基于纵向公平偏好视角的委托代理模型及薪酬激励机制研究

在高管薪酬水平过高、企业内部薪酬差距过大的背景下,从纵向公平偏好的视角研究了企业内部的委托代理关系和薪酬激励机制,假设员工是具有嫉妒和自豪两种纵向公平偏好的风险规避者,设计了代理人具有纵向公平偏好的委托代理模型。通过模型求解得到如下结论:当总经理的预期净收入高于员工时,其期望效用随着员工纵向公平偏好强度的提高而减小;当总经理的预期净收入低于员工时,其期望效用随着员工纵向公平偏好强度的提高而增大。     

基于公平偏好下的风险企业家道德风险研究

风险企业家在向风险投资家寻求融资共同发展风险项目的过程中表现出有限理性,具有公平偏好心理,其往往因为嫉妒心理而影响到自身的努力水平,这样,风险投资中的道德风险问题不可避免,进而会损害到风险投资家的利益。本文从有限理性的角度出发,通过设计针对具有公平偏好的风险企业家的有效激励机制,以此来分析和防范公平偏好心理带来的道德风险问题。研究表明,风险投资家应尽可能选择公平偏好程度较小的风险企业家作为投资对象,以减少或规避风险投资市场中的道德风险。     

Introducing Time‐to‐Educate in a Job‐Search Model

Transition patterns from school to work differ considerably across OECD countries. Some countries exhibit high youth unemployment rates, which can be considered an indicator of the difficulty facing young people trying to integrate into the labour market. At the same time, education is a time‐consuming process, and enrolment and dropout decisions depend on expected duration of studies as well as on job prospects with and without completed degrees. One way to model entry into the labour market is by means of job‐search models, where the job arrival hazard is a key parameter in capturing the ease or difficulty in finding a job. Standard models of job search and education assume that skills can be upgraded instantaneously (and mostly in the form of on‐the‐job training) at a fixed cost. This paper models education as a time‐consuming process, a concept which we call time‐to‐educate, during which an individual faces the trade‐off between continuing education and taking up a job.     

Bounded Rationality in Principal‐Agent Relationships

We conducted six treatments of a standard moral hazard experiment with hidden action. The behavior in all treatments and periods was inconsistent with established agency theory. In the early periods, behavior differed significantly between treatments. This difference largely vanished in the final periods. We used logit agent quantal response equilibrium (LAQRE) as a device to grasp boundedly rational behavior and found the following: (1) LAQRE predictions are much closer to subjects' behavior in the laboratory; (2) LAQRE probabilities and experimental behavior show remarkably similar patterns; and (3) including social preferences in LAQRE does not better explain the experimental data; (4) LAQRE cannot explain the contract offers of some players who seem to choose some focal contract parameters.     

Authority and Incentives in Organizations

I consider a corporation that consists of an owner, a manager, and two divisions. There exist externalities between the divisions: if a division behaves cooperatively, its success will increase the performance of the other division. The owner creates monetary effort incentives and allocates decision authority over the divisions. I characterize how externalities and benefits of control determine the corporation's optimal organization. The introduction of endogenous incentives changes the major findings of the existing literature, because then concentrated delegation of authority over both divisions to one of the division heads will be optimal if cooperation is important and divisions are difficult to incentivize.     

Contract Choice: Efficiency and Fairness in Revenue‐Sharing Contracts

We present a simple principal–agent experiment in which the principals are allowed to choose between a revenue‐sharing, a bonus, and a trust contract, to offer to an agent. Our findings suggest that a large majority of experimental subjects choose the revenue‐sharing contract. This choice turns out to be not only the most efficient but also, at the same time, fair. Overall, the distribution of earnings is only mildly skewed towards the principal. We conclude that, under revenue‐sharing contracts, concerns for fairness can be closely associated with the use of monetary incentives.     

