影子银行与金融危机

本文认为,此次全球金融危机的根源在于回购市场挤提引起的银行恐慌。机构投资者是回购市场的需求者,他们向影子银行"存款",影子银行则以资产抵押支持证券保证"存款"的安全。当证券化资产的折价率大幅提高时,就出现了回购市场挤提,引起银行恐慌,从而导致了此次全球金融危机。     

SECURITIZATION: A FINANCING STRATEGY FOR EMERGING MARKETS FIRMS

With emerging markets now in crisis, companies in developing countries are finding it difficult to obtain financing. Securitization, a transaction structure in which the securities sold to investors are backed by a company's receivables, is one of the few vehicles with at least the potential to provide financing at economic rates in the current environment of uncertainty.
Unlike U.S. securitization issues, emerging markets transactions often use a structure known as "future flows" securitization, in which the securities are backed by receivables that are not expected to be generated until after issuance. This article begins by describing how the process of future flows securitization carves out securities with levels of political risk acceptable to foreign capital market investors. Then it traces the history of emerging markets securitization from its origins in Latin America to its more recent uses during the Asian crisis. Securitization helped bring foreign investors back to Latin America after its debt crisis of the early 1980s. And while the Asian crisis has sharply reduced new issuance for all kinds of emerging market financings, the volume of securitization issues appears to have declined less precipitously than other types of transactions geared to foreign investors. Moreover, investment bankers are now hard at work planning new securitization issues for companies in both Latin America and Asia.
In exploring the longer-term effects of securitization on both domestic issuers and their economies, the author suggests that securitization could play a pivotal role in restoring emerging markets companies' access to global financial markets. Indeed, with a few exceptions such as Malaysia, most emerging markets are now responding to the crisis by taking measures to protect investors, such as requiring greater financial transparency and dispelling legal uncertainties that have discouraged securitization in particular and overseas investment more generally.     

The risk-relevance of securitizations during the recent financial crisis

We investigate changes in the risk-relevance of securitized subprime, other nonconforming, and commercial mortgages for sponsor-originators during the recent financial crisis. Using the volatility of realized stock returns, option-implied volatility, and credit spreads, we observe a pronounced increase in the risk-relevance of subprime securitizations as early as 2006. Furthermore, reflecting the evolution of the financial crisis in waves, we find that investors recognized the increased credit risk of other nonconforming and commercial mortgage securitizations as the financial crisis progressed. Additional analyses show that risk-relevance varies cross-sectionally with structural characteristics such as monoline credit-enhancement and the presence of special servicers for commercial mortgage securitizations. Our results inform the current debates on the opacity of securitization structures and highlight the need to take into account cross-sectional and inter-temporal heterogeneity in risk-relevance across securitized asset classes and securitization characteristics (e.g., quality and type of collateral and transaction structure).     

Credit risk transfer in U.S. commercial banks: What changed during the 2007–2009 crisis?

Following the debate on the role of credit risk transfer (CRT) in exacerbating the 2007–2009 crisis, this paper investigates the usage and effects of loan sales, securitization, and credit derivatives in U.S. commercial banks over the last decade, with special emphasis on the financial crisis. We find that in times of severe funding constraints, the need to raise financial resources becomes the principal incentive behind CRT. We document some beneficial effects of CRT on the economy, since the funds released through CRT are subsequently invested by banks to sustain credit supply, also in recession. However, we report higher overall riskiness in banks that engage intensively in loans sales and securitization, which translates into higher default rates during the crisis. Interestingly, the benefits and drawbacks of CRT are much stronger for loan sales and securitization than for credit derivatives.     

