How does house price influence monetary policy transmission?

The literature has focused on house price growth to explain the inefficiency of monetary policy. From the perspective of substitution, this paper explains the relationship between house prices and monetary policy considering not only house price growth but also house price uncertainty. By constructing a theoretical model including both financial-asset and fixed-asset investment, we find that expansionary monetary policy not only promotes total investment but simultaneously also leads to substitution towards financial assets. However, a rise in house price growth or house price uncertainty will mitigate the substitution effect generated by monetary policy. These propositions are supported by empirical data on China's nonfinancial listed firms from 2009 Q1 to 2018 Q3 and the results are robust to a variety of model specifications and empirical approaches. Our findings imply that real estate regulatory policy should coordinate with monetary policy in maximizing fixed-asset investment.     

Housing, consumption and monetary policy: How different are the US and the euro area?

This paper provides a systematic empirical analysis of the role of the housing market in the macroeconomy in the US and the euro area. First, it establishes some stylised facts concerning key variables in the housing market on the two sides of the Atlantic, such as real house prices, residential investment and mortgage debt. It then presents evidence from Structural Vector Autoregressions (SVAR) by focusing on the effects of monetary policy, credit supply and housing demand shocks on the housing market and the broader economy. The analysis shows that similarities outweigh differences as far as the housing market is concerned. The empirical evidence suggests a stronger role for housing in the transmission of monetary policy shocks in the US. The evidence is less clear-cut for housing demand shocks. Finally, credit supply shocks seem to matter more in the euro area.     

What is the effect of unconventional monetary policy on bank performance?

This paper examines the relationship between unconventional monetary policy and the US banking performance. Unconventional monetary policy is captured through the central bank's assets and excess reserves. Results show that unconventional monetary policy has a negative relationship with bank performance. Further analysis shows that the negative association between unconventional monetary policy and performance is mitigated for banks with a high level of asset diversification and low deposit funding. We also find that the negative relationship between unconventional monetary policy and performance subdues for deposit insured financial institutions. Finally, we use dynamic panel threshold analysis which reveals that the negative association between unconventional monetary policy and bank performance is particularly pronounced above the reported threshold value.     

How important is capital structure policy to firm survival?

If there is an economically important optimal capital structure, then firms that deviate too far from the optimum will face greater risk of failure or acquisition. Using data from the oil industry we find no significant evidence that capital structure policy affects acquisition or failure probability. Firms appear to increase leverage when they face attractive growth opportunities or when poor operating performance reduces equity value or compels borrowing. Firms are acquired when rapid growth has reduced financial slack. In a clinical examination, we address the question of how firms with persistently low leverage can operate and survive for many years without being targeted for acquisition. Our evidence supports the pecking-order hypothesis, including acquisition among potential financing sources.     

Macroeconomic shocks and the forward yield curve: how important is monetary policy?

The associations between macroeconomic fluctuations and the yield curve tend to be explained by the reactions of the monetary authority. This paper evaluates how macroeconomics shocks affect the forward yield curve for domestic and foreign debt markets in Venezuela, where monetary policy is not the main source of macroeconomic fluctuations. As previous results in the literature, macroeconomic shocks affect more strongly the short end of the yield curve in the expected direction. Overall, supply shocks explain most of the variability of long-term yields, spread and volatility. Nonetheless, short-term yield movements can be associated with general monetary conditions of the economy and not necessarily with monetary policy actions.     

Does easing monetary policy increase financial instability?

This paper develops a model featuring both a macroeconomic and a financial friction that speaks to the interaction between monetary and macro-prudential policy and to the role of US monetary and regulatory policy in the run up to the Subprime mortgage crisis. There are two main results. First, interest rate rigidities in a monopolistic banking system increase the probability of a financial crisis (relative to the case of flexible interest rate) in response to contractionary shocks to the economy, while they act as automatic macro-prudential stabilizers in response to expansionary shocks. Second, when the interest rate is the only available instrument, monetary policy faces a trade-off between macroeconomic and financial stability. This trade off is both qualitative and quantitative in response to contractionary shocks, while it is only quantitative in response to positive shocks. We show that a second instrument, such as a Pigouvian tax on credit to households on the demand side of the market, is needed to restore efficiency in the economy when both frictions are at work.     

