Do Investors Value a Firm’s Commitment to Social Activities?

Previous empirical research has found mixed results for the impact of corporate social responsibility (CSR) investments on corporate financial performance (CFP). This paper contributes to the literature by exploring in a two stage investor decision-making model the relationship between a firm’s innovation effort, CSR, and financial performance. We simultaneously examine the impact of CSR on both accounting-based (financial health) and market-based (Tobin’s Q) financial performance measures. From a sample of top corporate citizens, we find that: (1) a firm’s social responsibility commitment (CSR) contributes to its financial performance; (2) after controlling for investment in innovation activities, CSR continues to have a positive impact on a firm’s financial performance; (3) the customer dimension of CSR has a positive effect on both CFP measures, whereas the employee dimension indicates a significant impact only on financial heath; and (4) the community relation dimension of CSR only affects the market-based CFP measure of firms with high innovation intensity.     

Venture capital reputation: a blessing or a curse for entrepreneurial firm innovation—a contingent effect of industrial distance

This study investigates whether venture capital reputation is a blessing or a curse for entrepreneurial firm innovation by using data from 1553 observations of venture capital investments on entrepreneurial firms in China’s New Over-the-Counter (OTC) Market. Advantages that venture capital brings to entrepreneurial firms have been widely acknowledged in extant research. However, our research emphasizes the potential resource outflows rather than inflows when firms are embedded in a shared reputable venture capital, and finds that the curse effect of venture capital reputation on entrepreneurial firms is manifested. Furthermore, we develop the concept of venture capital “intra-industrial reputation” and “extra-industrial reputation” to give a contingent answer to the “blessing or curse” question. The conclusions are drawn indicating that the curse effect is contingent on industrial distance. Venture capital intra-industrial reputation is positively linked to entrepreneurial firm innovation, whereas extra-industrial reputation exerts a strong negative impact, which is responsible for the curse effect.     

The interplay of human and social capital in shaping entrepreneurial performance: the case of Vietnam

This study investigates the effects of human capital, social capital and their interaction on the performance of 1,398 Vietnamese new-born firms. Operating profit is used as the measure of success. Human capital is captured by individual-level professional education, start-up experience, and learning. Whereas the first two dimensions of human capital are measured with traditional indicators, we define learning as the ability to accumulate knowledge to conduct innovation activities (new product introduction, product innovation and process innovation). Social capital is measured as benefits obtained from personal strong-tie and weak-tie networks. Key findings are threefold: (i) human capital strongly predicts firm success, with learning exhibiting a statistically significant positive association with operating profit, (ii) benefits from weak ties outweigh those from strong ties, (iii) interaction of human capital and social capital displays a statistically significant positive effect on new-firm performance.     

