Strategic Role of Retailer Bundling in a Distribution Channel

We study retailer bundling in a distribution channel when the manufacturer for one bundled product can strategically set the wholesale price. We show that the retailer can use a bundling option as a strategic leverage to extract concessions from the manufacturer in form of a lower wholesale price. This finding contributes a novel rationale for retailer bundling to the bundling literature. Whenever the bundling option causes this concession-extraction effect, the retailer always benefits from the lower wholesale price. The manufacturer, nevertheless, does not necessarily suffer because bundling can lead to a higher consumer demand. We also show that the manufacturer's marginal production cost plays a critical role in driving the retailer's bundling decision, concession extraction behavior and consequently the total channel profit.     

Efficient replenishment in the distribution channel

Efficient replenishment (ER), a business process that involves the reduction of order cost to facilitate deliveries of goods from the manufacturer to the retailer, is becoming increasingly important in distribution channel management. While a well-executed ER program is expected to lower total channel costs and increase channel profit, very little is known about how this incremental channel profit is distributed between the manufacturer and the retailer and how it varies across the two common channel relationship structures, retailer price leadership and manufacturer price leadership.In this paper, we develop the conditions under which the manufacturer and the retailer gain more or less from the adoption of ER based on a game theoretic channel model of bilateral monopoly under the two channel relationship structures. We develop analytic results on the impact of ER on purchase quantity, price and the distribution of profits in three cases, namely, (1) when only the retailer adopts ER, (2) when both the manufacturer and the retailer adopt ER, and (3) when the manufacturer and the retailer are vertically integrated in the distribution channel, which adopts ER.The results, which can be generalized for all demand functions, show that the manufacturer benefits from the retailer's adoption of ER only when the manufacturer's holding cost relative to the retailer's is sufficiently large, relative to its order cost relative to the retailer's. By adopting ER, the retailer gains more than what the manufacturer gains even if the manufacturer is the price leader. Both the parties are likely to gain more if they both adopt ER than if only the retailer adopts ER. The incremental channel profit due to the retailer's ER adoption is highest in a vertically integrated distribution channel and is greater in a retailer-led channel relationship than in a manufacturer-led relationship.     

Distribution Channel Decentralization and Strategic Durability Choice

In a simple two‐period setting we examine a decentralized distribution (marketing) channel consisting of an up‐stream durable‐goods manufacturer and down‐stream retailer. The manufacturer sets the wholesale price and the product’s durability while the retailer selects an output level. We show that in this setting, the profit‐maximizing manufacturer unambiguously selects a higher durability than the socially efficient (cost‐minimizing) level in both uncommitted sales and rental markets. We show this ‘reversed planned obsolescence’ result is due to the strategic benefit of durability in this double‐marginalization (double monopoly mark‐up) setting. This is in stark contrast to the usual integrated channel result where the profit‐maximizing manufacturer will select an efficient level of durability in rental markets and an inefficiently low durability in uncommitted sales markets (due to the selling firm’s commitment problem with potential buyers). Intuitively, with a decentralized distribution channel, the manufacturer faces potential commitment problems with both current buyers and its down‐stream retailer. We show, only in cases where both sources of commitment issues are removed (i.e. the manufacturer can credibly commit to both potential buyers and its retailer), will the profit‐maximizing durability choice be socially efficient.     

Price and quality decisions in a vertically-differentiated supply chain with an “Online-to-Store” channel

Because of the prevalence of “Online-to-Store (OS)” channel, customers can purchase differentiated products online and pick up in-store. We develop a Stackelberg game-theoretic model to study the impact of an OS channel on quality levels, demands, prices, and profits of a manufacturer and a retailer in a supply chain. We assume that the retailer acts as a Stackelberg leader, and the manufacturer acts as a Stackelberg follower. The manufacturer produces and sells two products with vertically-differentiated quality levels to the retailer who in turn sells the products to customers through a Store channel, an Online channel, or an OS channel. The retailer incurs a handing cost if the OS channel is available, and consumers bear a shipping cost and a transaction cost when the products are purchased from the Online and Store channels, respectively. We find that the manufacturer should reduce both products’ quality levels and wholesale prices, whereas the retailer can increase the selling prices for a relatively small shipping cost and a not too small handling cost. When the products are available both online and in-store, however, the quality levels, wholesale prices and selling prices might increase for a small shipping cost and a not too small handling cost. Compared to the case in which both products are available online only with the OS channel, adding the Store channel is always beneficial for both parties. The intuition behind these results hinges on the trade-off between the handling cost and the increased market demand for the retailer. Moreover, the quality levels, the wholesale prices of both products, and the selling price of the low-quality product would decrease, while the selling price of the high-quality product increases for a sufficiently low transaction cost and a not too small shipping cost.     