Individual Decision Making in a Negative Externality Experiment

The experimental treatments analysed in this paper are simple in that there is a unique Nash equilibrium resulting in each player having a dominant strategy. However, the data show quite clearly that subjects do not always choose this strategy. In fact, when this dominant strategy is not a focal outcome it does not even describe the average decision adequately. It is shown that average individual decisions are best described by a decision error model based on a censored distribution as opposed to the truncated regression model which is typically used in similar studies. Moreover it is shown that in the treatments where the dominant strategy is not focal dynamics are important with average subject decisions initially corresponding to the focal outcome and then adjusting towards the Nash prediction. Overall, 66.7% of subjects are consistent with Payoff Maximization, 27.8% are consistent with an alternate preference maximization and 5.6% are random.     

转移定价参与、公平性感知与交易满意度——基于一项结构方程模型的实证研究

文章基于转移定价的行为学研究成果,将管理学中盛行的参与管理研究模型应用于转移定价领域.在国内集团企业问卷调查的基础上,文章根据国外对定价参与行为的研究成果,以及参与行为的情感模型,建立了包括定价参与、公平性感知和交易满意度在内的结构方程模型(Structural Equation M0deling,SEM).研究发现,结果的公平性在定价参与提升交易满意度的过程中起到了完全中介变量的作用,而过程的公平性则没有起到中介变量的作用.我们的研究有助于集团企业理顺内部交易关系、促进内部交易的顺利进行和集团整体战略的实施.     

激励理论在公共支出管理中的应用及有待解决的问题

公共支出过程中存在着多重委托-代理关系,如何激励代理人按照委托人的意愿行事,提高公共资源的配置效率和公共资金的使用效率是改善公共支出管理需要解决的问题.因此有必要在公共支出管理中应用激励理论.但是.应用激励理论必须解决代理人效用函数的设置等问题,而绩效评价可以提供效用函数的一些特征值.同时,公共支出管理中采用绩效评价方法,需要解决绩效评价后如何促使被评价的公共部门提高绩效水平的问题.在公共支出管理中应用激励理论,可以为上述问题找到答案.     

Decentralized Policymaking in a Long‐run Growth Model with Seigniorage and Taxes

The paper introduces decentralized policymaking into a game‐theoretic model with output growth through capital accumulation, and in which the determination of taxes, seigniorage and the long‐run growth rate of the economy reflects the strategic interactions between the government, the central bank and the private sector. The paper investigates, among other things, the impact on the long‐run growth rate of a higher degree of inflation aversion of the central bank and a higher degree of inefficiency in the tax system.     

风险企业的道德风险与控制权配置的模型分析

风险企业的控制权配制是在满足风险企业家激励相容和风险投资家参与约束条件下的一种相机性配置机制,它有别于 传统理论要求的"剩余索取权必须与控制权相匹配"的配置原则,能使双方在签约后根据企业绩效(或企业风险)的变动,进行相 应的权利调整,因而尽可能地解决了风险企业中的风险分担和激励问题。     

公司捐款与经济动机——汶川地震后中国上市公司捐款的实证研究

通过对5.12汶川地震后我国A股上市公司捐款数据的实证分析,我们发现公司捐赠行为存在提高声誉以获取广告效用的经济动机。其产品直接与消费者接触的公司比其他公司捐款数额平均多出50%。并且该经济动机也影响到公司的捐赠方式。由于捐赠现金能够引起更大的社会反响和更高的关注度,其产品直接与消费者接触的公司比其他公司捐赠更多的现金,平均多捐赠现金约1.8倍。其次,我们还发现公司捐赠行为是由自身能够承担社会责任的经济能力所决定的,业绩好的公司捐款总数和现金捐款数量更多。此外,公司规模及控股人类型等公司特征也对捐赠行为有影响。总的说来,公司出于广告效用的经济动机来选择捐赠数量和方式。本文建议对公司捐赠行为应该利用市场规律按照符合公司经济动机的方式引导和管理。     

产权信念及其对公平偏好与自利偏好的挤出

传统经济理论将产权作为经济绩效的外生变量,但是人类社会的演化路径表明产权是内生于人类族群的共同信念,它与内置于人类心智的公平偏好交互作用影响个体的决策行为。文章运用比较制度实验方法针对不同来源的产权考察其认同信念及其对公平偏好的影响。实验发现,产权不仅导致提议者对回应者和接受者有产权认同信念,也导致提议者的自利偏好和回应者的公平偏好被挤出;通过对利他偏好、策略行为和第三方评价的分离,测度了产权信念;提议者没有强烈的公平偏好动机,而是通过策略行为来最大化自身利益。     