The CEO,venture capitalists,and the board

An element in the never-ending debate about the process of funding highpotential businesses is the extent to which venture capitalists add value besides money to their portfolio companies. At one end of the spectrum, venture capitalists incubate start-ups and nurture hatchlings, while at the other extreme, so-called “vulture” capitalists feed on fledgling companies. A very important way in which venture capitalists add value other than money to their portfolio companies is by serving on boards of directors. Hence, by studying the role of outside directors, especially those representing venture capital firms, we were able to shed light on the issue of value-added.In the first phase of the research, we studied 162 venture-capital-backed high-tech firms located in California, Massachusetts, and Texas. In the second phase (with data from 98 of the 162 firms), the lead venture capitalists on the boards were classified according to whether or not they were a “top-20” firm.Board Size The average board size was 5.6 members, which was somewhat less than half the size of the board of a typical large company. Board size increased from 3 to 4.8 members with the first investment of venture capital.Board Composition and Control The typical board comprised 1.7 inside members, 2.3 venture capital principals, .3 venture capital staff, and 1.3 other outsiders. Insiders constituted 40% or less of the members of 82% of the boards, while venture capitalists made up over 40% of members of 55% of the boards. When a top-20 venture capital firm was the lead investor, then 55% of the board members were venture capitalists; in contrast, when the lead was not a top-20 firm, only 23% of board were venture capitalists.Value-Added Overall, our sample of CEOs did not rate the value of the advice of venture capitalists any higher than that of other board members. However, those CEOs with a top20 venture capital firm as the lead investor, on average, did rate the value of the advice from their venture capital board members significantly higher—but not outstandingly higher—than the advice from other outside board members. On the other hand, CEOs with no top-20 as the lead investor found no significant difference between the value of the advice from venture capitalists and other outside board members. Hence, in our sample, we could not say that there was a noticeable difference in the value of valueadded by top-20 boards and non-top-20 boards.The areas where CEOs rated outside board members (both venture capitalists and others) most helpful were as a sounding board, interfacing with the investor group, monitoring operating performance, monitoring financial performance, recruiting/replacing the CEO, and assistance with short term crisis. That help was rated higher for early-stage than later-stage companies.Our findings have the following implications for venture capitalists, entrepreneurs, and researchers.Venture Capitalist The main product of a venture capital firm is money, which is a commodity. It's impossible to differentiate a commodity in a martetplace where the customers have perfect information. As venture capitalists learned since the mid-1980s, their customers (entrepreneurs) now have an abundance of information that, while it may not be perfect, is certainly good enough to make a well-informed decision when selecting a venture capital firm. Hence, value-added may be the most important distinctive competence with which a venture capital firm—especially one specializing in early-stage investments—can differentiate itself from its competitors. If that is the case, then venture capital firms need to pay more attention to their value-added, because CEOs, overall, do not perceive that it has a great deal of value to their companies. The top-20 appear to be doing a somewhat better job in that area than other venture capital firms.Entrepreneurs If an entrepreneur wants outside board members who bring valueadded other than money, it appears that they can do as well with non-venture capitalists as with venture capitalists. The entrepreneurs we talked to in our survey gave the impression that board members with significant operating experience are more valued than “pure” financial types with no operating experience. If venture capital is an entrepreneur's only source offunding, then the entrepreneur should seek out firms that put venture capitalists with operating experience on boards. It also appears that an entrepreneur, will, on average, get more value-added when the lead investor is a top-20 firm, but there is a drawback: when a top-20 is the lead investor, it is more likely that venture capitalists will control the board. No entrepreneur should seek venture capital solely to get value-added from a venture capitalist on the board, because outside board members who are not venture capitalists give advice that is every bit as good as that given by venture capitalists.Researchers Value-added is a fruitful avenue of research. From a practical perspective, if valueadded exists it should be measurable. So far the jury has not decided that issue. Some finance studies of the performance of venture-capital-backed initial public offerings (IPOs) claim to have found valueadded, some claim to have found none, and at least one study claims to have found negative value- added. From a theoretical perspective, value-added is relevant to agency theory, transaction cost economics, and the capital asset pricing model. It also is relevant to strategic analysis from the viewpoint of distinctive competencies.     

A moving target: The geographic evolution of Silicon Valley, 1953–1990

This article provides an empirical examination of high-tech firm location data from 1953 to 1990 to show a dramatic shift in geographic centre of what is now called Silicon Valley. Universities (most notably Stanford), venture capital and law firms acted as magnets for divisions of established firms and local start-ups. These institutions combined with the Santa Clara County’s available land to pull the high-tech region’s epicentre south-eastwards from San Francisco, an early source of investment capital and legal expertise. These findings add another element (spatial change) for consideration in explaining the evolution of industry clusters.     

