Mutual Funds and Stock and Bond Market Stability

The unprecedented growth of mutual funds has raised questions about the impact of mutual fund flows on stock and bond prices. Many believe that the equity bull market of the 1990s is attributable to the huge flows of funds into equity mutual funds during this period and that a withdrawal of those funds could send stock prices plummeting. This article investigates the relationship between aggregate monthly mutual fund flows (sales, redemptions, and net sales) and stock and bond monthly returns during a 30-year period beginning January 1961 utilizing Granger causality and instrumental variables analysis. With one exception, flows into stock and bond funds have not affected either stock and bond returns. The exception is 1971–1981, when widespread redemptions from equity mutual funds significantly depressed stock returns. In contrast, the magnitude of flows into both stock and bond funds are affected significantly by stock and bond returns.     

The fragile capital structure of hedge funds and the limits to arbitrage

During a financial crisis, when investors are most in need of liquidity and accurate prices, hedge funds cut their arbitrage positions and hoard cash. The paper explains this phenomenon. We argue that the fragile nature of the capital structure of hedge funds, combined with low market liquidity, creates a risk of coordination in redemptions among hedge fund investors that severely limits hedge funds' arbitrage capabilities. We present a model of hedge funds' optimal asset allocation in the presence of coordination risk among investors. We show that hedge fund managers behave conservatively and even abstain from participating in the market once coordination risk is factored into their investment decisions. The model suggests a new source of limits to arbitrage.     

Mutual Fund Liquidity Costs

One dollar in purchases or redemptions generates an average cost of $0.006 for US equity mutual funds during the period 1997‐2009, approximately 70% lower than prior estimates derived from older data. However, large cross‐sectional differences exist between funds. Many funds have costs near zero, but funds that hold relatively illiquid equities, have relatively concentrated portfolios, and manage relatively large amounts of assets have average liquidity costs significantly greater than the full sample average. Furthermore, despite a large difference in underlying asset liquidity, US bond funds and US equity funds have similar average liquidity costs.     

AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF MUTUAL FUND EXPENSES

Mutual fund investors are subjected to many fees and expenses related to both the management of the fund assets and the sale and distribution of the fund's shares. In recent years these expenses have increased as a percentage of assets. The preoccupation of mutual fund investors with using performance evaluation as a selection criterion is misguided because of the volatility of investment returns. Whether the fund's performance is due to superior management or just good luck is difficult to determine. On the other hand, mutual fund expenses are stable. As such, the mutual fund investor should pursue a policy of choosing funds with low expenses. In this paper we conduct an empirical analysis of these expenses. The results of our analysis of equity funds suggest that expense-conscious investors should look at the fund size, age, turnover ratio, cash ratio, and existence of a 12b-1 fee as key determinants of expenses. Our analysis of bond funds suggests that the key factors are the fund's sales charge, weighted average maturity, size, and existence of a 12b-1 fee.     

Safe but fragile: Information acquisition,liquidity support and redemption runs

This paper proposes a theory of redemption runs based on strategic information acquisition by fund managers. We argue that liquidity lines provided by third parties can be a source of financial fragility, as they incentivize fund managers to acquire private information about the value of their assets. This strategic information acquisition can lead to inefficient market liquidity dry-ups caused by self-fulfilling fears of adverse selection. By lowering asset prices, information acquisition also reduces the value of funds’ assets-under-management and may spur inefficient redemption runs by investors. Two different regimes can arise: one in which funds’ information acquisition incentives are unaffected by the volume of redemptions, and another where market and funding liquidity risk mutually reinforce each other.     