Fiscal policy, long‐run growth, and welfare in a stock‐flow model of public goods

Abstract.  We introduce public capital and public services as inputs in an endogenous growth model. We show that the growth rate depends on the apportionment of tax revenues between the accumulation of public capital and the provision of public services. When public spending is financed by proportional income taxes, the growth rate, the level of public spending as a proportion of GDP, the level of investment in public capital as a proportion of total public spending, and the level of private investment as a proportion of total private spending all are lower in the equilibrium outcome than in the optimal outcome. JEL classification: E62, O40     

商业医疗保险中的道德风险防范与控制

道德风险在各种保险市场都存在,但在医疗保险市场却复杂得多。道德风险使医疗费用快速不合理地增长,过度消耗有限资源,给社会造成了极大的浪费,同时还恶化了医患关系,降低了社会诚信水平。分析了我公司9 876例案件中出现的道德风险及采取的防范措施。     

公平与效率视角下新农合二次补偿制度的困境与出路——基于甘肃省的调查研究

新型农村合作医疗二次补偿制度作为一种临时性的调控措施,增加了新农合基金的使用效率,拓宽了参合农民的受益范围。然而在实践中,新农合二次补偿制度尚存在一些自身难以克服的制度缺陷,如效率欠佳、公平性缺失、补偿对象甄别不规范等。此类问题已经制约着新农合的发展,不利于新农合规范高效率地运行。从公共政策公平与效率的视角对该制度所面临的困境进行分析,探讨了甘肃二次补偿制度困境突破的对策建议,以有助于促进甘肃乃至西北地区新农合制度的进一步完善。     

道德风险与存款保险额度的市场决定

中国建成何种存款保险制度模式将直接影响到银行行为和金融稳定。存款保险具有诱发银行从事更高风险经营的制度激励。为此,实践中许多经济体对存款保额人为设定上限。但总体上不是降低而是加大了银行体系的不稳定性。而保额如果由市场内生决定,则能够摆脱人为确定保额的困境。在金融业相对稳定的背景下,中国存款保险制度建设应该发挥后发优势,利用市场决定保额以尽量增加市场约束力。而且操作上也较为简单易行,并可与其他金融改革和制度建设互动进行。     

零售商公平关切下闭环供应链的回收模式比较与协调机制研究

针对制造商主导的闭环供应链,在考虑零售商为公平关切者的前提下,建立了三种回收模式(制造商回收、零售商回收和第三方回收)下的四个Stackelberg博弈模型,求解和比较不同情形下的最优价格、最优回收率和成员利润,分析零售商公平关切程度对最优决策的影响,得到了一系列有益的管理学结论。最后针对分散式决策下的效率损失,提出了基于二部定价契约的协调机制。     

Monetary policy in a cash‐in‐advance economy: employment, capital accumulation, and the term structure of interest rates

Abstract.  In this paper we study the effects of monetary policies on employment, capital accumulation, consumption, and the term structure of interest rates in a cash‐in‐advance economy, where money is required for consumption expenditures. Monetary policy involves targeting the inflation rate. The detailed dynamics of the model are fully worked out. As no numerical analysis is involved, we are able to identify very clearly the different channels through which monetary policy will impinge on the important macroeconomic variables. The model is also used to discuss the 'Great Canadian Slump.' JEL Classification: E52 and E43     

Debt and Punishment: Market Discipline in the Eurozone

This article challenges the conventional wisdom of weak market discipline in Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). In so doing, we empirically analyse the dynamics of market discipline for all 27 EU member states between 1992 and 2007. The existing literature tends to assert that markets discipline governments, without measuring whether the interest punishment markets impose actually has the purported effect on government policy. To better grasp the dynamics of market discipline it is essential to consider both sides. Market discipline is thus understood as a two-sided phenomenon. On the one hand, financial investors react to policy developments. On the other hand, policy-makers react to market signals. We find strong evidence that although the impact of fiscal policy developments on market punishment slightly decreases with monetary integration, government responsiveness to market punishment increases. This runs counter to the conventional narrative of policy-makers banking on bailout from fellow EMU members.