How venture capital firms differ

Four potential sources of differences between venture capital (VC) firms were examined—venture stage of interest, amount of assistance provided by the VC, VC firm size, and geographic region where located. Through a questionnaire, 149 venture capitalists provided data about their firms, about what they look for in evaluating an investment, and about how they work with a portfolio company following an investment.Firms were divided into four groups based on venture stage of interest. The earlier the investment stage, the greater the interest in potential investments built upon proprietary products, product uniqueness, and high growth markets. Late-stage investors were more interested in demonstrated market acceptance.There were no differences by stage regarding the desired qualities of management. However, after the investment was made, earlier stage investors attached more importance to spending their time evaluating and recruiting managers. Earlier stage investors sought ventures with higher potential returns—a 42% hurdle rate of return for the earliest stage investor versus 33% for the late-stage investor.Late-stage investors spent more time evaluating a potential investment. However, after the investment was made, there was little difference in the amount of time spent assisting the portfolio company. There were, however, differences in the significance that VCs attached to particular post-investment activities. Firms were split into three groups based upon the amount of time the VC spent with a portfolio company after an investment was made as lead investor. The most active group averaged over 35 hours per month per investment, and the least active group averaged less than seven hours.The difference in assistance provided was not strongly tied to differences in investment stage of interest. There were major differences in the importance the VCs attached to their post-investment activities. Not surprisingly, high involvement VCs viewed their activities as more important.Based upon the amount of capital they managed, firms were also split into three groups. Average fund size varied from 278 to 12 million dollars. The larger firms had more professionals and managed more money per professional. The large firms provided the least, and the medium-sized firms the most, assistance to portfolio companies. Large firms also made larger individual investments. Even though they invested over half their funds in late-stage investments whereas smaller firms focused on the earlier stages, the large firms were still a major source of early stage financing.There were no differences between geographic regions in the proportion of investments where the venture capital firm served as lead investor. There were, however, major regional differences in investment stages of interest. Also differences were observed between regions that were not a result of differing size and investment stage.     

Social capital of venture capitalists and start-up funding

How does the social capital of venture capitalists (VCs) affect the funding of start-ups? By building on the rich social capital literature, we hypothesize a positive effect of VCs?? social capital, derived from past syndication, on the amount of money that start-ups receive. Specifically, we argue that both structural and relational aspects of VCs?? social networks provide VCs with superior access to information about current investment objects and opportunities to leverage them in the future, increasing their willingness to invest in these firms. Our empirical results, derived from a novel dataset containing more than 1,500 first funding rounds in the Internet and IT sector, strongly confirm our hypotheses. We discuss the implications of our findings for theories of venture capital and entrepreneurship, showing that the role and effect of VCs?? social capital on start-up firms may be more complex than previously argued in the literature.     

Facilitators of organizational innovation: The role of life-cycle stage

One of the most serious challenges facing an entrepreneurial company, particularly a high-technology firm, is knowing how to manage innovation as the organization evolves. Macro-level facilitators/inhibitors of innovation—i.e., organizational and environmental conditions of a firm that promote or restrain innovation such as the structure of an organization, its incentive system, resources provided by its environment, or its ways of analyzing firm-external information—and their relationship to the innovativeness of the firm are considered in this study.Two basic arguments have been put forward previously as to why the innovativeness of an organization may change as it evolves. First, it has been suggested that facilitators of innovation change over time and so will firm innovativeness. That is, the relationship between the facilitator and innovation stays unchanged but the facilitator itself is transformed, causing changes in firm innovativeness as it develops. For instance, it has been suggested that mature firms become less innovative because their structure becomes overly formalized to perform other functions more efficiently, which then stifles innovative processes. Second, other researchers have proposed that the relationship between a facilitator and innovation changes as firms evolve; for instance a formal structure may support innovation in a younger firm because it allows the entrepreneur to focus her energy, whereas it may suppress innovation later since it inhibits an innovator's interaction with other environments. The results of our analysis, using data from 326 U.S. firms in different stages of their development and involved in many kinds of high-tech industries, support the second theory.However, the results for the relationships of the individual facilitators to innovation were not always as expected. We found that formally structured young firms were less innovative than informal ones and that in older organizations, formalization had no negative impact on innovation. This finding possibly can be explained with micro-level facilitators of innovation: younger firms may have more entrepreneurial personnel whose ability for innovation is more inhibited through a formal structure than the more “seasoned” employees in older, larger firms. However, this finding implies that the concern for formal structures with respect to firm innovativeness does not necessarily apply as typically assumed.Of similar significance was our finding with respect to the relationship between financial incentives and innovation. It has been suggested that younger rather than older firms use incentives such as equity to encourage an innovative environment. Results of this research, however, show that innovation is associated with stock incentives especially in older firms. This may be an indication for older firms to use differentiated incentives that reflect the individual's contribution to the firm to retain innovative personnel, whereas start-ups might rely on the excitement of working in a new venture as an incentive for innovative behavior.More in line with expectations were the results for how firms process external information. Environmental scanning and data analysis were positively associated with innovation, and this more so in older firms, presumably because they have become more remote from developments outside the organization. This result confirms the notion that much innovation by a firm is initiated externally. However, the results also indicate that the conditions of the environment itself are of lesser importance to firm innovativeness than the firm's active pursuit of information from its environment. An often discussed implication of these findings is that the boundaries of a firm must be permeable, at least from the outside in, and systematic information gathering from customers, competition, research institutions, etc. may be necessary to the success of a firm that depends on its product development. This seems especially important for older firms.As expected, the centralization of power in an organization also affected innovation. Centralization correlated positively with innovation in new ventures and negatively in older firms. This indicates the importance of the entrepreneur and strong leader in a start-up. It also suggests, though, that as the firm matures, this person has to give up some of her control and may have to relinquish the job at the head of the organization to someone else.Finally, there are some more general implications of this work to managers involved with organizational innovation. First, reliance on past experience may be detrimental to future performance. Whereas a firm evolves through different stages, means that have facilitated innovation earlier may be detrimental to it now or tomorrow, and vice versa. Second, copying successful strategies for innovation from other firms may not necessarily work—not because their implementation was worse but because the conditions of the other firm, for instance its evolutionary stage or its micro-level facilitators, were different.Researchers who study innovation should consider including life-cycle stage as a potential moderating variable. Factors that facilitate innovation at some point during an organization's evolution actually hinder it in another. Also, factors that were unimportant to innovation at the inception of a firm may facilitate it in later stages. This study supports the conclusion that the consideration of contingency factors, such as life-cycle stage, may enhance the development of a theory of organizational innovation.     