The impact of securitization on credit rationing: Empirical evidence

We study whether banks’ involvement into different types of securitization activity – asset backed securities (ABS) and covered bonds – in Spain influences credit supply before and during the financial crisis. While both ABS and covered bonds were hit by the crisis, the former were hit more severely. Employing a disequilibrium model to identify credit rationing, we find that firms with banks that were more involved in securitization see their credit constraints more relaxed in normal periods. In contrast, only greater covered bonds issuance reduces credit rationing during crisis periods whereas ABS aggravates these firms’ credit rationing in crisis periods. Our results are in line with the theoretical predictions that a securitization instrument that retains risk (covered bond) may induce a more prudent risk behavior of banks than an instrument that provides risk transferring (ABS).     

The determinants of vulnerability to the global financial crisis 2008 to 2009: Credit growth and other sources of risk

In this paper, we identify initial macroeconomic and financial market conditions that help explain the distinct response of the real economy of a particular country to the recent global financial crisis. Using four measures of crisis severity, we examine a data set with over 90 potential explanatory factors employing techniques that are robust to model uncertainty. Four findings are of particular note. First, we find empirical evidence for the pivotal role of pre-crisis credit growth in shaping the real economy's response to the crisis. Specifically, a 1% increase in pre-crisis lending translates into a 0.2% increase in the cumulative loss in real output. Moreover, the combination of pronounced growth in lending ahead of the crisis and the country's exposure to external funding from advanced economies is shown to intensify the real downturn. Economies with booming real activity before the crisis are found to be less resilient to the global shock. Buoyant growth in real GDP in parallel with strong growth of credit particularly exacerbated the effects of the recent crisis on the real economy. Finally, we provide empirical evidence on the importance of holding international reserves in explaining the response of the real economy to the crisis. The accumulation of international reserves mitigated the harmful effects of financial stress on the real economy, in particular when domestic funding via credit is abundant. The results are shown to be robust to several estimation techniques, including those allowing for cross-country spillovers.     

后金融危机时代中国信用卡产业的发展

信用卡资产证券化对美国信用卡危机的爆发起到了推波助澜的作用。与美国相比,我国信用卡产业总体运行状况良好,并未受到国际金融危机的严重冲击,市场拓展速度不断加快,风险控制要求更高,外包经营需求显现。但由于多种不稳定因素依然存在,产业发展之路并不平坦。各银行在后金融危机时代的信用卡业务发展中,要平衡市场拓展与风险管理之间的关系,在转型中谋发展,适时调整经营策略,注重产品与业务创新,密切加强与有关部门的交流与合作,从各个环节实施更为严格的风险管理措施,借助后台业务外包加速产业价值链整合,促进国内信用卡产业健康发展。     

“次级债风波”的影响为何是“重量级”的？

消费者信贷挑战金融行业的竞争并加快金融创新,次级债是金融机构在追逐利润前提下的资产证券化产物,然而资产证券化放大金融风险。有效性冲突是现代金融风险的一个新特征,它挑战现有金融监管方式,金融监管不能适应创新需要使得次级债风波重创美国金融市场。     

次贷危机中资产证券化对金融市场流动性的影响

次贷危机是一场金融市场流动性紧缩的危机.在流动性紧缩的过程中,连接多个利益主体的资产证券化负有很大责任.本文采用计量经济理论中的VAR模型对次贷危机中资产证券化对金融市场流动性的影响进行实证分析,发现在次贷危机的演进过程中,资产证券化确实对金融市场的流动性产生了持久的负面冲击效应,并导致了流动性紧缩的传导和扩散.因此,...     