How credible is a too-big-to-fail policy? International evidence from market discipline

This paper analyzes in an international sample of banks from 104 countries if the sensitivity of the cost of deposits to bank risk varies across banks depending on their systemic and absolute size. We analyze a period before the 2007 financial crisis and control for endogeneity of bank size, intervention policies in past banking crises, and soundness of countries’ public finances. Our results are consistent with the predominance of the too-big-to-fail hypothesis, although this effect is stronger in countries that did not impose losses on depositors in past banking crises and in countries with sounder public finances.     

Preferences or private assessments on a monetary policy committee?

Using Bank of England voting data, we show empirically that members’ votes are driven by heterogeneous individual assessments of the economy as well as their individual policy preferences. Estimates indicate that internal committee members form more precise assessments than externals and are also more hawkish. The estimates allow the first quantification of the gain due to information aggregation on monetary policy committees. The marginal gain from additional committee members tapers quickly after five members. There is no evidence of gains through externals’ moderating internals’ preferences. A relatively small committee of highly informed internal members emerges as a desirable committee structure.     

Systemic risk: A new trade-off for monetary policy?

We introduce time-varying systemic risk (à la He and Krishnamurthy, 2014) in an otherwise standard New-Keynesian model to study whether simple leaning-against-the-wind interest rate rules can reduce systemic risk and improve welfare. We find that while financial sector leverage contains additional information about the state of the economy that is not captured in inflation and output leaning against financial variables can only marginally improve welfare because rules are detrimental in the presence of falling asset prices. An optimal macroprudential policy, similar to a counter cyclical capital requirement, can eliminate systemic risk raising welfare by about 1.5%. Also, a surprise monetary policy tightening does not necessarily reduce systemic risk, especially during bad times. Finally, a volatility paradox a la Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014) arises when monetary policy tries to excessively stabilize output.     

Does better information about foreign shocks improve monetary policy?

This paper examines whether better information about foreign shocks leads to welfare-improving monetary policy using a stylised two-country New Keynesian general equilibrium model. We demonstrate that when terms of trade externality exist and national central banks have the incentives to shift terms of trade in their own favour, the equilibrium under imperfect information may be welfare superior relative to an equilibrium with perfect information. In addition, the welfare gains or losses from information sharing between central banks are found to be small for empirically plausible range of parameters for risk aversion and elasticity of labour supply.     

On the separation of monetary and prudential policy: How much of the precrisis consensus remains?

Prior to the crisis, monetary policymakers and prudential authorities had clearly defined tools and goals with little or no conflict. The crisis revealed a variety of overlaps, where one set of policies seems to influence those in another. Does this mean that two policy realms can no longer remain separate? I address the question by first asking whether monetary policy creates significant financial stability risks. My answer is generally no. Given that, central bankers should refrain from reacting to financial stability risks in most circumstances. Instead, the job of safeguarding the financial system should be left, as it was prior to the crisis, to prudential policymakers. But how can prudential policy best maintain financial stability? I argue that given our current state of knowledge, stress tests are the best tool to ensure crisis will be rare and not terribly severe. So, my answer to the question in the title is that the precrisis consensus remains largely intact.     

What determines the stock market's reaction to monetary policy statements?

We find that information communicated through monetary policy statements has important business cycle dependent implications for stock prices. For example, during periods of economic expansion, stocks tend to respond negatively to announcements of higher rates ahead. In recessions, however, we find a strong positive reaction of stocks to seemingly similar signals of future monetary tightening. We provide evidence that the state dependence in the stock market's response is explained by information about the expected equity premium and future corporate cash flows contained in monetary policy statements. We also show state dependence in the average stock returns on days of scheduled FOMC meetings and in the impact of monetary policy statements on stock and bond return volatility.     

Grand corruption instead of commitment? Reconsidering time-inconsistency of monetary policy

This paper suggests that inflation may be affected differently by grand corruption compared to its positive nexus with petty corruption. In an extended Barro and Gordon (1983a) model grand corruption may serve as a quasi-commitment device: a cheating (expropriating) government may actually deter a monetary authority from cheating (reneging). Furthermore, Rogoff”s (1985) conservative central banker has an unambiguously beneficial effect; she reduces the inflationary bias even more while also rendering fiscal policy more effective. The model nests the standard fiscal–monetary interaction logic with and without expropriation as well as the diametrical “symbiosis” result obtained by Dixit and Lambertini (2003a).     

