Earnings management and market liquidity

The main purpose of this paper is to argue the extent that earnings management lowers disclosure quality. It should increase information asymmetry and impair trading liquidity. Using a large sample of NYSE firms from 1996 to 2001, we find evidence to suggest that firms which exhibit greater earnings management are associated with lower market liquidity. Our results are robust to both real and accounting based measures of earnings management and two well established measures of market liquidity. However, they are not consistent with the Easley et al. probability of informed trade measure.     

Gauging the effects of stock liquidity on earnings management: Evidence from the SEC tick size pilot test

This paper studies whether stock market liquidity has a causal effect on real earnings management. We introduce a new and cleaner identification of liquidity shock - the 2016 Tick Size Pilot Program - to show that firms with less liquid stocks are more likely to engage in real earnings management. We provide direct evidence that stock liquidity helps to deter real earnings management via enhancing governance by long-term institutional investors through trading and direct intervention, and via facilitating short selling to discipline managers. The effect is stronger in firms that do not pay dividends.     

Stock liquidity and managerial short-termism

We examine whether stock liquidity exacerbates or mitigates managerial short-termism. Utilizing earnings management as a proxy for managerial short-termism, we establish three major findings. First, firms with liquid stocks engage in less accrual-based and real earnings management. Second, the effect of stock liquidity on earnings management is amplified for firms with high levels of managerial pay-for-performance sensitivity. Third, the positive association between the intensity of earnings management and firm cost of capital is evident only for firms with low stock liquidity. Our findings are consistent with the threat of blockholder exit as the main governance channel through which stock liquidity discourages opportunistic earnings management and mitigates managerial short-termism.     

Non-GAAP Earnings Disclosures on the Face of the Income Statement by UK Firms: The Effect on Market Liquidity

This study benefits by a special feature of the UK information environment which allows UK firms to disclose non-GAAP earnings on the face of the income statement to examine two interrelated questions. First, we ask whether the decision to disclose non-GAAP earnings on the face of the income statement is related to the firm's financial performance and corporate governance characteristics, and second, we investigate the effect of this disclosure decision on market liquidity. Using a dataset of 1227 hand-collected firm-year observations during the period 2006–2013, we show that better governed firms and firms with weaker financial performance are more likely to disclose non-GAAP earnings. Our evidence also suggests that this disclosure is associated with increased levels of market liquidity and the results hold after controlling for self-selection bias. We conclude that firms' decision to disclose non-GAAP earnings on the face of the income statement is more consistent with the incentive to provide information than to mislead the market.     

Information content of credit ratings in pricing of future earnings

This paper examines whether credit ratings convey information about the firm’s future earnings to the capital markets. Using the future earnings response coefficient methodology, we find that the current stock returns of rated firms reflect more future earnings than do the stock returns of non-rated firms. We also find that the market reflect more future earnings in current returns for higher-rated firms. In addition, we present evidence that returns impound future earnings to a greater extent after a ratings initiation or upgrade. We empirically eliminate the possibility that our findings are driven by earnings smoothing, market liquidity or omitted default risk factors associated with ratings. Our results are robust to controlling for potential omitted variables, endogeneity bias, loss versus profit firms, and serial correlation of error terms. Overall, the evidence suggests that credit ratings help disseminate private information to reduce information uncertainty about the firm’s future profitability among market participants.     

Stock Liquidity Risk and the Cross‐sectional Earnings‐Returns Relationship

We argue that a higher sensitivity to aggregate market‐wide liquidity shocks (i.e., a higher liquidity risk) implies a tendency for a stock's price to converge to fundamentals. We test this intuition within the framework of the earnings‐returns relationship. We find a positive liquidity risk effect on the relationship between return and expected change in earnings. This effect on the earnings‐returns relationship is distinct from the negative effect observed for stock illiquidity level. Notably, the liquidity risk effect is evident (absent) during periods of neutral/low (high) aggregate market liquidity. We also show that the liquidity risk effect is dominant in firms that: (a) are of intermediate size; (b) are of intermediate book‐to‐market; and (c) are profit making.     

An analysis of earnings management by European private firms

This paper addresses the questions of whether private firms in eight European countries engage in earnings management, and if so, whether tax incentives affect such practices. To measure earnings management, we analyze the earnings distributions of private firms and compare these distributions with those of public firms in the same countries. The empirical evidence suggests that in absence of capital market pressures, firms still have incentives to manage earnings, as we find that private firms avoid reporting small losses. We further find that private firms in some countries where tax regulation strongly influences financial accounting do not avoid reporting small losses. We attribute this finding to tax incentives reducing firms’ benefits of (upward) earnings management. Finally, our results suggest that some types of earnings management are due to capital market pressures and are specific to public firms since we do not find evidence that private firms avoid earnings decreases.     

