浅谈如何改善注册会计师执业环境

笔者在会计师事务所从业10年,见证和经历了中国注册会计师行业不断发展状大的改革发展历程,同时也深受到了会计师事务所执业环境的恶化,执业环境直接影响着注册会计师的执业行为,更影响着审计质量乃至注册会计师行业的发展。执业环境是指注册会计师及其所在会计师事务所在依法执行独立审计业务时所处的内外、上下、左右之间相互关系的情况和工作     

管理咨询对审计独立性的影响分析

一、管理咨询对审计独立性的影响分析 首先,我们用注册会计师和管理当局的单阶段博弈进行分析。假设管理当局和注册会计师都是有限理性的经济人,注册会计师在审计中履行了全部必要的审计程序。博弈开始,如果管理当局选择不作假的概率为P,效用为R,注册会计师审计收费为W,管理当局选择作假的概率就为1-P,其获得的额外效用为△R;[第一段]     

加强审计市场独立性的探讨

本文通过对当今审计市场的现状研究,分析了现阶段中国审计独立性缺失的多方面原因,特别是从客户管理当局的角度进行了着重分析,并针对其相关的制约因素提出几点维护其独立性的对策及建议。1、加强独立审计法制化建设,改善独立审计的执业环境;2、不允许作为会计师事务所合伙人或股东的注册会计师与客户具有直接或间接的经济利益;3、规范审计市场的无序竞争。     

对注册会计师行业监管的博弈分析

为遏制注册会计师的机会主义,必须通过监管机构的有效管制和法律武器。本文从建立简单的博弈模型入手,步步深入依次分析无监管、有监管的注册会计师行业与被审计单位管理当局的博弈、监管机构与注册会计师之间的博弈。最后对加强和改进注册会计师行业监管提出相应的建议。     

对以风险为导向的社会审计的探讨

社会审计主要是注册会计师按照相关规定接受委托、独立执业、有偿为社会提供专业服务的活动，其是在财产所有权和管理权两者的分离下而产生的一种概念，亦可称之为独立审计、注册会计师审计。本文首先对国内社会审计风险现状进行了分析，其次提出了有效控制社会审计风险的策略。     

会计责任与审计责任认定中存在的问题及解决方案的探讨

会计责任和审计责任是一对联系紧密的概念,两者通过受托经济责任紧密地联系在一起;同时,会计责任和审计责任是注册会计师审计中两个不同的概念,它们涉及到注册会计师和被审计单位的责任划分和可能承担的法律责任。但是,由于我国一系列法律法规之间还存在许多问题,如何维持注册会计师良好的职业环境,保护注册会计师的合法权益,同时又如何惩治那些违法违纪的会计师事务所、注册会计师,严肃执业纪律,已成为每一个注册会计师都应该关注的问题。     

我国审计收费制度存在的问题及对策研究

独立审计作为一种市场活动,其收费标准必然受到审计环境的影响.审计收费作为委托人与注册会计师之间重要的经济联系,不再被看作研究的前提,而被当作研究的主要对象.目前,注册会计师行业鱼龙混杂,更有部分注册会计师参与造假,导致了注册会计师行业诸多的法律诉讼,注册会计师也面临越来越大的审计风险.因此,本文拟在分析我国注册会计师行业现行审计收费制度存在问题的基础上,提出完善审计收费制度的政策建议.     

谈影响CPA审计独立性的原因及完善途径

独立是注册会计师的灵魂,独立原则是注册会计师职业道德准则中最基础的原则,是客观公正原则及其他职业道德规范的基础.没有独立性,注册会计师审计就失去了存在的意义.市场经济的进一步发展,对注册会计师的执业要求也达到了一个更高的阶段,更加强调注册会计师的职业道德和其应负的法律责任问题.为了提高注册会计师的职业道德,为了降低审计风险,避免法律责任,也要求注册会计师首先应具有真正意义上的独立性.那么,独立性受到影响的原因是什么,如何提高注册会计师的独立性.本文拟从以下两方面进行阐述.     

我国注册会计师执业环境现状研究及改善

注册会计师在世界经济发展中起着至关重要的作用。我国的经济发展速度越来越快,在这个过程中,注册会计师是我国市场经济中必不可少的一分子。注册会计师行业的自身努力和良好执业环境,是这一行业得以发展和注册会计师有效地发挥作用的前提。目前各种各样的因素,使我国注册会计师的执业环境有很多有待研究和解决的问题,而这些问题不光对注册会计师执业质量产生了很大的影响,对审计质量同样会产生很大的影响。若想提高注会的审计质量,改善其执业环境已迫在眉睫。     

注册会计师与上市公司的博弈分析

注册会计师如何在审计中保持客观独立的职业形象是个极其复杂又值得深入研究的话题。本文从博弈的视角,探析影响注册会计师独立性的因素,并考察政府在审计博弈中扮演的重要角色。通过完美信息博弈分析与颤抖手均衡分析,提出改善审计环境、加强监管与惩罚力度、提高媒体舆论在审计中发挥的作用等相关建议。     

Endogenous price leadership in a duopoly: Equal products, unequal technology

In the present paper we study endogenous price leadership in the context of a homogeneous product Bertrand duopoly model in which the firms have different, strictly convex cost functions. In such a framework it is well known that a simultaneous move price choice game does not have an equilibrium in pure strategies, but it has an equilibrium in mixed strategies. In the Stackelberg games with an exogenous price leader, we show that a pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) always exists. Although the SPNE might not be unique, the payoffs are the same across all SPNE. Finally, we analyze the issue of endogenous price leadership using the continuous version of the Robson (1990) timing game. The result is unexpected. One would expect the more efficient firm to emerge as the endogenous price leader. This is not always true. In most cases the endogenous leader is the firm with the highest "threshold" price. However, we also provide conditions under which the more efficient firm emerges as the leader. Our paper essentially complements Yano (2001) , which is based on the Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) framework.     