Pricing coordination of a dual-channel supply chain considering offline in-sale service

With the rapid development of e-commerce, the problem of pricing conflicts between online and offline channels has become increasingly prominent. And the in-sale service has become an important factor influencing consumers' purchase decisions. To study the impact of in-sale service, this paper establishes a dual-channel supply chain model considering offline in-sale service. Using Stackelberg's game theory and backward induction, it solves the optimal pricing of supply chain members and makes comparisons in both cooperative and non-cooperative situations. Finally, it coordinates the supply chain through a two-part tariff contract. The results show that (1) The optimal wholesale price and offline retail price are positively correlated with in-sale service quality. And the opposite of the optimal online direct selling price. (2) With the quality of in-sale service improving, the retailer's profit will increase and then decrease but the manufacturer's profit will always decrease under non-cooperation. The total profit of the supply chain will rise and then fall under cooperation. (3) The two-part tariff coordination maximizes profits with the manufacturer reducing the wholesale price and the retailer paying a transfer cost. (4) Cooperative decision is better than the non-cooperative decision in terms of the supply chain as a whole.     

Manufacturer-Optimal Wholesale Pricing When Retailers Compete

The existing marketing science literature on channels of distribution has emphasized pricing strategies that maximize either channel or manufacturer margin. This emphasis has implicitly assumed that optimal wholesale prices are independent of any fixed fees charged by the manufacturer. While this assumption is justified in a single-manufacturer, single-retailer world, it generally does not lead to manufacturer profit maximization in a world of competing retailers. In this paper we derive a manufacturer-optimal wholesale pricing strategy by simultaneously determining both elements of a two-part tariff (consisting of a wholesale price and a fixed fee). We show that the manufacturer will always prefer this sophisticated pricing strategy to one that maximizes either channel or manufacturer margin. We also show that both elements of the optimal tariff are functions of the absolute difference between retailer fixed costs.     

3PL服务提供商参与下的供应链定价及协调策略

基于单个制造商,单个3PL服务提供商和单个零售商组成的三级供应链系统,将第三方物流服务提供商定量的引入到供应链协调中来,并在物流服务价格由制造商和零售商共同分担的条件下,应用博弈论理论对供应链系统的定价、产量和利润进行了分析。联合定价时,运用相同利润总增长率的协调方式,确定了批发价和物流服务价格的大小;对独立决策和联合协调决策两种情形下均衡解的比较,得出协调定价不仅批发价、零售价和物流服务价都降低,而且还提高了供应链系统的整体利润;通过观察企业定价的大小,可以判断企业是否采取合作的态度,从而为决策者提供理论依据。     

Defensive strategy against a private label: Building brand premium for retailer cooperation

We build a game-theoretic model of price competition between a national brand manufacturer and a retailer that also sells its private label. In particular, we examine a national brand's strategy of building brand premium in the context of channel coordination. The importance of national brand's brand equity has been well-documented in many empirical and behavioral studies. We reinforce the argument that building brand premium should be the first line of defense for a national brand instead of aggressively cutting wholesale price. Not only does the national brand manufacturer benefit from it, but also the retailer who sells both the national brand and its own private label has less incentive to promote the latter. Therefore, it can induce retailer cooperation, which is essential for a successful strategy in a distribution channel.     

Interplays between manufacturer advertising and retailer store brand introduction: Agency vs. wholesale contracts

In retail supply chains, manufacturers' advertising for national brands and retailers' store brand introduction may relate to each other, and two types of contracts, i.e., agency contract and wholesale contract, are widely used. This paper uses game-theoretic models to investigate the strategic interaction between a manufacturer's advertising strategy and a retailer's store brand introduction strategy. We derive the equilibrium outcomes, including wholesale price, retail price, market demand, retailer's and manufacturer's profits under different contract forms. We find that when the product cost is small relative to the perceived value of the store brand, the introduction of a store brand will benefit the retailer. The retailer is more likely to introduce store brands under the wholesale contract than under the agency contract. In addition, compared with the wholesale contract, the agency contract may increase both the manufacturer's and the retailer's profits and lead to Pareto improvement for them.     

