Tractable hedging with additional hedge instruments

In an uncertain volatility model where only the stock and the money market account are traded, the upper price bound of a European claim is given by the solution of a Black-Scholes-Barenblatt equation. If an additional hedge instrument is available, the price bound can be tightened. This is also true if the set of admissible strategies is restricted to tractable strategies, which are defined as sums of Black-Scholes strategies. We study the structure of both strategies, the general strategies and the tractable strategies, when an additional convex instrument is available. For a call and a bullish vertical spread, we give closed-form solutions for the optimal tractable hedge when the additional instrument is a call option. We show that the position in the additional convex claim as well as the reduction in the price bounds allow to capture the amount of convexity risk a claim is exposed to.     

Realized hedge ratio: Predictability and hedging performance

This study explores the dynamic properties and predictability of the Realized Minimum Variance Hedge Ratio (RMVHR), constructed from five-minute spot and future returns of two stock indices and two exchange rates. A number of econometric models are employed to forecast directly the RMVHR and the out-of-sample performance is evaluated. Results from statistical measures suggest that the evolution of the realized hedge ratio series is predictable. In terms of risk reduction, we conclude that realized hedge ratio forecasts dominate conventional methods that use daily data while the benefit is pronounced when economic gains are considered. The superior performance of RMVHR methods holds across different asset classes but is more conspicuous in the case of stock indices. Finally, this study assesses the effect of sampling frequency and transaction costs.     

解读套期保值会计准则

2006年2月15日,财政部印发了38项企业具体会计准则.相对于其他37项具体会计准则,第24号准则<套期保值>显得非常陌生.探究其原因,一方面是过去国内套期保值业务并不常见,另一方面则与会计实务界普遍缺乏金融知识有关,加之学术界中金融与会计的融合程度还不高,使得目前很难找到可供参考的、系统介绍套期保值会计理论的中文资料.     

Corporate governance and hedge fund activism

Recently, the mainstream media have paid considerable attention to hedge funds behaving as agents of corporate change. We study this phenomenon using a unique dataset of hedge fund activism for the period 1994–2005, and find evidence that hedge fund activists improve both short-term stock performance and long-term operating performance of their targets. The most dramatic changes in performance accrue to targets where activists seek corporate governance changes and reductions in excess cash. Additionally, hedge funds themselves benefit from activism: the risk-adjusted annual performance of hedge funds seeking changes in corporate governance is about 7–11% higher than for non-activist hedge funds and hedge funds pursuing less aggressive activism. These results imply that hedge funds can facilitate long-lasting changes in corporate governance, cash flows, and operating performance that benefit target firm shareholders and hedge fund investors alike.     

Corporate reputation and hedging activities

This study examines whether corporate reputation affects derivative hedging. We posit that high-reputation firms are more likely to engage in hedging due to greater reputation costs and/or their commitment to lower financial risks. We find that high-reputation firms are more likely to engage in hedging, especially when their hedging efforts or effects are more observable to stakeholders. We also find that high-reputation firms are less likely to disclose the notional values of hedging positions and that interest rate hedging by high-reputation firms is detrimental to firm value. Our results shed light on the impact of reputational concerns on corporate risk management and disclosure policies.     

Implicit incentives and reputational herding by hedge fund managers

Several theories of reputation suggest that managers' incentives affect their propensity to engage in herding behavior. This paper investigates these theories by tracking hedge fund managers' herding behavior over their careers. I first examine managerial incentives for herding, and show that more senior managers that deviate from the herd have a significantly higher probability of failure and do not experience higher fund inflows than their less-senior counterparts. These implicit incentives should encourage managers to herd more as their careers progress. I find strong support for this hypothesis: using a number of proxies for herding, I show that more experienced managers herd more than less-experienced managers. Finally, I examine performance differences between more and less-experienced managers, and find that while more experienced managers underperform less-experienced managers, this underperformance does not appear to be caused by differences in herding. Overall, these results are in direct contrast with studies of mutual fund managers, reflecting important difference in implicit incentives between the two industries.     

Cutting the hedge: Exporters' dynamic currency hedging behaviour

We use a dataset that includes all New Zealand merchandise export transactions to analyse exporters' dynamic currency hedging behaviour. We focus on whether exporters change their hedging behaviour (“selectively hedge”) when the exchange rate and/or forward points depart from historical norms. We find that hedging ratios for exporters' Australian dollar exposures vary systematically as the exchange rate departs from historical averages; this behaviour is more marked for larger relative to smaller exporters. Consistent with efficient markets theory, there is no evidence that selective hedging is a profitable strategy for exporters.     

