On the implications of market power in banking: Evidence from developing countries

This paper investigates how different degrees of market power affect bank efficiency and stability in the context of developing economies. It sheds light on the competition-stability nexus by documenting and analyzing the complex interactions between a tripod of variables that are central for regulators: the degree of market power, bank cost and profit efficiency, and overall firm stability. The results show that an increase in the degree of market power leads to greater bank stability and enhanced profit efficiency, despite significant cost efficiency losses. The findings lend empirical justification to the traditional view that increased competition may undermine bank stability, and may bear significant implications for stressed banking systems in developing economies.     

Bank Competition and Financial Stability

Under the traditional “competition-fragility” view, more bank competition erodes market power, decreases profit margins, and results in reduced franchise value that encourages bank risk taking. Under the alternative “competition-stability” view, more market power in the loan market may result in higher bank risk as the higher interest rates charged to loan customers make it harder to repay loans, and exacerbate moral hazard and adverse selection problems. The two strands of the literature need not necessarily yield opposing predictions regarding the effects of competition and market power on stability in banking. Even if market power in the loan market results in riskier loan portfolios, the overall risks of banks need not increase if banks protect their franchise values by increasing their equity capital or engaging in other risk-mitigating techniques. We test these theories by regressing measures of loan risk, bank risk, and bank equity capital on several measures of market power, as well as indicators of the business environment, using data for 8,235 banks in 23 developed nations. Our results suggest that—consistent with the traditional “competition-fragility” view—banks with a higher degree of market power also have less overall risk exposure. The data also provides some support for one element of the “competition-stability” view—that market power increases loan portfolio risk. We show that this risk may be offset in part by higher equity capital ratios.

The risk–return relations in the Singapore stock market

This paper examines the risk–return relations in the Singapore stock market for the period April 1986 to December 1998. Though beta is significantly related to realized returns, the explanatory power is low. Adding other stock characteristics such as skewness and kurtosis provides limited incremental benefits. However, when a conditional framework based on up and down markets is introduced, the explanatory power increases more than 100 times and there is a significant positive (negative) relation between beta and returns when the market excess returns are positive (negative). The same relation applies when unsystematic risk, total risk and kurtosis are added separately to the beta–return relation during up and down markets with increased explanatory power. Our results indicate that other stock characteristics in addition to beta are also important in pricing risky assets and investors do not hold diversified portfolios. Our results are also checked and compared with another conditional model with time-varying betas conditional on a set of economic variables.     

Efficiency in the Pricing of the FTSE 100 Futures Contract

This paper studies the pricing efficiency in the FTSE 100 futures contract by linking the predictable movements in futures returns to the time-varying risk and risk premia associated with prespecified factors. The results indicate that the predictability of the FTSE 100 futures returns is consistent with a conditional multifactor model with time-varying moments. The dynamics of the factor risk premia, combined with the variation in the betas, capture most of the predictable variance of returns, leaving little variation to be explained in terms of market inefficiency. Hence the predictive power of the instruments does not justify a rejection of market efficiency.     

中国商业银行市场势力对其效率和稳定性的影响

文章运用随机边界模型估算了中国商业银行近十年来的成本、利润效率,并分别以勒纳指数和Z指数代表市场势力和稳定性,考察了市场势力对银行经营效率和稳定性的影响。结果表明:内地商业银行整体的效率逐年上升,但仍落后于香港的银行;四大商业银行的效率低于中小银行。市场势力与效率呈反向关系,而与稳定性的关系要区别对待:市场势力一方面增加了中小银行和香港银行的稳定性,另一方面也增加了四大商业银行和交通银行的经营风险。因此,继续深入金融自由化和银行业改革,恰当地引入一些竞争,会对中国商业银行经营的效率和稳定性起到积极的作用。     

The bright side of market power in Asian banking: Implications of bank capitalization and financial freedom

Using a sample of listed banks in the Asia-Pacific region from 2000 to 2016, this paper documents that higher market power reduces risk taking but increases loan growth and performance in banking. This highlights the "bright side" of bank market power in general. However, the positive effect of market power on bank stability is more pronounced for well-capitalized banks, although their performance tends to decline, and loan growth is unaffected by market power. Hence, bank capitalization plays an important role in strengthening financial stability due to an increase in bank market power. Moreover, banks with higher market power located in countries with a lower degree of financial freedom exhibit lower riskiness, higher loan growth, and better performance. Greater control by authorities in the financial sector is essential, not only to enhance financial stability, but also to boost financial intermediation and bank performance following an increase in bank market power.     