Emerging strategies in the venture capital industry

This article reports a study of the future direction of the venture capital industry by examining the basic strategies and strategic assumptions of a broad sample of venture capital firms. There are three main sets of results:First, the once homogeneous venture capital industry is rapidly dividing into several different “strategic groups.” Members of these “groups” are increasingly distinguishing themselves from other groups on four basic dimensions followed by member firms: 1. Financial Resources—Equity capital comes from a greater variety of sources (five major sources) resulting in fundamentally different demands on the mission of the receiving venture capital firm. 2. Staff Resources—The way venture capital firms use staff resources, particularly regarding investee management assistance, is becoming increasingly varied across different groups. Some firms provide fewer than 2-days per year, while others provide up to 450 man-days per year per client. 3. Venture Stages—While the overall industry retains a primary interest in stage 1,2, and 3 investment, specific firms vary considerably in the distribution of investment emphasis across these three stages. 4. Use of Financial Resources-Firms in the industry are becoming increasingly differentiated in the size of minimum investments they make ($100 M to $1000 M) and in their role as a direct investor versus a “broker” for institutional funds. Practicing venture capitalists should make use of this first set of findings in two ways. First, they may find it useful to compare their firm's orientation along these four strategic dimensions with those of the firm's that comprised this study. Second, they may seek to use these four strategic dimensions as a basis on which they might examine, clarify, and/or redefine the marketing strategy pursued by their firm.A second set of results identified three goals and priorities of venture capital firms that have neither changed over time nor across increasingly different strategic groups. Annualized, after-tax return on investments of between 25% and 40% remain the most common objective across all firms. A 5-to-6 year investment time horizon and a major emphasis on the quality of the management team in evaluating new deals were universal priorities across diverse venture capital firms.A third finding in this study was that venture capital firms profess greater “certainty” about the future direction of the venture capital industry than the direction of their firm. The most notable example of this is a strong sense that industry-wide rates of return are headed downward yet few senior partners expect their firm to experience this decline.Practicing venture capitalists may be interested to peruse these results to see what trends are predicted within the venture capital industry by this subsample of that industry. Second, they should consider the finding that industry-wide rates of return are headed downward in light of the first two sets of findings to develop their own opinion about the future performance of different strategic groups within the industry.It is important to note that the sample of venture capital firms on which this study was based did not include most of the larger, older funds. Some of these funds would be characterized as “industry leaders, pace-setters, and innovators.” The sample provides a solid representation of the “broad middle” of the venture capital industry and newer entrants into the industry. While larger, older funds are under represented, their impact on future trends and strategies in the industry is captured to some extent in the set of questions about “future direction of the venture capital industry.“Finally, the emerging strategic groups in the venture capital industry that were identified by this study may be useful information for investors as well as users of venture capital. For investors, the opportunity to participate in venture capital activity should become more clearly understood and varied. Basically, this study should help investors differentiate the strategic posture of different venture capital firms and funds on four factors rather than simply industry/geographic considerations.For users of venture capital, the results of this study suggest a possibility for multiple options that are both more accessible and more catered to specific needs. Users of venture capital should find a clearer basis on which to differentiate venture capital firms in terms of venture stage priorities, staff utilization orientations, sources and uses of financial resources. This should make for more informed “shopping” among different venture capital sources and provide a basis on which to “shop” for the most compatible firm.     