Multivariate GARCH hedge ratios and hedging effectiveness in Australian futures markets

We use the All Ordinaries Index and the corresponding Share Price Index futures contract written against the All Ordinaries Index to estimate optimal hedge ratios, adopting several specifications: an ordinary least squares‐based model, a vector autoregression, a vector error‐correction model and a diagonal‐vec multivariate generalized autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity model. Hedging effectiveness is measured using a risk‐return comparison and a utility maximization method. We find that time‐varying generalized autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity hedge ratios perform better than constant hedge ratios in terms of minimizing risks, but when return effects are also considered, the utility‐based measure prefers the ordinary least squares method in the in‐sample hedge, whilst both approaches favour the conditional time‐varying multivariate generalized autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity hedge ratio estimates in out‐of‐sample analyses.     

Hedging,hedge accounting,and earnings predictability

Review of Accounting Studies - Studies suggest that, pursuant to the implementation of SFAS 133, even sophisticated users of financial statements find it difficult to comprehend earnings...     

Managerial risk incentives and accounting conservatism

Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting - We provide empirical evidence of the effect of managerial risk incentives on financial reporting conservatism. We hypothesize that firms use greater...     

Empirical evidence concerning incentives to hedge transaction and translation exposures

We investigate Swedish firms’ use of financial hedges against foreign exchange exposure. Our survey data lets us distinguish between translation exposure and transaction exposure hedging. Survey responses indicate that over 50% of the sampled firms employ financial hedges, and that transaction exposure is more frequently hedged than is translation exposure. The likelihood of using financial hedges increases with firm size and exposure, and liquidity constraints are important in explaining transaction exposure hedging. Importantly, the existence of loan covenants accounts for translation exposure hedging, suggesting that firms hedge translation exposure to avoid violating loan covenants.     

Corporate hedging and the cost of debt

For a large sample of U.S. firms from 1994 to 2009, we empirically examine the impact of corporate hedging on the cost of public debt. We find strong evidence that hedging is associated with a lower cost of debt. The negative effect of hedging on the cost of debt is consistent across industries, and remains economically and statistically significant under various controls and econometric specifications. A cross-sectional analysis based on propensity score matching suggests that hedging initiation firms experience a drop in cost of debt, while suspension firms sustain a jump. We confirm our findings after employing an extensive array of models to address potential endogeneity. The influence of hedging on cost of debt is mainly through the lowering of bankruptcy risk and agency cost, and the reduction in information asymmetry. Finally, hedging mitigates the negative effect of rising borrowing costs on capital expenditure and firm value.     

How fair-value accounting can influence firm hedging

The potential influence of accounting regulations on hedging strategies and the use of financial derivatives is a research topic that has attracted little attention in both the finance and the accounting literature. However, recent surveys suggest that company hedging can be substantially influenced by the accounting for financial instruments. In this study, we illustrate not only why but also how the accounting regulations may affect hedging behavior. We find that under mark-to-market accounting, most firms concerned with earnings smoothness adopt myopic hedging strategies relative to the benchmark, cash flow hedging. The specific influence of the accounting regulations depends on market and firm-specific characteristics, but, in general, the firms dramatically reduce the extent of hedging addressing price risk in future accounting periods. We illustrate that the change in hedging behavior significantly dampens the increase in earnings volatility stemming from fair value accounting of derivatives. However, the adjusted hedging strategies may substantially increase the firms’ cash flow volatility.     

Corporate tax avoidance and high-powered incentives

This paper analyzes the links between corporate tax avoidance and the growth of high-powered incentives for managers. A simple model demonstrates the role of feedback effects between tax sheltering and managerial diversion in determining how high-powered incentives influence tax sheltering decisions. A novel measure of corporate tax avoidance (the component of the book-tax gap not attributable to accounting accruals) allows for an investigation of the link between tax avoidance and incentive compensation. Increases in incentive compensation tend to reduce the level of tax sheltering, in a manner consistent with a complementary relationship between diversion and sheltering. In addition, this negative effect is driven primarily by firms with relatively weak governance arrangements, confirming a central prediction of the model. These results can help explain the growing cross-sectional variation among firms in their levels of tax avoidance, the undersheltering puzzle, and why large book-tax gaps are associated with subsequent negative abnormal returns.     