Looking for Someone to Blame: Delegation,Cognitive Dissonance,and the Disposition Effect

We analyze brokerage data and an experiment to test a cognitive dissonance based theory of trading: investors avoid realizing losses because they dislike admitting that past purchases were mistakes, but delegation reverses this effect by allowing the investor to blame the manager instead. Using individual trading data, we show that the disposition effect—the propensity to realize past gains more than past losses—applies only to nondelegated assets like individual stocks; delegated assets, like mutual funds, exhibit a robust reverse‐disposition effect. In an experiment, we show that increasing investors' cognitive dissonance results in both a larger disposition effect in stocks and a larger reverse‐disposition effect in funds. Additionally, increasing the salience of delegation increases the reverse‐disposition effect in funds. Cognitive dissonance provides a unified explanation for apparently contradictory investor behavior across asset classes and has implications for personal investment decisions, mutual fund management, and intermediation.     

Purchase and redemption decisions of mutual fund investors and the role of fund families

This paper investigates the purchases and redemptions of a large cross-sectional sample of German equity funds. We find that investors not only punish bad performance by selling their shares, but also have a tendency to sell winners. Investors in large fund families show higher sales and redemption rates. Furthermore, family size also affects the flow-performance relationship: investors in large families punish bad performance more. Last, we find that inner family rankings play an important part for redemptions, with investors strongly redeeming their shares from intra-family losers. This result provides a potential reconciliation to the apparent contradiction between the low average holding period of mutual fund investors and the lack of investor discipline.     

Should Asset Managers Hedge Their “Fees at Risk”?

Although the recent financial crisis afflicted all asset managers, the problem of general market exposure was in some respects worse for the long-only funds that rely almost completely on asset-based fees than for the “absolute return” and other kinds of hedge funds that also receive performance-based fees. While the revenue generated by performance-based fees is expected to be volatile, asset-based fees tend to be viewed as an “annuity” stream that involves little or no earnings risk. But, especially in the case of long-only funds, large shortfalls in asset fees were caused by the combination of significant redemptions and sharp reductions in assets under management that accompanied the plunge in asset prices. In this article, the author attempts to quantify the expected effect of market fluctuations on the asset fees and profitability of long-only asset managers. Having done so, he then argues that traditional long-only asset managers—managers whose only reason for being is their ability to generate above-market returns (or “alpha”) on a fairly consistent basis—routinely retain too much beta risk in their primarily asset-based fee structures. The author offers two main reasons for long-only asset managers to hedge beta risk: (1) it would reduce the need for fund management firms to hold liquid capital to ensure solvency and fund important projects during market downturns; (2) it would provide the firm's current and prospective clients with a clearer signal of whether its managers are succeeding in the firm's mission of generating alpha, as well as the possibility of more equity-like and cost-effective incentive compensation systems for those managers.     

Another Puzzle: The Growth in Actively Managed Mutual Funds

Mutual funds represent one of the fastest growing type of financial intermediary in the American economy. The question remains as to why mutual funds and in particular actively managed mutual funds have grown so fast, when their performance on average has been inferior to that of index funds. One possible explanation of why investors buy actively managed open end funds lies in the fact that they are bought and sold at net asset value, and thus management ability may not be priced. If management ability exists and it is not included in the price of open end funds, then performance should be predictable. If performance is predictable and at least some investors are aware of this, then cash flows into and out of funds should be predictable by the very same metrics that predict performance. Finally, if predictors exist and at least some investors act on these predictors in investing in mutual funds, the return on new cash flows should be better than the average return for all investors in these funds. This article presents empirical evidence on all of these issues and shows that investors in actively managed mutual funds may have been more rational than we have assumed.     

