决策行为

选取2007~2012年沪深 A 股上市公司的 CEO 为研究对象,探讨 CEO 年龄对上市公司市场风险和公司风险决策特征的影响。实证发现：CEO 年龄越大,其所在公司的市场风险越小。进一步研究表明：老年 CEO 主要通过低风险决策行为来减少公司的市场风险,即：老年 CEO 在研发上投资较少,其公司经营杠杆比率以及过度投资程度相对较低。这一结论对于我们更好地理解老年 CEO 的风险决策行为,及对不同风险特征的上市公司如何聘请不同年龄的新 CEO 具有一定的启示意义。     

Financial Leverage,CEO Compensation,and Corporate Hedging: Evidence from Real Estate Investment Trusts

This paper studies the determinants of corporate hedging practices in the REIT industry between 1999 and 2001. We find a positive significant relation between hedging and financial leverage, indicating the financial distress costs motive for using derivatives in the REIT industry. Using estimates of the Black–Scholes sensitivity of CEO’s stock option portfolios to stock return volatility and the sensitivity of CEO’s stock and stock option portfolios to stock price, we find evidence to support managerial risk aversion motive for corporate hedging in the REIT industry. Our results indicate that CEO’s cash compensation and the CEO’s wealth sensitivity to stock return volatility are significant determinants of derivative use in REITs. We also document a significant positive relation between institutional ownership and hedging activity. Further, we find that probability of hedging is related to economies of scale in hedging costs.