Information,sell-side research,and market making

The interaction between an investment bank's research and market making arms may have important implications for the trading of a firm's stock. We investigate the impact that research has on the liquidity provided by the bank's market maker. Utilizing a large sample of Nasdaq firms, we show that market makers whose banks also provide research coverage provide more liquidity and contribute more to price discovery than do market makers without such research coverage. Finally, we show that such “affiliated” market makers are less affected by uncertainty following earnings announcements. Our results provide new evidence on the sources of liquidity improvements for Nasdaq firms, and suggest that the information produced by banks in the sell-side research process is beneficial to their market makers.     

避免亏损的盈余管理程度:上市公司与非上市公司的比较

本文以非上市公司盈余管理程度作为基准,运用参数估计的方法,对股票市场是否提高了公司盈余管理程度的问题进行研究。研究结论显示,1998年至2004年我国上市公司与非上市公司每年都存在避免亏损的盈余管理;在上市公司中,盈余管理公司比例为15.87%,它们提高ROA数据0.0122;在非上市公司中,盈余管理公司比例则只有5.49%,它们提高ROA数据0.0009。上市公司盈余管理频率大约为非上市公司的3倍,平均盈余管理幅度大约为非上市公司的13倍;两类公司盈余管理程度差异随着时间的推移而不断增大,因为非上市公司盈余管理程度在年度上的分布比较稳定,而上市公司盈余管理程度则随着时间的推移而不断增大。研究结论表明,股票市场提高了公司的盈余管理程度。     

Overvaluation and earnings management: Does the degree of overvaluation matter?

We examine whether the choice of earnings management strategies employed by managers of overvalued firms depends on the degree of market overvaluation. By distinguishing between substantially overvalued (SOV) and relatively overvalued (ROV) firms, we find that SOV firms significantly inflate earnings using both accruals-based and real earnings management. In contrast, managers of ROV firms do not engage in accruals-based earnings management and their firms’ accounts tend to report higher discretionary expenses. The reported higher discretionary expenses of ROV firms are comparable to the discretionary expenses of firms in the expanding stage of their business life cycle, a pattern consistent with ROV firms increasing discretionary expenses to finance growth and hence justify the high market valuation. Overall, we show that the existing evidence on income-increasing earnings management by overvalued firms is mainly driven by the pressure to sustain the high market valuation of firms that are substantially overvalued.     

Stock market listing status and real earnings management

This study analyzes real earnings management among privately held versus publicly listed firms. Our first finding is that public firms engage in more earnings management through operating activities. When a clear incentive to manage earnings in a specific direction is present we continue to find that public firms manage their earnings more than private firms. We reason that capital market pressure and ownership characteristics drive our results. Additional analyses reveal that public firms employ more real earnings management as a proportion of the total earnings management strategy. Furthermore, we find that mitigating factors of real earnings management have stronger impact in public firms. This study contributes to literature on non-accrual earnings management and to the broader understanding about the private vis-à-vis public firm reporting and operating behavior. Finally, we contribute by identifying an important societal cost of stock market listing, which is the increase in potentially value-destroying real earnings management.     

Product market competition and earnings management: Evidence from discretionary accruals and real activity manipulation

We examine the association between product market competition and earnings management activities. We use the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), a widely used measure for market concentration, as a proxy for product market competition. We examine two forms of earnings management: accrual-based and real activity-based. Our results are mixed, but generally suggest that both income-increasing accrual manipulation and real activity-based manipulation are more prevalent among firms in low competition industries than those in high competition industries. Our findings are robust to various measures of earnings management, alternative measures of product market competitions, and different subsamples. We further explore the reasons why firms in low competition industries are more inclined to manage earnings and find that the market consequences of missing important earnings targets are more severe among firms in low competition industries than those in high competition industries.     

A Comparison of Earnings Management Between KSE Firms and KOSDAQ Firms

Abstract:   This study investigates differences in earnings management practices of Korea Stock Exchange (KSE) firms and KOSDAQ (a Korean version of the NASDAQ market) firms during the period of 1996–1997. A sample of 1,256 KSE and 577 KOSDAQ firm‐year observations is used to compare earnings management practices of firms listed in the two different stock exchanges. The results of the study reveal that KOSDAQ firms tend to more actively manipulate earnings to avoid losses than KSE firms. KOSDAQ firms generally tend to increase reported earnings more aggressively than KSE firms when their operating cash flows are poor, and play down their reported earnings more when their operating cash flows are exceptionally good. The results of the study are quite robust in the sense that more aggressive earnings management practices of KOSDAQ firms persist even when operating cash flows are controlled.     