Insurance Market Effects of Risk Management Metrics

We extend the classical analysis on optimal insurance design to the case when the insurer implements regulatory requirements (Value-at-Risk). Presumably, regulators impose some risk management requirement such as VaR to reduce the insurers’ insolvency risk, as well as to improve the insurance market stability. We show that VaR requirements may better protect the insured and improve economic efficiency, but have stringent negative effects on the insurance market. Our analysis reveals that the insured are better protected in the event of greater loss irrespective of the optimal design from either the insured or the insurer perspective. However, in the presence of the VaR requirement on the insurer, the insurer's insolvency risk might be increased and there are moral hazard issues in the insurance market because the optimal contract is discontinuous.     

Distributive inefficiency in horizontal mergers: Evidence from wealth transfers between merging firms and their customers

The ultimate goal of antitrust enforcement is to maximize the surplus consumers enjoy by enhancing production efficiency and eliminating market power. Previous literature focuses on the average net wealth effects on merging firms and their stakeholder firms and reports evidence of efficiency gains while no evidence of market power in horizontal mergers. In this paper, we examine how efficiency gains distribute between the merging firms and their customer firms. We find a significant negative relation between the combined abnormal returns on the merging firms and those on their customer firms, demonstrating a wealth transfer effect. Such a negative relation is more pronounced when market power is likely to be more intensive. On average, the merging firms gain, and their customers do not lose. Our results suggest that market power allows merging firms to withhold merger gains that would have been passed to the downstream under perfect competition and prevents customers from enjoying the whole consumer surplus. Distributive inefficiency exists in horizontal mergers.     

The regulations–risk taking nexus under competitive pressure: What about the Islamic banking system?

Does market power condition the effect of bank regulations and supervision on bank risk taking? We focus on three regulatory tools: capital requirements, the restriction of activities, and official supervisory powers. Employing 10 years of unbalanced panel data on 123 Islamic and conventional banks operating in the Middle East and Asia, we arrive at the following conclusions. First, banking market power strengthens the negative impact of capital regulation on bank risk taking. Second, our empirical results suggest that the negative effect of activity restrictions on stability is diminished when banks have greater market power. Finally, we do not find strong evidence that the negative effect of supervisory power on banks’ risk taking is conditioned by their competitive behavior. In further analysis, we differentiate between Islamic and conventional banks regarding their competition, as well as their risk behavior. The results differ according to the banking business model. These findings could be useful for bank regulators in light of the accomplishment of Islamic banks’ regulatory framework. Indeed, the adoption of Basel III represents a significant regulatory challenge, given that it does not take into account the specificities of Islamic banks.     

Does banking system transparency enhance bank competition? Cross-country evidence

There seems to be a consensus among regulators and scholars that in order to improve the functioning of a banking system it is necessary to raise the level of bank information disclosure. However, its influence on bank competition – which is an important factor affecting the efficiency and stability of the banking system – is left out of consideration. To test whether greater bank information disclosure is associated with both lower market power and lower concentration in the banking markets, we use country-level data covering the years 1998, 2001, 2005 and 2010. Our findings show that countries with higher levels of bank transparency have lower levels of bank concentration, while the link between transparency and market power is less pronounced. We also show that the reduction of competition due to stricter disclosure requirements depends on bank credit risks and the relationship is U-shaped.     

International asset pricing under segmentation and PPP deviations

We analyze the impact of both purchasing power parity (PPP) deviations and market segmentation on asset pricing and investor's portfolio holdings. The freely traded securities command a world market risk premium and an inflation risk premium. The securities that can be held by only a subset of investors command two additional premiums: a conditional market risk premium and a segflation risk premium. Our model is empirically supported with important implications for tests of international asset pricing.     

Market Power in European Banking Sectors

We analyze the evolution of market power in the main banking sectors of the European Union. The evolution of the relative margins does not show an increase in the degree of competition within the EU. The explanatory factors of the relative margins most directly related to market power are not significant, and even have a negative influence (concentration in the deposits market). The size and efficiency of banks, default risk, and the economic cycle have a notable capacity to explain the behavior of the market power. The results show the inadequacy of using concentration measures as proxy for the competition environment in banking markets.     

Speculative trading and stock returns: A stochastic dominance analysis of the Chinese A-share market

The pricing of A-shares in China has long puzzled financial economists. This paper applies recent tests of stochastic dominance (SD) to examine whether differences in the return distributions of A- and B-shares in China are consistent with market efficiency. As SD is nonparametric, market efficiency can be examined without the joint test problem arising from misspecifications in the asset pricing benchmark. Our results show A-shares have second-order dominated B-shares from 1996 to 2005. This dominance was most significant during the market segmentation period, but has continued, albeit to a lesser extent even after the B-share market was opened to local investors in 2001. Our results are robust to using residual returns from an international asset pricing model instead of raw returns. We conclude that the superior performance of A-shares cannot be attributed to risk. The results are more likely due to a return bias caused by intense speculation among retail individuals under limited arbitrage.     