Household portfolio optimization with XTFs? An empirical study using the SHS-base

XTFs are plain-vanilla Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs) which replicate a broad, internationally diversified market index. We question, if XTFs can optimize the performance of households’ portfolios when taking multiple relevant asset classes into account, not only stocks. As opposed to most existing studies, we apply representative household portfolio data to estimate households’ portfolios. Households’ portfolios in our sample show similar compositions and can be grouped into one of three stylized portfolio compositions which exhibit asset class concentrations on cash/savings, mutual funds and individual stocks. For each stylized portfolio, we first investigate if an easily investable 60/40 stock/bond XTF portfolio which is risk-adjusted (including (de-)leverage costs) to the risk of the stylized portfolios, achieves higher returns than the stylized portfolios. This is the case for all stylized portfolios, even those with concentrations on cash/savings or mutual funds. Second, we examine risk/return-changes when replacing the entire risky assets of the stylized portfolios with the 60/40 stock/bond XTF portfolio including transaction costs. This leads to return enhancements in all stylized portfolios and particularly in the portfolio with high stock concentrations to risk reductions. Overall, we find that XTFs are generally suitable to optimize the performance of households’ portfolios under consideration of multiple relevant asset classes.     

How fast can your company afford to grow?

Everyone knows that starting a business requires cash, and growing a business requires even more. But few people understand that a profitable company that tries to grow too fast can run out of cash even if its products are great successes. So a big challenge for managers of any growing concern is to strike the proper balance between consuming cash and generating it. Authors Neil Churchill and John Mullins offer a framework to help identify and manage the level of growth that a company's cash flow can support. They present a formula to calculate an organization's self-financeable growth (SFG) rate, taking into account three critical factors: a company's operating cash cycle--the amount of time the company's money is tied up in inventory and other current assets before customers pay for goods and services; the amount of cash needed to finance each dollar of sales; and the amount of cash generated by each dollar of sales. The authors offer a detailed hypothetical example that carefully considers these three factors; they then illustrate how a company can influence its SFG rate by carefully managing some combination of those factors--that is, some mix of speeding cash flow, reducing costs, and raising prices. They expand on the original example by showing how to include income taxes and depreciation; plan for asset replacement; and identify which one of multiple product lines holds the greatest growth potential. The authors also discuss how various kinds of businesses--manufacturing firms, importers, and service companies--differ greatly in their abilities to finance growth from internally generated funds.     

Should Investors Avoid All Actively Managed Mutual Funds? A Study in Bayesian Performance Evaluation

This paper analyzes mutual-fund performance from an investor's perspective. We study the portfolio-choice problem for a mean-variance investor choosing among a risk-free asset, index funds, and actively managed mutual funds. To solve this problem, we employ a Bayesian method of performance evaluation; a key innovation in our approach is the development of a flexible set of prior beliefs about managerial skill. We then apply our methodology to a sample of 1,437 mutual funds. We find that some extremely skeptical prior beliefs nevertheless lead to economically significant allocations to active managers.     

Investor behaviour and reaching for yield: Evidence from the sterling corporate bond market

We provide evidence on how corporate bond investors react to a change in yields, and how this behaviour differs in times of market‐wide stress. We also investigate ‘reaching for yield’ across investor types, as well as providing insights into the structure of the corporate bond market. Using proprietary sterling corporate bond transaction data, we show that insurance companies, hedge funds and asset managers are typically net buyers when corporate bond yields rise. Dealer banks clear the market by being net sellers. However, we find evidence for this behaviour reversing in times of stress for some investors. During the 2013 ‘taper tantrum’, asset managers were net sellers of corporate bonds in response to a sharp rise in yields, potentially amplifying price changes. At the same time, dealer banks were net buyers. Finally, we provide evidence that insurers, hedge funds and asset managers tilt their portfolios towards higher risk bonds, consistent with ‘reaching for yield’ behaviour.     

Crises,Liquidity Shocks,and Fire Sales at Commercial Banks

If liquidity shortages cause financial crises, a lender of last resort can provide funds to banks facing potential fire sales. However, if funding problems primarily occur at banks with existing solvency problems, then government liquidity programs may not spur bank lending. We find that commercial bank funding does not typically dry up in a crisis, not even during the subprime crisis. Rather, weak banks are more likely to borrow less. Furthermore, banks rely more on deposits and newly issued equity than fire sales. When they do sell assets, they cherry pick assets in order to alleviate pressure from capital regulations.     