Product market power,industry structure,and corporate earnings management

This is the first study to establish a link between product market power of firms and the degree of earnings management. We hypothesize and document a significant and robust association between (a) a firm’s product market pricing power and its degree of earnings management, and (b) industry competitiveness and the degree of earnings management in the industry. Our study reveals that firms with inferior product market pricing power engage in greater discretionary earnings accruals, adding a new dimension to our understanding of the transparency and informativeness of firms’ financial statements. These findings are mirrored at the industry level where we document that more competitive industries are associated with greater earnings manipulation. The empirical evidence has direct implication on the informativeness and earnings quality of firms based on their product market power and competitiveness.     

Product market competition and earnings management: A firm‐level analysis

In this paper, we employ a firm‐level measure of product market competition constructed from the textual analysis of firms’ 10‐K filings to examine the relationship between managers’ perceived competition pressure and earnings management. We find that accounting irregularities and accrual‐based earnings management are positively related to product market competition. This finding is consistent with the notion that competition pressure increases managerial incentives to manage earnings, due to their career concerns. We also find that real earnings management is negatively related to product market competition. This finding suggests that real earnings management involves actions that decrease firms’ competitiveness and thus is costly for firms confronted with high competition pressure.     

The economic consequences of increased disclosure: Evidence from international cross-listings

We examine market behavior around earnings announcements to understand the consequences of the increased disclosure that non-U.S. firms face when listing shares in the U.S. We find that absolute return and volume reactions to earnings announcements typically increase significantly once a company cross-lists in the U.S. Furthermore, these increases are greatest for firms from developed countries and for firms that pursue over-the-counter listings or private placements, which do not have stringent disclosure requirements. Additional tests support the hypothesis that it is changes in the individual firm's disclosure environment, rather than changes in its market liquidity, ownership, or trading venue, that explain our findings.     

Does good corporate governance reduce information asymmetry around quarterly earnings announcements?

We examine the relationship between the quality of corporate governance and information asymmetry in the equity market around quarterly earnings announcements. We use the change in market liquidity (i.e., bid–ask spreads and depths) around the announcements as a proxy for information asymmetry. We use principal components analysis to identify three factors, board independence, board structure and board activity, that capture the information in the eight individual corporate governance variables we examine. We then use ordinary least squares and two-stage least squares to estimate the relations between market liquidity changes and the following four explanatory variables: directors’ and officers’ percentage stock holdings, board independence, board structure, and board activity. Our results indicate that changes in bid–ask spreads at the time of earnings announcements are significantly negatively related to board independence, board activity, and the percentage stock holdings of directors and officers. We also find that depth changes are significantly positively related to board structure, board activity, and directors’ and officers’ percentage stock holdings. Our results are consistent with the hypothesis that firms with higher levels of corporate governance have lower information asymmetry around quarterly earnings announcements.     

External financing and earnings management: Evidence from international data

Corporate financing conditions in the external capital market are significantly affected by information asymmetry, while internal financing is not. Given that earnings information influences market perceptions regarding firms’ quality, firms relying on external financing should have incentives to manage earnings to improve their financing conditions. This study investigates the effect of corporate external financing behavior on earnings management. Using a sample comprising 75,790 observations of 12,874 firms in 43 countries, we find that accrual-based and real earnings management are positively associated with firms’ reliance on external financing. This positive relationship holds especially true for firms that rely on equity rather than debt financing. We argue that reliance on external financing (especially equity financing), which is subject to problems arising from information asymmetry, generates a motive for earnings management.     

Short-selling and cost of equity: evidence from China

In this study, we take advantage of the gradual lifting of the short-selling ban in China and find that firms affected by the lifting of the ban experience a lower cost of equity. In addition, the affected firms also incur less earnings management, higher market liquidity and higher investment efficiency. Further evidence shows that firms’ cost of equity increases after their stocks are no longer eligible for short selling. Our inferences are robust to alternative measures of cost of equity, and to using a propensity score-matched sample. Our study contributes to the literature by providing evidence that short sellers play a monitoring role in the Chinese stock markets and sheds light on the benefits of short selling in emerging markets.     

Do UK firms manage earnings to meet dividend thresholds?

This paper examines earnings management by dividend-paying firms in cases where pre-managed earnings would fall below the expected dividend, and by non-dividend paying firms aiming to avoid reporting losses. We find that within the UK market the likelihood of upward earnings management is significantly greater in the former case than the latter, though both are drivers for earnings management. Large firms are less likely to upwardly manage earnings to reach dividend thresholds, consistent with prior UK evidence on the ability of the largest firms to avoid restrictive debt covenants. We also find that earnings management is more clearly observable through examining working capital discretionary accruals than through examining total discretionary accruals.