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1.
We consider a general equilibrium model of pure exchange economies with endowment externalities. Consumers’ behaviors depend not only on their own consumption but also on the endowments of the other consumers. Applying the same method of analysis in Balasko (2015) about wealth concerns, we first show that almost all properties of equilibrium, including smooth equilibrium manifold and genericity of regular economies, can be directly extended to the economy where the demand function depends on the endowments of others and wealth of only one consumer. Next, we clarify the sufficient conditions under which those properties remain true in the economy with the most general form of endowment externalities. Finally, we generalize the above sufficient conditions to derive generic regularity results in the economy with both consumption and endowment externalities. 相似文献
2.
Manzini and Mariotti (2014) define the menu-independent random consideration set rule, where the decision maker considers each alternative with a menu-independent probability known as the attention function. We relax the assumption of menu-independence and allow for any restriction to be imposed on the attention function. We show that there is an equivalence between the attention function and the hazard rate. This equivalence is used to characterize the menu dependent random consideration set rules that correspond to (i) specific conditions on the probability rule, and (ii) different stochastic choice models from the literature. 相似文献
3.
In the presence of three or more realisations of the aggregate endowment that are extremely ambiguous, in the sense that all relative probabilities are admissible, if agents have preferences that are representable by expected uncertain utility functions (Gul and Pesendorfer, 2014), general equilibrium does not generically exist in finite economies. It always exists, however, in continuum economies. 相似文献
4.
This paper investigates whether there is an allocation rule for which innovation never hurts anyone. Existing studies provide possibility characterizations together with efficiency and a natural participation constraint, assuming the domain of one input good and one output good in which nobody prefers to consume more of the input good than what she has. We show that this possibility result does not survive and we lead to impossibility either when (i) somebody wants to consume the input good more than what she has; or when (ii) there are multiple input goods. 相似文献
5.
We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for observed outcomes in extensive game forms, in which preferences are unobserved, to be rationalized first, weakly, as a Nash equilibrium and then as the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium. Thus, one could use these conditions to find that play is (a) consistent with subgame-perfect equilibrium, or (b) not consistent with subgame-perfect behavior but is consistent with Nash equilibrium, or (c) consistent with neither. 相似文献
6.
This paper presents a model of choice with limited attention. The decision-maker forms a consideration set, from which she chooses her most preferred alternative. Both preferences and consideration sets are stochastic. While we present axiomatisations for this model, our focus is on the following identification question: to what extent can an observer retrieve probabilities of preferences and consideration sets from observed choices? Our first conclusion is a negative one: if the observed data are choice probabilities, then probabilities of preferences and consideration sets cannot be retrieved from choice probabilities. We solve the identification problem by assuming that an “enriched” dataset is observed, which includes choice probabilities under two frames. Given this dataset, the model is “fully identified”, in the sense that we can recover from observed choices (i) the probabilities of preferences (to the same extent as in models with full attention) and (ii) the probabilities of consideration sets. While a number of recent papers have developed models of limited attention that are, in a similar sense, “fully identified”, they obtain this result not by using an enriched dataset but rather by making a restrictive assumption about the default option, which our paper avoids. 相似文献
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8.
We consider a family of exchange economies with complete markets where consumers have multiprior preferences representing their ambiguity aversion. Under a linear independence assumption, we prove that regular economies are generic. Regular economies exhibit enjoyable properties: odd finite number of equilibrium prices, local constancy of this number, local differentiable selections of the equilibrium prices.Thus, even if ambiguity aversion is represented by non-differentiable multiprior preferences, economies retain generically the properties of the differentiable approach. 相似文献
9.
This paper studies rational choice behavior of a player in sequential games of perfect and complete information without an assumption that the other players who join the same games are rational. The model of individually rational choice is defined through a decomposition of the behavioral norm assumed in the subgame perfect equilibria, and we propose a set of axioms on collective choice behavior that characterize the individual rationality obtained as such. As the choice of subgame perfect equilibrium paths is a special case where all players involved in the choice environment are each individually rational, the paper offers testable characterizations of both individual rationality and collective rationality in sequential games. 相似文献
10.
《管理科学学报（英文）》2018,3(1):1-15
Most route choice models assume that people are completely rational. Recently, regret theory has attracted researchers’ attentions because of its power to depict real travel behavior. This paper proposes a multiclass stochastic user equilibrium assignment model by using regret theory. All users are differentiated by their own regret aversion. The route travel disutility for users of each class is defined as a linear combination of the travel time and anticipated regret. The proposed model is formulated as a variational inequality problem and solved by using the self-regulated averaging method. The numerical results show that users’ regret aversion indeed influences their route choice behavior and that users with high regret aversion are more inclined to change route choice when the traffic congestion degree varies. 相似文献
11.