Asset sales in the mutual fund industry: Who gains?

We analyze gains from intercorporate sales of mutual fund subsidiaries, using mandated SEC disclosures to assess the performance of mutual funds transferred by these transactions. Sellers are financial conglomerates (banks) using equity-based deals to transfer poorly performing funds to highly focused asset management companies. The transferred funds experience significant improvements in risk-adjusted returns, efficiency, and asset growth. These improvements are closely correlated with the gains in wealth to buyers and sellers at deal announcements, indicating the market efficiently capitalizes expected performance improvements. Our results provide evidence that these transactions transfer assets to acquirers better able to manage them, generating gains for fund holders and buyer and seller shareholders.     

Relations between mutual fund flows and stock market returns in Korea

This paper analyses relations between stock market returns and mutual fund flows in Korea. A positive relationship exists between stock market returns and mutual fund flows, measured as stock purchases and sales and net trading volumes. In aggregate, mutual funds are negative feedback traders. Standard causality tests suggest that it is predominantly returns that drive flows, while stock sales may contain information about returns. After controlling for declining markets, the results suggest Korean equity fund managers tend to increase stock purchases in times of rising market volatility, possibly disregarding fundamental information, and to sell in times of wide dispersion in investor beliefs.     

How Does Size Affect Mutual Fund Behavior?

If actively managed mutual funds suffer from diminishing returns to scale, funds should alter investment behavior as assets under management increase. Although asset growth has little effect on the behavior of the typical fund, we find that large funds and small‐cap funds diversify their portfolios in response to growth. Greater diversification, especially for small‐cap funds, is associated with better performance. Fund family growth is related to the introduction of new funds that hold different stocks from their existing siblings. Funds with many siblings diversify less rapidly as they grow, suggesting that the fund family may influence a fund's portfolio strategy.     

Momentum or contrarian investment strategies: Evidence from Dutch institutional investors

This paper analyses investment strategies of three types of Dutch institutional investors - pension funds, life insurers and non-life insurers - over the period 1999-2005. We use balance sheet and cash flow data, including purchases and sales of equity, fixed income and real estate. We trace asset reallocations back to both active trading and revaluations and link investment decisions to firm-specific characteristics and macroeconomic variables. Overall, our results indicate that all three investor types tend to be contrarian traders, i.e. they buy past losers and sell past winners. Especially pension funds showed this behaviour in the most turbulent part of the sample - the crash of 2002 and early 2003 - implying that these institutions have a stabilising impact on financial markets when this is needed most. Life insurers tend to be contrarian traders when they have a high proportion of unit-linked policies, while non-life insurers are contrarian when they have a more risky business model.     

Real asset liquidity,cash holdings,and the cost of corporate debt

We study the impact of the interplay between cash holdings and asset sales on the corporate debt spread. We allow cash holdings and asset sales to assist with both debt repayment and sequential investments. The interplay between cash holdings and asset sales leads to a convex relationship between credit spreads and the liquidity of the market for real assets. We use the 2008 financial crisis as a natural experiment and find that post-2008, the nonlinearity of the link between credit spreads and asset liquidity is pronounced, closely matching analytical predictions. This is especially acute for highly leveraged and low profitability firms.     

MUTUAL FUND TRADES: ASYMMETRIC LIQUIDITY PREFERENCES AND FUND PERFORMANCE

We investigate the role of the liquidity of stocks traded by mutual funds on the performance of funds experiencing substantial and sustained redemptions (outflows) or inflows. Accordingly, we identify 770 redeeming fund‐periods and 1,757 inflow fund‐periods and find a statistically significant relation between the liquidity of the stocks they trade and the quantity of the stock traded. Notably, when funds experience redemptions, those with low portfolio liquidity have an elevated preference for selling more‐liquid stocks. In the following period, such funds statistically and economically underperform funds that sell less‐liquid stocks. This is consistent with redemptions detrimentally affecting shareholders that remain in a fund.