Competitive sustainable processes and pricing decisions in omnichannel closed-up supply chains under different channel power structures

In recent years, omnichannel retailing and remanufacturing issues have rapidly emerged in the closed-loop supply chain (CLSC). The omnichannel is a combination of online and in-store retailing, and it affects supply chain relationships and channel power structures by changing value creation processes. It allows consumers a hybrid shopping experience where they can order products online and pick them up in the store or test in-store and buy online (TSBO). Despite this practice, no studies exist on CLSC considering omnichannel retailing under different channel power structures. We investigate the TSBO retailing strategy and its impact on CLSC profit considering price competition between manufacturer and remanufacturer under Manufacturer Stackelberg (MS), Retailer Stackelberg (RS), Vertical Nash (VN), and cooperation (CO) models game settings. In this paper, mathematical models are developed to drive the optimal solution. A two-part tariff coordination mechanism (i.e., IS model) is also used to integrate all supply chain members. The proposed models examine the environmental and social welfare benefits of adopting green innovation products and remanufacturing processes in omnichannel retailing. A numerical study is carried out to illustrate the proposed models' application. The results show that the IS model can synchronize the economic, environmental, and social aspects leading to significant increases in performance. Total supply chain profit under the CO model is the highest. The manufacturer and remanufacturer generate higher profits in the MS model, whereas the retailer makes higher profits in the RS and VN models. When a manufacturer only wants to increase profit with green processes and is not concerned about omnichannel processes, more resources must be allocated for green innovation.     

Retail services and firm profit in a dual-channel market

With the rapid development of the Internet, many manufacturers nowadays use online technology to engage in direct sales. The mix of retailing with a direct channel adds a new dimension of competition and complementarity to a product's distribution channels. Our model focuses on the strategic role played by the retail services in a dual-channel competitive market. The manufacturer uses a direct channel as an effective tool to motivate the retailer to improve its retail services and profits from it. While operated by the manufacturer to motivate retailer to perform more effectively from the manufacturer's perspective, the direct channel may not always be detrimental to the retailer because the retailer can obtain a lower wholesale price from the manufacturer and a higher sales volume from the improved retail services. In our research, our results suggest that the improved retail services effectively alleviate the channel competition and conflict and improve the supply chain performance in a competitive market.     

Do channel members value the multiple-cooperation strategy?

When the manufacturer distributes his products through online and traditional channels, what type of innovative marketing strategy can be utilized to solve the channel conflict and improve the performances of all channel members? Our research addresses this important question by initiating a triple cooperative strategy for channel members to employ in a manufacturer – retailer dual-channel supply chain. Our results show that when the product is less compatible with online channel than with traditional channel, channel members can utilize a triple cooperative strategy to improve channel coordination and their individual performances effectively and efficiently. First, the manufacturer can utilize supportive retail sales effort as a valuable coordination mechanism to improve the performances of all channel members in the dual-channel distribution. Second, a channel coordinative price strategy can be utilized to further improve the performance of whole channel. Finally, a profit sharing mechanism is needed to create a Pareto result for both the manufacturer and the retailer. Furthermore, we extend our model to study the value of triple cooperative strategy in a manufacturer – two competitive retailers supply chain and derive the optimum marketing strategy.     

On manufacturers complementing the traditional retail channel with a direct online channel

With the explosion of the Internet and the reach that it affords, many manufacturers have complemented their existing retail channels with an online channel, which allows them to sell directly to their consumers. Interestingly, there is a significant variation within product categories in manufacturer's use of the Internet as a direct distribution channel. The main objective of this study is to examine the strategic forces that may influence the manufacturer's decision to complement the retail channel with a direct online channel. In particular, we are interested in answering the following questions:

1. Why is it that in some markets only a few firms find it optimal to complement their retail channels with a direct Internet channel while other firms do not?
2. What strategic role (if any), does the direct Internet channel serve and how do market characteristics impact this role?