Are ICT,Workplace Organization,and Human Capital Relevant for Innovation? A Comparative Swiss/Greek Study

This paper investigates and compares the relationships for Swiss and Greek firms between indicators for the intensity of use of modern information and communications technologies (ICT), several forms of workplace organization, and human capital, on the one hand, and several measures of innovation performance at firm level, on the other hand. For the Swiss firms, we find that ICT contribute to innovation activities (a) as enablers of process innovation (but not of product innovation) and (b) as means for increasing the efficiency of the R&D process. The organizational variables for “work design” and “employee voice” show significant positive correlations for most innovation indicators. Human capital matters primarily for R&D activities. The findings for the Greek firms indicate positive correlations of ICT with product and process innovation and of new “work design” with product innovation and R&D. No correlation of human capital with innovation could be found. No complementarities for the three factors with respect to innovation performance could be detected in either country.     

ICT,Innovation and Firm Performance: The Transition Economies Context

The aim of this article is to investigate the impact of information communication technologies (ICT) and innovation activities on firm performance using the Business Environment Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) firm-level data in the three rounds: 2002, 2005, and 2008. The novelty of this research is based on the idea of studying the usage of ICT and innovation activities on firm performance by using dynamic approach so that we can estimate the adjustments that arise from the impact of ICT and innovation activities. The rapid technological development and the growing use of information technology (IT) in business organizations have become the center of attention in past few years. A bulk of literature has been published on the use of IT in different industries, different types of business organizations, and in different areas of business management. On the other hand, the probability of the firm to undertake innovation activities has shown to enhance firm performance. This study implements various estimations on BEEPS observations to test whether the change in the usage of ICT and other innovation determinants have increase the probability of firms to undertake innovation activities. © 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

Exploring the innovation strategies of young firms: Corporate venture capital and venture capital impact on alliance innovation strategy

We investigate how governance structure and power influence alliance exploration strategy. Adopting a real options perspective and the agency view, we suggest that innovation strategies differ based on the firm's governance authority. We find that the motivations of corporate venture capitalist firms, venture capitalists, and firm founders may have an impact on the formation of exploratory alliances among adolescent firms. Using a sample of 122 adolescent firms, we examine the influence that governance structure has on the firm's alliance portfolio and innovation potential. While the influence of corporate venture capitalist firms alone do affect alliance formation strategy, corporate venture-backed firms with founders having high influence (knowledge or ownership in the firm) are more likely to form innovation-focused alliances. In contrast, venture capitalist-backed firms tend to avoid innovation-focused alliances, preferring more exploitive ones, even when founders have high influence within the firm.     

Joint ventures in patent contests with spillovers and the role of strategic budgeting

We consider an R&D contest between n firms in the presence of external spillovers. Our analysis focuses on the effects of these spillovers on joint venture activities between firms. In particular, we are interested in how different budget responsibilities within the research joint venture (RJV) affect profits of firms taking part in the joint venture and profits of their non-cooperating rival firms. Three arrangements for RJVs are analyzed: First, cooperation, in which the firms participating in the joint venture completely share the research they create in the innovation process and each firm has a sovereign budget responsibility. Second, a collusive arrangement in which the participating firms not only share their research but have joint budget responsibilities in the sense that they make all strategic choices cooperatively and maximize joint profits. Third, a hierarchical form, in which the cooperating firms establish joint headquarters which have strategic budget responsibility in the sense that it can strategically subsidize R&D efforts of its member firms so as to maximize overall RJV profits. We show that the first two arrangements can be mimiced in the hierarchical structure and that a hierarchical structure is optimal if it completely subsidizes its members’ R&D activities. In this case all rival firms are driven out of the contest.     