基于SPV制度缺陷看次贷危机后金融信用制度的重建

美国的次贷危机起源于资产证券化,而资产证券化的核心是特殊目的机构(SPV)。本文从SPV在次贷证券化中的功能构建及其制度设计中存在的缺陷出发,分析次贷危机发生的根源,进而提出后危机时代重建金融信用制度的基本原则和主要内容,以提升金融市场效率,防范金融风险。     

Syndicated Leveraged Loans During and After the Crisis and the Role of the Shadow Banking System

In an article published in this journal in 1998, Nobel laureate Merton Miller argued that one of the best weapons available to national economies in their defense against the macroeconomic effects of banking crises is the availability of non‐bank financial institutions and products—or what we now refer to as the “shadow banking system.” Although Miller may have exaggerated the independence of bank‐ and market‐based sources of financing, the author argues that events during and after the recent crisis have shown Miller's claims about the importance of non‐bank investors in the provision of credit to be fundamentally correct. Critics of securitization and the shadow banking system tend to focus on the subprime mortgage story in which the sudden re‐pricing of credit risk and the resulting disappearance of investment demand for ABCP, private‐label mortgage‐related ABS, and ABS CDOs created unexpected and significant downward price pressure on those asset types. But the leveraged loan market tells a very different story. In contrast to the near complete disappearance of private mortgage securitizations, the extraordinary recovery of the U.S. syndicated leveraged loan market demonstrates that the relation between commercial and shadow banking has proved to be a highly productive and resilient one—and very much a two‐way street. When leveraged loans and CLOs experienced problems from 2007 through 2009 due primarily to the widespread liquidity and credit market disruptions that affected essentially all structured credit products, institutional investors in leveraged loans disappeared and the leveraged loan primary market imploded. But when institutional participants recognized the value of the underlying asset—corporate loans—and regained confidence in shadow‐banking products, leveraged lending by banks recovered quickly and dramatically. This outcome is viewed as vindicating Professor Miller's statement about the benefits of shadow markets and securitization— namely, the role of non‐bank investors in diversifying the risk of credit creation while at the same time improving the price discovery process in different markets. The recent history of the U.S. leveraged loan market demonstrates that shadow banking system participants play a critical role in meeting the total demand for such loans, and that the ebbs and flows from institutional leveraged loan markets are strongly connected with the health and integrity of the underlying leveraged bank loan market.     

Capital and credit market integration and real economic contagion during the global financial crisis

This study investigates the role of financial integration in the spread of global financial crisis. In particular, this study shows how the effect of the crisis on real business cycle co-movement varied for capital and credit market integration, using a sample of 58 countries in 2001–2013. During the global financial crisis, the United States – the epicenter of the crisis – experienced a severe downturn in the real economy, and other countries followed suit. We find that during the global financial crisis, the business cycle co-movements between the United States and the rest of the world were stronger when the level of capital market integration between them was higher. However, the co-movements were weaker when the level of credit market integration was higher. These findings are robust even when including investment channels, local fundamental factors, endogenous policy responses across countries, and alternative measures for financial integration and business cycle co-movements.     

信用与资本——开发性金融研究

资本是关系到当下和长远发展的重要命题,而信用是实现从财富到资本转化的关键要素。本文从四个维度考察信用与资本的关系。一是关于信用的产生和演进,指出了信用产生的两个必要条件,并从社会财富三个阶段来审视信用和资本相互作用的演进过程。二是信用的性质和功能。讨论了信用的基本性质,以及规范商品和资本交易、促进资本形成以及信用的金融功能等基础性功能,并进一步讨论了信用的证券化功能以及金融市场建设功能。三是当前信用体系面对的新挑战和新问题。首先提出了美元外汇储备在一定意义上是美元信用对中国储蓄的证券化,是全球信用美元化的组成,在资本匮乏阶段是必要选择,而当下需要对财富和资本寻找新的载体,需要考虑和实现减少对美元的依赖。其次,从深化对国家信用的运用角度对解决问题的路径进行了思考,初步提出了通过发行以国家信用为基础的股权证券化工具,解决长期资本不足问题,应对当前挑战的设想。四是在回顾和总结部分,本文指出,信用的形态会随着资本发展而不断演进,从个人到企业、国家再到国际,从债务信用升级为命运信用即股权信用,乃至尚未出现的国际股权信用,是未来信用发展的方向。     