To address these issues we develop a model with a single strategic manufacturer serving a market through a single strategic retailer. In addition to the focal manufacturer's product the retailer carries products of competing manufacturers. Consumers in this market are one of two types. They are either brand loyal or store loyal. The retailer sets the retail price and the level of retail support, which impact the demand for the manufacturer's product. The retailer's decisions in turn depend on the wholesale price as well as the Internet price of the product if the manufacturer decides to complement the retail channel with an online channel. Our analysis reveals that the optimality of complementing the retail channel with an online channel and the role served by the latter depends critically upon the level of support that the retailer allocates to the manufacturer's product in the absence of the online channel. The level of support allocated by the retailer, in the absence of the online channel, depends upon the retail margins on the manufacturer's product relative to that on rival products in the product category. When the size of the brand loyal segment is small relative to the size of the store loyal segment then in the absence of the online channel, the manufacturer can lower wholesale price and enhance retail support, especially when the retail margins on the rival products are low. In contrast, when the size of the loyal segment is large and the retail margins on rival products are high the manufacturer will find it more profitable to charge a high wholesale price even if that induces the retailer to extend low levels of support. If the manufacturer decides to complement the retail channel with an online channel, some consumers who would have purchased from the retailer might prefer to purchase online. Our analysis reveals that when consumers' sensitivity to price differences across the competing channels exceeds a certain threshold it is not optimal for the manufacturer to complement the retail channel with an online channel. However, this price sensitivity threshold itself depends upon product/market characteristics, suggesting that manufacturers seeking to complement their retail channels with an online channel should look beyond the nature of threat the online channel poses to the retail channel in devising their optimal distribution strategies. When the retail margins on rival products are sufficiently small, complementing the retail channel with an online channel when optimal allows the manufacturer to price discriminate and enhance profits. In contrast when retail margins on rival products are sufficiently high, complementing the retail channel with an online channel serves to enhance retail support. We also identify market conditions under which profits of both the manufacturer and the retailer are greater with the online channel than that without it. This is particularly interesting since the online channel competes with the retail channel.     

The impact of parallel imports on investments in cost-reducing research and development

We develop a two-country model of endogenous investment in process innovation by a manufacturer facing competition from parallel imports (PI). We find that the distortions associated with PI inhibit innovation. However, the difference between the manufacturer's expected profits under successful and failed innovation is U-shaped in the cost of engaging in PI. Thus, the reduction in R&D investment depends on both legality of PI and transport costs. The reduction in innovation could harm global welfare, depending on whether the manufacturer was deterring PI with a high wholesale price. If so, banning such trade would raise expected welfare.     

Shopping in the omnichannel supply chain under price competition and product return

In recent years, omnichannel retailing has created value for prospective consumers. The rise of omnichannel retailing has changed consumers' buying habits, and manufacturers are facing stiff competition from retailers. To reduce this competition effect, manufacturers and retailers often work together to reduce showroom display costs. Despite this practice, there is little understanding of how omnichannel retailing impacts supply chain (SC) profit under competitive conditions. We investigate the test-in-store-and-buy-online (TSBO) retailing strategy and its impact on SC profit and price competition between manufacturers. The retailer sells products of both manufacturers through its website but displays products of only one manufacturer in the showroom, which bears the displaying cost. The retailer adopts a return policy for the other manufacturer. Stackelberg game was used to examine how members of the chain interact, and Nash equilibrium was used to find optimal strategies for players under decentralized and integrated channels. The results show that the TSBO strategy in retailing benefits all supply chain players under the integrated channel. A further interesting finding is that omnichannel SC profits are highest when retailers adopt a return policy. When two manufacturers compete and adopt different sales models, the manufacturer who uses the TSBO retail model reaps the most profit. Several other managerial insights are drawn from sensitivity analyses.     

Managing Channel Profits: The Role of Managerial Incentives

The existing literature has examined how manufacturers can enhance profits by employing specific channel structures and channel coordination mechanisms. In this paper, we examine the implications of strategically designed managerial incentives for channel performance in a duopoly. We first analyze how equilibrium outcomes (especially manufacturer profits) are altered when the manufacturers provide their channel managers with strategically designed incentives. Following that, we examine how optimal channel structure decisions are altered when manufacturers provide their managers with strategic incentives, i.e., we examine how strategic incentives moderate optimal channel structure decisions. In contrast with the existing literature, we find that an asymmetric channel structure with one manufacturer employing a profit-maximizing retailer and the other integrated manufacturer providing strategic incentives for the channel manager in charge of pricing, is an equilibrium outcome under certain conditions. We then compare how the implications of strategic incentives differ from those of channel structure decisions and channel coordination initiatives, and discuss when and why strategic incentives yield superior outcomes from the manufacturer’s perspective. Our results shed light on the sparsely researched role of managerial incentives in the channel context.     

Decomposing the effect of advertising: What happens in the retail channel?