Corporate cash holdings and CEO compensation incentives

We examine the effect of chief executive officer (CEO) compensation incentives on corporate cash holdings and the value of cash to better understand how compensation incentives designed to enhance the alignment of manager and shareholder interests could influence stockholder-bondholder conflicts. We find a positive relation between CEO risk-taking (vega) incentives and cash holdings, and we find a negative relation between vega and the value of cash to shareholders. The negative effect of vega on the value of cash is robust after controlling for corporate governance, is stronger in firms with high leverage, is reversed for unlevered firms, and is not present in financially constrained firms. We also find that the likelihood of liquidity covenants in new bank loans is increasing in CEO vega incentives. Our evidence primarily supports the costly contracting hypothesis, which asserts that bondholders anticipate greater risk-taking in high vega firms and, therefore, require greater liquidity.     

Optimal hedge ratios and alternative hedging strategies in the presence of cointegrated time-varying risks

This paper utilizes the inter-temporal relationship between the FTSE-100 stock index and its futures price level between 1992 and 1999 to examine the characteristics of several minimum variance hedge ratios and the performances of several alternative hedging strategies for dynamic portfolio management in the presence of cointegrated time-varying risks. Earlier studies neglected the importance of cointegration between the two variables which resulted in biased estimates. These studies, in general, also assume that the hedging period is the same as the estimation time interval. This paper also looks at several key issues when the holding period is longer than the estimation period, such as the construction of optimal minimum variance hedge ratios, and the trade-off between transaction costs and risk reduction.     

Optimal hedge ratio and hedging effectiveness of stock index futures: evidence from India

In a free capital mobile world with increased volatility, the need for an optimal hedge ratio and its effectiveness is warranted to design a better hedging strategy with future contracts. This study analyses four competing time series econometric models with daily data on NSE Stock Index Futures and S&P CNX Nifty Index. The effectiveness of the optimal hedge ratios is examined through the mean returns and the average variance reduction between the hedged and the unhedged positions for 1-, 5-, 10- and 20-day horizons. The results clearly show that the time-varying hedge ratio derived from the multivariate GARCH model has higher mean return and higher average variance reduction across hedged and unhedged positions. Even though not outperforming the GARCH model, the simple OLS-based strategy performs well at shorter time horizons. The potential use of this multivariate GARCH model cannot be sublined because of its estimation complexities. However, from a cost of computation point of view, one can equally consider the simple OLS strategy that performs well at the shorter time horizons.     

Corporate suppliers and customers and accounting conservatism

We argue that a firm's suppliers and customers prefer it to account more conservatively due to information asymmetry and these stakeholders' asymmetric payoffs with respect to the firm's performance. We predict that a firm meets this demand for accounting conservatism when suppliers or customers have bargaining advantages over it that enable them to dictate terms of trade or whether trade occurs at all. We show that when a firm's suppliers or customers have greater bargaining power, the firm recognizes losses more quickly. Our findings provide insights into how a firm's powerful suppliers and customers are associated with its accounting practices and also support the contracting explanation for accounting conservatism.     

Hedging, hedge accounting, and speculation in a rational expectations equilibrium

This paper explains corporate hedging and speculation in a two period rational expectations model. A risk averse manager represents a firm that is priced in a risk neutral market. The manager enters into a cash flow hedge of a forecast transaction by taking a short position in the futures market. When the futures position is chosen, the manager possesses private information regarding the firm’s production capacity. Mandatory disclosure of the futures position in the financial statements allows the market to draw inferences over the manager’s information. These inferences affect the market’s pricing decision and in turn the manager’s hedging decision. The futures position taken is chosen not only to reduce price risk exposure but to signal some capacity level. In equilibrium, however, the market anticipates the manager’s strategy and is not fooled.Considering varying managerial preferences, we analyze three settings. In the basic setting speculation occurs whenever the manager prefers high market values in both periods. In the second setting we add transaction costs and find that speculation is less likely. Finally, we introduce uncertainty regarding the manager’s preferences. If the market needs to determine prices based on expected preferences, incentives to speculate are mitigated in equilibrium but still present.