Designing domestic institutions for international monetary policy cooperation: A Utopia?

In a wide variety of international macroeconomic models monetary policy cooperation is optimal, non-cooperative policies are inefficient, but optimal policies can be attained non-cooperatively by optimal design of domestic institutions/contracts. We show that given endogenous institutional design, inefficiencies of non-cooperation cannot and will not be eliminated. We model the delegation stage explicitly and show that subgame perfect, credible contracts (chosen by governments based on individual rationality) are non-zero, but are different from optimal contracts and hence lead to inefficient equilibria. Optimal contracts require cooperation at the delegation stage, which is inconsistent with the advocated non-cooperative nature of the solution. A general solution method for credible contracts and an example from international monetary policy cooperation are considered. Our results feature delegation as an equilibrium phenomenon, explain inefficiencies of existing delegation schemes and hint to a potentially stronger role for supranational authorities in international policy coordination.     

How skilful are US fixed-income fund managers?

We develop a performance evaluation model that incorporates the factors proposed by Huij and Derwall (2008) and a fund-specific benchmark to analyse the performance of US fixed income funds. Using the full sample, and accounting for the possibility of false discoveries, we find that fund management companies extract most of any abnormal performance produced by their fund managers. Our sub-sample analysis indicates that after the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) there was a substantial increase in the number of bond funds with: both positive gross-of-fee alpha and positive net-of-fee alpha performance; and also a reduction in funds with negative-alpha performance. However, because the GFC was such a unique event, it would still be difficult to conclude that these managers offer value for money for investors compared to passive alternatives.     

How hardwired is human behavior?

Time and time again managers have tried to eliminate hierarchies, politics, and interorganizational rivalry--but to no avail. Why? Evolutionary psychologists would say that they are working against nature--emotional and behavioral "hardwiring" that is the legacy of our Stone Age ancestors. In this evolutionary psychology primer for executives, Nigel Nicholson explores many of the Science's central tenets. Of course, evolutionary psychology is still an emerging discipline, and its strong connection with the theory of natural selection has sparked significant controversy. But, as Nicholson suggests, evolutionary psychology is now well established enough that its insights into human instinct will prove illuminating to anyone seeking to understand why people act the way they do in organizational settings. Take gossip. According to evolutionary psychology, our Stone Age ancestors needed this skill to survive the socially unpredictable conditions of the Savannah Plain. Thus, over time, the propensity to gossip became part of our mental programming. Executives trying to eradicate gossip at work might as well try to change their employees' musical tastes. Better to put one's energy into making sure the "rumor mill" avoids dishonesty or unkindness as much as possible. Evolutionary psychology also explores the dynamics of the human group. Clans on the Savannah Plain, for example, appear to have had no more than 150 members. The message for managers? People will likely be most effective in small organizational units. As every executive knows, it pays to be an insightful student of human nature. Evolutionary psychology adds another important chapter to consider.     

What explains the lack of monetary policy influence on bank holding companies?

In this paper, we investigate how monetary policy innovations affect the equity returns of bank holding companies (BHCs). We also examine bank characteristics to determine what explains the cross-sectional and time-series variation in the returns' sensitivity. Similar to non-financial firms, we find that only unanticipated components affect bank equity returns; however, this effect is absent in the second half of our sample period. Smaller, less liquid banks have higher sensitivity; a higher ratio of time deposits to total deposits reduces this sensitivity. A higher ratio of non-interest income to total income also reduces this sensitivity, while capital-constrained banks have a higher sensitivity to monetary policy innovations. We argue that a higher dependence on non-interest income and the use of interest rate derivatives together may explain the disappearing influence of monetary policy on these BHCs.     

What does peer-to-peer lending evidence say about the Risk-Taking Channel of monetary policy?

This paper uses loan application-level data from a peer-to-peer lending platform to study the risk-taking channel of monetary policy. By employing a direct ex-ante measure of risk-taking and estimating the simultaneous equations of loan approval and loan amount, we provide evidence of monetary policy's impact on a nonbank financial institution's risk-taking. We find that the search-for-yield is the main driving force of the risk-taking effect, while we do not observe consistent findings of risk-shifting from the liquidity change. Monetary policy easing is associated with a higher probability of granting loans to risky borrowers and greater riskiness of credit allocation. However, these changes do not necessarily relate to a larger loan amount on average.