In this paper, we consider a general equilibrium model in which the economies are characterized by the distribution of firms on a set of branches of production; we will show that based on the decisions of the managers of the firms, it is possible to build a dynamic system whose solutions reproduce the possible trajectories of the economy. Once the initial state of an economy is known, that is, the initial distribution of firms, we will have a unique solution for this dynamic system, which will coincide with the evolution of the economy, that is, the evolution of prices and equilibrium allocations.The investment decisions of the administrators of the companies will change the distribution over the set of existing productive branches, which in turn will produce changes in the wealth of consumers who are also shareholders of the companies and then as a consequence, their demand will change, and therefore the equilibrium allocations and prices will too.In most cases, these decisions lead to an improvement in the efficiency of the productive side of the economy and an increase in the welfare of the economy as a whole, but, as we will show, under some particular circumstances, even when it comes to rational decisions from the point of view of administrators, this can lead to undesirable repercussions on the welfare of consumers. Besides, in a neighborhood of a critical economy, even when these decisions may involve small changes in the distribution of companies, they can cause abrupt and unexpected changes in the behavior of the economy, or in other words, they can cause an economic crisis. These are characterized by large changes in the prices, in the demand, and in the supply of goods. In contrast, in a sufficiently small neighborhood of a regular economy, small changes in the distribution of firms produced by the investment decisions of managers do not lead to large changes in the subsequent behavior of the economy. We will exemplify these statements with several numerical examples. 相似文献
12.
In this note, we give an equilibrium existence theorem for exchange economies with asymmetric information and with an infinite dimensional commodity space. In our model, we assume that preferences are represented by well behaved utility functions, the positive cone has a non empty interior and the individual rational utility set is compact. Our result complements the corresponding one in Podczeck and Yannelis (2008), in the sense that is applicable to commodity spaces in which the order intervals are (possibly) not compact with respect to any Hausdorff linear topology. 相似文献
13.
We show that the set of competitive equilibrium points of a pure exchange economy are the equilibrium points of a broader class of better-response demands than the usual utility-maximizing demand functions. The better-response demands are derived from assigning weights to all commodity bundles with higher utility than the current commodity bundle, with the greatest weights being placed on the commodity bundles with the highest utility gain. The usual utility-maximizing demand functions are then those in which the weight on the utility-maximizing bundle is one. We also show that these better-response demands belong to a large class of response maps that are generated by monotonic transformations of the utility functions and/or monotonic transformations of the weights assigned to the commodity bundles. 相似文献
14.
Utility functions are regarded as elements of a linear space that is paired with a dual representation of choices to demonstrate the similarity between preference revelation and the duality of prices and quantities in revealed preference. With respect to preference revelation, quasilinear versus ordinal utility and choices in an abstract set versus choices in a linear space are distinguished and their separate and common features are explored. The central thread uniting the various strands is the subdifferentiability of convex functions. 相似文献
15.
We establish an existence theorem for Cournot–Walras equilibria in a monopolistically competitive economy. Instead of the traditional approach which depends on Kakutani’s fixed point theorem, we employ the theories of aggregative games and best reply potential games. We show that, if there exists a representative consumer, under some conditions on preferences and production technologies, the profit maximization game is a (pseudo) best reply potential game. Hence, the existence of the equilibria is proved independently of the well known convex-valued assumption on the best responses. Although our assumptions result in the additive separability on a utility function of a representative consumer, the existence of increasing returns and indivisible productions can be allowed. In our model, it is shown that the game played by firms exhibits strategic substitutes whether the products of firms are substitutes or complements, and this plays an important role for the existence of the equilibria. 相似文献
16.
We study stochastic choice from lists. All lists present the same set of alternatives albeit in different orders. Faced with a list, the decision maker makes her choice in two stages. In the first stage she searches through the list till she sees alternatives. In the second stage she chooses from the alternatives she has seen. Both and the choice rule governing her second stage behavior are random. We show that the underlying primitives of our model are revealed by the decision maker’s choice frequencies from lists. We characterize the model and two of its special cases. In the first special case the decision maker deterministically chooses the best observed alternative according to a given preference. In the second, the decision maker maximizes random preferences. 相似文献
17.
We axiomatize a model of satisficing which features random thresholds and the possibility of choice abstention. Given a menu, the decision maker first randomly draws a threshold. Next, using a list order, she searches the menu for alternatives which are at least as good as the threshold. She chooses the first such alternative she finds, and if no such alternative exists, she abstains. Since the threshold is random, so is the resulting behavior. We characterize this model using two simple axioms. In general the revelation of the model’s primitives is incomplete. We characterize a specialization of the model for which the underlying preference and list ordering are uniquely identified by choice frequencies. We also show that our model is a special Random Utility Model. 相似文献
19.
The U.S. public transit system represents a multi-billion dollar industry that provides essential transit services to millions of urban residents. We study the market for new transit buses that features a set of non-profit transit agencies purchasing buses primarily from a few domestic bus makers. In contrast with private passenger vehicles, the fuel economy of public buses has not improved during the last thirty years and is irresponsive to fuel price changes. To understand these findings, we build a model of bus fleet management decisions of public transit agencies that yields testable hypotheses. Our empirical analysis of bus fleet turnover and capital investment highlights the role of energy prices, environmental regulations, and the “Buy America” mandate associated with receiving federal funding to purchase public transit buses. 相似文献
20.
In this paper we address a long standing gap in economic theory—the gap between claims for the dynamic efficiency of trading in markets, and the findings of formal economic theory, which justify those claims only under restrictive assumptions. We use agent-based methods to study the dynamics of exchange with trading agents who are characterized by several different preference relations. We see that outcomes converge with high probability to Pareto optima in the cases studied, including the well-known example due to Scarf. 相似文献