Founder/Chief Executive Officer Exit: A Social Capital Perspective of New Ventures

The founder/chief executive officer (CEO) exit is a significant event for all business organizations. However, a social capital perspective suggests that the exit of the founder/CEO may be more disruptive for new start-ups due to the critical role the founder/CEO plays in the new organization and the heightened potential chance for failure of a new venture. A social capital perspective suggests that the ability of the entrepreneurial firm to perform better is affiliated with the social capital within the organization. This study supports a social capital perspective of CEO exit and social capital's impact on performance. It helps establish a foundation of study of CEO exit and new ventures from this perspective.     

Job machine,think tank,or both: what makes corporate spin-offs different?

One way through which knowledge and technology transfer can take place is through the foundation of new firms by former employees of incumbent private firms. In this paper, we examine whether knowledge transferred from the incumbent causally affect employment growth and post-entry innovation activities of the new firm. We focus on start-ups for which a new idea (a new product, technology, production process, or management concept), which the founder developed during her work as an employee, was essential for setting up the new business. These firms are denoted corporate spin-offs. Using data from German start-ups founded in the period from 2005 to 2008, we apply nearest-neighbour propensity score matching. We find that corporate spin-offs outperform other start-ups founded by former employees of incumbent private firms that are not based on an essential idea in terms of post-entry innovation activities. However, we cannot show that corporate spin-offs benefit from the transferred idea in terms of employment growth. We conclude that a transferred idea is primarily an input factor and a stimulus for subsequent post-entry innovation activities of corporate spin-offs.     

The influence of experiential,inherited and external knowledge on the internationalization of venture capital firms

This paper examines the effect of different types of international knowledge accumulation on the internationalization of venture capital firms, as a particular type of professional service firms. We distinguish between experiential knowledge acquired through previous activities, inherited knowledge through the management team and external knowledge through network partners. Hypotheses are developed for both the likelihood and the number of cross-border investments. The hand collected dataset comprises a combination of survey and archival data on a unique sample of 110 venture capital firms from five different European countries. Analyses indicate a positive effect of experiential and inherited knowledge on internationalization, but external knowledge has limited impact. Intense international contacts even decrease international activities. Together, these results highlight the importance of experiential and inherited knowledge to overcome information asymmetries inherent in the internationalization of professional service firms, and of venture capital firms in particular.     