Securitized banking and the run on repo

The panic of 2007–2008 was a run on the sale and repurchase market (the repo market), which is a very large, short-term market that provides financing for a wide range of securitization activities and financial institutions. Repo transactions are collateralized, frequently with securitized bonds. We refer to the combination of securitization plus repo finance as “securitized banking” and argue that these activities were at the nexus of the crisis. We use a novel data set that includes credit spreads for hundreds of securitized bonds to trace the path of the crisis from subprime-housing related assets into markets that had no connection to housing. We find that changes in the LIB-OIS spread, a proxy for counterparty risk, were strongly correlated with changes in credit spreads and repo rates for securitized bonds. These changes implied higher uncertainty about bank solvency and lower values for repo collateral. Concerns about the liquidity of markets for the bonds used as collateral led to increases in repo haircuts, that is the amount of collateral required for any given transaction. With declining asset values and increasing haircuts, the US banking system was effectively insolvent for the first time since the Great Depression.     

重启资产证券化与我国的发展路径

传统金融监管不能有效应对资产证券化风险,是导致2008年次贷危机的主因。资产证券化在一国金融市场中占据重要地位,其发起-分流业务模式引发的风险需要金融监管者通过强化金融中介的激励机制和信息披露制度予以解决。美国已通过金融监管改革,在更安全、稳固的基础上重启资产证券化市场。我国有必要立足国情,完善试点法制和发挥自律组织的作用,重启并推广风险可控的资产证券化模式,以受益其功用和加快多层次资本市场的建设。     

What determines the Japanese corporate credit spread? A new evidence

This paper investigates the determinants of the corporate credit spreads changes in the Japanese bond markets. We show that the business cycle risk and market skewness risk affect changes in the credit spread in Japan even after controlling for the frequently used variables. We also find that the magnitude of market skewness risk is relatively higher for low-rated bonds. Our results are robust to changes in credit ratings, different maturity groups and time periods around the recent global financial crisis.     

我国商业银行资本管理新趋势对金融市场发展的影响

为吸取美国次贷金融危机的教训,一系列资本监管改革制度于2010年取得国际共识并逐步付诸实施。我国商业银行资本管理将呈现新的趋势,并影响到金融市场的发展：股票融资吸引力将上升,债券融资将有所萎缩,贷款转让、资产证券化市场将迎来新的发展机遇,信用债市场结构将面临调整。     

借鉴美国经验 防范我国CRMA风险

全球性金融危机将信用衍生品推上了风口浪尖,出于防范信用风险而设计的金融产品是危机的导火索。在经历了市场的深刻反省后,全球的信用衍生品规模又创新高,我国也适时推出了CRMA（信用风险缓释合约）系列信用衍生品,但在我国市场机制还不成熟的条件下对其监管是对监管部门的考验。本文分析了信用衍生产品市场的发展及其风险,指出我国金融监管当局应加强对CRMA风险的防范。     

美国次贷危机对中国资产证券化业务的影响及建议

美国次按危机爆发至今,已给美国以及全球金融市场带来了巨大的冲击。面对中国资产证券化发展方向的探讨,文章通过分析美国次贷危机的成因、中国证券化业务发展的现状,对比出美国次贷与中国已开展的证券化业务的本质区别,指出我们应从美国次贷危机中吸取教训,加强业务风险的防范,充分利用我国此项业务开展的后发优势,适当加快试点的步伐。     

Market Value of REIT Liquidity

We examine the relation between firm value and liquidity among REITs. Results show shareholders benefit from both cash and unused credit line capacity. The market values an additional dollar of cash at a premium and, as theory predicts, unused credit lines are significantly less valued than cash. Evidence suggests an increase in the market value of liquidity during the recent financial crisis. We also find that financial characteristics quantifying financial constraint influence the value of REIT financial flexibility. Most notably, the value of cash decreases with remaining credit line capacity. Although prior studies argue that cash and credit lines are substitutes, this is one of the first tests of whether the market prices this substitutability.