Estimating the technical and scale efficiency of Greek commercial banks: The impact of credit risk, off-balance sheet activities, and international operations

This paper uses data envelopment analysis (DEA) to investigate the efficiency of the Greek commercial banking industry over the period 2000–2004. Our results indicate that the inclusion of loan loss provisions as an input increases the efficiency scores, but off-balance sheet items do not have a significant impact. The differences between the efficiency scores obtained through the profit-oriented and the intermediation approaches are in general small. Banks that have expanded their operations abroad appear to be more technical efficient than those operating only at a national level. Higher capitalization, loan activity, and market power increase the efficiency of banks. The number of branches has a positive and significant impact on efficiency, but the number of ATMs does not. The results are mixed with respect to variables indicating whether the banks are operating abroad through subsidiaries or branches.     

Recovering the market risk premium from higher-order moment risks

We propose a consistent approach for the estimation of the market risk premium. As a first step, we define the broadest possible set of ex ante estimators from the viewpoint of a power utility optimiser holding the market portfolio. We then employ an evaluation framework to optimise the parametrisation of the methodology. We show that this theoretical framework can still produce reasonable market risk premium estimates, even when the representative agent is not a power utility optimiser. Our results show that the inclusion of higher-order moment risk premia improves the accuracy of the method.     

Banking Market Size Structure and Financial Stability: Evidence from Eight Asian Countries

Using commercial bank data from eight major Asian countries, we examine the relationship between the banking market size structure and the stability of financial institutions. We also analyze the effect of bank upsizing on the financial stability. Our results show that a rise in large banks’ market power, accompanying an increase in their market shares, lowers the capital adequacy of small banks. Small banks’ nonperforming loans and the possibility of their bankruptcy also increase as large banks’ market shares rise. We further show that larger banks tend to have lower capital adequacy ratios, liquidity ratios, and distance-to-default ratios. Our study suggests that large banks’ greater market shares are associated with small banks’ financial instability. Overall, these findings are consistent with the notion of the recent banking literature that has important antitrust policy implications.     

In search of distress risk in China's stock market

We examine the significance of size, book-to-market, and momentum factors in capturing financial distress risk in China's stock market. Consistent with the market underreaction hypothesis, we find that the momentum factor proxies for distress risk in China's stock market and that the explanatory power of momentum is subsumed when a distress factor is included in the asset pricing model. Our analysis demonstrates no evidence that size and book-to-market effects are driven by financial distress risk.¹     

Does stock market development always improve firm-level financing? Evidence from Tunisia

The question of whether or not increased stock market size allows for improved financing conditions for firms in emerging markets is an important one for policy-making. This paper seeks to investigate this issue by analyzing whether increases in market-level liquidity have indeed trickled down to individual firms over the last decade of stock market development in Tunisia, a fast-growing Mediterranean emerging market. We develop time varying liquidity scores for all firms listed in the Tunisian market over the 1997–2009 period and analyze the extent to which market development, firm-level characteristics and risk exposure affect the magnitude and the distribution of liquidity using a set of fixed effect panel regressions. Our results suggest that massive increases in value traded have created market congestion, thereby increasing the costs of trading, in a context of persistently low efficiency and increased international integration. The main implications of this process are (i) market-level development and international integration are not sufficient conditions to ease access to finance for local firms, (ii) further reforms in the Tunisian market should focus on diversifying corporate ownership and improving the disclosure of information, and (iii) international investors seeking diversification in Tunisia should be aware of a significant illiquidity risk.     

Climate change financial risks: Implications for asset pricing and interest rates

In addition to tail macroeconomic events (e.g. wars, financial crises and pandemics), climate change poses a threat to financial stability — with extreme climatic events increasing in frequency and intensity and policy risks putting pressure on asset valuations. We study the effect of a changing climate on asset prices and interest rates through the lens of a dynamic CAPM with rare disasters, time-varying risk and recursive preferences. In our model, a changing climate makes tail events more frequent and less predictable, increasing the premium of climate risk; interestingly, this change may not be fully reflected in the overall market risk premium that includes both components of risk: macroeconomic and environmental. Our results also support the hypothesis of a declining real rate of interest as the planet warms, while the increasing risk of climate policy reduces the participation of brown assets in the market portfolio.     

Returns to Scale,Market Power,and the Nature of Price Rigidity in New Keynesian Models with Self‐Fulfilling Expectations

Increasing returns to scale and firms' market power are two potential sources of sunspot expectations in neoclassical models. We show that in New Keynesian models, returns to scale and market power can have fundamentally different implications for broad macroeconomic issues, including self‐fulfilling expectations, depending on the nature of price rigidity. Our findings suggest that the design of stabilization monetary policy can depend on precise knowledge about the economy's real and nominal features. Therefore, a clear understanding of the specific economic environment and its relevance to monetary policymaking for ensuring macroeconomic stability can be an integrated part of monetary policy practice.