The Evolution of Fuzzy Rules as Strategies in Two-Player Games

This paper describes simulations using fuzzy rules that show how Nash equilibrium behavior can be achieved by boundedly rational agents in two-player games with infinite strategy spaces. That is, we show how agents using simple “rules of thumb” can achieve near-equilibrium outcomes without any overt computation of the equilibrium. This is accomplished by using a genetic algorithm to approximate repeated play. Two games of differing complexities, both with analytic solutions, are examined: a repeated linear-demand Cournot game and a contestable rent game. When fuzzy rules used only the most recent information, the games we examined converged to outcomes similar to their respective Coumot-Nash equilibrium outcomes. When fuzzy rules “remembered” play from the more distant past, we found that the games converged more slowly, if at all.     

Mixed strategy equilibria in repeated games with one-period memory

Infinitely repeated games is the pre-dominant paradigm within which economists study long-term strategic interaction. The standard framework allows players to condition their strategies on all past actions; that is, assumes that they have unbounded memory. That is clearly a convenient simplification that is at odds with reality. In this paper we restrict attention to one-period memory and characterize all totally mixed equilibria. In particular, we focus on strongly mixed equilibria. We provide conditions that are necessary and sufficient for a game to have such an equilibrium. We further demonstrate the exact set of payoffs that can be generated by such equilibria.     

上市公司会计舞弊的不完全信息博弈分析

本文运用博弈论分析方法,对上市公司会计舞弊问题进行了不完全信息静态博弈分析。通过分析,从理论上揭示了上市公司和注册会计师(会计师事务所)的行为动机以及博弈均衡结果,并对结果进行了分析。阐述了我国上市公司会计舞弊的现状和原因。借助博弈分析的结论,提出了减少我国上市公司会计舞弊的几点建议。     

Pass or Run: An Empirical Test of the Matching Pennies Game Using Data from the National Football League

This article examines play calling in the National Football League (NFL). It finds that a mixed strategy equilibrium game explains NFL play calling better than standard optimization techniques. When a quarterback is injured and replaced with a less capable backup, standard optimization theory suggests that the offense will run more often, passing less. Our game theoretic model predicts that the offense will not change its play calling because the defense will play against the run more often. Using every first half play from the 11 teams that had a starting quarterback miss action because of injury in the 2006 season, we find that the injury did not alter the likelihood that the offense would pass. We also find that coaches randomly mix passing and running plays, as the mixed strategy games predict.     

N人博弈情形中的行业失德与治理——以我国食品行业为例

文章在古诺模型的基础上,以我国食品行业集体失德危机为背景,建立了一个企业同时进行质量和数量博弈的模型,从双寡头情形扩展到N人博弈情形,证明了企业的逐利性将导致行业集体失德。尽管政府监管水平差异将导致不同的博弈均衡结果,但道德规范仅在中度监管情形下有意义,此时针对N人博弈中要么全部生产问题食品、要么全部生产正常食品的均衡策略,道德规范可以突出生产正常食品的聚点意义。     

The Logit Equilibrium: A Perspective on Intuitive Behavioral Anomalies

This paper considers a class of models in which rank-based payoffs are sensitive to “noise” in decision making. Examples include auctions, price competition, coordination, and location games. Observed laboratory behavior in these games is often responsive to the asymmetric costs associated with deviations from the Nash equilibrium. These payoff-asymmetry effects are incorporated in an approach that introduces noisy behavior via a logit probabilistic choice function. In the resulting logit equilibrium, behavior is characterized by a probability distribution that satisfies a “rational expectations” consistency condition: The beliefs that determine players' expected payoffs match the decision distributions that arise from applying the logit rule to those expected payoffs. We prove existence of a unique, symmetric logit equilibrium and derive comparative statics results. The paper provides a unified perspective on many recent laboratory studies of games in which Nash equilibrium predictions are inconsistent with both intuition and experimental evidence.     

Conduct in narrativized trust games

We “narrativize” a basic extensive form trust game by placing participants in a story that contextualizes the interaction with an unforeseeable future. In our narrative experiment, participants consider each decision as a character, advancing the story with their choices for salient payoffs. Our interest is in understanding how participants apply Adam Smith's rules of beneficent and just conduct in our narrativized games with epistemic conditions of an unknown future, conditions which aren't possible in extensive form. We invite our readers to participate in the story of the results, making meaning as participants in a narrative that unfolds with their choices.     

Corporate Social Responsibility or Payoff Asymmetry? A Study of an Endogenous Timing Game

We revisit an endogenous timing game by introducing corporate social responsibility into firms' payoffs. Previous research investigates an endogenous timing game in a mixed oligopoly, wherein one welfare‐maximizing public firm competes against profit‐maximizing private firms. It shows that the outcome is completely different from that of private oligopoly. In contrast to its result, we find that this change in payoff does not matter as long as the payoffs are symmetric. Our result indicates that asymmetry, and not welfare‐concerning objectives, yields specific results in the literature on mixed oligopoly.     

新型农业社会化服务的博弈分析

新型农业社会化服务体系是发展现代农业的重要支撑,遵循"覆盖全程、综合配套、便捷高效"的指导思想,构建了多目标战略决策模型。为寻求公益性和经营性服务的平衡,公共服务机构和龙头企业间的博弈是多目标效用能否实现的关键,纳什均衡解给出了两者的最优策略概率。结果表明:支付矩阵转移后的联盟博弈下,龙头企业占有决策优势。