The diverging interests of manufacturers and retailers famously give rise to the double marginalization problem but have consequences far beyond pricing. Advertising is another marketing instrument that is under the control of the manufacturer but its ultimate effect on consumer demand also depends on retailers’ pricing decisions. We decompose the effect of advertising in the channel and highlight an additional route through which advertising affects sales, namely via the changes in the retail price that a strategic retailer makes in response to changes in demand following manufacturer advertising. The total demand effect of advertising thus comprises the direct effects of advertising on market shares, and the indirect effects coming through adjustments that the retailer makes to the in-store prices of all the brands in a given product category in response to the shifted demand due to advertising. We match advertising data for four different categories (both food and non-food) to store-level scanner panel data, which also include information on wholesale prices. Controlling for wholesale prices, we establish in a reduced-form model that the retailer reacts to manufacturer advertising by changing retail prices instead of simply imposing a constant markup on the wholesale price. To further explore the role of the strategic response of the retailer in a systematic fashion and quantify the effects derived in the decomposition, we estimate a discrete-choice model of demand and determine the magnitude of the direct and indirect effects. We find that the indirect effect of advertising through retailer prices is about half the size of the direct effect, and thus substantively affects advertising effectiveness.     

Empirical investigation of channel reactions to brand introductions

We investigate how incumbent manufacturers and retailers alter their pricing behavior in response to new product introduction. In performing our analysis, we need to be cognizant of the fact that the observed price changes can be due to entry-induced changes in a) demand conditions or b) costs or, on the other hand, to the competitive behavior of c) manufacturers and/or d) the retailer. In order to separate these four changes, we posit that manufacturer and retailer pricing is an outcome of maximizing a combination of shares and profits. This enhanced objective function allows us to measure competitive conduct benchmarked as less or more competitive than under the Bertrand-Nash framework. Our empirical analysis is based on the toothpaste category for the time period January 1993–February 1995. During this period, there were three brand introductions in two rounds of entry. Using the estimates from the demand and the supply model, we compute the changes in the retail and wholesale prices that are attributable to changes in demand conditions, manufacturer and retailer competitive conduct, and cost changes. These results support our conjecture that inferring the change in conduct solely based on a change in observed prices is likely to be erroneous. For the first new brand entry, we find that the brand introduction did not significantly increase competition between manufacturers. As a result, the balance of channel power between the manufacturers and the retailers remained unaltered. Both retailer and manufacturer profit margins increased after the first entry. However, subsequent to the second entry, retailer share of channel profits increased at the expense of the manufacturers; manufacturers even saw a decline in their absolute profit margins. We believe that this research will provide insight for manufacturers and retailers regarding how the various channel participants are likely to react to new product introduction. Furthermore, policymakers interested in understanding competitive reactions to new product introduction should find this research useful.     

Used goods, not used bads: Profitable secondary market sales for a durable goods channel

The existing literature on channel coordination typically models markets where used goods are not sold, or are sold outside the standard channel. However, retailers routinely sell used goods for a profit in markets like textbooks. Further, such markets are characterized by a renewable consumer population over time, rather than the static consumer population often assumed in prior literature. We show that accounting for these market characteristics alters the optimal contract form as compared to the contracts derived in prior research. In particular, when new goods are sold in both the first and second periods of our model, the optimal contract differs from those in prior literature in that it can exhibit a negative fixed fee in the second period and requires contracting over the resale price in the second period. The model shows that the manufacturer makes higher profits from allowing used-good sales alongside new-good sales than from shutting down the retailer-profitable secondary market, and that unit sales expand with a profitable secondary market over those achievable without a secondary market. Furthermore, in contrast to previous investigations of durable goods markets that ignore the possibility of a retailer-profitable secondary market, we show conditions under which the manufacturer would optimally choose to sell no new goods in the second period, ceding the market entirely to the used-goods retailer. This research thus expands our knowledge of how durable goods markets work by incorporating the profitable operation of a retailer-run resale market.

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供应链成员企业投资RFID技术的激励机制：共享收入与谈判批发价的比较

许多已有研究发现供应链成员投资RFID技术的动机是一致的，它们假定投资前后的批发价能以相同方式制定。然而，供应链成员在投资前可能已达成固定的批发价。考虑包含一个制造商(她)和一个零售商(他)的供应链系统，成员可采用如分享销售收入(RS)、重新谈判批发价格(WR)、二者并用(B)的激励机制。结果发现在WR和B下，当制造商的谈判权力中等且标签成本较小时，投资RFID能实现双赢，但两家企业的投资动机不总是完全一致；当初始批发价足够高时，若制造商的谈判权力足够强，制造商和零售商对WR的偏好都高于N，对B的偏好都高于RS；当初始批发价较低时，若制造商的谈判权力中等，双方对RS的偏好都高于WR。若制造商的谈判权力较强，供应链系统在B下的收益比WR下的高；若制造商的谈判权力中等或较弱，供应链系统在B或WR下的收益都比N和RS下的高。