Why do venture capital firms exist? theory and canadian evidence

This paper investigates the role of venture capitalists. We view their “raison d’être” as their ability to reduce the cost of informational asymmetries. Our theoretical framework focuses on two major forms of asymmetric information: “hidden information” (leading to adverse selection) and “hidden action” (leading to moral hazard). Our theoretical analysis suggests four empirical predictions.1. Venture capitalists operate in environments where their relative efficiency in selecting and monitoring investments gives them a comparative advantage over other investors. This suggests strong industry effects in venture capital investments. Venture capitalists should be prominent in industries where informational concerns are important, such as biotechnology, computer software, etc., rather than in “routine” start-ups such as restaurants, retail outlets, etc. The latter are risky, in that returns show high variance, but they are relatively easy to monitor by conventional financial intermediaries.2. Within the class of projects where venture capitalists have an advantage, they will still prefer projects where monitoring and selection costs are relatively low or where the costs of informational asymmetry are less severe. Thus, within a given industry where venture capitalists would be expected to focus, we would also expect venture capitalists to favor firms with some track records over pure start-ups. To clarify the distinction between point 1 and point 2, note that point 1 states that if we look across investors, we will see that venture capitalists will be more concentrated in areas characterized by significant informational asymmetry. Point 2 says that if we look across investment opportunities, venture capitalists will still favor those situations which provide better information (as will all other investors). Thus venture capitalists perceive informational asymmetries as costly, but they perceive them as less costly than do other investors.3. If informational asymmetries are important, then the ability of the venture capitalist to “exit” may be significantly affected. Ideally, venture capitalists will sell off their share in the venture after it “goes public” on a stock exchange. If, however, venture investments are made in situations where informational asymmetries are important, it may be difficult to sell shares in a public market where most investors are relatively uninformed. This concern invokes two natural reactions. One is that many “exits” would take place through sales to informed investors, such as to other firms in the same industry or to the venture’s own management or owners. A second reaction is that venture capitalists might try to acquire reputations for presenting good quality ventures in public offerings. Therefore, we might expect that the exits that occur in initial public offerings would be drawn from the better-performing ventures.4. Finally, informational asymmetries suggest that owner-managers will perform best when they have a large stake in the venture. Therefore, we can expect entrepreneurial firms in which venture capitalists own a large share to perform less well than other ventures. This is moral hazard problem, as higher values of a venture capitalist’s share reduce the incentives of the entrepreneur to provide effort. Nevertheless, it might still be best in a given situation for the venture capitalist to take on a high ownership share, since this might be the only way of getting sufficient financial capital into the firm. However, we would still expect a negative correlation between the venture capital ownership share and firm performance.Our empirical examination of Canadian venture capital shows that these predictions are consistent with the data. In particular, there are significant industry effects in the data, with venture capitalists having disproportionate representation in industries that are thought to have high levels of informational asymmetry. Secondly, venture capitalists favor later stage investment to start-up investment. Third, most exit is through “insider” sales, particularly management buyouts, acquisitions by third parties, rather than IPOs. However, IPOs have higher returns than other forms of exit. In addition, the data exhibit the negative relationship between the extent of venture capital ownership and firm performance predicted by our analysis.     

Learning from own and others’ previous experience: the contribution of the venture capital firm to the likelihood of a portfolio company’s trade sale

The objective of this paper is to examine to what extent different venture capital firms contribute to the likelihood that the portfolio company in which they invested will realize a trade sale. We use arguments from learning theory to hypothesize the relationship between vicarious, experiential and congenital learning of the venture capital (VC) firm and the trade sale hazard of its portfolio companies. Based on our analysis of 206 VC-backed UK start-ups, we find that both trade sale experience of the VC and learning from syndicate partners with trade sale experience significantly increase the trade sale hazard. The routines and procedures learned from experienced syndicate partners complement experience accumulated through trial and error. Congenital trade sale experience of the investment managers on the contrary has no significant influence on the acquisition hazard.     

The Impact of Knowledge Resources on New Venture Performance

A new venture's strategy—and thus its performance—is based upon the knowledge the firm has about its market, its opportunity in that market, and its appropriate conduct to take advantage of that opportunity. Resource-based theory underscores knowledge as a type of resource that confers competitive advantage and the potential for sustainability, two factors that are critical for start-ups. Three types of procedural knowledge are considered to be important at start-up: (1) about the industry in which the venture competes; (2) about the type of business approach the venture is pursuing; and (3) about creating, building, and harvesting new ventures. Knowledge useful to the new venture is developed either through relevant personal experiences or by accessing relevant knowledge possessed by others. Hypotheses are developed regarding the impact on the performance of new ventures as a result of these sources of knowledge, and these relationships are explored in a study of new technology-based firms.     

A longitudinal study of the relationship between export activity and innovation in the Spanish firm: The moderating role of productivity

Does innovation lead the firm to export more products, or does a firm's export propensity induce it to innovate? How does a firm's productivity level change this relationship? After confirming that exporters develop more innovations than non-exporters, this study attempts to answer these questions by studying two effects. First, we analyse the impact of innovation on a firm's export activities while addressing potential endogeneity concerns. Second, we examine the impact of export activity on a firm's innovation performance. We must address both questions when considering firm productivity. To this end, we conduct a longitudinal analysis of 14,142 observations of an annual average of 1767 Spanish firms within the manufacturing sector during the period from 2001 to 2008. The results suggest that the self-selection hypothesis adequately explains the observed phenomena. That is, innovation induces firms to increase their export activities. This finding is robust to endogeneity. Nevertheless, firms do not experience any learning-by-exporting effects on the obtaining of product or process innovations. Productivity does not modify any of these relationships.